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ABSTRACT 
 
 
THE TURN TO THE NEIGHBOR: EMMANUEL LEVINAS’S CONCEPTUAL  
 
AFFINITIES WITH LIBERATION THEOLOGY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By 
 
Alain Mayama 
 
December 2007 
 
 
 
Dissertation Supervised by Dr. Marie L. Baird, Ph, D. 
My dissertation establishes some conceptual affinities between the philosophical 
project of Emmanuel Levinas and liberation theology. I analyze Levinas’s work by 
comparing it to two important liberation theologians, Gustavo Gutiérrez and Jon Sobrino, 
whose work, like his, needs to be brought into greater contemporary debate about the 
subject’s encounter with the other. I argue that fundamental to Levinas, Gutiérrez, and 
Sobrino is the fact that they all bring forth one major characteristic: the dimension of the 
divine opens forth in the human face. For Levinas, Gutiérrez and Sobrino, commitment to 
the neighbor is the necessary context for “understanding” God. They posit the human 
other as the possibility of the subject’s subjectivity. To be human is to act with love 
toward one’s neighbor.  
Using an analytical-comparative method and without claiming a perfect matching 
between Levinas’s philosophy and liberation theology, my dissertation demonstrates that 
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the dialogue between these two approaches addresses the insufficiency of the modern 
philosophical turn to the subject to appropriately address the question of the non-
recognition of the human other in history; I also assert that their unwavering commitment 
to the human neighbor reveals something of postmodern sensitivity defined, in this study, 
in terms of otherness and difference, relationality and interdependence. I contend that 
Levinas’s transcendental ethics provides liberation theology with a viable philosophical 
framework that is compatible with the truth of Christianity: the concern for the neighbor. 
On its part, liberation theology’s conversion to the neighbor bears witness to Levinas’s 
ethical responsibility in the real time of history. In order to show the relevance of 
Levinas’s philosophy for Christian theology in general, I discuss three Christian scholars, 
Enrique Dussel, Jean-Luc Marion, and Michael Purcell, who, while challenging some 
aspects of Levinas’s philosophy, still see its significance for Christian theological 
anthropology.  
This dissertation concludes by proposing Levinas’s philosophy and liberation 
theology’s turn to the neighbor as significant for addressing contemporary sub-Saharan 
Africa socio-political and ethnic conflicts. I also point out a couple of concrete historical 
examples of this turn to the neighbor which, if followed, could lessen the degradation of 
the human other in sub-Saharan Africa and in the world in general. 
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DEDICATION 
 
 
 
To the victims of human’s inhumanity to humans 
 
And to those whose daily life is an enduring turn to the other/neighbor 
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Introduction 
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to show how Emmanuel Levinas’s philosophy 
shares some conceptual affinities with liberation theology – as represented by Gustavo 
Gutiérrez and Jon Sobrino. It will articulate a possibility to read Levinas’s transcendental 
ethics of responsibility as a revalidation of one of the truths of Christianity: the concern 
for humanity of every human person as expressed in Christian theology in general and 
liberation theology in particular. By looking at Levinas’s conceptual affinities with 
liberation theology, this work hopes to be a modest contribution to the ongoing dialogue 
between Christian theology and postmodern philosophy. The Christian theological 
tradition has a long history of finding in some philosophers genuine valued dialogical 
partners. This dissertation finds in Levinas a valued dialogical partner whose work could 
benefit Christian theology in general and liberation theology in particular. 
What is most essential for Levinas’s philosophy and liberation theology is that 
they both bring forth one major point: the dimension of the divine opens forth in the 
human face. God’s transcendence emerges in love of one’s neighbor but not in the hatred 
of the human other. This dissertation will demonstrate that the dialogue between these 
two approaches, based on the turn to the neighbor, will prove fruitful in addressing the 
inadequacy of the modern philosophical turn to the subject to properly deal with the 
questions of poverty, violence, and oppression in today’s world.1 It will also argue that 
                                                 
1 Although Levinas himself refuses to make the Holocaust the subject of his thinking, we would argue with 
Jacob Meskin that “there can be no doubt that both Levinas’s life and his philosophy were deeply shaped 
by the trauma of Nazi genocide.” See Jacob Meskin, “The Jewish Transformation of Modern Thought: 
Levinas and Philosophy after the Holocaust,” Cross Currents 47, 4 (1997/1998): 507. Thus, it is our 
contention in this dissertation that both Levinas’s philosophy and liberation theology can be read as a 
response to the tragic legacy of an unchecked twentieth century ill-treatment of the human other. 
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Levinas, Gutiérrez, and Sobrino’s commitment to the neighbor reveals something of 
postmodern sensitivity defined, in this work, in terms of otherness and difference, 
relationality and interdependence.   
In Descartes, Kant, Husserl and Heidegger, as well as in the philosophical 
tradition, the question has been almost entirely about how the human subject knows the 
existence of the other person and how the other person enters into the consciousness of 
the subject.2 This philosophical discourse, governed by the primacy of being, forces 
every other discourse to validate itself before philosophy.3 Thus, the turn to the subject, 
as well as the belief in sameness that characterizes the modern era, was embraced by 
modern thinkers as the “ideals in modernity’s working out of its unique history.”4 This 
was the beginning of an exceptional awareness about the self and the world around the 
self. Most twentieth century works in philosophy and theology have been based on the 
heritage of the eighteenth and nineteenth century transcendental and ontological tradition 
that privileged and celebrated the uniqueness of the thinking subject and the primacy of 
being;5 the development of the fundamental task of theology testifies to this fact.6 
                                                 
2 Robert J. S. Manning, Interpreting Otherwise than Heidegger: Emmanuel Levinas’s Ethics as First 
Philosophy (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1993), 182. 
3 Emmanuel Levinas, “God and Philosophy,” in The Levinas Reader, edited by Séan Hand (Cambridge 
MA: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 167. 
4 David Tracy, “Theology and the Many Faces of Postmodernity,” Theology Today 51, 1 (1994): 104. 
5 Immanuel Kant is the central figure in the philosophical tradition on the issue of the thinking subject. This 
tradition was initiated in the West by Francis Bacon and René Descartes. See Immanuel Kant, Critique of 
Pure Reason, translated by Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1965); Prolegomena to 
any Future Metaphysics (Indianapolis/New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc, 1950). Some 
twentieth-century philosophers and theologians influenced by Kant: Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, Joseph 
Maréchal, Karl Rahner, Henri de Lubac, Jean Daniélou, M.-D. Chenu, Yves Congar, Lonergan, and 
Edward Schillebeeckx.  
6 For a helpful discussion on the development of the fundamental task of Christian theology, see Joseph A. 
Komonchak, “Defending Our Hope: On the Fundamental Tasks of Theology,” in Faithful Witness: 
Foundations for Today’s Church, eds. Leo J. O’Donovan and T. Howland Sanks (New York: Crossroad, 
1989), 14-26.  Marie L. Baird’s remarks with regard to the influence of Greek thought on Christian 
theology are helpful here. She writes, “The extent to which Christian theology is rooted in Greek 
philosophical assumptions and conceptual categories is the extent to which such theology also reflects the 
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Contrary to this trend, the examination of conceptual affinities between Levinas’s 
philosophy and liberation theology will show that the turn to the other/neighbor, which 
runs through their respective work, emerges as “a resistance to the same unquestioned 
sameness of the modern turn to the subject, the modern over-belief in the search for the 
perfect method, the modern social evolutionary narrative whereby all is finally and 
endlessly more of the self-same.”7 Here the Cartesian ego that influenced the disciplines 
of philosophy and theology, which systematically incorporated numerous individual 
human beings in a process that consumed their individuality, seem unbearably 
inappropriate in the face of the extreme degradation of human dignity in history. This is a 
failure of thought to grasp or comprehend the other, a failure to see the unthought in the 
history of philosophy and theology – that knowing takes place always within the context 
of the intersubjective relation. Our “free-thinking” culture is often suspicious of anything 
that might impose itself on our lives or threaten our individual freedom. We like to stay 
in “control” of the world as critical, independent, self-empowered subjects, and we refuse 
to reach out beyond ourselves toward the degradation of the dignity of the other in 
history. In this new trend of thought, the subjectivity and uniqueness of the subject is not 
about free-thinking, self-empowerment, and individual freedom; it is rather a turn to an 
infinite responsibility for the other prior to being for oneself. In some sense, this issue of 
an authentic self-other relation provides an invaluable purpose for the present study, 
because it suggests finding “some way to use rationality and reflection to take the 
Cartesian ego beyond rationality and reflection, leading it to register or recognize 
                                                                                                                                                 
primacy of ontology as the conceptual basis for the Christian theological project.” See her article, 
“Revisioning Christian Theology in Light of Emmanuel Levinas’s Ethics of Responsibility,” Journal of 
Ecumenical Studies 36, 3-4 (1999):341-351, especially 344. 
7Tracy, “Theology and the Many Faces of Postmodernity,” 108.  
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another, oscillating, enigmatic sort of ‘ethical’ truth”8 that constitutes a central response 
to the question of human existence and authenticity. 
Levinas’s philosophy and liberation theology, each in its own right, by positing 
the human other as the possibility of the subject’s subjectivity, invite humanity to situate 
the other/neighbor at the center of the definition of human subjectivity. To be human, 
therefore, is to act with love toward one’s neighbor. While not denying the suitability of 
the subject’s identity, unique conscience and sanctified dignity, it only finds its existential 
and fundamental meaning, this dissertation will argue, through love, relationship and 
solidarity with other humans. Levinas’s philosophy and liberation theology find in the 
turn to the other, who is both God’s mystery and the face of the neighbor, a promising 
avenue for the radical re-imagining of the world.  
Chapter one focuses on the ethical relationship in Levinas’s transcendental ethics. 
It will begin with an examination of the advent of Levinas on the scene of Western 
philosophy. It will show how Levinas takes issue with Husserlian and Heideggerian 
phenomenology for not giving a satisfying account of intersubjectivity and responsibility 
for the other. Specifically, we will examine why, for Levinas, ethics should replace 
metaphysics as first philosophy by analyzing the major concepts of his philosophy: the 
encounter with the other, the face, the trace, substitution, proximity, sensibility, 
responsibility, hostage, vulnerability, principle and anarchy, the Saying and the Said, and 
the third party. Since Levinas held that philosophical thought was rooted in pre-
philosophical experiences, and recognized the place of Jewish history as part of his life, 
this chapter will also examine Jewish aspects in Levinas’s thought, especially the 
                                                 
8 Meskin, “The Jewish Transformation of Modern Thought: Levinas and Philosophy after the Holocaust,” 
510. 
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influence that the Torah, the Talmudic tradition, and the Holocaust have on his 
philosophy. We will show the philosophical stirrings, subtle or overt, in his work, which 
will serve to put his position in dialogue with liberation theology’s perspective. 
The second chapter will be in two parts. The first part will provide core elements 
of Gustavo Gutiérrez’s theology of liberation. The second part will address Jon Sobrino’s 
theological approach. This chapter will examine both theologians’ social, cultural, and 
ecclesial background and theological perspectives. It will also show that for Gutiérrez 
and Sobrino the human person, the poor, the stranger, the widow, the oppressed, the 
homeless, etc is the place for a possible revelation from God. Since Gutiérrez and 
Sobrino analyze the human person in the light of the Incarnation of God in Jesus Christ, 
this chapter will discuss their anthropologies, as inspired by their Christologies and the 
experience of their social locations. It is in the works of justice, in loving one’s neighbor, 
that transcendence is encountered. 
The third chapter is the pivotal chapter of the dissertation as it focuses on the 
affinity between these two approaches. It will seek to establish that Levinas’s philosophy 
and liberation theology both view the turn to the other/neighbor as a power of genuine 
love, opening new avenues for the radical re-imagining of the world. They respond to the 
degradation of the human person’s life in history in a comparable way; search for the 
divine transcendence in a life of commitment to the other human person; find in the 
Judeo-Christian wisdom a distinct way of thinking of the subject-other relationship; and 
call for love of neighbor and justice. While calling for a redefinition of human 
subjectivity in terms of love of neighbor, these two approaches present also some 
divergences, which we will argue, offer an opportunity for dialogue. Levinas’s 
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philosophy provides liberation theology with a viable philosophical framework that 
would enrich its theological anthropology. Liberation theology, on its part, bears witness 
and historicizes Levinas’s philosophy in terms of conversion to the neighbor. In the end, 
this chapter will argue that the turn to the neighbor in Levinas and liberation theology is a 
precondition for peace, justice, and good social order. 
The fourth chapter will discuss how such similarities hold up in the view of some 
Christian scholars who have dealt with Levinas’s philosophical project. Three respected 
contemporary scholars have been selected: Enrique Dussel, Jean-Luc Marion, and 
Michael Purcell. These scholars, although interpreting the relevance of Levinas for 
theology along divergent lines, outline the basic themes of Levinas’s thought and the 
ways in which it might be deployed in fundamental, practical and philosophical theology 
of liberation. Dussel, Marion, and Purcell will helpfully serve the goal of this dissertation 
because they see the importance of Levinas’s philosophy for theological anthropology. 
Chapter five will bring together arguments of the previous chapters. It will 
propose Levinas’s thought and liberation theology’s turn to the neighbor as critical for 
addressing contemporary sub-Saharan Africa socio-political and ethnic conflicts. Socio-
political and ethnic conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa are mostly due to the struggle for 
political and economic power for one’s own self realization and/or one’s ethnic group. 
Levinas’s philosophy and liberation theology’s redefinition of human subjectivity as the 
one for the other is pertinent to the issue of excesses of political power, poverty, and 
frequent ethnic conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa. It is an invitation to all sub-Saharan 
Africans to rise beyond socio-political and ethnic boundaries and build unified nations. 
For the purpose of fostering an appreciation of the potential that Levinas’s philosophy 
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and liberation theology’s turn to the neighbor offer to sub-Saharan African society, this 
chapter will point out a couple of concrete historical examples of this turn to the neighbor 
in the sense of Purcell’s being otherwise or of what we would describe in this dissertation 
as affective responsibility. This chapter will suggest that Levinas’s philosophical project 
and liberation theology are significant for dealing with the sub-Saharan Africa socio-
political and ethnic situation. The emphasis here is on the ethical engagement with the 
human other that makes the subject fully human. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Emmanuel Levinas’s Transcendental Ethics of Responsibility 
 
Introduction 
 
Regardless of what one thinks, the fact remains that everyone thinks and speaks 
within some particular context which shapes one’s thought process, and contributes to the 
conclusions one articulates. Emmanuel Levinas is no exception to this contextual 
characterization of all human thought. Since this is an acknowledged part of our 
understanding of knowledge today, the task of this first chapter is to understand – not 
only the context from which Levinas’s philosophy developed – but also the originality of 
his method as he attempts to transform philosophy and move it beyond the borders of the 
conventional ways of reasoning.  
In order to achieve a clear understanding of Levinas’s philosophical project, this 
chapter will begin by situating Levinas’s thought within the phenomenological tradition 
of Continental philosophy. It will give an overview of Husserl’s and Heidegger’s 
occupation with ontology, and show how Levinas takes issue with Husserlian and 
Heideggerian phenomenology for not giving a satisfying account of intersubjectivity and 
responsibility for the other. This chapter will also examine Levinas’s transcendental 
ethics of responsibility in order to illumine his enduring concern about the primacy of the 
ethical relation to the other person.  
Specifically, this study will examine why – for Levinas – ethics should replace 
traditional metaphysics as first philosophy by analyzing the major concepts of his 
philosophy: the encounter with the other, the face, the trace, the infinite, transcendence 
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and time, the Saying and the Said, and the third party. The encounter with the other calls 
the ethical subject to responsibility to the point of substitution, proximity, obsession, 
sensibility, hostage, vulnerability, maternity, etc. Since Levinas held that philosophical 
thought was rooted in pre-philosophical experiences, and recognized the place of Jewish 
history as part of his life, this chapter will also examine Jewish aspects in Levinas’s 
thought, especially the influence that the Torah, the Talmudic tradition, and the 
Holocaust had on his philosophy. This work will show the philosophical stirrings – subtle 
or overt – in his work, which will serve to put his position in dialogue with liberation 
theology’s perspective. In the presentation of this material this study will rely on 
Levinas’s own texts as well as on a number of secondary sources. 
I. Situating Emmanuel Levinas within the Metaphysical Tradition 
 
Emmanuel Levinas has been acknowledged as one of the most significant 
European philosophers of the last few centuries. This can be attributed – not only to his 
radical critique of Husserl, Heidegger and the entire Western philosophy for their oubli 
de l’autre or égologie – but most especially, to the momentum he was able to give to 
philosophical thought in explaining its metaphysical and ethical structures. This is 
demonstrated by fact that he has been the topic of numerous articles, books, and 
dissertations around the globe.1  
 
                                                 
1 Roger Burggraeve, Lévinas: Une bibliographie primaire et secondaire (1929-1985) avec complément 
1985 -1989 (Leuven: Peeters, 1990), 11. Burggraeve’s book gives an excellent primary and secondary 
bibliographical resource on Emmanuel Levinas up to the year 1989. For a comprehensive primary and 
secondary sources on Levinas to the present, see  data base online at http://www.uvh.nl/levinas/  
 3
Elements of his biographical details2 tell us that he was born on January 12, 1906 
in Kovno, Lithuania. He was raised in a Jewish family and his parents were committed 
members of a significant Jewish community well-known for its inflexibility in the 
practice of Judaism. During the First World War, his family was forced to immigrate to 
Kharkov, Ukraine, and then back again after the German defeat. Levinas’s intellectual 
career began with his studies in philosophy in Strasbourg, France in 1923. From that 
moment his entire life was connected to a number of French intellectuals of the twentieth 
century such as Charles Blondel, Henri Carteson, Maurice Halbwachs, Maurice Pradines, 
and Maurice Blanchot.3  
Between 1928-1929 he made a research trip to Freiburg, Germany, and studied 
under Husserl and later under Husserl’s successor, Martin Heidegger. Having obtained 
his license in philosophy, Levinas began his study of Husserl’s Logical Investigations, 
and wrote his thesis on La théorie de l’intuition dans la phénoménologie de Husserl 
(1930). Martin Heidegger, however, had a great impact on Levinas through his teaching 
and work, especially Being and Time. He placed Heidegger in the ranks of Plato and 
Kant; even though in his first essay, “De l’évasion,” published in 1935, he will attempt to 
distance himself from Heidegger’s notion of Being.4  
                                                 
2 For a full-length biography of Emmanuel Levinas, see Salomon Malka, Emmanuel Levinas: la vie et la 
trace (Paris: J-C Lattès, 2002) and Marie-Anne Lescourret, Emmanuel Lévinas (Paris: Flammarion, 1994). 
The bibliographical notes presented here are representative of works consulted from the following sources: 
Emmanuel Levinas, “Signature,” in Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism, translated by Seán Hand 
(Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1990), 291-295; Adriaan Theodor Peperzak, Beyond: The 
Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1997), 1-6; Michael 
B. Smith, Toward the Outside: Concepts and Themes in Emmanuel Levinas (Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
University Press, 2005), 1-16; Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi, eds, The Cambridge Companion To 
Levinas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), xv-32. 
3 Peperzak, Beyond: The Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, 1. 
4 Peperzak, Beyond: The Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, 1-2. 
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Both Husserl and Heidegger can be seen to have influenced Levinas's first two 
major publications: Existence and Existents (1947), and En Découvrant l'existence avec 
Husserl et Heidegger (1949). Furthermore, Levinas became influential in France for his 
translations of Husserl and Heidegger into French. It is widely agreed that he was 
responsible for the introduction of Husserl’s and Heidegger’s phenomenology to France.  
Following his marriage and naturalization as a French citizen (1930) – and after 
his military service in Paris – Levinas worked at Ecole Normale Israélite Universelle, a 
Jewish organization that prepared teachers for the Alliance Israélite Universelle, where he 
was appointed the director. During World War II (1940), he was a prisoner of war in a 
German camp along with the other French officers of his regiment. During his time in the 
military prisoners’ camp, he served as an interpreter of Russian and spent most of his 
time reading and discussing Hegel, Proust, Diderot, Rousseau, and others while tragically 
most members of his family in Lithuania were assassinated by the Nazis.5 Levinas, 
though Jewish, was protected by the French uniform, and was not exterminated along 
with six million other Jews. This memory of the Holocaust has always played a major 
role in his thinking, and was without a doubt a causal issue in his long-lasting concern for 
the primacy of the ethical relation to the other person.  
In his book, Existence and Existents (1947), Levinas manifestly asserted the need 
for a thought beyond ontology, opposing ipso facto Heidegger’s thought that aimed at 
transcending the metaphysics of beings to Being. He points to another transcendence, the 
Good, which commands a movement beyond the limits of Being. It was not until the late 
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1950’s and early 1960’s that he began to develop his own philosophy - critiquing 
Heidegger, prior phenomenologists and Western thinking in general.6   
Levinas’s explicit critique of Heidegger’s project is presented in his 1951 article, 
“L’ontologie est-elle fondamentale?” His essay, “Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity,” 
published in 1967, was an appropriation of the concept of infinity from Descartes, 
anticipating many of the theses he later developed in Totalité et Infini: Essai sur 
l’extériorité (1961), (Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, 1963). With the 
publication of Totalité et Infini, Levinas established his philosophical and global fame 
which led to invitations and the publication of a great number of philosophical papers. He 
taught philosophy at the University of Poitiers in 1961 and at the University of Paris-
Nanterre in 1967. In 1973 he moved to Paris VI (Sorbonne), and became an honorary 
professor in 1976. The publication of Totalité et Infini: Essai sur l’extériorité, 1961 
constituted the turning point of his philosophy. In this book, he suggested a new 
orientation in phenomenology and in the whole history of European philosophy, from 
Parmenides to Heidegger. He criticized Western civilization for its dependency on Greek 
philosophy that laid too much emphasis on the thinking subject and encouraged a system 
of totalization. He proposed to go beyond the conventional and ethically Western 
totalization, and addressed the problematic of ontology by analyzing the self-other 
relation. The other is not known as such, but calls into question and confronts the self-
righteousness of the self through desire, language, and the concern for justice. Ethics for 
Levinas begins with the encounter with the other while maintaining that such a relation 
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cannot be simply reduced to a symmetrical relationship. It cannot be localized historically 
or temporally.7 
Furthermore, Levinas asserted that ethics calls into question the “Same.” Here, the 
encounter with the other has no empirical basis as an event or non-event in linear time, 
nor is there a “self” that exists a priori to the encounter which may choose to avoid the 
traumatic experience of alterity. The encounter, a discovery of alterity in itself, is an 
original and essential moment through which the self comes into being – it precedes 
freedom and determinism, action and passivity. This encounter has always taken place 
already, and its terms make up a central paradox in Continental philosophy.  
Levinas’s second major book, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence 
(Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence) was published in 1974. This book asserts 
Levinas’s intention for a philosophy that goes beyond ontology, using Plato’s 
categorization of the Good as beyond the ousia. Suddenly new descriptions are given, 
which are entirely absent from Totalité et Infini. The relation between the other and self is 
explored in terms of asymmetrical proximity, vulnerability, responsibility, substitution, 
hostage, obsession, and persecution; and the concept of Time is carefully examined as 
fundamental diachrony. The other the subject encounters is both the other human being 
and God. Yet, Levinas’s God is never present in the time of history; his God always 
passes by into an immemorial past, a passing that leaves a trace from which the human 
other emerges as primary command.8  
The postwar years were marked by his meeting with the Talmudic scholar 
Monsieur Chouchani, with whom he studied. These studies resulted in a series of five 
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volumes of Talmudic readings. The last of these readings, Nouvelles Lectures 
Talmudiques, appeared shortly after his death. At the time Levinas was writing this work 
he was actively involved with the Colloque des Intellectuels Juifs de Langue Française, 
and the majority of his Talmudic studies originate in lectures he presented there. His 
Talmudic commentaries include Quatre lectures Talmudiques (1968), Du sacré au saint 
(1977), and L'au-delà  du verset (1982).  Levinas published a great deal of other books 
and articles before his death on Christmas day of the year 1995, after a long period of 
illness. The funeral oration, ‘Adieu’, was given by Jacques Derrida at the funeral on 28 
December 1995.  
The biographical details presented above show that Levinas developed his ethical 
philosophy by challenging the phenomenological method that attempts to understand 
human experience in terms of rationality. It is an approach that limits an analysis into 
human experience on consciousness and denies any significant relationship with 
something beyond self-consciousness. Obviously, at the start, Levinas’s critique seems 
problematic. How does reason prevent relationship beyond consciousness? The answer to 
this critical question could be found in the tradition that originates in Descartes and Kant, 
even though it takes proper shape in Husserl and Heidegger. Since Levinas’s philosophy 
begins from his critique of this tradition, it is in order to begin this study with a review of 
the metaphysical and phenomenological tradition. Here this work will focus only on 
Descartes and Kant as it will address Husserl’s and Heidegger’s occupation with 
phenomenology later on in the chapter. 
 
 
 8
René Descartes and Rational Subjectivity 
 
Descartes begins his study of rational subjectivity by trying to distance himself 
from the philosophical tradition before him that presented the unity between thinking and 
being as the ultimate philosophical question. He starts his Meditations by questioning all 
that can convincingly be questioned with the hope to establish a solid philosophical 
foundation upon which will be based all future philosophical knowledge. Descartes 
launches his inquiry into rational subjectivity by wondering whether things are as they 
appear. Is it possible that human perception of reality might as well be images in a 
dream? And if so, is it not also right to wonder whether what comes to human perception 
might not be as it appears. This for Descartes could be an obstacle to the rational inquiry 
into the philosophy of knowledge.9  
Furthermore, having posited this fundamental doubt, Descartes realizes that the 
existence of the being who doubts is a prerequisite for the meaningfulness of the 
fundamental doubt. For in order for a being to think, one thing must be true: this being 
must exist. The implication is that one cannot meaningfully claim that he/she doubts that 
he/she exists without first existing. Hence, for Descartes, the existence of a being who 
doubts can be said to be a claim beyond doubt. Now, for Descartes, this being who 
doubts is the same that understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling, and also 
imagines and has sensory perceptions. And all these faculties that are active within the 
mind of this being are called acts of thinking or ideas.10 Now these acts of thinking and 
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the being that make them possible constitute what Descartes calls rational subjectivity 
(ego cogito). Rational subjectivity is a world of self-centeredness in which a thinking 
subject is in control and nothing other than the self can exist. This is an ideal world, a 
world constituted through the act of the thinking subject and in which the ideas that 
belong to this subject appear to be like the world of sensible experience. Descartes, 
however, later argues that the foundation of philosophical knowledge requires the 
existence of another world apart from the ideal world of the thinking subject, because the 
task of philosophical knowledge is to determine the exact relationship between these two 
worlds.11 
 Having posited the concept of rational subjectivity – constituted by a thinking 
subject and the field of its ideas – Descartes will now attempt to establish a proof for the 
independent existence of infinite being. In this process, he begins by exploring the ideas 
that belong to the mind of this thinking subject. These ideas may be considered in two 
ways. First is to take them formally or actually as ideas and second is to examine the 
object in them.12 For him, “in so far as the ideas are considered simply as modes of 
thought, there is no recognizable inequality among them: they all appear to come within 
me in the same fashion.”13 Furthermore, “in so far as different ideas are considered as 
images which represent different things, it is clear that they differ widely.”14 Obviously, 
there is in Descartes’ view a conviction that objects in ideas fall into three metaphysical 
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classes: the ideas of modes or accidents, the ideas of finite substances, and the idea of an 
infinite substance.15  
Now, for Descartes the idea of an infinite substance is more perfect than the ideas 
of modes and finite substance, because “something cannot arise from nothing, and also 
that what is more perfect – that is, contains in itself more reality – cannot arise from what 
is less perfect.”16 This means that the effect of a cause can never have more reality than 
its cause. Thus, necessarily, the objective reality in the ideas of a mode and finite 
substance, originate from the idea of the infinite substance. Hence, “the cause of a finite 
substance must be a finite substance or an infinite substance. It cannot be a mode, 
because a mode contains less reality than a finite substance. Since this maxim is true for 
things taken formally, Descartes thinks, it must also be true for objects in ideas.”17  
Descartes’ argument reaches its climax when he addresses the issue of the 
possible cause of the idea of God in the thinking subject. This possible cause, for 
Descartes, has to be traced in the infinite substance, which must exist formally in order to 
cause an idea of an infinite substance taken objectively. And this would suggest that God 
must exist. Besides, the only way one can possess the idea of God is for God to have put 
this idea in one’s mind.18 Descartes writes: “It is true that I have the idea of substance in 
me in virtue of the fact that I am a substance; but this would not account for my having 
the idea of an infinite substance, when I am finite, unless this idea proceeded from some 
substance which really was infinite.”19 So, one’s awareness of one’s inability to 
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comprehend God, that is, one’s awareness of one’s rational limits – its finitude – requires 
that the idea of God be prior to the idea of oneself. The existence of an idea that contains 
more objective reality than the finite substance indicates the presence of an idea that the 
finite substance could not have created for itself, as this idea could only originate from an 
infinite being that must actually exist. Now, since God exists, the idea of God has to be 
prior in the subject to the subject’s idea of him/herself. Levinas comes up with a more 
radical conclusion than Descartes. For Levinas, as Beavers argues, “the impossibility of 
thinking completely the idea of an infinite substance along with the desire to do so 
indicates that an encounter with this infinite substance must be prior to my act of 
thinking.”20 That is why the idea of face-to-face encounter with the other person in 
Levinas precedes the entire order of knowledge. Levinas writes: 
In the access to the face there is certainly also an access to the idea of God. In 
Descartes the idea of the Infinite remains a theoretical idea, a contemplation, a 
knowledge. For my part, I think that the relation to the Infinite is not a knowledge, 
but a Desire. I have tried to describe the difference between Desire and need by 
the fact that Desire cannot be satisfied; that Desire is like a thought which thinks 
more than it thinks, or more than what it thinks. It is a paradoxical structure, 
without doubt, but one which is no more so than this presence of the Infinite in a 
finite act.21 
 
To the extent that desire cannot be satisfied in Levinas’s metaphysical desire for the 
otherness of the other, he is indebted to Descartes’ idea of infinity. The idea of infinity in 
Descartes is eternal, that is, knows no end.22  In both Descartes and Levinas, this idea is 
in the thinking subject (ego cogito), transcending the ego cogito’s isolation. Thus, in the 
Meditations, Descartes engages in the study of the philosophy of knowledge of the 
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known world by first examining the relationship between a finite and infinite being. This 
is the insight that Levinas would recognize, but which Kant, Husserl and Heidegger 
would fall short of identifying.23  
Immanuel Kant and the Phenomenal World 
 
At the starting point of Kant’s philosophical project – like Descartes’ – is the 
conviction that the discovery of rational subjectivity necessitates the acceptance of 
idealism.  Yet, Kant does not share Descartes’ idea of the isolated mind that does not 
assume the existence of a prior categorical experience. At the onset of Kant’s 
philosophical project is the reception of idealism which – for him – seems to necessitate a 
proof for the existence of an external world. He asks a question: how is the experience of 
objects possible? Kant answers this question by calling on the concepts of categories, 
which must be presupposed prior to experience. For Kant, the ego utilizes the concepts of 
categories to systematize objects within experience and constitute them in their 
relationship with one another. In so doing, the ego makes objects ready to be known prior 
to any experience of them as objects.24 
Kant’s recognition that objects have to be prearranged for experience by the ego 
situates him on the brink of one of the most important findings in the history of 
philosophy, namely, that the real is phenomenal. For him, the world that is known is only 
the world of objects as they appear in experience. As any conjecture to what must be the 
case apart from experience is impossible, Kant is convinced that Descartes’ proof for the 
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existence of God is problematic, because it employs the category of cause and effect 
beyond the realm of appearances.25 
With this issue about the origin of the concept of causality, Kant begins his 
Copernican revolution in philosophy by conceiving a relationship between sensibility and 
understanding that constitutes a key element about the problem of knowledge.  For Kant, 
“objects are given to us by means of sensibility, and it alone yields intuitions; they are 
thought through the understanding, and from the understanding arise concepts.”26 Thus, 
for Kant “sensible intuition is the means by which an object, derived from sensation, is 
situated in immediate relation to knowledge.”27 Concepts such as causality, Kant would 
argue, are not drawn from experience, “but sprang from the pure understanding.”28 
Hence, Kant’s assertion in Critique of Pure Reason that knowledge is two-fold, 
comprised both of what human beings receive through their sense impressions and of 
what their own faculty of knowledge provides from itself. Kant calls the first aspect of 
knowledge that derives from experience, a posteriori, and the aspect of knowledge that 
our faculty of knowledge supplies from itself, a priori, that is to say, knowledge 
completely autonomous of all experience.29 
This concept of a priori led Kant to reconceive fundamentally the relationship 
between the subject and knowledge, between the knower and the process of knowing. For 
Kant, as Robert Manning argues, “the mind is not only the passive recipient of sense 
impressions, but it supplies to sense impressions its own a priori structures, and 
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‘supplies’ them in the sense that sense impressions are experienced through these a priori 
structures.”30 Yet, Kant also admits the limit of this a priori knowledge to know external 
things in themselves. He writes,  
...objects in themselves are quite unknown to us, and that what we call outer 
objects are nothing but mere representations of our sensibility, the form of which 
is space. The true correlate of sensibility, the thing in itself, is not known, and 
cannot be known, through these representations; and in experience no question is 
ever asked in regard to it.31  
 
But Kant’s concept of a priori knowledge or Copernican Revolution in Philosophy, as 
Manning has interestingly noted, separated human subjectivity to whatever it came into 
contact with but that was exterior to it, its other. But Kant would try to break this gap in 
his book, Critique of Practical Reason, but in the end the chasm proved difficult to be 
bridged.32 The rift between the subject and its other, not only was manifest in Kant’s 
work, it also gave the entire continental philosophy its fundamental challenge, namely, 
trying to overcome Kant’s chasm between subject and object.33 The greatest challenge to 
Kant’s notion of the rift between subject and object came from the German philosophers 
Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger.34 Husserl takes Kant seriously and 
creates the phenomenological method to explain consciousness by redefining the world in 
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terms of experience only. The following section will consider carefully Husserl’s and 
Heidegger’s occupation with phenomenology as it provides the impetus for 
understanding Levinas’s own philosophical project.  
II. An Overview of Edmund Husserl’s and Martin Heidegger’s Occupation with 
Phenomenology 
 
As one cannot begin to consider Levinas’s philosophy without acknowledging the 
phenomenological tradition within which his thought emerges, it is necessary to 
understand Levinas’s relationship to these two great phenomenologists. Levinas has 
always insisted that – despite fundamental differences from Husserl and Heidegger – his 
philosophy from the beginning follows in the phenomenological tradition of these great 
mentors. About Husserl, he comments: 
Husserl brought a method to philosophy. It consists in respecting the intentions 
which animate the psyche and the modalities of appearing which conform to 
these intentions, modalities which characterize the diverse beings apprehended by 
experience. It consists in discovering the unsuspected horizons within which the 
real is apprehended by representative thought but also apprehended by concrete 
pre-predicative life, beginning with the body (innocently), beginning with culture 
(perhaps less innocently).35  
 
In Freiburg between 1928 and 1929 he had studied under Edmund Husserl and Martin 
Heidegger. In 1930, he published the first book on Husserl in French and in 1932 the first 
substantial article in French on Heidegger’s philosophy, and he collaborated on the 
French translation of Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations (1931). Levinas dedicated much of 
his early philosophical career to explicating the work and significance of his German 
teachers. This study will look at Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological reduction and 
Heidegger’s critique of representational consciousness. In this way, this work will be able 
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to explain why Levinas takes issue with Husserl and Heidegger, account for his 
association with phenomenology and explain his steady development of a post-
phenomenological ethics which differentiates itself in opposition to the philosophy of 
Husserl and Heidegger. 
Edmund Husserl and the Phenomenological Reduction 
 
Many attempts were made in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to address 
the Kantian dilemma of the gap between subject and object. From the very beginning, 
Husserl shared Kant’s ideal of making philosophy scientific, yet he distances himself as 
far as possible from Kant’s preoccupation with the independent existence of the external 
world. Husserl insists that his writings “…are attempts at genuinely executed 
fundamental work on the immediately envisaged and grasped things; and even where 
they proceed critically, they do not lose themselves in discussions of standpoint, but 
rather leave the last word to the things themselves and to the work on them.”36  
Husserl’s phenomenological method took shape with his publication of Ideas 
Concerning Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy in 1913. In this 
book, he intended a phenomenology filtered of all claims about reality other than that of 
intentional consciousness.37 He alludes to the blossoming apple tree in the garden to 
elucidate the notion of intentionality.38 For him, the notion of intentionality asserts that 
all consciousness is a consciousness of something and that all mental acts have an object.  
Husserl’s goal has been to give an absolutely secure philosophical foundation to 
the natural sciences, and this could only be provided – Husserl would argue – by a strict 
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reflection on what science does not normally question, that is, the role of the perceiving 
consciousness in the constitution of the perceived world. Husserl could not, as Levinas 
puts it, accept as unquestionable the natural attitude of scientific realism, that is, the 
presumption that the world as we experience it exists outside and independently from 
consciousness.39  
Against this natural attitude, Husserl proposes the methodological innovation he 
called phenomenological reduction, or transcendental reduction, or the epoché. What 
exactly is Husserl’s phenomenological reduction? Husserl’s phenomenological reduction 
is the bracketing of all questions about the reality of things outside consciousness. This 
includes the existence of the external world, and – significantly – the existence of other 
consciousnesses. Thus, Husserl’s expression to return “to the things themselves” became 
to return to the consciousness of the subject that is always consciousness of something. 
Phenomenology is no longer only the science of phenomena in themselves but also the 
science of ‘pure consciousness.’40 In other words, for Husserl, as Michael Purcell argues, 
“before ever there is a differentiation into a subject and an object, there is, on the 
‘subjective side’, a consciousness which is never other than a consciousness of, and, on 
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the ‘objective side,’ an object which is only ever perceived as. This is described in the 
terms of intentionality.”41  
For Husserl, thought is never without an object, and consciousness always intends 
something other than itself; it transcends itself. “Intentionality is for Husserl, a genuine 
act of transcendence and the very prototype of any transcendence.”42 By emphasizing 
consciousness as a realm of absolute existence, Husserl rises above those who question 
and doubt the correspondence of knowing and known. For Levinas, Husserl’s affirmation 
of consciousness as always a consciousness of and as an absolute existence, articulates 
both the unquestionable and definite character of the cogito.43 This underscores a key and 
significant distinction between Husserl and Descartes. Descartes takes for granted the 
self-evidence of consciousness, but falls short of cross-examining its sources. Purcell 
remarks: 
Thus, in the Cartesian schema there is the move from the absolute existence of 
consciousness to the existence of God, whose veracity guarantees the evidence of 
the senses, and thereafter to the existence of the world which offers itself to 
consciousness through the senses. The cogito is the foundation from which all 
else follows. For Husserl, however, consciousness is always and already 
consciousness of…and always and already implicates the existence of a world. 
Thus, unlike Descartes, existence does not follow from a cogito, but rather 
existence allows a cogito.44 
 
While Husserl reduces the entire world to human subjectivity, Descartes goes beyond 
subjectivity toward the infinite as the creator of the entire universe, even of the 
phenomenal world. The ego creates its world in an act of world-constitution. In this act, 
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the entire world is reduced to subjectivity.45 Husserl writes, “this reduction to my 
transcendental sphere of particular ownness or to my transcendental concrete I-myself, by 
abstraction from everything that transcendental constitution gives me as Other, has an 
unusual sense… I ‘alone’ remain.”46 The effect of this reasoning is that one 
consciousness also represents the ‘sense’ of the other person as one who is able to 
experience the world.  
Husserl, by positing the subject’s intentional consciousness as that which defines 
the other makes this other dependent on the subject. The other, in this intersubjective 
relationship, is considered present simply in an “objective sense” and constituted as “co-
present;” because the other’s coming into the world is contingent to the subject’s 
intentionality. For Husserl, the other person is not the extra-mental other; it is my 
consciousness that makes present the other person there. He/she is not him/herself there 
and can never become a him/herself-there.47 Thus, in Husserl’s analysis of human 
experience and the constitution of meaning the existential status of objects apart from 
experience is irrelevant. By implication, the other human person has no role and is 
irrelevant to the meaning of life, except that in his/her relationships with the subject in the 
world, he/she is constituted by the subject’s intentionality. So for Husserl, the 
experienced world and all exterior objects depend on the subject’s consciousness. It is the 
subject’s very act of knowing that establishes the objects as objects, since they are only 
objects for consciousness. Hence, in the formation of meaning, the subject only relies on 
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his/her consciousness, since no object precedes knowledge. Meaning is entirely the result 
of the subject’s action.48 
Levinas commends Husserl for taking philosophical discourse away from a 
naturalist conception of being toward a phenomenological one. In the naturalist 
conception of being, “being and its categories are ascribable only to objects in the known 
world, much as Kant’s categories were.”49 According to Levinas, Husserl’s main 
contribution has been his discovering of the crucial and basic distinction between being 
qua consciousness and being qua thing.50 In Husserl’s phenomenological turn, Levinas 
sees a prospect for a movement from the theory of knowledge to the theory of being.51 
For him, Husserl’s phenomenology had the merit of defining subjectivity’s intrinsic 
ontological value and his/her inherent meaning. The subject’s existence and experience is 
what defines his/her significance in life. This is the main goal of Husserl’s 
phenomenological reduction, that is, to present humans with their authentic identity. Yet 
this presentation, for Levinas, remains inadequate as it mostly focuses on a merely 
contemplative and speculative view of life but different from it.52 Levinas also recognizes 
as implicit in Husserl’s theoretical and cognitive dimension of intentionality the notion of 
knowledge, which focuses on an analysis of cognitive life, but yet does not exhaust all of 
life. Husserl’s non-theoretical acts that are constitutive of objects open up to a new and 
irreducible ontological structure.53 There are, therefore, in Husserl’s thought 
                                                 
48 Beavers, Levinas Beyond the Horizons of Cartesianism, 25.  
49 Beavers, Levinas Beyond the Horizons of Cartesianism, 25. 
50 Levinas, Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology, 26. (Levinas’s italics) 
51 Levinas, Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology, 32. 
52 Levinas, Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology, 149. 
53 Levinas, Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology, 132. 
 21
fundamentals that seem to open up a more affluent concept of existence than a simple 
presence of an object to contemplative consciousness.54  
Levinas also notes, however, the incompleteness of Husserl’s thought, because it 
takes all relationships to function in a theoretical and intentional manner. The abstract 
nature of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction, according to Levinas, stems from his 
vacillating conception of consciousness. While Husserl’s phenomenological reduction, 
Levinas argues, may not have the intention of being merely theoretical or speculative, but 
seeks to discover our truly concrete life, nevertheless, it falls short of grasping the 
contradiction in the idea of pure immanence and the fact that consciousness will need a 
world in order to exist.55 Levinas sees in Husserl’s “indecision or rather obscurity in the 
relation between hyle and noesis, that the reduction seems to be a return to a 
consciousness without the world in which the world would have to be constituted on the 
basis of a pure hyle, a type of abstraction in which one seems to see a revival of the 
sensationalist theses.”56 Here Husserl reduces consciousness to knowing and as a result 
takes it away from the concrete life as it is lived. Levinas writes: 
There is another reason why the phenomenological reduction, as we have 
interpreted it so far, does not reveal concrete life and the meaning that objects 
have for concrete life. Concrete life is not the solipsist’s life of a consciousness 
closed upon itself. Concrete being is not what exists for only one consciousness. 
In the very idea of concrete being is contained the idea of an intersubjective 
world. If we limit ourselves to describing the constitution of objects in an 
individual consciousness, in an ego, the egological reduction can be only a first 
step toward phenomenology. We must also discover ‘others’ and the 
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intersubjective world. A phenomenological intuition of the life of others, a 
reflection by Einfühlung opens the field of transcendental intersubjectivity and 
completes the work of the philosophical intuition of subjectivity. Here again, the 
problems of the constitution of the world will arise.57  
 
Levinas criticizes Husserl because his philosophy of the phenomenological reduction 
leaves unidentified the pre-conditions of the phenomenological reduction. He writes 
[D]espite the revolutionary character of the phenomenological reduction, the 
revolution which it accomplishes is, in Husserl’s philosophy, possible only to the 
extent that the natural attitude is theoretical. The historical role of the reduction 
and the meaning of its appearance at a certain moment of existence are, for him, 
not even a problem.58 
 
In other words, as Beavers affirms, “Levinas’s philosophy is directed precisely at the pre-
conditions for the reduction. Prior to the intentional relation, that is, prior to thought, 
unfolds another kind of meaning that Husserl neglects”59 – namely – the intersubjectivity 
and responsibility for the other. To be sure Levinas reproaches Husserl for his 
intellectualism and for his abstraction of consciousness from history. Husserl’s 
transcendental ego looks at the raw matter of life from a disinterested, uninvolved, 
ahistorical position. Consciousness is sovereign, responsible only to itself, and free.60 
Martin Heidegger comes to the rescue of Edmund Husserl by trying to extend Husserl’s 
phenomenological reduction to the constitution of human existence rather than restraining 
it himself to the subject’s intentional consciousness. Yet he too, in Levinas’s estimation, 
will not go far enough.61  
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Heidegger and Representational Consciousness 
 
So far we have seen that the key to Husserl’s phenomenology lies in its 
denunciation of the natural attitude and its reducing human experience to the experience 
of the objects. Husserl takes this stance because of his firm commitment to the doctrine of 
intentionality. Intentionality is, for him, the characteristic activity of consciousness as it 
constitutes itself in relation to the world. The division between object and subject can be 
regarded as one of the ways in which consciousness makes the world intelligible to itself. 
The world is understood as a compilation of objects thus constituted by the intentional 
power of consciousness. Here Husserl reduces the world to the transcendental ego.62 
Heidegger reacts to Husserl’s phenomenological reduction by raising a 
fundamental ontological question of metaphysics in his unprecedented book, Being and 
Time. He asks: What is the meaning of Being in general? Heidegger’s effort is geared 
towards redefining phenomenology in terms of Being.63  For him, phenomenology is “a 
method of ‘intuitive grasping’ of things in their being, a way in which the being of things 
could be wrested away from their disclosure and hiddenness and laid bare.”64 This, for 
Heidegger, is nothing other than what Husserl expresses in the maxim to the things 
themselves. Heidegger believes that Husserl’s maxim, to the things themselves, that is, to 
the things as they are constituted by and in consciousness, means to the things as they 
actually are in their being;65 because Husserl’s objects of consciousness are, first and 
foremost, the beings that one meets in the world. Heidegger therefore posits the meaning 
of Being in general as the prerequisite for understanding particular beings or entities or 
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what it means for them to exist.66 This issue has been – for Heidegger – the major failure 
of the entire philosophical tradition including Kant, that is, “to master the basic problem 
of Being.”67 Now, the right way to understand being, Heidegger asserts, is to begin with 
the examination of the Dasein. In his philosophical discourse Being and Time, Heidegger 
offers an existential ontology of selfhood as Dasein (being-there) – the concretely 
existing human being who is there – as part of a world. He writes: 
We are ourselves the entities to be analyzed. The Being of any such entity is in 
such case mine. These entities, in their Being, comport themselves towards their 
Being. As entities with such Being, they are delivered over to their own Being. 
Being is that which is an issue for every such entity.68 
 
For Heidegger, Dasein exists as an entity which in each case I myself am. What I myself 
am or, what Heidegger calls Mineness, is constitutive of any existent Dasein as that 
which make Dasein’s two modes of existence – authenticity and inauthenticity –
possible.69 Furthermore, in Dasein’s original disclosedness as Being-in-the-world, one is 
thrust into the ontological contingency of “Being-in” a milieu and “Being-with” others 
and with-oneself, which underlies all participation, engagement and concrete 
involvement with the world that is given in a person’s immediate preoccupations and 
concerns. Thus, the world itself is constitutive of Dasein’s Being, and Dasein finds itself 
in the world and is affected by it. Dasein is thrown into the world as being-in-the-world. 
The state of being thrown is an indispensable a priori, yet insufficient for totally 
establishing Dasein's Being.70  
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Heidegger’s conception of Dasein as always already Being-in-the world, as an 
entity concerned about its Being and as a Being who understands the Being of entities 
enables him to argue that Dasein is to be examined prior to any effort to express its Being 
as ‘rational animal.’ Human beings are first and foremost concerned about their existence 
before the search for knowledge and its achievement in representation which are 
expressions of their fundamental concern about existence.71 Thus, for Heidegger, prior to 
the introduction of the categories of subject and object in knowledge there is a 
relationship between Dasein and its world. It is from this relationship that Dasein’s Being 
as concern and his characterization of knowing as a mode of Being takes shape. Dasein is 
principally a Being who acts and only secondarily a Being who knows. Now, the entities 
Dasein encounters in its world are significant in so far as they are useful to Dasein for 
some reason or another.72 In a way, for Heidegger, “such entities are not thereby objects 
for knowing the ‘world’ theoretically; they are simply what gets used, what gets 
produced, and so forth.”73 
Significant here is the fact that Heidegger – while accepting what his 
predecessors, Descartes, Kant, and Husserl, have to say about the characterization of 
reason since it is in reason that Dasein’s world comes to a substantial existence as the 
world of subjects and objects – distances himself from his predecessors on the 
understanding of knowledge. Knowing, for Heidegger, “is founded upon Being-in-the-
world, and this means that the world is given in knowledge even if it cannot be conceived 
and taken up as a theme.”74 Thus, where Husserl limits representation within the 
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parameters of the transcendental ego Heidegger argues that “prior to representing 
realities, the human being dwells in the world… knowing is but one way in which the 
human being exhibits this concern” in the context of life.75 While Heidegger inherits 
“from Husserl the method and means of uncovering the transcendental conditions of 
knowledge”76 he deems it possible only “by the opaque drama of a concrete existence in 
a concrete history which cannot be mastered by theoretical evidence.”77  
Levinas’s discussion with Heidegger has to be understood within the context of 
Husserl’s phenomenological reduction.  Most of Levinas’s critique of Husserl is in every 
respect Heideggerian, even though he had in the same time published anti-Heideggerian 
studies.78 Levinas reproaches Husserl for his intellectualism and for his abstraction of 
consciousness from history. He discovers in Heidegger a philosophy entirely engaged in 
the world, in experience and desire, which replaces the Husserlian terms of noesis and 
noema (acts and objects of consciousness) with the Heideggerian vocabulary of history, 
world, and dereliction or thrown-ness.79  
In a couple of articles, however, Levinas began to express discontent with 
Heidegger’s work by questioning and contesting the primacy of ontology.80 Heidegger – 
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Levinas contends – seems to maintain the supremacy of the same over the other. He does 
not destroy it, but rather he characterizes a whole current of Western thought. Dasein that 
Heidegger puts in the place of the soul, of consciousness, of the Ego, retains the structure 
of the same.81 In order to avoid reproducing this primary presumption of Western 
philosophy, Levinas began to build up his own philosophy in which his debts to 
Heidegger do not prevent him from suggesting that we must leave Heidegger’s thought 
behind.  In the introduction to From Existence to Existents (De l’existence à l’existant), 
Levinas writes: 
If at the beginning our reflections are in large measure inspired by the philosophy 
of Martin Heidegger, where we find the concept of ontology and of the 
relationship which man sustains with Being, they are also governed by a profound 
need to leave the climate of this philosophy [le climat de cette philosophie], and 
by the conviction that we cannot leave it for a philosophy that would be pre-
Heideggerian.82  
 
Furthermore, in the article “De la description à l’existence,” he questions Heidegger’s 
ontology with the following questions: Is the relation of man to Being uniquely ontology? 
Does ontology exhaust the possibilities of relationship with Being, or is there something 
which exceeds ontology? Does the search for the meaning of Being miss something 
which may be even more fundamental?83 
 In Heidegger’s ontology, Levinas refutes the fact that the relationship between 
beings and Being primarily consists in “comprehension or understanding.”84 Heidegger 
understands the entities, beings within the horizon of Being. “In so doing, he rejoins the 
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‘great tradition of Western philosophy,’ which is to understand ‘the particular, which 
alone exists,’ within the context of a knowledge of the universal.”85 Levinas has 
expressed himself on this in a rather important manner: 
The primacy of ontology for Heidegger does not rest on the truism: “to know an 
existent it is necessary to have comprehended the Being of existents.” To affirm 
the priority of Being over existents is to already decide the essence of philosophy; 
it is to subordinate the relation with someone, who is an existent, (ethical relation) 
to a relation with the Being of existents, which, impersonal, permits the 
apprehension, domination of existents (a relationship of knowing), subordinates 
justice to freedom. If freedom denotes the mode of remaining the same in the 
midst of the other, knowledge, where an existent is given by interposition of 
interpersonal Being, contains the ultimate sense of freedom. It would be opposed 
to justice, which involves obligations with regard to an existent that refuses to 
give itself, the other, who in this sense of freedom would be an existent par 
excellence. In subordinating every relation with existents to the relation with 
Being the Heideggerian ontology affirms the primacy of freedom over ethics.86 
 
For Levinas, Heidegger underestimates ethics or the relation to the other. That is, he 
makes it submissive to ontology. This way of understanding existence does not allow 
another being (autrui) to present him/herself as he or she is.  Levinas sees in 
Heideggerian ontology a penchant which places the relationship with the other to the 
relation with being in general. This way of thinking unavoidably set the stage for 
attitudes of domination, violence and tyranny.87 This argument has been the source and 
center of Levinas’s transcendental ethics of responsibility, from the 1940s until the 
publication of Totalité et infini in 1961, and his subsequent works.88 Levinas criticizes 
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Heidegger not only because he falls short of appreciating the transcendence of the other, 
but also because his notion of being simply ignores the absurdity and the confusion of 
mere being-there (in the sense of il y a) and overlooks the dreadfulness of a completely 
anonymous existence.89  
For Levinas, Heidegger – who “sets out to solve the problem of solipsism” by 
grounding knowledge existentially “as one of the many modes of being human”90 – fails 
to appreciate the fact that the “contact between the self and the other” [in-the-world] 
“cannot occur in reason or in function, but in affectivity, which is ultimately tied to 
sensibility.”91  
Even though Levinas departs from the tradition of rational subjectivity that began 
with Descartes and was clarified by Kant, Husserl and Heidegger he is still within the 
horizon of Cartesianism. This insight into how his philosophy is related to Descartes, 
Kant, Husserl and Heidegger will enable us to comprehend fully his singular way of 
doing phenomenology after the manner of Heidegger rather than Husserl. Yet different 
from them, Levinas asserts that knowing takes place always within the context of the 
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intersubjective relation. The issue of the other becomes now the central theme of his 
philosophy. Levinas’s philosophical enterprise will then be dominated by one question: 
what does it means to think of the other as other? This leads us to the examination of 
Levinas’s transcendental ethics of responsibility.  
III. Emmanuel Levinas’s Ethics of Responsibility 
 
The previous section of this chapter discussed how the philosophical project of 
Levinas developed out of a confrontation with the phenomenological tradition of Western 
philosophy. This philosophy, Levinas observes, is dominated by the distinction between 
existents and existence and is concentrated on the thinking existence. Levinas reverses 
the course and moves it to a new direction: “from existence to the existent and from the 
existent to the other, a path which delineates time itself.”92 Levinas seeks to develop a 
phenomenological alternative to the ontology of Husserl and Heidegger which reduces 
the subject’s relation to otherness to comprehension or understanding. The central task of 
Levinas is to attempt to describe a relation with the other person that cannot be reduced to 
comprehension. He argues that ethics, that is, intersubjectivity and responsibility for the 
other, should replace traditional metaphysics as first philosophy.  
In this section, we would like to shed some light on Levinas’s ethics of 
responsibility. This exposition will be far from exhaustive, but it will help situate 
Levinas’s philosophy within the context of this work. We will begin by looking at 
Levinas’s understanding of ethics as first philosophy in order to appreciate that which is 
beyond being, the ethical command. The ethical command – which precedes all knowing, 
choosing, willing, or even Being – is demanded by the encounter with the other through 
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the face, the trace, and the infinite. The encounter with the other calls the ethical subject 
to responsibility to the point of substitution, sensibility, hostage, proximity, and 
vulnerability. It is this encounter with the other that constitutes the central point of 
Levinas’s thought. Indeed, it is only through the ethical command – prior to free choice 
and to any ontological thematization – that we experience the trace of the divine other, 
God. Furthermore, in order to clarify the relationship between the ethical command 
which is diachronic and pre-ontological, and its expression in the thematized world, we 
will examine Levinas’s understanding of transcendence and time, the Saying and the 
Said, and the third party.  In the end, we will establish the impact of Judaism and the 
Holocaust on his thought. 
Ethics as First Philosophy 
 
Levinas’s thesis, ethics is first philosophy, stems from his resolve to leave the 
climate of Husserl’s idealism and Heidegger’s thinking toward the ethical issue of the 
meaning of being, obtainable in the face-to-face relation. The essential task of his work 
becomes an effort to describe a relation with autrui, the other person that cannot be 
abbreviated to knowledge. Autrui is certainly Levinas’s key term in all of his work. It 
signifies the human other, the other person who can never be represented in a theme or a 
concept in his/her relationship with the subject because he/she is beyond comprehension 
of Being.93  
Levinas’s philosophy exalts ethics, making the ethical relation the most central 
definition of philosophy. Our ethical duty to one another, he maintains, must be 
considered first philosophy and the central truth that heads as sovereign over the rest of 
                                                 
93 Simon Critchley’s introduction to The Cambridge Companion to Levinas, 11. 
 32
philosophy. The question might then be how does Levinas arrive at this priority of ethical 
relation over ontology? The answer has to be found in his understanding of the self – 
other relationship.  
In Totality and Infinity - which sets his whole philosophical agenda - Levinas 
presents how the self first comes to ascertain its identity as the same not only by its 
opposition to an other, but from out of its concrete egoism in relation to the world. In this 
relation to the world, the egoist self remains free, dominating and mastering what is other 
without being determined by it. And the moments in the self’s sojourn in the world in 
which it first establishes its identity are, enjoyment, dwelling, labor and possession, and 
representation.94 These, for Levinas, are the moments through which the constitution of 
the self of interiority and economy are articulated.95  Here, the self gets separated from 
totality by retiring to the interiority of a home where everyone is at home: chez soi.  
As soon as Levinas introduces the face of the other totality breaks into pieces. The 
face of the other plays a central role because “the gleam of exteriority or of 
transcendence”96 happens in the face of the other, requiring a new thinking in the face of 
the other. Levinas describes the appearance of the absolute other – who is the infinite – in 
terms of desire and the face. My relation to the other – he argues – is desire, not need, 
because “over him I have no power.”97 One cannot comprehend the other, confine 
him/her, and place him/her within a context in order to get a handle on him/her. The other 
is ungraspable. The other and self are radically separated from one another. The other 
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does not limit the self; the other allows the self to transcend itself to reach to the heights 
to be better than it is.98 
Ultimately the ethical relationship, for Levinas, does not stem from an individual 
conscious choice confronted with the face of the other. Ethics does not first arise in the 
context of knowledge and freedom of an intentional consciousness. Ethics precedes 
ontology, not in a synchronic, but in a diachronic way.  In a diachronic way the face of 
the other commands me, prior to any commitment on my part, to responsibility. Levinas 
writes: 
Responsibility for the Other, for the naked face of the first individual to come 
along. A responsibility that goes beyond what I may or may not have done to the 
Other or whatever acts I may or may not have committed, as if I were devoted to 
the other man before being devoted to myself. Or more precisely, as if I had to 
answer for the other’s death even before being. A guiltless responsibility, 
whereby I am none the less open to an accusation of which no alibi, spatial or 
temporal, could clear me…A responsibility stemming from a time before my 
freedom - before my (moi) beginning, before any present…Responsibility from 
my neighbor dates from before my freedom in the immemorial past, 
unrepresentable past that was never present and is more ancient than 
consciousness of…A responsibility for my neighbor, for the other man, for the 
stranger or sojourner, to which nothing in the rigorously ontological order binds 
me – nothing in the order of thing, of the something, of number or causality. It is 
the responsibility of a hostage which can be carried to the point of being 
substituted for the other person and demands an infinite subjection of 
subjectivity.99 
 
The ethical imperative is so primordial that one always is late in one’s response to the 
ethical command of the face that calls one to responsibility. The subject is always first 
and foremost “the servant of a neighbor, already late and guilty for being late… [the 
subject is structured] from the outside, traumatically commanded, without interiorizing 
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by representation and concepts the authority that commands him/her.”100 He/she is 
always in a state of insomnia/wakefulness (impossibility of sleep), that is, always in 
perpetual responsibility for the other.101 One’s responsibility for the other pre-exists any 
self-consciousness, and it is unconditional. It is enactive of subjectivity and transcends all 
emotional, historical or social unforeseen events which could limit it. The other’s face is 
real humanity and carries with it the idea of infinity rather than totality. For Levinas, “the 
other becomes my neighbour precisely through the way the face summons me, calls for 
me, begs for me, and in so doing recalls my responsibility, and calls me into question.”102 
Thus, for Levinas, what constitutes the human person’s very humanity is the concern for 
the death of another, not its concern for its own death. The philosophical question par 
excellence is no longer “why being rather than nothing, but how being justifies itself.”103 
For philosophy to regain its credibility, Levinas argues, it has to substitute ontology with 
the ethical relation, for “ethics is not a moment of being; it is otherwise and better than 
being, the very possibility of the beyond”104 that points to the Good. Ethics is first 
philosophy. 
 
 
                                                 
100 Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, translated by Alphonso Lingis 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991), 87. 
101Levinas, Existence and Existents, 65ff; Emmanuel Levinas and Richard Kearney, “Dialogue with 
Emmanuel Levinas,” in Face to Face with Levinas, edited by Richard A. Cohen (Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 1996), 30 (My italics). 
102 Levinas, “Ethics as first philosophy,” in The Levinas Reader, 83. 
103 Levinas, “Ethics as first philosophy,” in The Levinas Reader, 86. (My italics) 
104 Emmanuel Levinas, “God and Philosophy,” in The Levinas Reader, 179.  Richard Cohen’s comments 
are helpful here; he writes: “Levinas insists on ethics, on a metaphysical responsibility, an exorbitant and 
infinite responsibility for other human beings, to care not for being, for the unraveling of its plot, but for 
what is beyond and against being, the alterity of the other person. ‘Do I have,’ he asks, ‘the right to be’?” 
See his introduction to Ethics and Infinity, 3. 
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Ethical Subjectivity: Encounter with the Other, the Face, the Trace, and the Infinite 
 
We established above that Levinas’s ethics as first philosophy was the result of 
his determination to distance himself from his mentors who gave priority to the 
comprehension of being, making it more central to the definition of philosophy itself than 
the ethical relation with the other. This ethical encounter with the other – pre-thematic 
and pre-ontological – constitutes the center and principal originality of Levinas’s 
analyses. Levinas associates this other with the other person and, in the form of illeity, 
with God.105 The other for Levinas is the absolute other that the same/self cannot 
comprehend, or place within a context in order to get a handle on him. He or she is 
completely ungraspable.  
Levinas’s philosophical ethics takes places in the context of non-intentional 
consciousness which is a form of mauvaise conscience.106 Mauvaise conscience is the 
non-intentional consciousness of the ethical subject, an identity without identity of the 
ethical subject, a feeling of never being responsible enough. It is “a fear for all the 
violence and murder my existing might generate, in spite of its conscious and intentional 
innocence. A fear which reaches back past my ‘self-consciousness’ in spite of whatever 
moves are made towards a bonne conscience by a pure perseverance in being.”107 Hence, 
ethical subjectivity is understood in terms of an asymmetrical proximity, vulnerability, 
responsibility, substitution, hostage, obsession, persecution, maternity, etc. Levinas 
                                                 
105 Alphonso Lingis’s introduction to Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, xxxiii. 
106 Most helpful on Levinas’s thought about mauvaise conscience/bonne conscience, see his “Ethics as First 
Philosophy,” 80-82. (Levinas’s italics). Marie L. Baird’s explanation on the difference between mauvaise 
conscience and bonne conscience is helpful. She writes: : mauvaise conscience “is not simply ‘bad 
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personal identity and egoic-self-concern…mauvaise conscience is fearful of occupying the place of another 
which becomes justified with the rise of the intentionality-driven ego.” See her On the Side of the Angels: 
Ethics and Post-Holocaust Spirituality (Leuven: Peeters, 2002), 69-70. 
107 Levinas, “Ethics as First Philosophy,” in The Levinas Reader, 82. (Levinas’s italics). 
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argues that “the other remains infinitely transcendent, infinitely foreign; his face in which 
his epiphany is produced and which appeals to me breaks with the world that can be 
common to us, whose virtualities are inscribed in our nature and developed by our 
existence.”108 The other appears to me as the face of the other, the trace and the infinite. 
The face, for Levinas, does not just mean the physical and visible face. It exceeds one’s 
gaze by which one would objectify it. He writes:  
The way in which the other presents himself, exceeding the idea of the other in 
me, we here name face. This mode does not consist in figuring as theme under my 
gaze, in spreading itself forth as a set of qualities forming an image. The face of 
the Other at each moment destroys and overflows the plastic image it leaves me, 
the idea existing to my own measure and to the measure of its ideatum – the 
adequate idea.109 
 
Here Levinas supports the ethical subject’s relation to a transcendence that is outside of 
the system of objectifying thought. This transcendence is that of the face of the other, as 
she/he reveals her/himself to me in his/her absolute otherness – which is outside of any 
context – because the face of the other never appears to one’s intentional consciousness. 
It never appears within the time of history. Yet, it addresses the situation of inhumanity in 
history in time that goes contrary to the synchronic time. The other’s face expresses 
his/her uncontaminated exposure; his/her mere presence addresses a silent request to the 
subject not to kill him/her.  The face reveals to the subject the reality of the other human 
person in his pure humanity, beyond all the socio-political and economic roles. It calls 
into question the insensitivity of the self, and validates the uniqueness of the subject as 
that which is irreplaceable in responsibility. The distinctiveness of the subject rests in the 
                                                 
108 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 194. (Levinas’s italics). It is important to note that for Levinas “the other 
does not purely and simply negate the I; total negation, of which murder is the temptation and the attempt, 
refers to an antecedent relation. The relation between the Other and me, which dawns forth in his 
expression, issues neither in number nor in concept.” 194.  
109 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 50-51. (Levinas’s italics) 
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fact that no one can answer for him/her. The face is what is against the violence intrinsic 
in the totalization of being in which the other is reduced to the same. It commands the 
expression “Thou shall not kill” and calls the ethical subject to exposure and 
vulnerability.  
A further important element in the understanding of the face is that the other 
always meets the ethical subject from an immemorial past, considered as a never-ending 
responsibility, otherwise than the time of representation, that calls forth the ethical 
subject’s submission to the face of that other who both orders and begs. This face, 
Levinas argues, passes away in this unrepresentable time as a trace. He writes: 
A face is a trace of itself, given over to my responsibility, but to which I am 
wanting and faulty. It is as though I were responsible for his morality, and guilty 
for surviving. A face is anachronous immediacy more tense than that of an image 
offered on the straightforwardness of intuitive intention. In proximity the 
absolutely other, the stranger whom I have “neither conceived nor given birth to,” 
I already have on my arms, already bear, according to the Biblical formula, ‘in my 
breast as the nurse bears the nurseling.’110 
 
For Levinas, the trace of the other is what is left of the other for us in the other’s absence 
– an absence which nothing can reverse as it refers back to what is beyond the face – to 
absolute exteriority. The fact that the face is an unrepresentable trace calls forth in 
Levinas’s thought the idea of transcendence which goes beyond every closed structure of 
totality in which every other relation is linked in terms of either knowledge or power. It is 
this transcendence of the ethical relation that Levinas calls the infinite. He writes “the 
face of the other in proximity, which is more than representation, is an unrepresentable 
trace, the way of the infinite.”111  The question for Levinas is whether or not, beyond 
being, a meaning might not show itself whose priority, translated into ontological 
                                                 
110 Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, 91. 
111 Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, 116. 
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language, will be called prior to being.112 Levinas sees in the face of the other, the trace 
of God, who is never there. And God – to be sure – is only revealed through his trace. At 
this point we might as well ask how precisely this infinite of the other bears the infinity 
of God. The answer, for Levinas, has to be found in the ethical subject’s turn to the face 
of the other. Thus, “the ethical subject’s responsiveness to the face of the other is always 
already a desire for the infinite of God.”113 This desire “is beyond satisfaction, and, 
unlike a need, does not identify a term or an end. This endless desire for what is beyond 
is dis-interestedness, transcendence – desire for the Good.”114 From this point of view, 
God for Levinas “remains near because God’s trace passes in the face of the other. Yet 
God is also utterly transcendent calling upon the ethical subject to ‘what is non-desirable, 
the undesirable par excellence – the other’ enacted as responsibility for that other.”115 
Levinas – as Marie Baird would argue – “posits a sort of a triangular relationship to 
divinity mediated through the ethical relation: ‘The goodness of the Good…inclines the 
movement it calls forth, to turn it from the obliqueness that goes higher than 
straightforwardness’.”116 Levinas asserts:  
To be good is a deficit, waste and foolishness in a being; to be good is excellence 
and elevation beyond being. Ethics is not a moment of being; it is otherwise and 
better than being, the very possibility of the beyond. In this ethical reversal, in this 
reference of the desirable to the non-desirable, in this strange mission that orders 
the approach to the other, God is drawn out of objectivity, presence and being. He 
                                                 
112 Levinas, “God and Philosophy,” in The Levinas Reader, 168. 
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is neither an object nor an interlocutor. His absolute remoteness, his 
transcendence, turns into my responsibility – non-erotic par excellence – for the 
other…117 
 
Levinas’s comments are helpful in establishing the fundamental connection between the 
face, the trace and the infinite. He affirms the fact that the ethical relation is “the irruption 
of God within being, or the bursting out of Being towards God in the desire for the 
infinite that is enacted as responsibility for the other.”118 Hence, the absolute otherness of 
another, envisioned as absence, communicates to the trace of God in man. “God thus falls 
into meaning or comes to the idea in the infinity of an ethical obligation in response to 
the face of the other.”119  
To be sure, in Levinas, the ethical enactment as bearing the trace of God focuses 
on two aspects of God. On the one hand we have “the absolutely transcendent God, 
YHWH or the kabbalistic Ein-Sof, who remains completely outside of and unaffected by 
the world”120 (God and Philosophy). On the other hand, there is also the immanent God, 
Elohim (the kenotic God), “who, like a soul of the world, maintains the existence, light, 
power and holiness of the world, in the form of continuous creation.”121 So what we see 
                                                 
117 Levinas, “God and Philosophy,” in The Levinas Reader, 179. 
118 Levinas, “Revelation in the Jewish Tradition,” in The Levinas Reader, 202; see also Baird, On the Side 
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119 Baird, On the Side of the Angels, 77. 
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121 Emmanuel Levinas, “Judaism and Kenosis,” in In The Time of the Nations, translated by Michael B. 
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in Levinas’s conception of God is the interplay of these two aspects. Levinas, however, 
focuses more on Elohim, the kenosis of God, because of his association with the worlds 
and humans. He writes:  
[T]here is a privileged relationship between the human soul, the soul of Israel, and 
God. There is a connaturality between man and the manifold entirety of creature 
on one hand, and a special intimacy between man and Elohim on the other. This 
intimacy is characterized both by Elohim’s superiority to man, who is a part of 
creation, and by the dependency, intended by Elohim, of Elohim on man with 
respect to everything concerning the association of Elohim with the worlds, i.e., 
everything concerning the very existence and devotion of the worlds. Man, by 
acting in agreement with the Torah, nourishes the association of God with the 
world; or, by his transgression, he exhausts the powers of that divine 
association.122 
 
Again, in the same vein he continues: 
God associates with or withdraws from the worlds, depending upon human 
behavior. Man is answerable to the universe! Man is answerable for others. His 
faithfulness or unfaithfulness to the Torah is not just a way of winning or losing 
his salvation: the being, elevation and light of the worlds are dependent upon it. 
Only indirectly, by virtue of the salvation or downfall of the worlds, does his own 
destiny depend on it. As if through that responsibility, which constitutes man’s 
very identity, each one of us were similar to Elohim.123 
 
Hence, for Levinas, “the very being of the world is thus dependent upon the model of 
ethical responsibility”124 exemplified by the prophet’s answer: ‘Here I am.’ This 
prophetic approach is “a moment of the human condition itself” that concerns every 
human person; no one is exempt from this moment.125 The subject, therefore, is always 
summoned up to a responsibility he/she never bargained for; a responsibility engraved in 
the infinity of the face of the other. He/she realizes him/herself in extreme passivity that 
                                                                                                                                                 
conceptualization in the book of Rabbi Haim of Volozhin (1759-1821), Nefesh Hahaim (The Soul of Life). 
For more details, see Levinas, “Judaism and Kenosis,” 122-127; Baird, On the Side of the Angels, 78.  
122 Levinas, “Judaism and Kenosis,” in In The Time of the Nations, 124-125. 
123 Levinas, “Judaism and Kenosis,” in In The Time of the Nations, 125. 
124 Baird, On the Side of the Angels, 78. 
125 Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 113. 
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precedes and questions all freedom.126 Hence, in the subject’s ethical encounter with the 
other, the infinity of the other bears the trace of the infinity of God. And the trace for 
Levinas “is not just one more word: it is the proximity of God in the countenance of my 
fellowman.”127  
The subject is distressed, confronted, called out of its naïve, calculating sleep, 
awakened to its injustice and welcomes the other into its world. For Levinas, the ethical 
relation of infinite responsibility for the other is that which endorses the human person 
into subjectivity itself. He characterizes ethical subjectivity and responsibility as 
“maternity in the complete being ‘for the other’ which characterizes it” or “having-the-
other-in-one’s-skin.”128  As for Levinas humanity at its best is an act rather than a state of 
being, human responsibility becomes passivity in action. Thus, to be human is to act 
ethically. The human person rightly understood is fundamentally responsible prior to any 
commitment in relation to the other human person.  
The Temporality of the Ethical Encounter: Transcendence and Time, the Saying and the 
Said, and the Third Party. 
 
The foundation of Levinas’s philosophy is the ethical encounter between the moi, 
(self) and autrui, (the other). This relation is considered in terms of sensibility, 
vulnerability and exposure, proximity, the face, hostage, obsession, trauma, persecution, 
substitution, obligation and responsibility. It is within this context that Levinas lays out 
his own basic approach concerning the temporality of the ethical encounter and his own 
account of its construction and meaning. To talk about the temporality of the ethical 
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encounter supposes an understanding of Levinas’s idea of time. The notion of time, in 
Levinas’s project, is deep-seated in the asymmetrical straightforwardness of the subject-
other relationships, and it constitutes the basic configuration of being. This notion is both 
ethical and intersubjective.129 Thus the ethical encounter for Levinas takes place in 
atemporal temporality. In this section of the work, we will have a closer look at concepts 
such as transcendence, Saying and Said, and the third party in relation to the temporality 
of the ethical encounter.  
Transcendence and Time 
 
Key to Levinas’s understanding of subjectivity is the notion of separation130 
between alterity and the same. It expresses otherness and difference between the subject 
and the other, and insists on the fact that the other remains absolutely transcendent and 
infinite with respect to the subject. For Levinas, as Michael Purcell comments, 
“subjectivity is ‘the-Other-in-me,’ experienced not in itself … but in the responsibility 
for-the-other which is provoked and evoked in me.”131 What is at stake in Levinas’s 
philosophy is the dimension of alterity of the other human person that has to be 
understood in terms of that which exceeds comprehension totally, that which is higher to 
the horizons of being, the truth of being, and precedes the grounds of philosophy. Now, 
what is higher than being, comprehension, and philosophy is the priority of ethical order 
                                                 
129Richard A. Cohen, Elevations: The Height of the Good in Rosenzweig and Levinas (Chicago: The 
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130 Michael Purcell, Mystery and Method: The Other in Rahner and Levinas (Milwaukee: Marquette 
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and the infinite responsibilities that stem from it.132 Hence, the surplus or extra to which 
Levinas draws attention in terms of infinity is “transcendent exteriority.”133 What then is 
transcendence for Levinas? 
The idea of the infinite, for Levinas, has to do with height, nobility, and 
transascendence.134 Transcendence, for Levinas, is characterized by a relationship with 
the other in his or her verticality. The move toward the other in terms of his or her 
verticality introduces the dimension of height, not as principally a position in being, but 
an ethical relation.135 Levinas writes: 
Transcendence designates a relation with a reality infinitely distant from my own 
reality, yet without this distance destroying this relation and without this relation 
destroying this distance as it would happen with relations within the same; this 
relation does not become an implantation in the other and a confusion with him, 
does not affect the very identity of the same, its ipseity, does not silence the 
apology, does not become apostasy and ecstasy.136   
 
What really happens in the relation between the self and the other is that the other is 
always on high, and his appeal is always by way of command and injunction. Levinas’s 
other always presents itself as the absolutely other, the transcendent human other (autrui) 
who shows a face and opens a dimension of height, that is to say, it infinitely overflows 
the bounds of being and knowledge. And “the epiphany of the Absolute Other is a face 
by which the Other challenges and commands me through its nakedness and 
destitution.”137 The other challenges the subject from its humility and height, provokes 
this ethical movement, disturbs its good conscience with a surplus inadequate to 
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intentionality. Thus, “because of this inassimilable surplus,” Levinas comments, “we 
have called the relation which binds the I to the other (Autrui) the idea of the infinite.”138 
The subject is put into question by the other in an elevation, where the subject’s 
consciousness finds in itself more than it can contain. Before the other (autrui), the 
subject is infinitely responsible.  
Levinas’s approach can be called transcendental, better, diachronically 
transcendental139 - as Charles Reed argues - because, it “is produced on the basis of 
exposure rather than evidence… [and] …operates within a new notion of temporality.”140 
Here, temporality is “understood as time opened up by and for the ‘ethical adventure’ of 
the relationship to unassimilable, incomprehensible other person.”141  The other who is 
totally other has always already transcended, disturbed the imaginary self-centered 
totality of the same, in a time that goes contrary to the linear, synchronic time of being 
and history. Levinas’s affirmation of the priority of the other takes place in diachronic 
temporality.142 It is in this time that the self transcends itself, that the infinite comes to 
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pass and that the self is related to the other.143 The encounter between the self and the 
other, therefore, takes place in the time of transcendence. This is a time that is not able to 
be recovered by memory or represented, known and mastered, for it comes from the 
other.  
The Saying and the Said 
 
In order to appreciate the nature of responsibility of the subject vis-à-vis the other, 
it might be helpful to analyze how Levinas expresses this relationship in terms of the 
concept of Saying and the Said. Levinas develops his argument about ethics as first 
philosophy by positing the notion of the Saying and the Said (le dire et le dit).144 
Alphonso Lingis explains it in these terms: 
Levinas several times proceeds by way of language to these positions. In general a 
language, the said, is the medium of simultaneity, the field where everything past 
or to come can be presented into a system, that establishes togetherness, that 
institutes synchrony. Space, the sphere of the simultaneous, is itself a work of 
temporalization, constituted and fixed, maintained logos itself is sustained by the 
saying that is a relationship with alterity.145 
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145 Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, xxix. 
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Here, Levinas inserts the subject’s address to the other into a communication in which the 
Saying is already active prior to any Said since the relationship between the Saying and 
the Said is not synchronic, but diachronic. “[T]herefore the Saying is beyond the 
possibility of thematic exposition in the Said.”146 The Saying can never be reduced to the 
Said, and remains beyond the ontological play of being or beyond essence. Saying is “the 
pure surplus over evidence, theme and logic. It is the positive production of the other as 
other (autrui), and it is this which gives all significations its significance.”147 To illustrate 
the connection between Saying and ethical responsibility, Levinas writes: 
Saying is a denuding, of the unqualifiable one, the pure someone, unique and 
chosen; that is, an exposedness to the other, where no slipping away is possible. 
In its sincerity as sign given to another, it absolves me of all identity…This 
absolution reverses essence. It is not a negation of essence, but a 
disinterestedness, an “otherwise than being” which turns into a “for the other,” 
burning for the other, consuming the bases of any position for oneself and any 
substantialization which would take form in this consummation, consuming even 
the ashes of this consummation, in which there would be a risk that everything be 
born again.148 
 
Levinas presents the Saying as that which is prior to its thematization in the Said. The 
Saying is the ethical relation, the responsibility the subject has for the other who faces 
him or her. By contrast to the Saying, the Said is the realm in which themes are stated and 
disclosed. It is the realm of ontology and phenomenology – of what shows itself. The 
Said establishes meaning and identification; it is the thematization of meaning and 
consciousness, “a statement, assertion or proposition of which the truth or falsity can be 
ascertained….One might say that the content of my words, their identifiable meaning, is 
the said.”149  
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In the relation between the Saying and the Said, however, Levinas is faced with a 
difficulty, namely, how to conceptualize the ethical Saying within the ontological Said. 
Levinas admits the fact that the Saying, at some point, has to be thematized into ontology 
through the Said. Hence, he maintains the interruption of the ethical Saying within the 
ontological Said.150  The Said is the thematization of the Saying, without exhausting it in 
this thematization. The Saying while entering in the Said maintains its alterity and 
diachrony and its primacy of the ethical command. Levinas writes: 
When stated in propositions, the unsayable (or the an-archical) espouses the forms 
of formal logic; the beyond being is posited in doxic theses, and glimmers in the 
amphibology of being and beings – in which beings dissimulate being. The 
otherwise than being is stated in a saying that must also be unsaid in order to thus 
extract the otherwise than being from the said in which it already comes to signify 
but a being otherwise.151 
 
The Saying, which signifies the otherwise than being, is transformed into a Said, which 
conveys just a being otherwise. Yet the Saying, ultimately, cannot be contained in or 
comprehended by the Said for it exceeds the Said.  
In this “ethical event of communication,”152 in which language enables the subject 
to approach the neighbor, “the first word says only the saying itself before every being 
and every thought in which being is sighted and reflected.”153 Furthermore, in the 
responsibility for the other, “the saying in being said at every moment breaks up the 
definition of what it says and breaks up the totality it includes.”154 The Saying expresses, 
therefore, the moment at which God comes to mind in the trace seen in the face of the 
other. This trace comes from an immemorial past, a past which was never present, the 
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realm of the Saying, the first Saying. Levinas argues that “the first saying is to be sure but 
a word. But the word is God.”155 
The Third Party 
 
In the ethical relationship the subject is responsible for the neighbor prior to any 
choice, action or decision that would commit the subject to this relationship. It is a 
relation prior to freedom. After reviewing the duo self – other, Levinas finds that they 
remain undisturbed by concern for the rest of humanity. The ethical subject once only 
confronted with the face of the other that called him or her to responsibility, now has also 
to take into account the arrival of the third party on the scene.  
If proximity ordered me only to the other alone, there would not have been any 
problem, in even the most general sense of the term. A question would not have 
been born…The responsibility for the other is an immediacy antecedent to 
questions, it is proximity. It is troubled and becomes a problem when a third party 
enters.156 
 
With the third party Levinas announces the birth of consciousness. He states: 
Consciousness is born as the presence of the third party. It is in the measure that it 
proceeds from it that it is still disinterestedness. It is the entry of the third party, a 
permanent entry, into the intimacy of the face to face. The concern for justice, for 
the thematizing, the kerygmatic discourse bearing on the said, from the bottom of 
the saying without the said, the saying as contact, is the spirit in society.157 
 
Three main accounts on the role of the third party in Levinas’s philosophical project 
suggest that the third party is the place of the passage to justice and human fraternity in 
the political sphere.158 In Levinas’s writings, the relationship between ethics and politics 
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is announced by this entrance of the third party, le tiers. The other and the third party, my 
neighbors, contemporaries of one another, put distance between me and the other and the 
third party. He writes: 
The third party introduces a contradiction in the saying whose signification before 
the other until then went in one direction. It is of itself the limit of responsibility 
and the birth of this question: What do I have to do with justice? A question of 
consciousness. Justice is necessary, that is, comparison, coexistence, 
contemporaneousness, assembling, order, thematization, the visibility of faces, 
and thus intentionality and the intellect, and in intentionality and the intellect, the 
intelligibility of a system, and thence also a copresence on an equal footing as 
before a court of justice.159  
 
Levinas introduces the third party into the face of the other to prevent the complicity of a 
private relation. The third party, Levinas argues, as he/she looks at the subject in the eyes 
of the other, evokes the language of justice, because the appearance of the other as face 
opens humanity. The other’s face in his/her exposure as a face presents to the subject the 
misery of the poor one and the stranger.160 Robert Bernasconi expounds upon what this 
means: 
The face of the other does not ask only for him-or her-self, as if there were only 
two of us in the world. My responsibility to the other does not allow me to put 
aside my responsibility to the others. However, even if there is thereby already 
implied a questioning of my relation to the other – for example, as to whether it is 
too exclusive or consuming – Levinas’s focus falls on the way the face to face 
provides the basis for an ethical questioning of the political.161 
 
In his own words, Levinas writes: “In the measure that the face of the other relates us 
with the third party, the metaphysical relation of the I with the other moves in the form of 
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the We, aspires to a State, institutions, laws, which are the source of universality.”162 The 
absence of the third party in the subject’s face to face encounter with the other human 
person, not only would permit the complicity of private relation, but also would present a 
risk of absolving the subject from all his/her commitments and obligations to everyone 
else.163 Hence, “the presence of the face, the infinity of the other, is a destituteness, a 
presence of the third party (that is, of the whole humanity which looks at us) and a 
command that commands commanding.”164  
Levinas insists on the fact that this third party is not merely a multiplication of the 
other. From the outset the third party is concurrently different from the other, and makes 
the subject one among others. This quality or condition of being other is itself primarily 
ethical, not merely in a mathematical sense, but in the sense of a relation of demand and 
conflict.165 In the confrontation with the third party the other whom the subject is 
responsible for is also responsible for another. He writes: “the third party is other than the 
neighbor, but also another neighbor, and also a neighbor of the other, and not simply his 
fellow…the other stands in relationship with the third party, for whom I cannot entirely 
answer, even if I alone answer before any question, for my neighbor.”166 
 A further aspect with regard the arrival of the third is the use of the word illeity. 
Illeity is “that which preserves the specific signifyingness of a trace in each trace of an 
empirical passage, over and above the sign it can become.”167 This illeity addresses, for 
Levinas, the same issue to which the third party is directed, that is, it prevents a 
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possibility of a private relation; yet more than the third, it breaks off the face to face 
relationship and initiates justice.168 For Levinas, Bernasconi contends,  
Illeity is … not only ‘the fact that the others show themselves in their face.’ Illeity 
also has certain ‘indirect ways’ that through ‘the presence of a third party 
alongside of the neighbor’ lead one along the path of thematization and 
consciousness to that comparison of the incomparable that is necessary for justice 
and that is usually assigned to the third person perspective. Illeity is the condition 
for irreversibility, the irreversibility of time and of the relation with the Other.169 
 
At the intercession between the ethical and the political, Levinas places the third party or 
the interhuman which corresponds to what he calls fraternity.170 Fraternity, for Levinas, 
is not motivated by resemblance in human race or biological genus in human society; it is 
not an adequate ground upon which to base the subject’s responsibility for the other 
human person who is separated from him/her. Because, “the biological human 
brotherhood – conceived with the sober coldness of Cain – consists in conceiving 
responsibility as proceeding from freedom or in terms of a contract.”171 Rather, fraternity 
which Levinas talks about is the way in which the subject’s relation with one human 
other already opens up to the relation with other human others. He affirms:  
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[T]he relation with the face in fraternity, where in his turn the Other appears in 
solidarity with all the others, constitutes the social order, the reference of every 
dialogue to the third party by which the We – or the party – encompasses the face 
to face opposition, opens the erotic upon a social life, all signifyingness and 
decency, which encompasses the structure of the family itself.172 
 
The word justice in Levinas’s thought stems from the other’s close relationship with the 
third party and it is centered on love. Now, since love calls for justice, the subject’s 
relation with the other human person, the neighbor cannot but involve other neighbors or 
third parties whom the subject’s neighbor maintains a relationship with.173 One can argue 
that the entrance of the third party on the scene in Levinas’s thought is brought about by 
his desire to emphasize the relevance of his thought for concrete human community. For 
him society must be a fraternal community to be commensurate with the 
straightforwardness and the primary proximity in which the face presents itself to one’s 
welcome. His thought – as he himself pointed out in the preface of Totality and Infinity – 
is a response to a Western philosophical understanding of the human being that has led to 
war and to the directly and indirectly oppressive penchant of human institutions.174  
Levinas’s philosophy does not hang in the air on the level of spiritual desire, but 
rather, challenges empirical situations. Levinas himself describes it in these words: “The 
fact that the other, my neighbor, is also a third party with respect to another, who is also a 
neighbor, is the birth of thought, consciousness, justice and philosophy.”175 This fact 
would be made clearer with the analysis of the impact of the Jewish aspects in Levinas’s 
philosophy to which we now turn. 
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VI. The Influence of Jewish Aspects in Emmanuel Levinas’s Philosophy 
 
Any attentive reader of Levinas’s work would agree with the fact that Levinas’s 
declared philosophical ambition was influenced by his Jewish background and heritage. 
He was born in Kovno, one of the places in Lithuania that was the center of Ashkenazi 
Jewish learning. “The Lithuanian Jews were famous for their insistence on rigorous 
argument, and their contempt for the enthusiastic and charistimatic religiosity with 
Hassidism.”176 Most scholars of Levinas seem to note two main sources from which 
Levinas draws his inspiration: the experience of Jewish life through his familiarity of the 
Hebrew Bible and Greek/European philosophy and literature. Levinas’s life, however, 
has also been influenced by the feeling and the remembrance of the Nazi horror. This 
section examines the role Jewish thought and the Shoah played in Levinas’s 
philosophical project. 
Levinas and Judaism 
 
We have noted that Levinas’s work was enriched by the Hebrew Bible and Greek 
philosophy. Levinas’s thought is profoundly rooted in Judaism yet it remains 
philosophical.  The Jewish aspect of Levinas’s thought is noticeable through his 
resistance to Western philosophy expressed through the opposition between Jerusalem 
and Athens. Jews are reminded of the conflict each year at the feast of Hanukkah which 
celebrates their recurrent and astonishing victory over Hellenic universalism.177 Levinas 
expresses this clash on the intellectual level by opposing “the absolute transcendence of 
the other person encountered ethically and the relative transcendence of the truth of being 
determined as presence, especially as found in the phenomenology of Husserl and 
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Heidegger.”178  Hence, Jewish aspects in Levinas’s work must clearly be understood in 
relation to his critique of Western thought.179 Opposing the primacy of Knowledge, 
Levinas proposes an ethical priority that recalls the overall different priority articulated in 
the well-known response of the Jewish people at Mount Sinai: “We will do and we will 
listen.”180 Thus, as Richard Cohen argues,  
Levinas’s entire philosophy can be understood as but another layer of meaning 
attached to Sinai, another interpretation – priority of the other, conscientiousness 
before consciousness, ethics before reason – exalting and penetrating to the heart 
of one of the greatest moments in the religious history of the world.181 
 
Therefore, the Judaism Levinas draws from “is one that speaks to Jews, opens a space for 
their difference”182 and then speaks to all humanity. “It is a Judaism … that teaches 
humanity its humanism, the absolute transcendence that opens up between people united 
ethically.”183 This is a Judaism characterized by the fundamental obligation which we 
find in the Jewish Bible, namely, the hineni (here I am) of Abraham. Abraham is offering 
himself here to God unreservedly. Levinas speaks of this expression when he writes: 
The subjectivity of the subject, as being subject to everything, is pre-original 
susceptibility, before all freedom and outside of every present. It is accused in 
uneasiness or the unconditionality of the accusative, in the “here I am” (me voici) 
which is obedience to the glory of the Infinite that orders me to the other…it is 
one absolved from every relationship, every game, literally without situation, 
without dwelling place, expelled from everywhere and from itself, one saying to 
the other “I” or “here I am.” The ego stripped by the trauma of persecution of its 
scornful and imperialist subjectivity, is reduced to the “here I am,” in a 
transparency without opaqueness, without heavy zones propitious for evasion.184 
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For Levinas, therefore, “to be a human being – to be what Jews call a mensch – involves 
recognizing that I am commanded to say hineni,” because what is essential is the 
relationship with the other.185 Levinas universalizes the traditional Jewish teaching which 
argues that obedience to the divine command is the source of dignity for a Jew. He 
applies it to all humans, arguing that humans find their dignity by observing God’s 
original ethical command to say hineni to the other. To say hineni is to respond to the call 
for infinite responsibility for the other.186 
What Levinas does in using his Jewish heritage to expound his philosophical 
thought is precisely to emphasize the “underivability” of the fundamental obligation, 
hineni, from any epistemological source. Concepts such as infinite responsibility, face, 
trace, height, etc, connect “with his two fundamental ideas that ethics is based on 
obligation to the other, not on any empirical or metaphysical ‘sameness’ between myself 
and the other and that this fundamental obligation is asymmetrical.”187 For instance, with 
regard to the infinite responsibility, Levinas follows “an ancient Jewish principle that 
says every Israelite is responsible for every other. The corresponding Levinasian claim is 
that every human being is responsible for every other.”188 In the face of the other, there is 
an elevation, a height that makes the other higher than I am. And God is without content 
apart from the relation to the other. God for Levinas appears in the ethics and justice of 
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the relation of one person to another, in the one for another. In reading Levinas one is 
struck by many mentions of the Jewish Bible and the Talmud. He writes:  
The great miracle of the Bible lies not at all in the common literary origin, but, 
inversely, in the confluence of different literatures toward the same essential 
content. The miracle of this confluence is greater than the miracle of the unique 
author. Now the pole of this confluence is the ethical, which incontestably 
dominates this whole book.189 
 
Levinas sees in the Bible and the Talmud the sources of ethical knowledge to which all 
humans should refer. He goes as far as proposing the wisdom of the Talmud as “an 
excellent source of experiences, food for philosophers.”190 One clear example of 
Levinas’s texts where his thought and religious idea converge is in the preface to Entre 
Nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other: 
The main intent here is to try to see ethics in relation to the rationality of the 
knowledge that is immanent in being, and that is primordial in the philosophical 
tradition of the West; even if ethics – ultimately going beyond the forms and 
determinations of ontology, but without rejecting the peace of reason – could 
achieve a different form of intelligibility and a different way of loving wisdom, 
and perhaps even – but I will not go that far – the way of Psalm 111:10.191 
 
In addition there is a noticeable and productive crossing point between Levinas’s writings 
in Difficult Freedom and his philosophical works. These confessional writings continue 
to a certain extent Levinas’s meditations on the face. They are considered essential to a 
serious appraisal of his work as a whole. They make explicit a dimension in Levinas’s 
work – his inspiration in or reference to Judaism – that is only implicit in the 
philosophical work. About the influence of Jewish thought on Levinas’s work, Richard 
Cohen interestingly notes: “the ethics Levinas finds in Jewish texts is, of course, the face-
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to-face dialogical metaphysics that he elaborates in his properly philosophical work.”192 
Strangely enough, it was exactly through Judaism that Levinas believed he could 
designate a locus beyond cultural relativity: that domain was, for him, the ethical. 
Perhaps the most articulate feature of Levinas’s Judaism is voiced in his preface to 
Difficult Freedom when he says: “The other’s hunger – be it of the flesh, or of bread – is 
sacred; only the hunger of the third party limits its rights; there is no bad materialism 
other than our own.”193 We would say with Adriaan Theodoor Peperzak that the 
fundamental message of Jewish thought in Levinas’s vision can be summarized by the 
following: 
It ties the meaning of all experiences to the ethical relation among humans: it 
appears to the personal responsibility of man, who, thereby, knows himself, 
irreplaceable to realize a human society in which humans treat one another as 
humans. This realization of the just society is ipso facto an elevation of man to the 
society with God. This society is human happiness itself and the meaning of life. 
Therefore, to say that the meaning of the real must be understood in function of 
ethics, is to say that the universe is sacred. But it is sacred in an ethical sense. 
Ethics is an optics of the divine. No relation to God is more right or more 
immediate. The divine cannot manifest itself except through the neighbor. For a 
Jew, incarnation is neither possible, nor necessary. After all, Jeremiah himself 
said it: “To judge the case of the poor and the miserable, is not that to know me? 
says the Eternal.”194 
Levinas’s Jewish-Talmudic writings imply a philosophical dimension, and both can be 
used at the same time, each clarifying the other. An attentive reader would recognize in 
Levinas’s philosophy, references, examples and phrases that stem from the deepest 
themes in Jewish ethics and spirituality. In his metaphysical ethics, as Richard Cohen 
argues,  
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Levinas weaves the specifics of the moral and holy language of Judaism into a 
compelling and critical web with the most advanced issues and idioms of 
contemporary continental philosophy…He persuades not by citing proof-texts, 
which would have no force in philosophical discourse in any event, but by giving 
voice to the prior and discordant claims of morality, to the very priority of its 
claim, as exerted by the one who faces, the other person to whom the morally 
elected self is obligated, the ‘orphan, widow, and stranger,’ for whom and to 
whom one is responsible unto death.195 
Levinas and the Holocaust 
 
There seems to be in Levinas’s major philosophical works a sense of urgency to 
prevent some catastrophe or war due to the drama of the metaphysical interest in human 
beings. He writes in the preface to Totality and Infinity that:  
Everyone will readily agree that it is of the highest importance to know whether 
we are not duped by morality. Does not lucidity, the mind’s openness upon the 
true, consist in catching sight of the permanent possibility of war? The state of 
war suspends morality; it divests the eternal institutions and obligations of their 
eternity and rescinds ad interim the unconditional imperatives. In advance its 
shadow falls over the actions of men. War is not only one of the ordeals – the 
greatest – of which morality lives; it renders morality derisory. The art of 
foreseeing war and winning it by every means – politics – is henceforth enjoined 
as the very exercise of reason. Politics is opposed to morality, as philosophy to 
naïveté.196  
 
This picture of war is taken up again and amplified in Otherwise than Being, in the 
following terms: “War is the deed or the drama of the essence’s interest. No entity can 
wait its hour. They all clash, despite the difference of the regions to which the terms in 
conflict may belong. Essence thus is the extreme synchronism of war.”197 This sentiment 
will eventually play a major role in all aspects of his thought. For Levinas, “war leaves 
nothing exterior to it and changes the other to the same. Is this not another way of 
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expressing the Hitlerian directive, the Gleichschaltung, a command that the entire Reich 
was to think and act in unison?”198 In 1934, reflecting on the doctrine of Hitlerism, 
Levinas wrote a short note to the editors of the Catholic journal, Esprit, not only to 
condemn the barbarism of National Socialism, but also to denounce Western 
philosophy’s emphasis on the radical freedom of human beings. 
The article stems from the conviction that the source of the bloody barbarism of 
National Socialism lies not in some contingent anomaly within human reasoning, 
nor in some accidental ideological misunderstanding. This article expresses the 
conviction that this source stems from the essential possibility of elemental evil 
into which we can be led by logic and against which Western Philosophy has not 
sufficiently insured itself.199 
 
From this we see clearly how Levinas distances himself from Western philosophy “which 
has transformed its radical freedom into gratuitous play (or a game: un jeu), preferring to 
retain its freedom by not choosing anything rather than considering it the prelude to a 
commitment.”200  
The Holocaust is, of course, the most important historical event that most 
influenced Levinas. Its impact on Levinas’s life and philosophical thought cannot be 
missed. Michael Smith helpfully comments on this: “The rise of anti-semitism in the 
1930s, the threat of totalitarianism, and the Holocaust itself not only ‘mark’ Levinas’s 
work, they set in motion a complex intertwining of his philosophical reflection with the 
state of the world in which it unfolded.”201 He himself rightly pointed out in his essay 
“Signature” that his entire life has been influenced by the feeling and the memory of the 
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New York: Routledge, 2002), 5-48, especially 29-40. Caygill’s book Levinas & the Political gives a very 
systematic presentation of the link between philosophical and political aspects of this period of Levinas’s 
thought. 
200 Smith, Toward the Outside, 112. 
201 Smith, Toward the Outside, 109.  
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Nazi horror.202 Worst still, members of his own family were victims of this anti-semitism. 
Questions of religious faith after the Holocaust, the meaning of Judaism and the relation 
between being and beyond being turn out to be crucial to Levinas’s personal experience 
and thought. In his own words he expresses it this way: 
When one has that tumor in the memory, twenty years can do nothing to change 
it. Soon death will do no doubt cancel the unjustified privilege of having survived 
six million deaths. But if, during that stay of grace, life’s occupations and 
diversions are filling life once more…nothing has been able to fill, or even cover 
over, the gaping pit. We still turn back to it from our daily occupations almost as 
frequently and the vertigo that grips us at the edge is always the same.203 
 
In the same vein, he continues quoting Shmuel Agnon, the Nobel Prize-winning Israeli 
novelist: 
Six million Jews murdered by the Gentiles among us. A third of Israel has been 
killed, and the other two-thirds orphaned. There is no one in Israel who does not 
have several dozen dead among his or her close relatives…It was a great thought 
that He who lives eternally had, to have chosen us from among all the people, to 
give us the Torah of Life, although it is a little difficult to understand why he 
created, facing us, a kind of human being that would take our lives because we 
observe the Torah.204 
 
With the inscriptions at the beginning of Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence, 
Levinas’s perception of the Holocaust takes an universal dimension to include the non-
Jewish, the victims of the same anti-Semitism: “To the memory of those who were 
closest among the six million murdered by the National Socialists, and the millions upon 
                                                 
202 Levinas, “Signature,” in Difficult Freedom, 291. The Hebrew inscriptions at the bottom at the beginning 
of Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, provides us with Levinas’s personal testimony. He remembers 
members of his family who were assassinated. It reads: “To remember the soul of my father, my teacher, 
Rabbi Yechiel, the son of Rabbi Abraham Halévi; my mother, my teacher, Deborah, the daughter of Rabbi 
Mosche; my brothers, Dov, the son of Rabbi Yechiel Halévi, Aminadab, the son Rabbi Yechiel Halévi; and 
my father-in-law, Rabbi Shmuel, the son of Rabbi Gerschon Halévi, and my mother-in-law, Malcha, the 
daughter of Rabbi Haim. May their souls be bound.” 
203 Emmanuel Levinas, “Nameless,” in Proper Names, translated by Michael B. Smith (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1996), 120. 
204 Levinas, Proper Names, 15.  
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millions of all confessions and all nations, victims of the same hatred of the other man, 
the same anti-Semitism.”205  
For Levinas, anti-Semitism is the equivalent of anti-humanism. In this context the 
Holocaust is absolute and useless human suffering, an event that sides itself with the 
worse order of human catastrophe.206 After such a disaster, the alternative is to leave the 
world of theodicy – the “vindication of divine justice in the face of the existence of 
evil”207 – and “assume a full responsibility for human behavior that is not the product of 
my freedom but ironically its condition that is given in the created fabric of the world.”208 
For Levinas, it is time that humans take responsibility rather than redirecting it onto the 
divine.  This sentiment leads him to focus on Jewish texts in search of new priorities in 
life, because, for him, there are no institutions left to count on. All human values have 
been swept away and human beings have embraced warlike virtues. He recommends 
giving priority to inner life and advocates the values of Judaism as the way out of this 
unbearable situation. Judaism, he suggests is humanity on the brink of morality without 
institutions.  
How does Judaism conceive of humanity?... by experiencing the presence of God 
through one’s relation to man…The way that leads to God therefore leads ipso 
facto – and not in addition – to man….the fact that the relationship with Divine 
crosses the relationship with men coincides with social justice…epitomizes the 
entire spirit of the Jewish Bible.209  
 
                                                 
205 Levinas’s preface to Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence. 
206 Sandor Goodhart, “Conscience, Conscience, Consciousness: Emmanuel Levinas, the Holocaust and the 
Logic of Witness,” in Emmanuel Levinas: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers, vol. 3, 146. 
207 On Levinas’s approach to theodicy after the Holocaust, see a helpful overview by Sandor Goodhart, 
“Conscience, Conscience, Consciousness: Emmanuel Levinas, the Holocaust and the Logic of Witness,” 
147. 
208 Goodhart, “Conscience, Conscience, Consciousness: Emmanuel Levinas, the Holocaust and the Logic of 
Witness,” 147.  
209 Goodhart, “Conscience, Conscience, Consciousness: Emmanuel Levinas, the Holocaust and the Logic of 
Witness,” 147. Levinas, Difficult Freedom, 16. 
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For Levinas, Goodhart comments, “all responsibility is in our hands, not because there is 
no God or because God has concealed or veiled His Face but because… God is otherwise 
than being, a God who demands of us nothing less than shouldering God’s own 
responsibility for others, for their lives, for their responsibility, even for their deaths.”210 
Conclusion 
 
In the present chapter we have offered a review of Levinas’s philosophy which 
centers on his transcendental ethics of responsibility. This consideration is essential for 
any discussion of his thought in relation to liberation theology. We situated Levinas’s 
thought within the phenomenological tradition of Continental philosophy. We further 
gave an overview of Husserl’s and Heidegger’s occupation with ontology, and showed 
how Levinas took issue with Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology for not giving 
a satisfying account of intersubjectivity and responsibility for the other.  
The examination of Levinas’s transcendental ethics of responsibility led us to 
appreciate his enduring concern about the primacy of the ethical relation to the other 
person. In order to further clarify Levinas’s assertion that ethics should replace 
metaphysics as first philosophy, we analyzed major concepts of his philosophy: the 
encounter with the other, the face, the trace, the infinite, transcendence and time, the 
Saying and the Said, and the third party and its call to justice. We also noted that the 
encounter with the other, in Levinas’s thought, calls the ethical subject to responsibility 
to the point of substitution, proximity, obsession, sensibility, hostage, vulnerability, 
maternity, etc. Given that Levinas held that philosophical thought was rooted in pre-
philosophical experiences – and recognizing the place of Jewish history as part of his life 
                                                 
210 Goodhart, “Conscience, Conscience, Consciousness: Emmanuel Levinas, the Holocaust and the Logic of 
Witness,” 147.  
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– we also looked at Jewish aspects in his thought, especially the influence that the Torah, 
the Talmudic tradition and the Holocaust have on his philosophy.  
This review has established that for Levinas the appropriate basis for philosophy 
lies not so much in the conjecture which gives rise to reflection, but “in a cry of ethical 
revolt, bearing witness to responsibility. It begins in prophecy.”211 Levinas presents the 
meeting with the face of the other as the suitable context in which to glimpse the trace of 
the divine. God is encountered in the ethical command of “Love thy neighbor.” The 
subject emerges as human in and through the ethical relation understood as love of the 
other as neighbor.   Here “there is only ‘me’ who bears the other ‘in my skin’ with the 
unique irreplaceability implied in this position.”212 These philosophical stirrings – subtle 
or explicit – will serve to put his position in dialogue with liberation theology’s 
standpoint. It is to liberation theology’s perspective that we now direct our consideration.
                                                 
211 Levinas, “God and Philosophy,” in The Levinas Reader, 185. With regard to Levinas’s view of 
philosophy as prophetic, Purcell writes, “Levinas views philosophy as prophetic, for philosophy’s task 
today is essentially a placing in question of the dominance of ontology and assessing ethics as first 
philosophy. The assertion of the primacy of the ethical and the challenge to the totalizing system is the role 
of the prophet. The prophet is related to ‘a surplus always exterior to the totality, as though the objective 
totality did not fill out the true measure of being, as though another concept, the concept of infinity were 
needed to express this transcendence with regard to totality, non-encompassable within a totality and as 
primordial as totality.’ The prophetic experience is situated within the totality and history, but it disrupts 
that totality.” See, Purcell, Mystery and Method, 218, footnote, 5. 
212 Baird, “Divinity and the Other: The Ethical Relation as Revelatory of God,” 105. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
The Neighbor as Liberation Theology’s Point of Departure: 
Gustavo Gutiérrez and Jon Sobrino 
 
Introduction 
 
The rise of modernity had a serious impact in the church’s theological approach.1 
Most contemporary theologians, since the Age of the Enlightenment, seem to take as 
their point of departure the challenge raised by the modern spirit, which proposes 
experience as essential for human understanding, while questioning the spiritual world 
and requiring of it a purification and revitalization.2 The substance of this experience 
includes all that is encountered in existence, because the experiential is always related to 
society, the place of human encounter with the others.  
One of the major tasks of theology became to reflect on experience, that is, the 
bringing together of human experience and the Christian story.3 Hence, the need for 
                                                 
1The term modernity can be rather slippery because it can describe a wider range of periods. As it applies to 
this dissertation, this term means the Cartesian-Kantian model of thought that places the human subject at 
the center of all knowing and meaning.  This helps to characterize the major contours of Emmanuel 
Levinas’s and liberation theology’s critique of modernity that tends to measure everything from the turn to 
the subject, the independent, the free and self-sufficient individual. 
2 Some twentieth century theologians influenced by the modern spirit include, to name but a few: Karl 
Rahner, Henri de Lubac, Jean Daniélou, M.-D. Chenu, Yves Congar, Bernard Lonergan, and Edward 
Schillebeeckx. 
3 Wilhelm Breuning, “Experience of God,” in Handbook of Catholic Theology, edited by Wolfgang Beinert 
and Francis Schüssler Fiorenza (New York: Crossroad, 1995), 248; Ellen Leonard, “Experience as a Source 
of Theology,” in Sources of Theology: Current Issues in Theology 3, Proceedings of the Catholic 
Theological Society of America, 43 (1998): 44-45. Gerald O’Collins has argued that, Roman Catholic 
fundamental theology has only recently incorporated the language of “experience” into its theology. The 
term was avoided by most Catholic theologians before the Vatican II Council (1962-1965); see his article 
“Experience,” in Dictionary of Fundamental Theology, edited by René Latourelle and Rino Fischella (New 
York: Crossroad, 1995), 306. For discussion on the role of human experience in theology, see Henri 
Bouillard, “Human Experience as the Starting Point of Fundamental Theology,” The Church in the World: 
Theology in the Age of Renewal. Concilium (New York: Paulist, 1965), 79-91. Donald L. Gelpi, The Turn 
to Experience in Contemporary Theology (New York: Paulist, 1984), 90.  
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fundamental theology, not only to incorporate experience into its project, but rather to 
begin its venture with human experience. This turn to experience resonated with many 
Catholics to the point that they were convinced – over and against the resistance and the 
obstinacy of some popes, namely Pius VI and later Pius IX – that turning to the new 
world was for the church the only option left, leading to the new era called new 
evangelization. The new era began during the pontificate of Leo XIII, who with the 
publication of the Encyclical Rerum Novarum laid the foundations for the option for the 
poor that became explicit under John XXIII.4  
Vatican II’s “Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern world” 
(Gaudium et Spes) expresses the urgency for a real solidarity of the Church with the 
whole human family, specially, with those “afflicted in any way.”5 The document affirms 
the Church’s responsibility and function of analyzing the signs of the times and of 
interpreting them in the light of the Gospel.6 It encourages Christians, especially pastors 
and theologians, to seek a balance between modern spirit and traditional themes, and 
begin a constructive dialogue with the contemporary world regarding the lasting 
questions of living the faith.7  In the immediate aftermath of the Council, the eighteenth 
                                                 
4 José Comblin, Called For freedom: The Changing Context of Liberation Theology (Maryknoll, N.Y.: 
Orbis Books, 1998), 1. For a helpful study on the rise of the expression “New Evangelization,” read 1-21. 
5 “Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World,” Gaudium et Spes 1, in Vatican Council II: 
The Conciliar and Postconciliar Documents, edited by Austin Flannery, vol.1, New Revised Edition (New 
York: Costello Publishing Company, 1998). 
6 Gaudium et Spes 4. 
7 Dennis P. McCann, “Signs of the Times,” in The Modern Dictionary of Catholic Social Thought, edited 
by Judith A. Dwyer (Collegeville, Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, 1994), 882. The Second Vatican 
Council began the official reinstatement of experience in sacred theology by vindicating some of the 
concerns and insights of the Modernists. The Council used the actual term experience in its teaching even if 
it was only carefully employed in the documents Gaudium et Spes and Dei Verbum.  Dei Verbum speaks of 
the “intimate sense of spiritual realities which Christians experience.” See, Gerald O’Collins and Edward 
Farrugia, “Modernism,” in A Concise Dictionary of Theology (New York: Paulist Press, 1991), 145; 
“Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation, “Dei Verbum 8, in Vatican Council II: The Conciliar and 
Postconciliar Documents, edited by Austin Flannery, vol.1, New Revised Edition (New York: Costello 
Publishing Company, 1998). 
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century turn to the subject became part of the Roman Catholic fundamental theological 
agenda. Human subjectivity and history became the fundamental ground for an 
epistemological theology. The starting point in theological method was no longer God, 
but the human person and his/her sitz im leben.8 
In a continent such as Latin America, the challenge to Christian theology became 
the political oppression and the socio-economic plight of “the ‘non-persons,’ those who 
are not recognized as humans by the social order: the poor, the exploited, those 
systematically and legally deprived of their status as human beings, those who barely 
realise what it is to be a human being.”9 Liberation theology invites Christian theology to 
leave the climate of the turn to the subject and move a step forward toward a 
consideration of the turn to the other that constitutes the truth of Christianity: the concern 
for the humanity (dignity) of every human being created in God’s image. This theology 
argues that God’s transcendental power is seen in human historical reality. To be sure, for 
Gutiérrez, Sobrino, and all liberation theologians, the opening to transcendence is the 
opening to history, such that the concepts of the kingdom of God and soteriology are 
linked to the creation of a better society and ethics. God’s transcendence and mystery are 
made visible only in human historical experience of love and responsibility for the 
neighbor.  
                                                 
8 Theologians date the turn to the subject to the seventeenth and eighteenth century Enlightenment (Kant 
and Descartes).  The influence of this turn to the subject on Christian theology took another two centuries. 
For Catholic theology, the crucial moment was the Second Vatican Council in the early 1960s. For a good 
survey of this turn to the subject, see Komonchak, “Defending Our Hope: On the Fundamental Tasks of 
Theology,” in Faithful Witness: Foundations for Today’s Church, 18-19; Gelpi, The Turn to Experience in 
Contemporary Theology, 90.  
9 Gustavo Gutiérrez, “The Task and Content of Liberation Theology,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Liberation Theology, translated by Judith Condor and edited by Christopher Rowland (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 28. 
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The stress here is on the neighbor’s humanity as a first moment in the process of 
theological reflection. The humanization of the victims of this world through the 
principle of love of neighbor as taught by Christianity characterizes Gutiérrez’s and 
Sobrino’s theological enterprise. It is a theology that stems from the meaning of love of 
neighbor in Christianity in the midst of the tragic human situation. It searches for the 
divine transcendence in a life of commitment to the other human person, and calls for 
justice and love of neighbors.   
This chapter aims at discussing Gutiérrez’s and Sobrino’s theological contribution 
to Catholic theology. After discussing the emergence of liberation theology in the context 
of both modernity and sacred theology, this chapter examines Gutiérrez’s and Sobrino’s 
social, cultural, and ecclesial background and their major theological themes.  Lastly, this 
chapter will show that the central insight of Gutiérrez’s and Sobrino’s theological models 
repose on the human neighbor. The human person, the neighbor, the poor, the stranger, 
the widow, the oppressed, the homeless, etc is the place for a possible revelation from 
God.10 For Gutiérrez and Sobrino, it is in the works of justice, in loving one’s neighbor, 
that transcendence is encountered. Thus, salvation cannot be dissociated from the real 
historical humanity in which humans live. This soteriological perspective takes its 
content from Jesus’ command of love of neighbor, his ministry to the poor and his 
opposition to oppression. Notwithstanding possible reservations in terms of the method 
                                                 
10 James Gustafson gives a strong criticism of liberation theology in terms of a lack of subordination of 
human piety and ethics to God and God’s purposes. As a matter of fact, Gustafson criticizes a great deal of 
Christian theology for the same reason, of making human existence the measure of the content of religious 
piety; see his Ethics from a Theocentric Perspective (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981), 22-
25. Other articulations of the same suspicion are in terms of a reduction of the vertical dimension of 
Christian faith to the horizontal. For an overview of some criticisms of liberation theology, see Arthur F. 
McGovern, Liberation Theology and Its Critics: Toward an Assessment (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 
1989), 11-14, 47-50; Dennis P. McCann, Christian Realism and Liberation Theology: Practical Theologies 
in Creative Conflict (Maryknoll, N. Y.: Orbis Books, 1981). 
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used to articulate this thought in the concrete situation, this chapter would argue that the 
foundation of liberation theology, that is, the turn to the neighbor, has a continuing 
relevance for the critical issues of Christian life and witness in our postmodern wounded 
world, and share some conceptual affinities with Levinas’s philosophical turn to the 
other. Gutiérrez, Sobrino, and Levinas – as it will be shown in the third chapter – argue 
that the other human person or the neighbor is the condition for the possibility of the 
subject’s subjectivity, and that humans relate to God as subjects of a historical world. 
I. The Emergence of the Theology of Liberation 
 
The historical roots of liberation theology are to be found in the earliest colonial 
days in Latin America, namely, at the time of Conquista. At the time of the crossing of 
the Atlantic Ocean by Columbus, the Conquistadores and the missionaries, religion and 
state, were working hand in hand. Christ’s images that were developed took the line to 
suit the colonialist propaganda interests; Christ was presented as a dying man and as a 
heavenly ruler (1492).11 In a sense, Christology, instead of being liberative, was 
developed as a tool for oppression. Prophetic missionary voices questioned the Church’s 
position and the ill treatment of indigenous Indios. The names of Bartolomé de Las 
Casas12 (1484-1566), Antonio de Montesino, and others stand as figures of the opposition 
                                                 
11 Volker Küster, The Many Faces of Jesus Christ: Intercultural Christology (Maryknoll, N. Y.: Orbis 
Books, 2001), 41- 42. Küster Volker is a lecturer in the history of religion, mission and ecumenics in the 
University of Heidelberg. His book, The Many Faces of Jesus Christ, offers a good overview to the 
theologies of the Third World. It focuses on commonalities and differences of Third World Christologies, 
and on their significance for ecumenism.  
12 The positive role Bartolomé de Las Casas played in setting the stage in which liberation theology was 
built does not mean that we overlook his initial participation in the colonial system. He later converted and 
freed his Indio slave so as to stop the system. 
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to the systematic killing of the Indios. For these missionaries, the Indios became the poor 
of whom the scriptures speak about.13  
The most notable fact about the emergence of liberation theology in Latin 
America, however, is the cultural challenge that modernity posed to traditional 
Christianity in the late 1960s. This was not a new phenomenon. Already in the early days 
of the church, Christians were to defend and explain their faith in their cultural milieu. 
They found in the neighboring cultures logoi spermatikoi (germinal intelligibilities) that 
enabled them open up their faith to the new cultural realities. This incorporation of the 
cultural in the ecclesial was so effective that in the twelfth and thirteenth century the 
church established universities as a means to a necessary cultural commitment. There 
surfaced a few daring figures, most outstandingly Thomas Aquinas.14 In that sense, 
Kenneth L. Schmitz is right to argue that one would be right while discussing liberation 
theology to use Aquinas as a reference point, because at the basis of his theology lies 
human historical experience (human active intellect).15 Pope Leo XIII, in his time, 
presented Aquinas to the world as a guide in this very praxis, because Aquinas developed 
                                                 
13 Küster, The Many Faces of Jesus Christ , 42, 45. 
14 Komonchak, “Defending Our Hope: On the Fundamental Tasks of Theology,” 15-16. Komonchak 
writes: Thomas Aquinas “not only took up the challenge of writing new works contra gentiles (against the 
pagans) but even borrowed from the new languages and methods to construct the great new summae 
theologicae (theological synthesis)…Unfortunately, the same thing cannot be said about the succeeding 
ages when challenges became far more radical and fractured over centuries the social and cultural unity of 
the Christendom. In the face of the complex developments that occurred during the Renaissance and 
Reformation, the scientific revolution, the Enlightenment, the economic and social revolutions of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and the rise of historical consciousness, the church desperately needed 
imitators of Aquinas, people with his ability, confidence, modesty, and respect. But it seldom found them. 
Instead, particularly after the French Revolution, most of these developments were interpreted as a 
demonically inspired apostasy from the former ideal … But instead of launching a confident evangelizing 
effort, [the church] created a distinct Catholic subsociety, inspired by a distinctly antimodern subculture,”  
16. It was not until the Second Vatican Council that that these cultural elements were taken into 
consideration in Catholic theology. 
15 Kenneth L. Schmitz suggests following Thomas Aquinas’ point of view that “the evidential role of 
experience in Thomas points towards experience as prelude to conceptualization.” By conceptualization 
Schmitz does not refer to the formation of abstract concepts, but rather the entire range of the intellectual 
life of the human person in community and in the world. See his article “St Thomas and the Appeal to 
Experience,” Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society of America, 47 (1992) 1-20. 
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a universal understanding of a particular temporal-historical situation that put into focus a 
community of beings.16 Currently, Schmitz contends “the appeal to experience is taken 
by many to be what gives to meaning its modern currency. Experience so taken becomes 
the central bank for meaning and for its communication and exchange.”17 Fulton Sheen 
observes that experience seeks encounter and relationships rather than arguments;18 here 
experience is a direct encounter with reality.19 Aquinas has provided an intellectually and 
affectively rich understanding of experience which had proved crucial in the development 
of Catholic theology’s appeal to experience.  
Most contemporary theologians, who took seriously questions raised by 
modernity, as we shall see below, were imitators of Aquinas. They had talent, self-
assurance, humility, and admiration for him; and more importantly, these scholars, both 
before and after the Council, brought back to Catholic consciousness, the spirit and the 
determination of the Fathers of the church to face major cultural challenges. This 
theological orientation had great impact on Vatican II Council’s new reading of the 
socio-economic and cultural context. Vatican II committed the church to participate not 
only in the “joy and hope, grief and anxiety” (Gaudium et Spes, 1) of contemporaries but 
to join them in the common responsibility of analyzing critically socio-political, 
economic and cultural issues.20  
                                                 
16 Schmitz, “St Thomas and the Appeal to Experience,” 13. 
17 Schmitz, “St Thomas and the Appeal to Experience,” 1. 
18 Sheen Fulton “Contemporary Conceptions of Religion,” Proceedings of the American Catholic 
Philosophical Association 2 (1926): 76. 
19 For more on this see Werner Schneiders, “Experience in the Age of Reason,” in Revelation and 
Experience, edited by Edward Schillebeeckx and Bas Van Iersel, Concilium 113 (1979): 22; also Dietmar 
Mieth, “What is Experience?” in Revelation and Experience, edited by Edward Schillebeeckx and Bas Van 
Iersel, Concilium 113 (1979): 49. For a cautionary perspective on the appeal to historical experience for 
theology, see David Tracy, Plurality and Ambiguity: Hermeneutics, Religion, Hope (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1987). 
20 Komonchak, “Defending Our Hope: On the Fundamental Tasks of Theology,” 17. 
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Joseph A. Komonchak notes three areas in which modernity challenged classical 
theology: the epistemological, the historical, and the political. The epistemological 
inaugurated by Descartes and Kant required that “all knowledge claims be justified 
critically through an analysis of the structure and dynamics of human consciousness. This 
‘turn to the subject’ meant philosophy’s passage from metaphysics to epistemology as 
grounding discipline, from being to subjectivity as the primary focus, and from nature to 
history as the primary object.”21 The historical consciousness has to do with human 
beings’ responsibility for the ever-evolving history of the world in which they are a part. 
This means that as they live in history, they exercise their freedom within the limits of the 
conditions of history and at the same time, have the responsibility, individually and 
communally, to construct the human future. In other words, they have to adapt to new 
realities. The socio-political factor represents the third area. Its main concern is the 
permanent transformation of the socio-political structures of societies. A new socio- 
political environment forces Christian theology to rethink its presuppositions as these 
changes effect a displacement of the public function of religion as being part and parcel 
of human society. The church to remain credible was to face head-on the effect of 
modernization rather than retreating into a less significant system stimulated by an ideal 
of the past, which has no connection with credible and relevant new cultural realities.22  
Vatican II affirms Roman Catholic theology’s relationship with modernity and a 
great generation of theologians collaborated to bring about this significant encounter. It 
became important to articulate the meaning of Christian theology by considering the 
cultural context and the experience of persons to whom and for the sake of whom the 
                                                 
21 Komonchak, “Defending Our Hope: On the Fundamental Tasks of Theology,” 18. 
22 Komonchak, “Defending Our Hope: On the Fundamental Tasks of Theology,” 18-19. 
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gospel is proclaimed. From that moment onward, Catholic theologians made theological 
anthropology the focal point of fundamental theology. They attempted to show how “the 
fundamental structure and dynamism of the human consciousness opens itself to the 
question of God and to a possible revelation from God.”23 The anthropocentric turn 
became the main “task of Christian theology that of showing how the central Christian 
doctrines meet the fundamental needs and desires of the human person which the basic 
anthropology uncovers.”24  
To be sure, most theologians that articulated this theological anthropology were 
German and were influenced by the philosophical anthropology of Max Scheler. They 
included Emil Brunner, Paul Tillich, Friedrich Gogarten, Karl Rahner, Wolfhart 
Pannenberg, Jürgen Moltmann, and Walter Kasper to name but a few. No one, however, 
was more prominent in those days than Karl Rahner. Rahner pays attention to the insights 
of the Greek philosophers, the Bible, the transcendental Thomism of Joseph Maréchal, 
and the historicity of Heidegger to announce a method that combines anthropocentrism 
and theocentrism. Rahner’s task has been to make the truth of Christianity as articulated 
by the church’s tradition pertinent and connected to human experience.25 He uses a 
correlational method that links experience and revelation to show the reasonableness for 
                                                 
23 Komonchak, “Defending Our Hope: On the Fundamental Tasks of Theology,” 21. 
24 Komonchak, “Defending Our Hope: On the Fundamental Tasks of Theology,” 21. 
25 Gasper Martinez, Confronting the Mystery of God: Political, Liberation, and Public Theologies (New 
York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2001), 15. (My italics). For Martinez, “Rahner marks a 
turning point in Catholic theology because he is able to show the intrinsic connection between human 
openness to God and human nature as the latter appears in the analysis of experience. That is the reason 
why Rahner (although he was not alone in bringing about the change, and, therefore, the names of Yves 
Congar, Henri de Lubac, M.-D. Chenu, Bernard Lonergan, and others should be added to his on that score) 
is said to have set the agenda for the development of a catholic theology concerned with the realities of 
history and contemporary society, eager to enter into dialogue with modernity, and called to be socially 
relevant,” 5. For a valuable vade mecum on the theology of Karl Rahner, see The Cambridge Companion to 
Karl Rahner, edited by Declan Marmion and Mary E. Hines (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005). 
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theological reflection “from within human experience.”26 For Rahner, every categorical, 
concrete experience points always as its condition of possibility to a transcendental 
experience that is, unthematically but originally, involved in the experience of 
transcendence. And transcendence, always hinted at in any human experience, is most 
adequately identified with the triune God of Christian revelation.27  
Rahner’s theology is important for understanding the emergence of liberation 
theology. It plays the role of a starting point and opens new ways for subsequent 
theological currents. Liberation theology, in its determination to make Christianity 
relevant for human society, shares Rahner’s key principle, specifically, “the intrinsic 
correlation that exists between human history and the history of salvation.”28 It is from 
this heritage that Gutiérrez, Sobrino and other Latin America scholars developed their 
own theological projects by taking into account their socio-political and economic 
context of poverty and oppression. The fundamental discontinuity in relation to Rahner is 
that Latin America Liberation theology takes as its starting point human relationships 
with one another in society as a place of God’s revelation while Rahner begins with the 
subject’s transcendental experience with God and then directs that experience to human 
historical reality.29 It is not enough to only focus on the philosophical anthropology of the 
                                                 
26 Martinez, Confronting the Mystery of God, 17. 
27 Martinez, Confronting the Mystery of God, 6-7. 
28 Martinez, Confronting the Mystery of God, 23. 
29 While there is certainly a need for an explicit and elaborate historical moment in Rahner’s method, we 
would still think that in his approach to method, anthropology, grace and Christology, Rahner argues for 
the reciprocal interdependence of transcendental and historical reflection in theology. His recognition of the 
necessity of furthering justice and peace in the social realm and Christianity’s need to go against the socio-
political status quo and protect the poor and rootless, shows his interest with both political and liberation 
theologies, beyond the transcendental orientation, see his “Thoughts on the Possibility of Belief Today,” in 
Theological Investigations, vol. 5 (New York: Seabury, 1975), 10, 16; “The Development of Dogma,” in 
Theological Investigations, vol. 1, translated by Cornelius Ernst (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1963), 42, 49, 
50, 64.) Furthermore, Rahner’s theological project takes seriously the reality of the love of God and the 
love of neighbor. Rahner justifies church involvement in social development based on its mandate to love 
one’s neighbor and on its eschatological hope. (See Daniel T. Pekarske, “Theological Justification of the 
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subject’s openness to the transcendent being, but rather, it is important, liberation 
theology argues, to realize that the opening to transcendence is the opening to history, 
such that the concepts of the kingdom of God and soteriology are linked to the creation of 
a better society and ethics. 
 After Vatican II, conditions were created within the Church for local churches to 
find their ways for a new Catholic praxis; hence, a new method of theology was 
necessary. Reading the signs of the times, Latin American theologians developed a new 
theological method: social Christianity. The effort since the council, to construct local 
theologies or social Christianity stemmed from the desire to leave the climate of a 
generalized anthropology and address, as Komonchak contends, “questions of meaning 
and value posed by individuals living in particular places at specific times, confronting 
concrete personal and social challenges with the resources mediated by their societies and 
culture.”30   
Social Christianity, which began in the 1930s and continued to have some appeal 
until the early 1960s, emerged in response to the hardships, uprisings, and repressions of 
that period. It stressed the duty of lay persons to remedy social ills without waiting for the 
religious hierarchy, represented by its priests, to act. Although these movements did not 
advocate change in the basic social and political structure of the country, they did call for 
improvements. In most Latin American countries between the 1950s and 1960s, populist 
governments inspired nationalistic consciousness, and significant industrial development 
benefited only the middle classes and the urban proletariat while a huge sector of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Church’s Development Work,” abstract, Karl Rahner’s Theological Investigations 1-23 (Milwaukee: 
Marquette University Press, 2002), 547-548; For a helpful study on this, see Karl Rahner, “Theological 
Justification of the Church’s Development Work,” in Theological Investigations, vol. 20, translated by 
Edward Quinn (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1981), 66-70, 70-73. 
30 Komonchak, “Defending Our Hope: On the Fundamental Tasks of Theology,” 23. 
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peasantry was forced into a deep rural marginalization. The consequence of this was the 
creation of strong popular movements seeking profound changes in the socio-economic 
structure of their countries. In turn, these movements provoked the rise of military 
dictatorships to safeguard the interests of capital repression and police control of all 
public demonstrations. In the Church of Latin America, the 1960s’ renewal began with a 
movement whereby lay persons, bishops, priests and religious started taking their social 
role seriously.31  In the late 1960s, the social attitudes of the Roman Catholic Church in 
El Salvador, as elsewhere, were profoundly influenced by Vatican II and the social 
encyclicals of Pope John XXIII,32 as well as by the Second Latin American Bishops’ 
Conference held in Medellin, Colombia, in 1968, which addressed the issues of Vatican 
II from a distinctly Latin American perspective. The Medellin document on poverty 
begins: 
The Latin American bishops cannot remain indifferent in the face of the 
tremendous social injustices existent in Latin America, which keep the majority of 
our peoples in dismal poverty, which in many cases becomes inhuman 
wretchedness. A deafening cry pours from the throats of millions of men, asking 
their pastors for a liberation that reaches them from nowhere else.33 
 
These gatherings, especially the Medellin conference, emphasized the need for a more 
worldly involvement by the Roman Catholic clergy in the lives and problems of 
                                                 
31 Christian Smith, The Emergence of Liberation Theology: Radical Religion and Social Movement 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 71-88. 
32 For an overview of the impact of both the Vatican II Council and the Medellin conference on the 
beginning of the liberation theology movement, see Smith, The Emergence of Liberation Theology: Radical 
Religion and Social Movement. According to Christian Smith, “The Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) 
has been called ‘the greatest event in twentieth-century church history, an event which caused a 
‘Copernican shift’ in Catholic thought’.” 94.  Mater et Magistra (1961) – Christianity and Social progress:  
Deplores the widening gap between rich and poor nations, arms race and plight of farmers. Calls Christians 
to work for a more just world; Pacem in Terris (1963) – Peace on Earth: Affirms full range of human right 
as the basis for peace. Calls for disarmament and a world-wide public authority to promote universal 
common good. 
33 Smith, The Emergence of Liberation Theology, 18. For an overview of the Vatican II period leading to 
Medellin, see 122-164. 
 76
parishioners and advocated activist programs to improve the living conditions of the 
lower class. The document commits the Church to a project of a radical social change 
“claiming that to create a just social order … is an eminently Christian task.”34 
 As the Latin American socio-political and economic situation called for actions, 
liberation theologians introduced a radical interpretation of the Bible that employs 
Marxist terminology to analyze and condemn the wide disparities between the wealthy 
elite and the impoverished masses. Hence, a liberating theology was set out in a particular 
context, a context of poverty and oppression. Gutierrez is seen as the founder of this 
theological approach in the late 1960’s, and since then, one of its proponents. He 
“proclaims a prophetic theology based on the gospel and the experiences of men and 
women who have committed themselves to the process of liberation in the oppressed and 
exploited land of Latin America.”35 For Küster Volker, if Gutiérrez is the father of this 
new approach to theology in a Latin American context, Leonardo Boff and Jon Sobrino 
are among those who gave it a systematic direction.36 Sobrino, confronted with the 
phenomenon of oppression in El Salvador, sought to reinterpret the spectrum of Christian 
theology in light of the real.37 This real for Sobrino is what is profound and true, and 
what touches the inner being of the individual. An option was made in Latin America to 
recapture the truth of Christianity by showing concern for the poor, the oppressed, and 
the marginalized of the society. And this preferential option for the poor was the germ of 
what later came to be known as liberation theology – concern for others’ humanity. 
                                                 
34 Smith, The Emergence of Liberation Theology, 18-19. 
35 Küster, The Many Faces of Jesus Christ, 47. (Küster’s italics).  
36 Küster, The Many Faces of Jesus Christ, 47-48. 
37 In this regard, Ignacio Ellacuria is influential. In fact, the real for Ellacuria is history and/or reality of 
people’s life. For a helpful study, see his “The Historicity of Christian Salvation,” in Mysterium 
Liberationis: Fundamental Concepts of Liberation Theology, edited by Ignacio Ellacuria and Jon Sobrino 
(Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books/Collins Dove, 1993), 251-289. Here Ellacuria argues for the fundamental 
unity of the divine and the human in history. 
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In Latin America, a theology of liberation arises by asking the following 
questions: “What is the meaning of faith in a life committed to the struggle against 
injustice and alienation? And what is the meaning of the struggle against an unjust 
society and the creation of a new man in the light of the Gospel?”38 How to proclaim God 
as Father in an inhuman world? “How do we tell the ‘non-persons’ that they are the sons 
and daughters of God?” 39 How could we explain human suffering before God?  
What is at stake here for liberation theology is the humanity of human beings, that 
is, the place of mediation of God’s revelation. Christianity, Gutiérrez and Sobrino affirm, 
cannot be dissociated from the real historical fact of humanity: the subject’s encounter 
with the other who bears the mark of God. Although Gutiérrez and Sobrino, always 
against the background of Vatican II, had their theology opened up by the same 
Rahnerian heritage, each developed his theological project in different cultural and social 
contexts, yet denounced the same human responsibility behind poverty, injustice, and 
oppression. At this point, we now turn to the analysis of the theology of Gutiérrez and 
Sobrino, paying special attention to the social, cultural, and ecclesial milieu of each and 
their major theological themes. 
II. Gustavo Gutiérrez 
 
An understanding of liberation theology as a theological movement would be 
possible only in relation to the characteristics of the society and the church from which it 
emerges as a way to comprehend Christian faith. In the case of Gutiérrez this context is 
the Peruvian society and by extrapolation the whole of Latin American society. It is 
therefore in order to examine here the social, cultural, and ecclesial background from 
                                                 
38 Komonchak, “Defending Our Hope: On the Fundamental Tasks of Theology,” 23 
39 Gutiérrez, “The Task and Content of Liberation Theology,” 28. 
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which Gutiérrez’s theology stems.  In the process of his thought, religion, faith, and God 
become part of everyday life, narrowing the gap between the secular and the sacred, 
between life and faith.   
Social, Cultural, and Ecclesial Background of Gutiérrez Theology 
 
 Gutiérrez is a Dominican priest and theologian born on 8 June 1928 in Peru where 
he obtained his Bachelor of Science from the National University of Lima in 1950. 
During his years in Europe (1951-1960), he studied philosophy and psychology in 
Louvain, and theology in Lyon and Rome. It was not until 1985 that he received his 
doctorate from the Institut Catholique de Lyon. Gutiérrez has been professor at the 
Pontifical University of Peru and visiting lecturer at many major universities in North 
America and Europe. He is John Cardinal O'Hara professor of theology at the University 
of Notre Dame. Ordained to the priesthood in 1959, he works as pastor in Rimac, Peru, 
directs the Bartolomé de Las Casas Center in Lima, and has been a member of the 
Peruvian Academy of Language. Gutiérrez is recognized for his work for human dignity 
and life in Latin America and the Third World. He has also published in and been a 
member of the board of directors of the international journal, Concilium.40 
His years of studies in Europe, especially his encounter with les mouvements 
spécialisés d’Action Catholique (Catholic Action’s specialized movements) and la 
nouvelle théologie, would have an impact on him and on other Latin American graduate 
                                                 
40 Marcella Althaus - Reid, “Gutiérrez, Gustavo,” in The Oxford Companion to Christian Thought, edited 
by Adrian Hastings, Alistair Mason and Hugh Pyper with Ingrid Lawrie and Cecily Bennett (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), 284; Martinez, Confronting the Mystery of God, 111; See also University 
of Notre Dame Website at [database on-line] available from 
http://www.nd.edu/~theo/faculty/gutierrez.html, accessed April 27, 2006. 
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students who came to Europe to study.41 Proponents of la nouvelle théologie called for a 
theological renewal that would bring the church into contact with the concerns of 
contemporary society.42 During those years, according to Muskus, Gutiérrez came into 
contact with the inspiring intellectual environment of European Catholicism in search of 
renewal and profound dialogue with modern social sciences. He was also attentive to 
different philosophical and ideological movements – regarded with suspicion by the 
church – such as Marxism, Freudianism, the different theories of evolution, etc.43  
Equally important in that regard is the pastoral consequence that derives from 
these theological developments, namely, that witness aspect of Christian faith in society. 
Christians were invited to witness to the values of the gospel of love in their different 
social milieus. These developments are important to Gutiérrez’s theology. His 
experiences in Europe were translated into the Latin American scene. When he returned 
to Lima in 1959, he became pastor in a parish and began working as a lecturer in the 
department of theology and social sciences at the Catholic University of Lima. He also 
                                                 
41 Martinez, Confronting the Mystery of God, 111-112. For an understanding of la nouvelle théologie, see 
Ted Mark Schoof, Survey of Catholic Theology, 1800-1970, translated by N.D. Smith (Glen Rock, N.J.: 
Paulist Newman Press, 1970), 91-121, 194-210. Smith, The Emergence of Liberation Theology, 86-87. 
42 Smith, The Emergence of Liberation Theology, 86. Well known among these scholars were “Jean 
Daniélou, Henri de Lubac, Yves Congar, M-D Chenu, and Henri Bouillard. In the course of time, they 
developed contacts with Swiss theologians Hans Küng and H. Urs von Balthasar, Karl Rahner of Germany, 
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43 Eddy José Muskus, The Origins and Early Development of Liberation Theology in Latin America with 
Particular Reference to Gustavo Gutiérrez (Waynesboro, GA: Paternoster Press, 2002), 4.  Muskus’s book 
questions liberation theologians’ claim about the originality of their theological perspective. Markus claims 
to produce important evidence to show that the fundamental tenets of Latin American liberation theology 
had their origin in Europe. This issue has been a source of divergent views as Martinez would 
acknowledge. He writes “the relationship between European theology and liberation theology has been the 
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what makes them different from each other.” See Martinez, Confronting the Mystery of God, 112. 
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Moltmann. Miguez Bonino critiqued Moltmann and other European theologians for retreating to a neutral 
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on the same theological principles of the theologians he was critiquing and that liberation theologians in 
general did in fact not contribute much to theological enterprise from a strictly Latin American 
perspective.” cf. footnote 84, p. 287.  
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became the chaplain of the National Union of Catholic Students, a university branch of 
Catholic action where he identified himself with the political fight of the people and the 
extensive number of articles he wrote articulated that profound concern.44 
While Gutiérrez is acknowledged worldwide as one of the most original and 
expressive theologians of liberation, few, however, give sufficient attention to the fact 
that he is a Peruvian theologian who was born among the poor of Peru, and lived in 
Rimac, Lima, “a gray dirty, noisy slum where residents are anxiously trying to survive, to 
find or keep a job, to feed and clothe children.”45  It was in this context of abject poverty 
in Rimac that Gutiérrez not only worked as pastor and friend of the poor, but also wrote 
nearly his entire theology. Being a Quechan Indian by birth Gutiérrez is located among 
the oppressed in Peru who suffered prejudice and discrimination from fellow Peruvians 
because of their mestizos’ heritage. As the people of Peru struggle for hope Gutiérrez puts 
that hope into theological language.46  
Peru is situated in western South America, bordering the South Pacific Ocean, 
between Chile and Ecuador. It is a land of remarkable beauty and complex socio-political 
problems. Ancient Peru was the seat of several prominent Andean civilizations, most 
                                                 
44 Muskus, The Origins and Early Development of Liberation Theology in Latin America with Particular 
Reference to Gustavo Gutiérrez, 4-5. With regard to Gutiérrez’ involvement in the UNEC (Unión Nacional 
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changed its emphasis from religious to the political sphere under the influence of Gutiérrez…Garland 
points out that at that time the doctrinal position of the UNEC became more extreme, emphasizing the 
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45 Curt Cadorette, “Peru and the Mystery of Liberation: The Nexus and Logic of Gustavo Gutiérrez’s 
Theology,” in The Future of Liberation Theology: Essays in Honor of Gustavo Gutiérrez, edited by Marc 
H. Ellis and Otto Maduro (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1989), 49. 
46 On the constitutive Peruvian identity of Gutiérrez’s theology, see Curt Cadorette, “Peru and the Mystery 
of Liberation: The Nexus and Logic of Gustavo Gutiérrez’s Theology,” 49-58, and also Cadorette, From 
the Heart of the People: The Theology of Gustavo Gutiérrez (Oak Park, IL: Meyer-Stone Books, 1988), 
esp. 30-82. Muskus, The Origins and Early Development of Liberation Theology in Latin America with 
Particular Reference to Gustavo Gutiérrez, 3. 
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notably that of the Incas whose empire was captured by the Spanish conquistadors in 
1533. Peruvian independence was declared in 1821, and remaining Spanish forces were 
defeated in 1824.47 After years of military rule, Peru embraced democratic leadership in 
1980, but its wealth and economic structure have deteriorated over the years due to a 
number of factors, including the growth of a violent insurgency.  
In Peru it is obvious that poverty, corruption, drugs, and terrorism are 
interconnected. These are the major problems that the country faces in addition to 
discrimination and division. The Spanish conquest and the subsequent colonization 
negatively affected the cultures and traditions of the country.48  One of the direct 
consequences of the conquest was the dramatic massacre of the native population and the 
inhuman working conditions. Even after the independence from the Spaniards, the 
natives were still being oppressed and discriminated against. They were not consulted in 
the political process and could not hold public office.49 The racial structure of the country 
made up of natives, whites, blacks, mestizos, Chinese and Japanese has created a very 
complex racial mix in which marginalization and repression were common. For instance, 
the Indians were excluded and considered as nonpersons; they were disregarded and ill-
treated by the ruling white minority.50 Gutiérrez has constantly stated that in Peru and in 
many other Latin America countries, both natives and blacks were counted among the 
                                                 
47 For an excellent description of the socio-political, cultural and economic situation of Peru, see Martinez, 
Confronting the Mystery of God, 89-110. 
48 Martinez, Confronting the Mystery of God, 92 - 94. According to Martinez, “the lack of solutions to these 
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49 Martinez, Confronting the Mystery of God, 95- 96. 
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nonpersons. For Peruvians the fundamental question has been the question of identity in 
the land of conquest, poverty, and violence.  Cadorette writes  
[B]oth in the past and in the present, race, class, and gender determine who will 
flourish and who will perish in Peru…. The legacy of colonialism is all too tragic: 
divisive, destructive stratification built into the fabric of the nation’s history, 
immense disparity between rich and poor, male and female, and a painfully 
ambiguous sense of nationhood. This is the human, historical backdrop of 
Gustavo Gutiérrez’s theology.51 
 
The crucial development in recent Peruvian history that constitutes the direct referential 
point for Gutiérrez’s theology, most especially his notion of ‘the irruption of the poor in 
history,’ is the population growth in the 1940s. As a result many Peruvians, especially the 
Sierra and the Selva left the villages to immigrate into the cities, looking for a better life 
in terms of jobs, services, and social mobility. As this situation could not leave people 
indifferent, a group of thinkers and politicians came up and proposed a rethinking of the 
nation and a change in its structures. These intellectuals would eventually have a major 
influence on Gutiérrez’s theological project.52 
With regard to the role of the church, one could say that the church played a 
major role in Peru. From the outset the church’s role has been confusing because of its 
close tie with the conquerors. This relationship was part of Alexander VI’s papal bull in 
1493.53 The royal patronage of Spain over the church in Peru made the Peruvian church 
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52 Gasper Martinez makes this point by mentioning a couple of towering figures of this generation of 
intellectuals who influenced Gustavo Gutiérrez: Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre (1895-1979), founder of the 
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53 Martinez argues that “in 1493, Pope Alexander VI acknowledged in five bulls the right of the Spanish 
crown to the territories in America under the conditions of evangelizing them. The papal bulls were one of 
the main elements used by the crown to justify its possessions and the legitimacy of its policies, arguing 
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submissive to the Spanish crown and the task of evangelization was in the hands of the 
crown. Instead of denouncing this situation of real exploitation of the local population, 
the church, in a way, blessed the establishment of the law that nearly always privileged 
the existence of systems that gave the conquerors compensations at the expense of the 
indigenous.54  
Notwithstanding the church’s involvement and confusing role during this period, 
some of its members had the courage to denounce the colonial mistreatment of the 
Indians and defend their right to be considered of equal dignity with the conquerors, also 
in the name of Christ.55 For instance Bartolomé de Las Casas, although he never achieved 
his goal, was outstanding in denouncing the abuses and the illegality of the conquest.56 
As things started changing gradually in the country, the Peruvian church became 
suspicious of the central government with regards to the people’s social plight. This 
movement seemed to have been generalized in the wider Latin American church. Diverse 
Christian communities in the Latin America continent came together for the first time in 
“an attempt to interpret the new social challenges the church had to face in a society that 
                                                                                                                                                 
that the crown had fulfilled the condition of evangelizing those possessions…In 1505 and 1529 new bulls 
established the patronage of the Spanish crown over the church in the American territories, meaning that 
the administration of missionary work (such as the sending of missionaries and the appointment of bishops) 
was directly under the crown. That determined that the role of the church in America was intrinsic to the 
advance of the conquest, that the administration of the task of evangelization was in hands of the crown, 
and that the roles of the church and the crown were not clearly separated.”  See, his Confronting the 
Mystery of God, 100-101. 
54 Martinez, Confronting the Mystery of God, 101. 
55 According to Martinez, “Gustavo Gutiérrez has examined this difficult situation in his historical-
theological work on the Spanish missionary Bartolomé de Las Casas” in his Las Casas: In Search for the 
Poor of Christ, translated by Robert R. Barr (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1993), see Martinez, 
Confronting the Mystery of God, 101. For an overview on the role of the church in this period, see 
Martinez, Confronting the Mystery of God, 101-102. “One difficulty in judging the role of the church in the 
conquest and colonization is,” Martinez writes, “on the one hand, the difference between principles and 
practice and, on the other hand, the diversity of attitudes and actual behaviors inside the church with respect 
to that practice.”  
56 Martinez, Confronting the Mystery of God, 104. Martinez writes, Las Casas “is Gutiérrez’s model both in 
perspective and in content for liberation theology.” He “brought completely new insights and approaches 
into the theological discussion, as regards the understanding of human nature, history, and God.”  
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was becoming more complex and more and more touched by the transformations of 
modernity.”57 This began the church’s commitment to take special actions aimed at 
addressing the very root of unjust situations of poverty and oppression. It was the 
beginning of a cry for love of neighbor and justice. 
 In Peru, the opening of the church to the modern world, along the lines of the 
Vatican II’s Gaudium et Spes, exposed the country to its social problems. The reality of 
the sweeping poverty had challenged the basic premises of the modern hopeful view of 
the world. Most Latin American countries denounced a relational framework which 
created an unhealthy dependency of developing nations upon the developed countries. 
The denunciation was articulated on the model of analysis called the theory of 
dependency which spread throughout Latin America in the late 1960s.58 
In the same period, Latin American bishops were holding their second general 
conference in Medellin, Colombia interpreting Vatican II from their own local 
standpoint. The conclusions of the conference had a tremendous impact on the Latin 
American church as it took a strong position in opposition to unjust social structures. 
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Medellin became for the church in Latin America a re-reading of Vatican II’s goal of 
being the universal sacrament of salvation. Medellin’s conference by so doing 
undoubtedly made clear the new orientation of the Latin American church, namely the 
preferential option for the poor. Such an orientation, Medellin argues, has to be espoused 
by the universal church.59 Also crucial in the development of the theology from the 
underside of history was the third conference of Latin American bishops in Puebla, 
Mexico, in 1979. Puebla proclaimed the preferential option for the poor of the Latin 
American church.60 In Peru the church identified itself openly with the cause of the 
people, especially the poor. Thus, the first steps of Gutiérrez’s theology have to be 
understood against this background.  
Gutiérrez’s education inspired him to come to grips with those challenges from 
the poor and the oppressed. His training and encounter with people in Europe made him 
conscious of the need to take sides with the oppressed and the poor. According to 
Cadorette, that Gutiérrez knows the people’s culture and language and that he shares their 
hopes and aspirations as part of his heritage are significant elements for whoever who 
wants to understand him both as a human being and a theologian.61 The main points of 
his theology examined henceforth will help to uncover the reason why the experience of 
the poor and oppressed are important to Gutiérrez’s understanding of faith. 
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Gutiérrez’s Major Theological Themes 
 
Gutiérrez’s theology is an attempt at reflection, based on the gospel and the 
experiences of men and women committed to the process of liberation in the oppressed 
and exploited land of Latin America. For Elizabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, Gutiérrez places 
at 
 [T]he center of theological reflection the poor, the ‘others,’ the nonpersons, who 
are absent from history. He insists over and against Euro-American ‘progressive’ 
theology that the point of departure for Latin American theology is not the 
question of the modern nonbeliever but the struggle of the nonperson for justice 
and freedom.62  
 
Gutiérrez’s theological themes run through his writings, most especially in his book, A 
Theology of Liberation: History, Politics, and Salvation, which introduces the insights, 
themes, and process of liberation to the rest of the world. For the purpose of this 
dissertation, our attention will be focused on the following themes because of their 
relevance:  theology as critical reflection on praxis, the fundamental option for the poor, 
encountering God in history, liberation, development and salvation, spirituality of 
liberation, and the church as sacrament of history.  
Theology as Critical Reflection on Praxis 
 
In analyzing Gutiérrez’s theology the influence of Vatican II and other theological 
currents that became decisive at that council must be kept in mind. The Council and 
Gutiérrez’s European stage sparked in him a new understanding of what being a Christian 
means. He became completely influenced by the primacy of pastoral action in his 
                                                 
62 Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, “The Politics of Otherness: Biblical Interpretation as a Critical Praxis for 
Liberation,” in The Future of Liberation Theology: Essays in Honor of Gustavo Gutiérrez, edited by Marc 
H. Ellis and Otto Maduro (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1989), 311. (Schüssler Fiorenza’s italics). While 
Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza praises Latin American liberation theology for its effort to center theological 
reflection on the poor, the “others,” she also regrets the fact that it has not sufficiently attended to the fact 
that the majority of the poor in the world are women and children dependent on women. See 311-325. 
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reflection and expressed his dissatisfaction with the classical task of theology defined as 
wisdom and rational knowledge.63  
Theology for Gutiérrez has to be understood as the critical reflection on the 
church’s action in the light of the revealed word. This means a reflection “on humankind, 
on basic human principles… [and on a]…clear attitude about economic and socio-
cultural issues in the life of the Christian community.”64 As a result, theology would 
unavoidably “be a criticism of society and the church insofar as they are called and 
addressed by the Word of God.”65 Thus, “a privileged locus theologicus for 
understanding the faith will be the life, preaching, and historical commitment of the 
church.”66 Citing the work of Yves Congar, Gutiérrez asserts:  
If the church wishes to deal with the real questions of the modern world and to 
attempt to respond to them …it must open as it were a new chapter of theologico-
pastoral epistemology. Instead of using only revelation and tradition as the 
starting points, as classical theology has generally done, it must start with facts 
and questions derived from the world and from history.67 
 
 This turning to the totality of human history allows theology to realize its significant 
function vis-à-vis ecclesial praxis without limitation. In this way, Gutiérrez believes 
theology “fulfils a prophetic role insofar as it interprets historical events with the 
objective of revealing and proclaiming their profound significance.”68 In the final 
                                                 
63 Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation, 4-5. He writes with regard to this classical task of theology that 
“theology is of necessity both spirituality and rational knowledge. These are permanent and indispensable 
functions of all theological thinking. However, both functions must salvage, at least partially, from the 
division and deformations they have suffered throughout history. A reflective outlook and style especially 
must be retained, rather than one or another specific achievement gained in a historical context different 
from ours.” See also Robert McAfee Brown, Gustavo Gutiérrez: An Introduction to Liberation Theology 
(Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1990), 75-101. 
64 Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation, 9. 
65 Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation, 9. 
66 Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation, 9. 
67 Yves Congar, Situation et tâches présentes de la théologie (Paris : Les Éditions du Cerf, 1967), 72 as 
quoted by Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation, 9-10.  
68 Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation, 10. 
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analysis, theology, understood as a critical reflection on society and the church inevitably 
calls for a redefinition of the two tasks of classical theology. Wisdom’s and rational 
knowledge’s approach to theology ought to have the ecclesial praxis as their point of 
departure and their context. As Gutiérrez asserts: 
 It is for all these reasons that the theology of liberation offers us not so much a 
new theme for reflection as a new way to do theology… It is a theology which is 
open – in the protest against trampled human dignity, in the struggle against the 
plunder of the vast majority of humankind, in liberating love, and in the building 
of a new, just and comradely society – to the gift of the kingdom of God.69  
 
This kind of theology, emerging from concern for historical events, is both desired and 
needed. 
The Fundamental Option for the Poor 
 
Poverty, marginalization, oppression, and the new forms of exploitation brought 
about by capitalism have been the major problems for Latin American countries since the 
nineteenth century and up to the recent past.70 This is what Medellin so fittingly describes 
as “institutionalized violence” on the poor and a systematic violation of the most 
elemental human rights.71  It is in view of this that Gutiérrez came to an awareness of the 
world of the ‘other’ – of the poor, the oppressed, and the exploited class.  He questions all 
the economic, social, and political order that oppresses and marginalizes the poor and 
proposes a theology of the fundamental option for the poor. He seeks to go to the very 
root of the misery and injustice in which millions in Latin America and other parts of the 
world live. 
                                                 
69 Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation, 11-12. (Gutiérrez’s italics) 
70 Gutiérrez, The Power of the Poor in History, 186. 
71 Gutiérrez, The Power of the Poor in History, 191. 
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From the outset, Gutiérrez’s theological project is about the life of the poor and 
oppressed. In the situation where Gutiérrez lives the questions of the meaning of life and 
God were not posed by intellectuals, but rather by those whom he calls nonpersons, the 
oppressed, those for whom society has no place. They are indeed treated as such by those 
with power in society. They wonder how to believe in God in the world that denies their 
personhood. For Gutiérrez this question concerns the whole human person “who is 
already wondering how liberation can come and how one can move from being a 
nonperson to a real person. And this means looking at the political, social, and economic 
structures of society as the context in which the theological issue is raised.”72  
The characteristic trait in Gutiérrez’s theology is the connection between pastoral 
practice and reflection. This linkage has greatly to do with the spirit of Vatican II which 
invites Christians to give witness to their faith in society. The Medellin conference in 
1968, embracing the spirit of Vatican II, encouraged the Latin American theologians to 
creatively relate the doctrine of the church to the world in Latin America. An impetus 
was added with the publication of Populorum Progressio and the Third World Bishops’ 
Letter to the Peoples of the Third World. These two documents clearly condemn the 
exploitation of the poor by developed countries and invite the church to take seriously the 
plight of the poor and the oppressed.73  
                                                 
72 McAfee Brown, “Preface: After Ten Years,” in Gustavo Gutiérrez, The Power of the Poor in History, 
viii. 
73 Martinez, Confronting the Mystery of God, 121.  For a full text of the Third World Bishops’ letter, see 
Alfred T. Hennelly, Liberation Theology: A Documentary History (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1990), 
48-57. Medellin can be seen as a defining moment for the fundamental option for the poor. For Gutiérrez, 
“it was the texts of the Episcopal Conference of Medellin which brought to public attention the theme of 
liberation as the pivot for apprehending faith.” See Gustavo Gutiérrez, “Liberation Movements and 
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  Gutiérrez is looking for a program of transformative action dependent on both 
the word of God and a right social analysis that effectuates “liberation from every form of 
exploitation, the possibility of a more human and dignified life, [and] the creation of a 
new humankind” 74 – all of which passes through the love of one’s neighbor who bears 
God’s image. For Gutiérrez the existence of poverty is structural and its causes lie in the 
oppression of some classes by others. Marginalization, oppression, and poverty are rooted 
in social relations. Any conversation about Christian love must criticize such attitudes 
and take side with the oppressed. All genuine theology, for Gutiérrez, has to take into 
consideration the irruption of the poor in history by creating thus a new and different 
society. The task of Christian theology as taken from this fundamental option for the poor 
is to tell both the oppressors and the nonpersons, that God is love, and that this love 
makes us all brothers and sisters. Martinez words are here helpful, as they summarize 
Gutiérrez’s theology: 
Gutiérrez’s theology of liberation is a decision to work from the viewpoint of the 
poor – the exploited classes, marginalized ethnic groups, and scorned cultures. 
This led him to take up the great theme of poverty and the poor in the Bible. As a 
result, the poor appear within this theology as the key to an understanding of the 
meaning of liberation and of the meaning of the revelation of a liberating God.75  
 
The Encounter with God in History 
 
The fundamental theological issue in the discussion about encountering God in 
history is that of the relationship between nature and grace as developed by Karl Rahner. 
Rahner maintains the essential relationship between nature and grace by arguing that 
                                                                                                                                                 
is no doubt that his influence at Medellin was  decisive to establish the overall orientation and the 
theological framework of the assembly, and that, in turn, he was confirmed and encouraged by the spirit 
and the result of the conference in his search for the theology of liberation.” 121. For an analysis of a 
mutual influence between Medellin and Gutiérrez, see McAfee Brown, Gustavo Gutiérrez: An Introduction 
to Liberation Theology, 11-14. 
74 Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation, 174. 
75 Martinez, Confronting the Mystery of God, 120. 
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God, the holy mystery, is connected to human history by revealing himself in Jesus and 
he is operative in history through the Holy Spirit. Gutiérrez sees in Rahner’s 
understanding of the relationship between nature and grace an avenue for the assertion of 
an intrinsic link between human history and salvation history. Thus, in his book, A 
Theology of Liberation, he creatively worked out Rahner’s significant view which affirms 
the constant existence of God’s grace in all created reality and the central connection 
between the history of salvation and history at large. 
Gutiérrez constructs his project upon the Rahnerian foundations and must 
specifically embrace Rahner’s anthropological perspective. Yet he also expands Rahner’s 
anthropology by focusing, not on the subject in general, but on the concrete and historical 
subject’s relationship with the other in his/her own society. Gutiérrez’s subject is the 
other, the nonsubject, the neighbor, the other human person utterly poor, oppressed and 
abandoned.76 Gutiérrez is eager to show how the human subject relates to God through 
the encounter with the nonsubjects, the others.77 This is Gutiérrez’s way of answering the 
question about the meaning of the Latin America struggle. Human history, therefore, is 
the location of our encounter with God, in Christ.  
In history, Gutiérrez argues, the biblical God has always been close and 
committed to human beings. At the outset of the history of the chosen people, God made 
a covenant with the people and vowed to live with them forever (Exod. 29: 45-46; 26: 11-
12); and God’s sanctuary is in the midst of them forever (Ezek. 37: 27-28). The tent, the 
Ark, and the mountain in the Hebrew Scriptures stressed God’s presence sharing in the 
                                                 
76 Martinez, Confronting the Mystery of God, 122. 
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Praxis of Suffering: An interpretation of Liberation and Political Theologies (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis 
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historical life of the people and how he revealed himself in history (Exod. 33: 7-11; Num. 
1:1; 10: 35-36; 11:16, 24-26; Deut. 31: 14; 2 Sam. 7: 6-7). Again, in proclaiming the new 
covenant with his people, God promised to be present in the very heart of every human 
(Ezek. 36: 26-27; Jer. 31: 33).78 God’s commitment to human beings, however, was 
totally fulfilled, for Gutiérrez, with the Incarnation of the Son of God who became flesh 
to dwell among us (John 1:14). “God is visible in the humanity of Christ, the God-Man, 
irreversibly committed to human history.”79 Christ is God’s temple and “the Christian 
community is a temple of living stones, and each Christian, a member of the Christian 
community, is a temple of the Holy Spirit who should not be destroyed” (1Cor. 3: 16-
17).80 
Gutiérrez asserts also in a more comprehensive way that “not only Christians are 
temples of God; every human being is.”81 To substantiate this he refers to the episode of 
Cornelius in the New Testament (Acts 10:45, 47; 11: 16-18 and 15:8). Hence, Jesus 
Christ is the universalization of the presence of God. “In him, in his personal uniqueness, 
the particular is transcended and the universal becomes concrete.”82 Now, since humanity 
– every human person – is the living temple of God, all human actions in history have an 
effect upon God. As a consequence, “we meet God in our encounter with others; we 
encounter God in the commitment to the historical process of humankind.”83 That the 
encounter with God occurs in the neighbor is a traditional biblical theme. Matthew 25: 
31-45 is a very good illustration of this, but the whole Hebrew Scriptures teach: to know 
                                                 
78 Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation, 107-108; see also The Power of the Poor in History, 3-12. 
79 Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation, 109. 
80 Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation, 109. (Gutiérrez’s italics) 
81 Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation, 109. 
82 Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation, 109. 
83 Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation, 110. See also The Power of the Poor in History, 12-16. 
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God is to do justice (Jer. 22:13-16). Whatever is done for the stranger, the widow, and the 
orphan has an effect upon God; those are the three types of poor. With regard to the 
parable of the final judgment in Matthew 25, Gutiérrez insists that Christ is in the 
neighbor we encounter daily. Christ teaches us the importance of the other person as the 
ultimate meaning of human life. He insists “on a love which is manifested in concrete 
actions, with ‘doing’ being favored over simply ‘knowing’, and the revelation of the 
human mediation necessary to reach the Lord.”84  
The love of God for human beings is found incarnated in human love. Gutiérrez 
gives the example of the Samaritan who approached the injured man on the side of the 
road to explain that God is loved in the neighbor (Luke 10: 33; 1:7, 8; 7:13; 15:20).85 
Thus, “the neighbor” Gutiérrez warns:  
[I]s not an occasion, an instrument, for becoming closer to God. We are dealing 
with a real love of persons for their own sake and not ‘for the love of God,’ as the 
well-intended but ambiguous and ill-used cliché would have it – ambiguous and 
ill-used because many seem to interpret it in a sense which forgets that the love 
for God is expressed in a true love for persons themselves. This is the only way to 
have a true encounter with God. That my actions towards another is at the same 
time an action towards God does not detract from its truth and concreteness, but 
rather gives it even greater meaning and import.86  
 
A distinct merit of Gutiérrez and the entire liberation theology movement is that it gave 
renewed attention to the centrality of human mediation as the primary means to reach 
God, which has strong scriptural roots:  
our encounter with the Lord occurs in our encounter with others, especially with 
those whose human features have been disfigured by oppression, despoliation, 
and alienation and who have “no beauty, no majesty” but are the things “from 
which men turn away their eyes” (Isa. 53:2-3)…Our attitude towards them, or 
rather our commitment to them, will indicate whether or not we are directing our 
                                                 
84 Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation, 113. 
85 Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation, 114. 
86 Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation, 116. 
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existence in conformity with the will of the Father. This is what Christ reveals to 
us by identifying himself with the poor in the text of Matthew.87 
 
For Gutiérrez, “theology of liberation means establishing the relationship that exists 
between human emancipation – in the social, political, and economic orders – and the 
kingdom of God.”88 Martinez’s words excellently illustrate Gutiérrez’s thought on the 
other human person’s role in our relationship with God:  
God is encountered in history because God is irreversibly committed to human 
history in Christ. Christ is the point of encounter of God and the creature and the 
expression of the utter importance of human reality and history within the divine 
plan. It follows then that to believe in God and to encounter God in history 
through the other are intrinsically linked.89 
 
Liberation, Development and Salvation 
 
For Gutiérrez, liberation theology’s emphasis on the turn to the neighbor in the 
human historical situation cannot remain indifferent to the problems of human liberation 
and development, because God’s desire to save humankind embraces all human reality.  
As the world experiences profound and rapid socio-cultural transformation, differences in 
the transformation process have separated diverse countries, regions, and groups of 
people on the planet. This situation calls for liberation and development of those less-
privileged as a participation in God’s desire to save all humankind.90 As the evangelical 
principles are in radical incompatibility with unjust and alienating structures of societies, 
Christians, in virtue of their faith in the God of love, should be moved to participate in 
the liberation of the oppressed peoples and exploited social classes.91 Gutiérrez sees the 
process of liberation and development as a way to address the most primary human 
                                                 
87 Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation, 116. 
88 Hennelly, Liberation Theology: A Documentary History, 69. 
89 Martinez, Confronting the Mystery of God, 120. 
90 Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation, 13. 
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aspirations of liberty, dignity, and the possibility of personal fulfillment for all.92 He 
understands the struggle for liberation and development as the breaking of the domination 
of the rich countries and the misuse of power and wealth by some people in their 
societies. For Gutiérrez, the process of liberation articulates the unavoidable moment of 
fundamental change which is unfamiliar to the common use of the term development. For 
a strategy of development to be effective and meaningful, Gutiérrez insists, it has to take 
place within the context of liberation.93  
Gutiérrez views “development [as] a total social process, which includes 
economic, social, political, and cultural aspects, [because] this notion stresses the 
interdependence of the different factors.”94 Progress in one area implies a move forward 
in all areas, while stagnation in one area would hold back the growth of the rest. To view 
development in this wider context, Gutiérrez affirms, unavoidably calls for an ethical 
aspect which assumes a concern for human values. Thus, development as economic 
growth would be meaningful only by embracing a humanistic perspective: the concern 
for human values, most fundamentally the dignity of the human person.95 For Gutiérrez, 
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to speak about a theology of liberation and development is to seek an answer to the 
question: what relation is there between salvation and the historical process of human 
liberation?96 The need for liberation and development as a participation in God’s desire to 
save all humankind led Gutiérrez to argue for a close link between salvation and 
liberation. “Salvation – the communion of human beings with God and among 
themselves – is something which embraces all human reality, transforms it, and leads it to 
its fullness in Christ.”97  
The world beyond ours is the transformation and fulfillment of the present life. 
Hence, as Gutiérrez states, “the absolute value of salvation – far from devaluating this 
world – gives it its genuine meaning and its own autonomy, because salvation is already 
latently there.”98 The salvific action of God underlies all human existence, because there 
are no two histories, one profane and one sacred. “There is one history – a ‘Christo-
finalized’ history.”99 Thus, “salvation embraces all persons and the whole person; the 
liberating action of Christ – made human in this history and not in a history marginal to 
real human life – is at the heart of the historical current of humanity; the struggle for a 
just society is in its own right very much a part of salvation history.”100  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
August 6, 1984, noted  certain “dangers” of Liberation theology, especially its use of Marxist ideas and its 
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Spirituality of Liberation 
 
For Gutiérrez history is one, and the history of salvation is at very heart of human 
history. Human history, therefore, provides the location of the human encounter with God 
where it can find peculiar expression in contact with others so as to bring about the 
liberation of humankind. To place oneself in the perspective of the kingdom of God 
means to participate in the struggle for the liberation of those oppressed by others. 
Gutiérrez stresses the urgent need for a spirituality of liberation that focuses on a 
conversion to the neighbor, the oppressed person, the exploited social class, the despised 
ethnic group, the dominated country.101 He sees a relationship between spirituality and 
the content of liberation theology, and insists that human spiritual life cannot be separated 
from historical life.102  
 Gutiérrez distinguishes three themes of the new spirituality: conversion, 
gratuitousness, and joy. Conversion means a break with the past, a setting out on a new 
path. It involves a possibility for a new life, lived in solidarity with others. Moreover, it 
also has to influence the socio-economic, political, cultural, and human milieu from 
which conversion comes about.103 Hence, a real human person is concerned with the life 
of those of who suffer injustice. A purely interior and spiritual attitude is not enough to 
become a new person. Conversion to the neighbor is significant because it leads to the 
“knowledge” of God; “to know God is to do justice… Hunger for God and hunger for 
bread, mainly bread for the neighbor, are perpetually interconnected.”104  
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Gratuitousness has to do with God’s gracious love. It is the source of our ability to 
love, act and commit ourselves to a liberating task. A genuine love begins with an 
attention to the real need of the other human person, not with an obligation to love.105 For 
Gutiérrez “the conversion to one’s neighbors, and in them to the Lord, the gratuitousness 
which allows me to encounter others fully, the unique encounter which is the foundation 
of communion of persons among themselves, and of human beings, with God, these are 
the source of Christian joy.”106 Joy as a gift is an expression of life’s victory over death. 
It is already present and not yet present amidst the complexities and worries of the great 
effort for the construction of a more just society.107 Joys also articulates the assurance 
that undeserved oppression and suffering will be surmounted. In the face of this, 
Gutiérrez argues,  
The only joy that can finally sustain is ‘Easter joy, joy springing from hope that 
death is not the final word of history,’ and that those who encounter crucifixion 
can likewise experience resurrection. God’s activity can be seen in movements for 
justice, and human involvement in such movements makes the life of joy 
possible.108 
 
Spirituality as the placing of oneself in the perspective of the kingdom means to join a 
new way that privileges an option on behalf of life. The option finds expression 
predominantly in the life of commitment to those who are subject to ‘a premature and 
unjust death.’ This attitude of God must serve as a model for all humans.109 As the 
prophet Micah puts it, “He has showed you, O man, what is good; and what does the 
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Lord require of you but to do justice, and to love kindness, and to walk humbly with your 
God?” (6:8). 
The Church as Sacrament in History 
 
Any examination of Gutiérrez’s ecclesiology cannot but make reference to the 
influence of the Second Vatican Council on the church as a whole and the encouragement 
it gave to the Latin American church. Vatican II documents on the church in the modern 
world, Gaudium et Spes, defined clearly what role the church should play amidst the 
profound and rapid changes as well as the cultural and social transformations that are 
evident around the world.110 During the period of the council, and with the return home 
of a new generation of priests from their studies in Europe, the Latin American church 
began to think through ways of launching a discussion on salvation explicitly addressed 
to the plight of women and men in their part of the world. The aim was to arrive at a 
common pastoral and theological trend for the Latin American people in the light of their 
sitz im leben. Medellin’s conference theme summarizes well this new orientation: “The 
Church in the actual transformation of Latin America in the light of the Council.”111  
As Vatican II was able to set forth a new perspective for the church by speaking 
of it as a sacrament of salvation whose visibility in history reveals and signifies 
humankind’s union with God and the unity of all humankind,112 Gutiérrez called for “a 
new ecclesial consciousness and a redefinition of the task of the church in a world in 
which it is not only present, but of which it forms a part more than it suspected in the 
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past.”113 As the universal sacrament of salvation, the church has to be a sign of the reality 
it proclaims to humankind, that is, its being is not ‘for itself,’ but rather ‘for others.’114 As 
a result, the church must cease to see itself as the exclusive place of salvation and instead 
orient itself towards a new and radical servant of the people. It has to turn to the world, 
where Christ and his Spirit are continually active for the salvation of all humanity. It 
should also be evangelized by the world.115 Gutiérrez writes: 
This dialectic relationship is implied in the emphasis on the church as sacrament. 
This puts us on the track of a new way of conceiving the relationship between the 
historical church and the world. The church is not a non-world; it is humanity 
itself attentive to the Word. It is the people of God which lives in history and is 
oriented toward the future promised by the Lord. It is, as Teilhard de Chardin 
said, the “reflexively Christified portion of the world. The church-world 
relationship thus should be seen not in spatial terms, but rather in dynamic and 
temporal ones.”116 
 
Consequently, the church as a sign of God’s presence in history should – in its concrete 
existence – be a place of liberation both internally and externally. It should break with 
unjust social orders, commit itself to oppose exploitation and alienation, promote justice 
on behalf of the nonpersons, and dedicate itself to build a society of solidarity and justice. 
This is, for Gutierrez and other liberation theologians, the essence of what the church is: 
to strive to create a human brother/sisterhood. In the context of Latin America, Gutiérrez 
asserts, the role of the church is to struggle against the radical causes of injustice, 
oppression, and marginalization of the poor. If it does so, it will play its prophetic role 
and so be an authentic and effective sign of unity under the universal love of God.117  
                                                 
113 Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation, 143. 
114 Lumen Gentium, 48; Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation, 147. 
115 Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation, 147. 
116 Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation, 147. 
117 Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation, 148. 
 101
Gutiérrez’s theology of liberation – as presented in his major theological themes – 
is a decision to work from the viewpoint of the neighbors, the other human persons, 
especially those who are oppressed and marginalized. It calls for the ‘creation’ of new 
human persons based on God’s love for us and the love of neighbor. Jon Sobrino’s 
theological perspective, after Gutiérrez, takes the same direction. It is to Sobrino’s 
theology that we now turn. 
III. Jon Sobrino 
 
In the preceding part of this chapter Gutiérrez’s theology was analyzed and it 
became clear that an understanding of liberation theology as a theological movement 
would be possible only in relation to the characteristics of the society and the church 
from which it surfaces. A useful place to begin an examination of Sobrino’s theological 
project is the El Salvadoran society and by extension the whole of Central American 
society. It will therefore be the task of this study to situate Sobrino’s thought in his socio-
cultural and ecclesiastical context. In the development of his reflection, the humanization 
of the victims of this world becomes part of everyday life. This lessens the breach 
between the worldly and the holy and links life and faith.   
Social, Cultural, and Ecclesial Background of Sobrino’s Theology 
 
Jon Sobrino, a Spanish-Basque, was born in 1938 and entered the Jesuit order in 
1956 at the age of eighteen. He went to El Salvador in 1957 as a nineteen-year-old Jesuit 
novice, and since then, has belonged to its Central American province. Between 1963 and 
1965, he earned a licentiate in philosophy and humanities as well as a diploma in 
engineering, both from the University of St. Louis. After his ordination to the priesthood 
in 1969, he continued his studies in theology at the Jesuit College of St. Georgen in 
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Frankfurt, where he received a doctorate in 1975. His dissertation was on “The 
Significance of Cross and Resurrection in the Theologies of Jürgen Moltmann and 
Wolfhart Pannenberg.” 118  
Upon his return to El Salvador he began editing, along with his Jesuit confrere 
Ignacio Ellacuria, a collection of books entitled Mysterium Liberationis. This series was 
meant to be the Summa Theologica of liberation theology. In November 1989, members 
of the Salvadoran army murdered Ellacuria and five other Jesuits priests. Apart from the 
two periods of study in Germany and in the United States, Sobrino has spent his life in El 
Salvador teaching at the Jesuit University José Simeón Cañas in San Salvador, its capital 
and largest city.119 He is one of the many Roman Catholic clergy who have risked their 
lives by identifying with and defending the Salvadoran poor and oppressed. Sobrino 
escaped the fate of six of his closest companions who were murdered by the security 
forces in November 1989, only because he was lecturing in Asia at the time.  
The Republic of El Salvador is situated in Central America and it is surrounded 
on the south by the Pacific Ocean, on the west by Guatemala, and on the north and east 
by Honduras. It is “the smallest,” “one of the poorest” and “most densely populated 
republics in Latin America.”120 According to Peterson the “average per capita gross 
national product was slightly over one thousand U.S. dollars in 1991, and combined 
under, and unemployment hovers around seventy percent.”121 Most Salvadorans have no 
access to clean water, food, and medical care. There is also a high level of illiteracy. 
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Peterson points out that the notable disproportionate sharing of land and revenue has also 
contributed to the plight of the people, in a society in which most families have 
traditionally depended on agriculture for their living. 
After independence from Spain, indigenous lifestyle was yet to improve. The 
economic problems and the concentration of land and wealth in the hands of a few was 
still a major concern. For instance, as Peterson shows “one percent of the population 
controls seventy-one percent of the farmland, and over ninety-six percent of the rural 
population has twelve acres or less. Half of the national income goes to only eight 
percent of the population.”122 As a result this created a significant economic disparity 
among the population and has stimulated several revolutions during colonial and 
postcolonial periods of the country’s history. To the indigenous protests the government 
and the landowners responded with the formation of militia groups to repress popular 
protest.123 While the country seemed to have made some economic progress during the 
1950s and 1960s, its overpopulation, economic problems, and inequitable social system 
led to social and political unrest. By the end of the 1970s, murder and other terrorist acts 
by leftist guerrillas and especially by right-wing “death squads” had become 
common.124 Peterson describes the situation as follows: The  
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[C]entral government remained out of reach of the opposition, political organizing 
intensified at the grassroots. Spurred by the continued corruption and economic 
injustices, a number of organizations emerged during the late 1960s and early 
1970s to challenge the traditional division of power and resources. In parts of the 
countryside, peasants organized to demand fairer wages, land distribution, and 
living conditions.125 
  
Peterson also explains that following Vatican II and the Medellin conference, church-
based groups in rural areas of El Salvador, such as FECCAS (the Christian Peasant’s 
Federation) and the UTC (Union of Farmworkers) began to reflect on the meaning of the 
scripture in relation to their situation.126 These, according to Sigmund, “proposed an 
agrarian reform program that would respond to the desperate land hunger of an 
overpopulated country in which most of the land was in the hands of a small, wealthy 
oligarchy.”127 Quickly, in Peterson’s estimation, “these organizations developed 
leadership skills as well as ideas about social justice and the value of collective action, in 
base Christian communities, cursillos, encuentros, and other Catholic educational and 
pastoral programs.”128 Moreover, these organizations had the support of clergy and 
religious, and most importantly those connected with the Jesuit institutions in San 
Salvador which were accused of promoting reform. Included here were obviously Ignacio 
Ellacuria and Sobrino whose call for the end of injustice and violence led to accusations 
of leftist sympathies.129 
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In El Salvador, social Christianity emerged in the 1930s in response to the 
hardships, uprisings, and repressions of that period. The movements called for 
improvements and the respect of the other human person. In the late 1960s, the social 
attitude of the Roman Catholic Church in El Salvador was profoundly influenced by 
Vatican II and the social encyclicals of Pope John XXIII.130 Also influential was the 
Second Latin American Bishops’ Conference held in Medellin, Colombia, in 1968, which 
addressed the issues of Vatican II from a distinctly Latin American perspective. These 
gatherings, especially the Medellin conference, emphasized the need for a more worldly 
involvement by the Roman Catholic clergy with the lives and problems of parishioners 
and advocated activist programs to improve the living conditions of the lower class.  
Sobrino observes that the poor and the outcast are a majority that live in misery 
because of socio-economic structures, severe repression and political violence. This 
situation of injustice in El Salvador between the 1970s and 1980s has contributed to his 
commitment to view the world through the eyes of the poor, the marginalized and the 
oppressed – the victims of this world. He writes: 
I have been asked to write about “how my mind has changed,” and I must say that 
it has changed indeed – though not just my mind, I hope, but my will and heart as 
well. Because the changes that I have experienced and will write about have also 
been experienced by many others in El Salvador and throughout Latin 
America…I will therefore try to explain the essence of such fundamental change 
from the perspective of El Salvador, comparing it with another change which is 
often said to lie at the heart of so-called modern Western civilization. From the 
time of Kant, such change has been described as an awakening from a “dogmatic 
slumber” – an awakening that is like the liberation of reason from subjection to 
authority and which, in turn, gives rise to the dogmatic proclamation that the 
fundamental liberation of the human being lies in the liberation of reason. In the 
Third World, the fundamental change also consists of an awakening, but from 
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another type of sleep, or better, from a nightmare – the sleep of inhumanity. It is 
the awakening to the reality of the oppressed and subjugated world, a world 
whose liberation is the basic task of every human being, so that in this way human 
beings may finally come to be human.131 
 
This realization is what Sobrino experienced upon his return to El Salvador in 1974 after 
his studies in Europe. Many of his Jesuits brothers and others, among them Ellacuria and 
Archbishop Oscar Romero, had already been awakened from the sleep of inhumanity and 
had begun to speak of the poor, injustice, and liberation. Gradually, it became clear to 
him “that truth, love, faith, the gospel of Jesus, God, the very best we have as people of 
faith and human beings – these were somehow to be found among the poor and in the 
cause of justice.”132 In El Salvador, Sobrino argues, he discovered what the cross of Jesus 
signifies looking at the life of millions of innocent people who die at the hands of 
executioners, and because of poverty and injustice. He explains: 
What characterizes our Salvadoran reality is the unjust poverty of the majority, 
which produces a slow daily death, to which can be added the speedy and violent 
death which occurs in the form of repression and war. The world which is more 
real and more Salvadoran is thus the world of poverty and injustice. This is in a 
quantitative sense, since the majority are poor, and it is in a qualitative sense, 
because that poverty is not only one dimension of reality among many, but the 
one which cries out the most.133 
 
Confronted with the phenomenon of oppression in El Salvador, Sobrino – like his Jesuit 
brothers – could not but begin by asking the questions: Why this oppression and what are 
its roots? How is it “possible to be a human being and not sometimes feel the shame of 
belonging to inhuman humanity”?134 This experiential reality led him to the ideological 
suspicion of the superstructure, particularly of Christian theology; and so he arrived at a 
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new way of experiencing theological reality, which became, in a way, his new 
hermeneutic. 
Sobrino seeks to reinterpret the spectrum of Christian theology in light of the real. 
The real is, for Sobrino, the historical humanity in which we live. He takes the real for his 
starting point and rethinks the whole of revelation and the life of the church in a search 
for the salvation-liberation of the victims of this world. He was relentless in his efforts to 
develop a systematic Latin-American liberation theology with a Christological 
perspective. Christology is central to Sobrino’s theological reflection as it will be 
discussed fully below. Influenced by his theological education and journey through his 
historical-social location, he came to understand Christology as a reflection on praxis, 
whereby context precedes the text.  
The world of poverty and crucified peoples has allowed Sobrino to overcome 
blindness and discover dishonesty. He made an option, above all, to live in the midst of 
the true Salvadoran reality. This was his fundamental option for the poor, demanded of 
Christians by the gospel and ethically required by history. But above all, it is a primarily 
human option to become simply real and more human himself. The emphasis here is on 
the sufferings of the majority of people, not only in Latin America but all over the world. 
“Jesus’ actions,” Sobrino argues, “were designed not only to declare the dignity [of the 
poor and the oppressed] in the sight of God, but also to mount a radical assault on the 
causes of their social indignity – the material conditions of their existence and the 
religious concepts of their time.”135  
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Jon Sobrino’s Major Theological Themes 
 
 The life, death and the resurrection of Jesus stand at the center of Sobrino’s 
hermeneutical approach to theology. His reflection is mainly Christological and endorses 
the image of Jesus’ historical life, his teaching about the kingdom, and his death and 
resurrection. It is in this Christological approach that his main themes surface: the 
historical Jesus, the death and resurrection of Jesus, the centrality of the Reign of God, 
ecclesiology, and spirituality as being human with spirit.   
The Historical Jesus 
 
An important aspect in Sobrino’s Christological thinking is the possibility of 
constructing Christology on the basis of the historical Jesus.136  In his book Christology 
at the Crossroads,137 he makes clear that the historical Jesus is the best starting point for 
developing Christology.138 He sees the historical Jesus as being concrete and the basic 
traits of Jesus as key.139 He argues that “it is access to the concrete Jesus that brings out 
his universal potentialities in diverse historical situations.”140 Hence, “the historical Jesus 
is the hermeneutic principle that enables us to draw closer to the totality of Christ both in 
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terms of knowledge and in terms of real-life praxis.”141 This is how Sobrino finds the 
unity of Christology and soteriology.  
 Sobrino sees Latin American Christology as responding to a concrete situation in 
the light of the actual history of Jesus of Nazareth. The dominant image is that of Christ 
as the Liberator. For him, theology goes beyond the role of explanation and focuses 
instead on developing a concrete praxis for responding to the situation at hand.  In this 
sense, liberation theologians begin with the area in which they see a need for salvation 
and find in Christ a response. Sobrino also argues that liberation theology’s turn to the 
historical Jesus as a model is a normative way for Christians and other humans to discern 
how to act in their own political and social situations.142 
The Death and Resurrection of Jesus 
 
As the historical reality of the cross of Jesus is critical to the theological notion of 
Christian resurrection, Sobrino argues that there should be a more concerted emphasis in 
theology on the cross of Jesus, the scandal of the event, and what it means for today. For 
Sobrino, Jesus’ crucifixion is at the center of his historical life. This is the central facet of 
theology as it articulates the genuine originality of the Christian faith.143 Without the 
cross, it is impossible to conceptualize the resurrection of Christian people with concrete 
reality. Sobrino denounces any theological approach that tries to explain away the event 
of Jesus’ crucifixion by only focusing on the resurrection.  
The death of Jesus shows that he truly suffered the same way like those living in 
poverty and oppression in the present-day Latin America. And as such, it is an important 
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concrete point of reference for the victims of this world to develop Christology. The 
theological consideration of the death of Jesus leads to a reformulating of the conception 
of God. It was on the cross that God himself suffered the death of the Son and took upon 
himself all the pain and suffering of history.144 In so doing, God expressed his love for 
humanity in a historical way. If the cross of Jesus was not a historical reality, the 
revelation of God in the cross could not have occurred because the death of Jesus on the 
cross historicizes God’s love.145 As such, the suffering of those oppressed in today’s 
society must be able to relate to the suffering of Jesus in a real way. So the suffering of 
Jesus on the cross must be a real event of history.  
The reality of the cross opens the reality of freedom from oppression for people in 
the real world. Without the cross being accepted as a real historical event, the reality of 
salvation through the cross would be impossible to achieve, Sobrino observes.  He holds 
the cross at the center of his theology and feels that it must be viewed as a historical 
reality. He urges humanity to take the crucified people down from the cross. Finally, he 
also sees the reality of the cross as the way to political holiness. Because of Jesus, people 
can die in the hope of resurrection, looking forward to a new heaven and a new earth. 
Jesus’ suffering on the cross shows God’s solidarity with the victims of this world.146 
 Sobrino, while understanding Jesus’ Resurrection as an eschatological event, also 
argues that this event, ultimately, has significance in the reality of our history. Faithful to 
his Christological starting point, he approaches the resurrection event from the 
perspective of the Third World situation – the victims of this world as a challenge to the 
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affluent to conversion. The eschatological aspect of the Risen Lord’s existence may 
include some type of breaking into our own history and it may shape our life accordingly. 
Our experience, although non identical to the original experience, has a “certain 
repeatability of the Easter experience.”147 What seems more appropriate for Sobrino is 
“the experience of the irruption of something quasi-eschatological into the human 
situation.”148 The experiences of the victims of the world are real experiences of finality 
in history, not mediated by texts but by actual reality: “injustice that generates poverty, 
violence, lies, and death, but also a situation that generates hope, compassion, justice, and 
love.”149 These experiences happen, according to Sobrino, in various dimensions: 
anthropological, theological, and ecclesial.  
 However, the Christological dimension remains the focal point of these 
experiences, for the risen Christ is the crucified Jesus. Besides, “the resurrection 
concentrates God’s eschatological action in history on the person of Jesus, and that in this 
sense present-day experiences are not identical with those narrated in the New 
Testament… but we can allow ourselves to be given the capacity for remaking – 
experiences of finality.”150 In spite of everything, there is light and hope in the crucified 
people. For Sobrino therefore, “Christian faith lives when, throughout history, we not 
only accept a doctrinal testimony that, coming from outside, remains always something 
external to us, alien to us, but when we go on remaking this type of experience of 
finality.”151 The experience of finality is discipleship, the following of Jesus within the 
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circumstances of history. It is a certain form of fullness not the totality that should change 
the quality of one’s life. To live fully is to live more in the conditions of historical 
existence through love, triumph, freedom, and joy. Freedom as triumph over selfishness, 
joy as triumph over sadness. The lives of the victims of this world inspire a new spirit of 
struggle and new hope in people. Sobrino sees Jesus’ resurrection as a Christian response 
to a lasting human question of justice for the victims of this world.152 
The Centrality of the Kingdom of God 
 
  More than influencing a particular theological treatise, the symbol of the kingdom 
of God has shaped a way of doing theology and its fundamental character. This is true 
especially in the case of liberation theology of various provenances and motifs. Jon 
Sobrino has argued at length, and convincingly, that whereas for Latin American 
theology the liberation of the poor is the primacy of reality, the kingdom of God rather 
than the resurrection of Jesus is its eschaton.153  
 In Sobrino's view, there are several convergences between liberation theology and 
the theme of the kingdom of God. Liberation theology presupposes a pre-theological 
option for the poor who are the addressees of the kingdom of God.154 Furthermore, it has 
certain formal characteristics which correspond to the symbol of the kingdom of God: it 
is concerned with historicizing the transcendental realities of faith, with denouncing and 
unmasking historical sin, with transforming reality, and with making the people the 
subjects of theology and the agents of faith.155   
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 Jesus’ historical life as the mediator of the Father brings about this kingdom of 
God. Sobrino insists on life as the historical content of the kingdom of God. Because 
poverty means proximity to death, “life means that, with the advent of the kingdom of 
God, the poor ceases to be poor.”156 Life is a reality which points to ‘more;’ “its concept 
is dynamic and directional,”157 it unfolds gradually in multiple levels of realization and is 
always open to the “perpetual element of the ‘more’ in the concept of the kingdom of 
God.”158 God becomes the God of those who suffer “lack of life,” the victims of this 
world and this divine solidarity go as far as the Cross. The centrality of the kingdom of 
God means that God desires life for the poor and delivers them from the anti-kingdom. 
Ecclesiology 
 
 For Sobrino Christology is not merely anthropological and social in nature, but 
also theological and ecclesial. The Second Vatican Council’s Dogmatic Constitution on 
the Church begins with the following words: “Christ is the light of humanity; and it is, 
accordingly, the heart-felt desire of the sacred Council, being gathered together in the 
Holy Spirit, that, by proclaiming his Gospel to every creature, it may bring to all men that 
light of Christ which shines out visibly from the church.”159 This quotation shows the 
direct link between Jesus and the church; the church exists because Jesus willed it. This 
helps to understand Sobrino’s approach to the reality of the church. At the basis of his 
ecclesiology, there is the experience of the poor. Sobrino presents a passionate 
commitment to the poor, not just those who have nothing, but especially those deprived 
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by an unjust global system of the goods to which they are entitled. This point drives his 
theological reflection on the church. The poor call the church into question, as nothing 
else does, but they have not been the church’s central concern.160  
 The most serious aspect from a theological point of view is that the poor have not 
come to possess the theological status they deserve according to Jesus. Sobrino, 
therefore, hopes to shed light on some basic problems faced by a church that desires to be 
faithful to its Christian nature. He then proposes the historical Jesus as a model of strict 
theological importance to ecclesiology because “the essence of the church does not exist 
unless it takes historical form.”161 Although he admits that the church comes into 
existence after the resurrection event, he nevertheless underlines the correlation of the 
resurrection to the reality of history, namely the reality of Jesus’ ministry to the poor 
prior to his crucifixion. Jesus’ ministry and his crucifixion are continuous images leading 
to the resurrection. Today the risen Lord has appeared to the church of Latin America to 
restore it again; He gave the Latin American church the grace of ‘seeing’ him in the poor, 
hence the existence of the church of the poor.  
 For Sobrino, the church of the poor is a church “formed on the basis of the poor 
and that finds in them the principle of its structure, organization, and mission.”162 It is in 
this church that one finds the basic substance of ecclesiality, namely, faith, hope, love, 
the presence of Christ and mission. Furthermore, this church of the poor is not to be 
identified with the Vatican II understanding of church as the people of God because of 
                                                 
160 Jon Sobrino, The True Church and the poor, translated by Matthew J. O’Connell (Maryknoll, N.Y.: 
Orbis Books, 1984). 
161 Sobrino, The True Church and the poor, 3. 
162 Sobrino, The True Church and the poor, 93. 
 115
the universal vagueness that Vatican II gives to the term people of God.163 A church of 
the poor means going beyond a purely universalist, ethical approach of the people of 
God; it “means that the poor are the authentic theological source for understanding 
Christian truth and practice and therefore the constitution of the church.”164 These 
churches are where people should seek and find God.  
 If this is now the orientation, what then comes of the universality or the 
catholicity of the church? In response to this question Sobrino affirms that the 
universality referred to in catholicity is not achieved except through partisanship, which 
means through  
the discovery of the originality and the specificity of the ‘local’ church… There is 
a good deal of evidence to prove that the church in Latin America is becoming an 
authentic ‘local’ church and not simply an appendage or prolongation of the 
churches of the parent countries. This development is a result of the church’s 
option for the poor.165 
 
 While Sobrino acknowledges the teaching of the magisterium on ecclesiology as 
normative, he also insists on the fact that its interpretation cannot but take into 
consideration the cultural specificity of each milieu. In the case of Latin America, 
Sobrino would argue, a relevant ecclesiology should be more attentive to the plight of the 
poor and the oppressed. It is no longer enough to affirm that praxis comes first, but that 
the historical subject of this praxis, the others, should be taken seriously. By so doing, the 
church ceases to be abstract but concrete in history and therefore relevant to the people. 
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165 Sobrino, The True Church and the poor, 112. 
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Spirituality 
 
 In Sobrino’s judgment, too many people and too many theologians fail to 
emphasize the need to see a link between the demands of real life with spirituality. He 
understands spirituality as a “life with a certain spirit, life lived in a particular spirit, 
especially, in the case of Christian spiritual life, or life lived in the spirit of Jesus.”166 
 From the very beginning, theology of liberation in Latin America has thought to 
be a creative synthesis of what it means to be human and Christian in the real world of 
today. Rather than speaking of spirituality in the abstract, Sobrino’s point of departure is 
the concrete that actually becomes present in human beings and animates their thoughts, 
feelings, and actions. He begins with the proposition that spiritual persons are persons 
who live with spirit. Spirituality does not intend a relationship with immaterial, invisible 
realities; spirituality is the spirit with which humans confront the real, the concrete 
history in which we all live. Sobrino presents the basic premise of spirituality in terms of 
honesty and fidelity to the truth of things as they actually are, responding to the demand 
of people’s concrete reality. 167   
 Basic for liberation theology’s spirituality, Sobrino asserts, is the spirituality of 
forgiveness expressed through love of the oppressors. This love seeks the conversion of 
the oppressors.168 This means that the victims of this world are the locus of conversion 
and evangelization because their situation calls for the universal setting for God’s 
question: what have you done to your brother/sister? Thus, for Sobrino, the non-poor are 
called to respond and correspond to the God of the poor revealed in Jesus. And this 
                                                 
166 Jon Sobrino, Spirituality of Liberation: Toward Political Holiness (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 
1988), 2. 
167 Sobrino, “Spirituality and the Following of Jesus,” in Systematic Theology, 236-241. 
168 Sobrino, The Principle of Mercy, 59-68. 
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requires conversion of all who are not on the side of the victimized poor, that is, the 
oppressors and those who participate in oppression by their passivity.169 The real here is 
the life of the other human being. Salvation, Sobrino affirms, cannot be dissociated from 
the real historical humanity in which we live.  
For Sobrino, theology is about following Jesus in the path of justice and love in 
the cause of God’s kingdom by taking the crucified people down from the cross. For what 
the Lord requires of us is to embody justice and love in history. This is the way we 
respond to God’s love; the way of seeking the answer to the question of what it means to 
be human. Sobrino’s theology of liberation, like Gutiérrez’s, is a decision to work from 
the viewpoint of the neighbor. Sobrino’s subject, like Gutiérrez’s, is the other, the poor, 
the exploited classes, marginalized ethnic groups, and despised cultures.  
The analysis of liberation theology in Latin America as understood by Gutiérrez 
and Sobrino has shown that God is found in the course of human history and more 
importantly in the neighbor. God stands before humans on the boundary of the historical 
future. He is the driving force of history urging Christians to experience transcendence as 
a permanent turn to the neighbors. The Christian God we worship is the crucified God 
who submerges himself in a world of misery. God is found on the crosses of the 
oppressed rather than in beauty, power, or wisdom. At this point, it would be significant 
to address the issue of the centrality of the neighbor in liberation theology as it makes 
explicit how the Christian response to God is to be lived out. 
 
 
                                                 
169 Sobrino, The Principle of Mercy, 59-68. 
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IV. The Centrality of the Neighbor in Liberation Theology 
 
At the heart of Rahner’s philosophical theology is a view of the world as the 
mysterious field where God’s self-communication in Jesus and the Holy Spirit takes 
place. God for Rahner remains a mystery, always beyond human reach, as the horizon 
posited in humans’ movement toward knowing and willing, freedom and love. In a 
transcendental movement human beings are oriented and able to know God only through 
their being in the world. Karl Rahner has always held that the human spirit, although 
transcendent, is bound ontologically to matter, the physical, appearance, the world and 
history by a transcendental relation. Therefore its encounter with the transcendence is 
always and inevitably mediated through history.170 This implies that there is no pure 
religion separate from history because religion is at all times and unavoidably a reality of 
the world in which human beings live. Whatever their religion, human beings express 
their faith within a concrete particular historical situation. All symbols, concepts, things, 
places, persons and events of history, are elements of mediation between a human person 
and the divine transcendence.171  
Since Vatican II the Catholic Church has adopted this approach to theology as a 
way of making Christian doctrine relevant to the contemporary questions. Hence, for the 
Catholic Church and Christian theology faith is an experience that governs the whole of 
one’s life and being. It has been the concern of the Catholic Church to persistently 
                                                 
170 This idea is the main trend of his transcendental anthropology and this is well-expressed in his Hearers 
of the Word, translated by Michael Richards (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969), 130-149.  Friedrich 
Schleiermacher expresses the same thing in phenomenological terms of consciousness: There can be no 
consciousness of transcendence apart from consciousness of this world. See his The Christian Faith (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1963), 125-127. 
171 Roger Haight, An Alternative Vision: An Interpretation of Liberation Theology (New York: Paulist 
Press, 1985), 74. For an account of different ways in which historical symbols may structure religious faith 
see Mircea Eliade, Patterns in Comparative Religion, translated by Rosemary Sheed (New York: Sheed 
and Ward, 1958). 
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condemn the injustices of the economic and social conditions created by modern 
societies. The church’s declarations have always been in support of basic human rights in 
the social, economic, and political orders of societies. Liberation theology has in recent 
times endeavored to give voice to these concerns through a less conventional structure of 
thought which has been the object of many criticisms, mainly for its use of Hegel’s and 
Marx’s views of history.172 History for Hegel and Marx is not something to speculate 
about but also a place where real issues of the future of humanity are dealt with. The 
notion of historical consciousness that liberation theology embraces from Hegel and 
Marx emphasizes the eschatological vision of history. History is now understood as the 
place where the process of emancipation of human beings occurs because God reveals 
God’s self through history or God saves in history. This vision of eschatology raises 
fundamental questions: how could historical-temporal-spatial events be events of 
salvation while retaining a basic orientation toward the future (eschatological salvation)? 
How does liberation theology understand the tension between the already and the not-yet 
of salvation?  
                                                 
172 With regard to Marxist ideas, Vatican II’s Congregation for the doctrine of faith published in 1984 an 
(Instruction on Certain Aspects of the Theology of Liberation) instruction aimed at drawing attention of 
pastors, theologians, and all the faithful to the deviations and risks of using concepts borrowed from 
various currents of Marxist thought. The Catholic Church has formulated two criticisms against Liberation 
Theology. First, the use of Marxist analysis and other theories that in the end, it is said defeat the cause of 
the poor. The church’s argument states one cannot examine injustice in Marxist terms without tacitly 
endorsing the philosophy's denial of the spiritual world and of God. Second, the questioning of the church's 
hierarchy and authority lines. Liberation Theology undermines the Church leaders' influence over the laity. 
The interest in Christian-Marxist dialogue was not limited to Latin America, but it evolved in a distinctive 
way. Among the many works from the perspective of Christian theologians, see René Coste, Marxist 
Analysis and Christian Faith, translated by Roger Couture and John Cort (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 
1985); Arthur McGovern, Marxism: An American Christian Perspective (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 
1980); Anselm Kyongsuk Min, Dialectic of Salvation: Issues in Theology of Liberation (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1989). For a criticism of liberation theology from a contemporary Marxist 
perspective, see Alistair Kee, Marx and the Failure of Liberation Theology (Philadelphia: Trinity Press 
International, 1990). 
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Liberation theology’s biblical hermeneutic was shaped by its reception of the 
Enlightenment philosophical perspective that argues for the independence of human 
reason. The turn to the subject became the fundamental point in Christian theology. 
God’s transcendence and self-disclosure were no longer only mysterious, rather God is 
found in the medium of human dealings in history. Yet, for liberation theology, the 
devastating experiences of oppression and poverty in Latin America have shown the limit 
of this excessive emphasis on the thinking subject’s freedom and autonomy in history. It 
challenges also a futuristic vision of eschatology that has no bearing on human reality. 
Liberation theology recognizes that the here and now of salvation has a basic orientation 
toward the future. But it insists that this process begins here on earth and ends in eternity. 
For Gutiérrez, Sobrino, and most liberation theologians, the historization of salvation 
does not consist of reducing salvific action to the transformation of the socio-political 
structures. It consists of saying that salvation does not reach its fulfillment if it does not 
attain that historical dimension, and when appropriate, that political dimension. It 
proposes the turn to the other, that is, social responsibility and commitment to the other 
human person that is necessary for the establishment of the anthropology of the new 
human.  
It argues that the human person’s fullness and the defeat of socio-political and 
economic structures of power in human societies can be realized only through a re-
appropriation of the biblical principle of Christianity of love of neighbor. This is a 
fundamental response to the issue of human existence and authenticity. For liberation 
theology, Gutiérrez asserts, “the veneration of God and the doing of God’s will are the 
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necessary conditions for reflection on Him.”173 Humans find God mostly through 
concrete commitment toward the poor (cf.Matt.25:31-46). “Contemplation and 
commitment in human history are fundamental dimensions of Christian existence.”174 
John Risley’s comments on liberation theology as an authentic spirituality that embraces 
the neighbor and God are here helpful: 
The gospel sense of the poor, moreover, is also the authentic verification of the 
contemplative and interior values of Christian spirituality… orthodox Catholic 
spirituality, when trying to discern the criteria for the authenticity of prayer and 
mystical experience, has always responded that the verification does not come 
with the contemplative prayer in itself, that is, with the subjective mystical 
experience. That can easily be deceiving. No, its verification is in the practice of 
fraternal love, in fidelity to the sense of the brother or sister in need. The gospel 
declares that authentic spirituality is one love which embraces both God and 
neighbor, the neighbor who is precisely the poor and needy (Luke 10:29ff.; Matt. 
25:31ff.). The experience of God and the experience of the poor are mutually 
verifying and mutually reinforcing: the sense of the poor brings with it and 
reinforces the sense of God, and vice versa.175  
 
For liberation theology, the biblical concept of salvation is associated with the process of 
liberation from oppression and injustice. Sin is understood in terms of the human 
person’s inhumanity to the other human. For Liberation theology, as Gutiérrez affirms, 
“it is not enough to say that love of God is inseparable from the love of one’s neighbor. It 
must be added that love for God is unavoidably expressed through love of one’s 
neighbor.”176 Hence, God is found in our neighbor and salvation is said not to be 
dissociated from the real historical humanity in which we live. The history of salvation 
becomes the salvation of history embracing the entire process of humanization. 
Liberation theology centers its argument about the centrality of the neighbor on biblical 
                                                 
173 Gutiérrez, “The Task and Content of Liberation Theology,” 28. 
174 Gutiérrez, “The Task and Content of Liberation Theology,” 29. 
175 John Risley, “Liberation Spirituality,” Spirituality Today 35 no. 2 (1983): 136. 
176 Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation, 114-115. (Gutiérrez’s italics) 
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stories of the quest for justice and human dignity, exemplified by Israel's liberation from 
Egypt and Jesus’ life, death, and resurrection.  
Jesus Christ, the founder and determining factor of Christian faith, taught a self 
sacrificing love of God and love of neighbor as an integral part to our relation to God. He 
displayed his teaching as the fundamental reason of his own life. He went around doing 
good. He was remembered after his death by his friends for his actions which were 
consistent with his teaching and faith.  To be his disciple is about following in his life 
patterns which are essentially a life of love and doing good, not simply for one’s friends, 
but for the others, one’s enemies, the outsiders. Hence, in the ethical teaching of Jesus 
Christ, as Roger Haight argues, “the love of God and the love of neighbor are 
inextricably entwined.”177 For liberation theology, Haight contends, “one cannot love 
God wholly without including in that love all that is of God, especially all other people 
who are God’s own… [Equally] an authentic love of other people implies a love for what 
makes them be and be as they are, their ground of being, God.”178  
With respect to the connection between love of neighbor and love of God, 
liberation theology uses two main texts: the parable of the Good Samaritan (Luke 10: 29-
37) and the text of the last judgment in (Mat. 25: 31-45). The story of the Good 
Samaritan presents two figures of the neighbor; both the one who approached the 
wounded man and made him his neighbor and the one who fell into the hands of the 
robbers. The neighbor is not only the one who one finds in one’s path, but also the one in 
                                                 
177 Haight, An Alternative Vision, 76. The argument here is the same as that of Sobrino in Christology at the 
Crossroads. 
178 Haight, An Alternative Vision, 77. This analysis is dependent on Karl Rahner’s in “Reflections on the 
Unity of Love of Neighbor and the Love of God,” in Theological Investigations, VI (Baltimore: Helicon 
Press, 1968), 231-249. See also Rahner’s “The Mission of the Church and the Humanizing of the World,” 
Doctrine and Life, XXI (April and May 1971), 171-178, 231-242. 
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whose path one places himself, the one who one approaches and actively seeks. To be a 
Christian, for Gutiérrez and Sobrino, is to draw near, to make oneself a neighbor in taking 
actions in history as Christians live their lives as beings in the world. God reveals his 
human face in history through his Son Jesus Christ. Energized through faith in Jesus 
Christ, Christians give witness to God’s will and become on earth, the instruments and 
models of God’s love for humankind.  
The last judgment text presents two fundamental points: loving one’s neighbors as 
one loves oneself and the preferential option for the least of these. To live out these two 
commandments is without a doubt life’s greatest challenge and highest purpose. The 
context of the parable infers that the poor are the ones who have been hungriest, thirstiest 
and most naked and so we must not fail to care for them. For liberation theology, 
following the scriptures, how humans treat one another is a critical part of how we love 
God. Thus, any act of love toward the others, especially the poor, marginalized, and 
exploited ones, is an act of love toward God. Gutiérrez explains: 
God is loved in the neighbor… To love one’s brother or sister, to love all persons, 
is a necessary and indispensable mediation of the love of God… This holds to a 
certain extent for every human person according to the important text of Matthew 
25, which reminds us that an action on behalf of a human being is an action on 
behalf of God. It is to love God: if you gave food and drink, you gave it to me; if 
you denied it, you denied it to me.179  
 
As Saint John puts it: “But if a man says, ‘I love God,’ while hating his brother, he is a 
liar. If he does not love the brother whom he has seen, it cannot be that he loves God 
whom he has not seen” (1John 4: 20). The strength of liberation theology is in its 
compassion for the poor and its conviction that Christians should not remain passive and 
unconcerned to the plight of their neighbors. The human person’s inhumanity to a fellow 
                                                 
179 Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation, 115; Gutiérrez, “Toward a Theology of Liberation,” 74. 
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human is sin and calls for conversion and Christian resistance. Liberation theology is a 
plea for costly discipleship and a reminder that to follow Jesus has practical social and 
political consequences. Here is how Gutiérrez puts it: 
Love of neighbor is an essential component of Christian life. But as long as I 
apply that term only to the people who cross my path and come asking me for 
help, my world will remain pretty much the same. Individual almsgiving and 
social reformism is a type of love that never leaves its own front porch... On the 
other hand my world will change greatly if I go out to meet other people on their 
path and consider them as my neighbor, as the Good Samaritan did... the gospel 
tells us that the poor are the supreme embodiment of our neighbor. It is this option 
that serves as the focus for a new way of being human and Christian in today's 
Latin America. But the existence of the poor... is not neutral on the political level 
or innocent of ethical implications. Poor people are by-products of the system 
under which we live and for which we are responsible... That is why the poverty 
of the poor is not a summons to alleviate their plight with acts of generosity but 
rather a compelling obligation to fashion an entirely different social order.180 
 
What Gutiérrez seems to be saying here is that to follow Jesus leads to a concern for 
social justice. This is an intrinsic form of authentic Christian faith, because it is the 
determining form that structures faith’s love for other human beings. Haight’s words 
explain exceedingly well how liberation theology understands Christian faith:  
Active concern for other human beings on a social level, though never to the 
exclusion of concern for the other levels of personal and transcendent freedom, 
constitutes real union with God by an implied faith. And all faith that lacks this 
concern as its forms is incomplete and suspect.181  
 
Furthermore, for liberation theology, as Gutiérrez argues, the bond between love of 
neighbor and the love of God  
is not only valid for Christians, but for all persons who, in one way or another, 
welcome the Word of the Lord into their heart… God is revealed in history, and it 
is likewise in history that persons encounter the Word made flesh. Christ is not a 
                                                 
180 Gustavo Gutiérrez, “Liberation Praxis and Christian Faith,” in Frontiers of Theology in Latin America, 
translated by John Drury and edited by Rosino Gibellini (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1979), 8. 
181 Haight, An Alternative Vision, 80. 
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private individual; the bond which links him to all persons gives him a unique 
historical role.182 
 
 For liberation theologians, human beings find the Lord in their encounters with others, 
and to be a human is to commit oneself in one way or the other in the process of the 
respect of human dignity and emancipation. The centrality of the neighbor in liberation 
theology lies in the fact that one’s action toward the other is at the same time an action 
toward God. Again, liberation theology urges Christian theology to leave the climate of 
the turn to the subject and move toward a consideration of the turn to the other that 
constitutes the truth of Christianity: the concern for the humanity of every human being 
created in God’s image. Haight argues that liberation theology’s commitment to neighbor 
implies also a commitment to God’s ultimate transcendence: 
The neighbor then is certainly the test and the criterion of authentic self-
transcendence vis-à-vis God. But even more, the ‘others,’ he and she and they, are 
the privileged near-at-hand mediating vehicle through whom, by responding 
precisely to them, we respond to God. It is therefore true that while we are in 
history the only way we can love God authentically is through the neighbor.183 
 
Haight’s point is a valid one. Liberation theology, notwithstanding some excess in the 
application of this theology in concrete situations, takes as its starting point the love of 
neighbor as it constitutes the truth of Christianity. Every human person, especially the 
poor, the stranger, the oppressed – the nonpersons – is an incarnation of God’s image in 
the world and deserves to be treated with respect and dignity. And in so doing we meet 
the divine transcendence who from eternity calls us to justice and love of neighbors. 
There is a need to build up and enforce stronger political and local solidarity in the world. 
 
                                                 
182 Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation, 115. 
183 Haight, An Alternative Vision, 77-78. 
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Conclusion 
 
In Central and Latin America, this chapter noted, the challenge to Christian 
theology was the political oppression and the socio-economic plight of “the ‘non-
persons,’ those who are not recognized as humans by the social order: the poor, the 
exploited, those systematically and legally deprived of their status as human beings, those 
who barely realise what it is to be a human being.”184 This led to the emergence of 
liberation theology. It is a theology that stems from the meaning of love of neighbor in 
Christianity in the midst of the tragic human situation; hence, the centrality of the 
neighbor as the condition of an authentic self-transcendence vis-à-vis God in liberation 
theology. It calls for the liberation of the neighbor and argues that it is in the works of 
justice toward the other human person, in loving one’s neighbor, that the divine 
transcendence is encountered in concrete life.  
This chapter discussed the place of neighbor in liberation theology through the 
eyes of Gutiérrez’s and Sobrino’s theological perspective. It argued that liberation 
theology emerged as a response to the existence of a crucified people, the non-persons, 
the poor and the oppressed of our world – whose suffering presents Christian faith with 
an urgent demand – that we turn toward them in love and solidarity because they also are 
children of God. The stress here is on the neighbor’s humanity, as created in God’s 
image. Thus, love of neighbor is the first moment in the process of theological reflection 
for Gutiérrez, Sobrino, and other liberation theologians. The examination of the social, 
cultural, and ecclesial background of Gutiérrez and Sobrino has helped make sense of and 
appreciate the theological origins of their thought in time and place. Furthermore, this 
chapter has also shown that for Gutiérrez and Sobrino the human person, the poor, the 
                                                 
184 Gustavo Gutiérrez, “The Task and Content of Liberation Theology,” 28. 
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stranger, the widow, the oppressed, the homeless, is the place for a possible divine self-
disclosure. As Gutiérrez and Sobrino analyze the human person in the light of the 
Incarnation of God in Jesus Christ, this chapter argued that their theological reflections 
are inspired by their Christologies and the experience of their social locations. Liberation 
theology as presented by Gutiérrez and Sobrino stems from the “Christology from below” 
and in this perspective, it is very concrete and social and calls for an ever-closer link 
between faith and daily life, between theory and practice. Hence, liberation is seen as 
dialectically linked with the humanization of the other human person, Levinas’s autrui 
who bears the trace of the divine. For Gutiérrez and Sobrino salvation cannot be 
dissociated from the real historical humanity in which humans live. This soteriological 
perspective takes its content from Jesus’ command of love of neighbor, his ministry to 
the poor and his opposition to oppression. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Emmanuel Levinas and Liberation Theology in Dialogue: An 
Intersubjective Model for the Radical Re-imagining of the 
World 
 
Introduction 
 
The first chapter established that the core of Levinas’s philosophy is the 
relationship between the other and the subject. As we have seen, Levinas articulates his 
position on the issue of the other within the Western philosophical tradition and presents 
ethics as first philosophy.1 He acknowledges his debts to Plato who first placed the Good 
beyond being, to Descartes who opened thought to the idea of the infinite and to Kant 
whose criticism had shaken up philosophical dogmatism.2 His aim has been to renew 
twentieth century phenomenology by combining “a radical critique of Western 
philosophy with a Platonizing retrieval of the pre-Platonic tradition of Israel.”3 Levinas 
was dissatisfied with Western philosophy’s tendency to base all knowing, willing, and 
meaning on the intentional consciousness of the subject, rejecting thus any possibility for 
the existence of the other independent of the subject. In his work, responsibility is first an 
ethical gesture, “set forth as the determinative structure of subjectivity”4 in its 
                                                 
1 Emmanuel Levinas explains his whole philosophical project in one of his first major works, Totality and 
Infinity. It is important to note here that Levinas’s use of the word “ethics” should not be understood in the 
traditional sense of moral principles, norms, obligations, and interdictions that rule human behavior, rather 
as the pre-originary and pre-radical practice of the good that transcends all dimensions of theory and 
contemplation of a thematized subject. This is a position of which Levinas’s entire work is an expression.    
2 S. Ploudre and R. Simon, “Ethique et morale chez Emmanuel Levinas,” Le Supplément 160 (1987) : 123-
124. 
3 Adriaan T. Peperzak, preface to Ethics as First Philosophy: The Significance of Emmanuel Levinas for 
Philosophy, Literature and Religion, edited by Adriaan Peperzak (New York: Routledge, 1995), ix. 
Levinas’s Platonic retrieval centers on the idea of the goodness beyond being which Plato developed in the 
Republic (508e-509b).  
4 Alphonso Lingis’ introduction to Otherwise than being or Beyond Essence, xi. (My italics) 
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“relationship with the Good, which is over and beyond Being.”5 It is a command that 
orders a being to act for the good of the other who presents him/herself as a face. The 
face is an unrepresentable trace and calls forth the idea of transcendence.  
Liberation theology – as developed by Gutiérrez and Sobrino – was the object of 
the second chapter. This theology posits one’s responsibility towards the poor, the 
stranger, the oppressed, etc, as constitutive of one’s subjectivity and relationship with the 
divine transcendence. It sees in the faces of the crucified people of Latin America and the 
Third World the face of Jesus Christ. Gutiérrez and Sobrino also insist on the necessary 
link between the notions of kingdom of God, grace, and soteriology with the creation of a 
better society – the radical re-imagining of the world.  
The purpose of this third chapter is to examine the conceptual affinities of 
Levinas’s philosophy with liberation theology. The thesis here is that Levinas’s 
humanism – as opposed to the humanism of the Enlightenment6 – finds some conceptual 
affinities with liberation theology and it is a revalidation of one of the truths of 
Christianity and Christianity’s vision of human life and existence: the concern for the 
humanity of every human being or love of neighbor.7 Levinas’s philosophy and liberation 
theology, each in its own right, responds to the human situation at least in one 
comparable way. Their respective work in philosophy and theology emerged as a 
response to the twentieth century’s tragic human situation as at once transcendent yet 
absolutely weak and exposed. They search for the divine transcendence in a life of 
commitment to the other human person, find in the Judeo-Christian wisdom a distinct 
                                                 
5 Alphonso Lingis’ introduction to Otherwise than being or Beyond Essence, xii. 
6 For Emmanuel Levinas, the humanism of the Enlightenment is the privileging of the human subject over 
and against the human other. He mentions anti-semitism as one of the consequences of this view of 
humanism; see his Difficult Freedom: Essay on Judaism, 277- 288. 
7 Pope Benedict XVI reaffirms this argument in his first encyclical Deus Caritas Est. 
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way of thinking of the subject and the other, and call for love of neighbor and justice. 
Hence, they both view the turn to the other/neighbor as a power of genuine love opening 
new avenues for the re-imagining of the world. What is fundamental for Levinas’s 
thought and liberation theology is that they both bring forth one major characteristic: the 
dimension of the divine opens forth in the human face. God’s transcendence emerges not 
in the oppression and hatred of other human beings but in love of one’s neighbor.  
This chapter will begin with an overview presentation of the movement from 
modernity to postmodernity that constitutes the context for our philosophical and 
theological reflection on Levinas’s ethics of responsibility and liberation theology. The 
presupposition here is that the twenty-first century in which we live is a postmodern 
world. It is a period that questions modernity’s overemphasis on individual subjectivity. 
The term modernity as it applies to this dissertation stands for the Cartesian-Kantian 
model of thought that celebrates the uniqueness of the thinking subject as the center of all 
knowing and meaning. Yet, within the postmodern environment nothing seems to hold, 
most foundational culture, intellectual and religious values are being questioned, and new 
meanings are being born at the meeting of diverse ideas and worldviews. 
While postmodernity, like modernity, has its negative and positive aspects, the 
definition of postmodernity that this dissertation embraces is the one that emphasizes the 
absolute necessity of relationality, interdependence, and solidarity, based on the 
philosophical theology of otherness and difference, to use David Tracy’s words.8 It takes 
the form of the turn to the other, resists modernity’s excessive focus on the subject, and 
                                                 
8 David Tracy, On Naming the Present: Reflections on God, Hermeneutics, and Church (Maryknoll, N.Y.: 
Orbis Books; London, England: SCM Press, 1994); “Theology and the Many Faces of Postmodernity,”104-
114; “Forms of Divine Disclosure,” in Believing Scholars: Ten Catholic Intellectuals, edited by James L. 
Heft, 1st edition (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005): 47-56. (My italics) 
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offers a better prospect for a redefinition of subjectivity as being for the other. Since this 
postmodern world is the context in which contemporary philosophical theology has to be 
undertaken, this dissertation argues that a reconsideration of Levinas’s thought and 
liberation theology, each in its own right, as they both view the turn to the other/neighbor 
as a way to approach the otherness of divine transcendence, offers this prospect both 
philosophically and theologically. Hence, the examination of commonalities and 
differences that can be found between Levinas’s thought and liberation theology will 
constitute the second moment of this chapter. It will be argued that the conceptual 
affinities between Levinas’s thought and liberation theology – especially their turn to the 
other/neighbor – can contribute toward a redefinition of subjectivity as “being-in-the-
world” for the other human person. In today’s postmodern world, philosophy and 
theology should turn around and face the other who is both God and every human being. 
This turn to the other is most needed for any possible re-imagining of today’s world. 
In order to further show the connection between Levinas’s philosophy and 
liberation theology, this chapter will put forward some propositions as to how their 
thought might be put in dialogue. In a sense, this chapter will assert that Levinas’s 
transcendental ethics provides a viable philosophical anthropological framework that is 
compatible with the centrality of love of neighbor in liberation theology. For Levinas to 
argue that all human beings have by nature an essential desire for the Infinite who gives 
himself in responsibility for the other human person is unquestionably a radical 
awakening that differentiates his thought from abstract philosophies, bringing it closer to 
liberation theology’s understanding of the human person. Similarly, this work will 
suggest that liberation theology historicizes Levinas’s transcendental ethics of 
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responsibility. It will be argued that liberation theology’s spirituality of conversion to the 
neighbor bears witness to Levinas’s ethical responsibility. In the end, this chapter will 
argue that the turn to the other/neighbor in Levinas’s philosophy and liberation theology 
is a precondition for peace, justice and good social order.  
I. The Context for Philosophical and Theological Reflection: The Postmodern 
World 
 
It is usual for contemporary scholars to explain the late twentieth and this early 
twenty-first century as a postmodern world.9 It is a new environment in which all 
intellectual reflections take place, and this work is no exception.  A number of terms have 
been put forward to describe this new environment: information society, consumer 
society, post-modernity, postmodernism, post-industrial society, post-capitalism, and so 
forth.10 The debates around this new concept, as Anthony Giddens would contend, are 
mainly centered on the philosophical and epistemological issues as initiated by Jean-
François Lyotard.11  
To be sure, the term postmodernity is most often used in opposition to modernity 
to signify a kind of demarcation or distance from the modern era which put emphasis on 
“individual subjectivity, interiority, and self-subsistent autonomy.”12 Situating the 
                                                 
9 Stephen Edelston Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1992); Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press, 1990); Eric Voegelin, History of Political Ideas, Religion and the Rise of Modernity, 
Vols. III, IV, V, edited by James L. Wise (Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 1999); Charles 
Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1989); Louis Dupre, Passage to Modernity: An Essay in the Hermeneutics of Nature and Culture 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993). 
10 Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 1-2. 
11 Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 2. Jean-François Lyotard is considered the father of 
postmodernism. He defines postmodernity, philosophically and epistemologically, as the end of 
modernity’s period of the grand universal narrative that explains any given discipline; see his The Post-
Modern Condition (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985). 
12 Michael Downey, “Postmodernity,” in The New Dictionary of Catholic Spirituality edited by Michael 
Downey (Collegeville, Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, 1993), 746.  
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beginning of modernity in the sixteenth century, most scholars agree that modernity is the 
result of the academic changes that occur with Galileo in physics and astronomy and 
René Descartes in mathematics and epistemology. With their works appeared the concept 
of the rationality in human dealings.13 From then onwards, rational methods became a 
standard in thinking about nature and in dealing with the problems of human life and 
society in decontextualized terms.14 Of course, any reasonable person would admit and 
appreciate modernity’s contribution to intellectual, socio-political and economic values. 
Not only did it transform the modes of social life in the Western world, but it had also 
more or less influenced other parts of the globe. On the whole and in all fairness “the 
development of modern social institutions and their worldwide spread have created vastly 
greater opportunities for human beings to enjoy a secure and rewarding existence than 
any type of pre-modern system.”15 Most twentieth century works in philosophy and 
theology were influenced by this modern turn to the subject.16 
 Modernity also, however, contains negative aspects whose initial cause could be 
attributed to Descartes’ agenda for modernity as it centered on a method grounded in the 
subjects’ self-presence.17 In addition, cultures other than Western culture were not 
considered as possessing history because they were primitive, archaic, and pre-historical. 
They were “‘lesser’ copies of the modern drive to sameness, the modern ‘Western’ 
                                                 
13 Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity, 12. According to Toulmin “beyond this point” 
of agreement, “different people go on in different directions. Some focus on the merits of these changes, 
some on their damaging by-products, while a few attempt to strike a balance between the costs and benefits 
of the new attitudes. What is rarely questioned is the timing of the changeover: the significant changes are 
usually placed between the prime of Galileo in the 1600s, and the appearance of Newton’s Principia in 
1687.”  See p. 12. 
14 Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity, 9. 
15 Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 7. 
16 See introduction, p. xiii, footnote 5. 
17 Tracy, “Theology and the Many Faces of Postmodernity,” 104. 
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scientific, technological, democratic culture that is culture and history.”18 Furthermore, 
the degradation of the human other, visible in today’s world, has been partly the 
consequence of modernity’s over-confidence on the individual subject’s capacity to 
create, with the help of modern technology, a safe and secure society where order, 
cohesion, and coherence will reign.19 Yet modernity’s courageous “claims for the idealist 
self-subsistent rational self and its view of history as inevitably progressive have been 
unsettled by the ‘terror of history’ which interrupts and disorients, calling into question 
human conceptions of order, divine providence, indeed the very nature of God.”20 This 
description could be said to characterize the breakdown of the modern turn to the subject. 
The modern individual subject, whose structured cognitive functions were thought to 
offer a foundation for integration and unity in self, and the starting point for the ultimate 
human ordering of human relationships in societies, seemed to have failed to fulfill the 
genuine yearnings of the human heart.21 Unfortunately, however, the influence of this 
modern individual subject is still noticeable in today’s postmodern world.  
As this study situates its discussion in the context of postmodernity, it does not, 
however, deny the fact that postmodernity, like modernity, has its negative and positive 
aspects. There are still today different accounts of postmodernity and intense struggles on 
how to define this new turn in any particular field, as well as in general. Besides, the 
unbalanced changes in social relations in recent years and the attempts of various 
scholars at defining postmodernity in the context of their differing fields of inquiry have 
characterized the puzzling and always challenged territory of postmodernity. 
                                                 
18 Tracy, “Theology and the Many Faces of Postmodernity,” 104. (Tracy’s italics) 
19 Downey, “Postmodernity,” 746. 
20 Downey, “Postmodernity,” 746. 
21 Downey, “Postmodernity,” 747, 748. 
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Postmodernity is a period when nothing seems to hold, all consistent value systems seem 
to collapse, new meanings are being born at the meeting of different elements, and more 
importantly modern individual subjectivity is being questioned. As a result, conflicts of 
all kinds are becoming more and more common.  
In the present age as never before, Anselm Min Kyongsuk argues, the 
globalization of the world has created two dialectics that invite humanity to new ways of 
thinking the subject both philosophically and theologically: the dialectic of 
differentiation, in which humans are made ever more aware of differences in nationality, 
culture, religion, ethnicity, gender, class, language; and the dialectic of interdependence, 
which forces them to find a way of living together regardless of differences.22 In addition, 
political issues with reference to the incorporation or integration of strangers, the politics 
of sexual category, the treatment of the poor by the rich, of the disabled by the healthy, of 
non-Europeans by Europeans, not to talk of the crisis of ethnicity in Africa and so forth, 
also seem to require a properly philosophical and theological skill in what looks like their 
common root, that is, the human subject’s encounter with the human other.23 And this, to 
be sure, is, as Roger Haight asserts, “the human and theological crisis of our epoch.”24 
For Haight, “the massive human poverty and oppression in our time, both the amount of 
it and the degree of the damage it does to human life, calls into question the very meaning 
of human existence and hence our faith.”25 What is at stake here is the very meaning of 
the human other in the postmodern situation that has been neglected in the Western 
                                                 
22 Anselm Min Kyongsuk, The Solidarity of Others in a Divided World (New York: T & T Clark 
International, 2004), 1. (Kyongsuk’s italics) 
23 Rudolph Bernet, “The Encounter with the Stranger: Two Interpretations of the Vulnerability of the Skin,” 
in The Face of the Other & the Trace of God: Essays on the Philosophy of Emmanuel Lévinas, edited by 
Jeffrey Bloechl (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000), 43. 
24 Haight, An Alternative Vision, 43. 
25 Haight, An Alternative Vision, 43. 
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philosophical and theological reflection which inspired modernity’s dominating and self-
centered subject.  
Notwithstanding these divergences and contestations, this work wishes to argue 
that how one defines postmodernity in contemporary history, whether one has a positive 
or negative, simplistic or complex understanding of it, accounts both for a specificity of 
one’s perspective and one’s vision of the humanity of humans. Given that the above 
description represents both modernity’s overpowered subject and the present situation in 
the world, the questions now become: what is the role of philosophy and theology in this 
kind of world? What kind of discourse are theology and philosophy? Where should 
philosophy and theology turn in their conversation with postmodern “wounded” culture?  
While there are diverse accounts and intense struggles on how to define the 
postmodern turn, the definition that serves the purpose of this work stems from a more 
practical approach to philosophy, theology and natural science which will mark a return 
to the concerns with otherness and difference.26 It calls for a new perspective of 
coexistence, based on the consideration of the transcendental dimension of the human 
person, and is “appreciative…of the indispensability of relationality, interdependence, 
community, and traditions,”27 given the degradation of the dignity of the human other in 
history. Thus, the definition of postmodernity this work embraces is, as David Tracy 
argues, the one that  
at its best is a fully ethical response to the ambiguities of modernity [that is] an 
ethics of resistance – resistance, above all, to more of the same, the same 
unquestioned sameness of the modern turn to the subject, the modern over-belief 
                                                 
26 Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity, 186-192. David Harvey, The Condition of 
Postmodernity: An Inquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Basil 
Blackwell, 1989), 47-48; Tracy, “Forms of Divine Disclosure,”47-56; “Theology and the Many Faces of 
Postmodernity,” 104-114. (My italics) 
27 Downey, “Postmodernity,” 747. 
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in the search for the perfect method, the modern social evolutionary narrative 
whereby all is finally and endlessly more of the self-same.28  
 
This orientation is what has been defined as the postmodern turn to otherness. Levinas’s 
transcendental ethics of responsibility and liberation theology, each in its own right, 
provide a possibility for this turn to the other who is both God and every human being. 
They find in the Judeo-Christian wisdom the “prophetic-ethical sense for the other, 
especially the preferred other of the prophets, the poor, the marginal, and the 
oppressed.”29 In today’s postmodern world philosophy and theology are invited to 
address the question of the other. David Tracy writes: 
Genuine postmodernity begins not in ennui but in ethical resistance. 
Postmodernity begins by trying to think the unthought of modernity. Beyond the 
early modern turn to the purely autonomous, self-grounding subject, beyond even 
the most recent turn to language (the first great contemporary challenge to modern 
subjectism) lies the quintessential turn of postmodernity itself- the turn to the 
other. It is that turn, above all, that defines the intellectual as well as the ethical 
meaning of postmodernity. The other and the different come forward now as 
central intellectual categories across the major disciplines, including 
theology…Part of that return to otherness…is the return of biblical Judaism and 
Christianity to undo the complacencies of modernity, including modern 
theology.30 
 
The least one can say is that the question concerning the subject’s relation to the human 
other has tremendous significance for any theological enterprise attempting to face head 
on the problem of inhumanity (poverty, injustice, exploitation, murder, war etc.) in a 
postmodern context.  
What is attempted here is not a comprehensive analysis of postmodernity, rather, 
at best, an overview of the general horizon of the movement from modernity to 
postmodernity and how in the postmodern period the other human person – in his/her 
                                                 
28 Tracy, “Theology and the Many Faces of Postmodernity,” 108. 
29 Tracy, “Forms of Divine Disclosure,” 55. 
30 Tracy, “Theology and the Many Faces of Postmodernity,” 108. 
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irreducible otherness and difference – becomes the center of interest in the disciplines of 
philosophy, theology and the natural sciences. The examination of the dialogue between 
Levinas’s transcendental ethics of responsibility and liberation theology which proposes, 
notwithstanding some divergences, the turn to the other/neighbor as an intersubjective 
model for the radical re-imagining of the world, finds here its significance. The turn to 
the other/neighbor opens a possibility for a better world in which the human other will no 
longer be seen as a threat to the subject’s existence but rather as a necessary companion 
for the subject’s existence in history. The suggestion that humans see in other humans the 
dimension of the divine introduces the notions of surplus, transcendence and infinity that 
could lessen the possibility of the hatred of the other person. With Gutiérrez, Sobrino, 
and Levinas, this dissertation argues that – in today’s world – the claim the other makes 
upon the subject ought to be the starting point of any reflection on subjectivity. 
II. Areas of Affinity between Levinas’s Philosophy and Liberation Theology 
 
One can be excused for reacting with skepticism to any proposal linking the 
names of Levinas and liberation theology. One might understandably be doubtful that 
significant convergences can be found between two such dissimilar approaches. Is it not 
Levinas who insisted that his point of departure is not theological, and that it is not 
theology that he does but philosophy?31 Is the use of the notion of experience in 
liberation theology not already wedded to the ontological foundations of Western 
philosophy and theological anthropology criticized by Levinas? What has liberation 
theology to do with postmodern philosophy? Levinas’s thought and liberation theology 
                                                 
31 Emmanuel Levinas, “Transcendence et Hauteur,” Bulletin de la Société Française de Philosophie 56 
(1962) : 110. 
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are not engaged, of course, in the same project and present differences in approach, yet it 
is certainly possible to hold the two in a kind of “productive tension.”  
An attentive reader of Levinas’s philosophy would certainly agree that there are a 
number of elements in his thought upon which a fruitful dialogue could be established 
with liberation theology. The main focus here will be to establish areas of affinity 
between these two approaches. As stated earlier on, the plausibility of discussing 
Levinas’s philosophical conceptual affinities with liberation theology can be said to be 
justifiable by a couple of aspects: each in its own right emerged as a response to the 
situation of human suffering in history, each searches for the divine transcendence in a 
life of commitment to the other human person, each finds in the Judeo-Christian wisdom 
a distinct way of thinking of the subject and the other, and each calls for love of neighbor 
and justice. They both view the turn to the other/neighbor in love as a prospect for the 
creation of a better world.  
Levinas, Gutiérrez, Sobrino, and the Human Historical Situation 
 
As it was argued in the first chapter, Levinas was influenced by his experience of 
the Shoah in the articulation of his philosophy. In condemning this incomparable atrocity, 
he takes issue with modernity’s failure to address the horror of history, and most 
especially, the rise of National Socialism in Germany as expressed through the 
Holocaust. He saw the Nazis’ extermination of the Jews as completely opposed to the 
Judeo-Christian concept of love of neighbor. The expressions such as alter-ego (Husserl) 
and being-with (Heidegger) articulated Western philosophy’s inclination to posit the 
subject to authenticate the existence of the other.  In his new direction, Levinas defined 
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the subject’s identity through the encounter with the face of the other that takes place in 
diachronic temporality.32  
While Levinas takes inspiration for his philosophy from his feeling and memory 
of the sufferings of millions in the world, he advocates for a view of history that remains 
transcendent (Infinity) with regard to the totality and the freedom of the individual 
subject. He insists, however, that this transcendental movement takes place both “within 
totality and history, within [human] experience.”33 Human history, for Levinas, has to be 
understood as eschatological infinity whereby within human experience, the subject’s 
desire for the other human person always breaks totality and calls the subject to infinite 
responsibility in terms of affectivity and sensibility.34 Here the human other marks the 
end of history as totality and opens up a world in which the human other is the condition 
of possibility for the subject’s subjectivity. What Levinas is attempting here is an 
asymmetrical relation both beyond and within human experience in history that has to 
take “the form of giving the very bread I eat… and to give oneself in giving it.”35   
Like Levinas, Gutiérrez and Sobrino, as presented in the second chapter, were 
provoked by the political oppression and the socio-economic plight of the non-persons, 
                                                 
32 For the discussion on the term diachronic temporarility, see Chapter One, page 44. 
33 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 23. (My italics). For Levinas, the notion of Infinity as eschatology is 
opposed to Western thought’s egological history. It establishes a relationship with being both beyond and 
within totality, history, and experience. It “draws beings out of the jurisdiction of history and the future; it 
arouses them in and calls them forth to their full responsibility.” 
34 Levinas offers an account of subjectivity as sensibility in his book Otherwise than Being or Beyond 
Essence, 14-15; 61-97. With regard affectivity, Levinas argues that in responsibility for the neighbor the 
subject is affected by exteriority that he/she cannot control, by the Infinite. This “being-affected” is what he 
calls affection, see his “The Thinking of Being and the Question of the Other,” in Of God Who Comes to 
Mind, translated by Bettina Bergo (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 118. (Levinas’s italics). 
Affectivity as “an excellence of love, of sociality and ‘fear for others’ which is not my anxiety for my own 
death,” becomes then for Levinas the characteristic of the humanness of the human person in passivity of 
consciousness; see his “The Idea of the Infinite in us,” in Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-other, 221. For 
Levinas therefore, “love is possible only through the idea of the Infinite – through the Infinite put in me, 
through the ‘more’ which devastates and awakens the ‘less’, turning away from teleology, destroying the 
moment and the happiness of the end.” Levinas, “God and Philosophy,” in The Levinas Reader, 177. 
35 Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, 72. 
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the poor, the oppressed, the despised of Latin American society and the Third World. The 
Kantian awakening to human reason which Christian theology embraced was no longer 
adequate in the midst of human sufferings; it became imperative that Christian theology 
awake from its deeper “sleep of inhumanity to a reality of humanity.”36 Gutiérrez and 
Sobrino accepted to face the challenge of taking the “crucified people,” the poor and the 
oppressed of the world down from the cross. Thus, their theologies emerged as an 
invitation to Christian theology to leave the climate of transcendental subjectivity and 
move toward a consideration of the human needs of the non-persons in concrete history, 
hence the centrality of the neighbor in liberation theology. It is a wake up call for the 
humanization of the victims of poverty, oppression, and marginalization. The human 
condition in history has been the starting point for both Levinas and liberation theology.  
Furthermore, the introduction of the third party in Levinas’s philosophy also 
constitutes a point of affinity and dialogue between these two approaches. It opens 
Levinas’s thought to the human situation in history by introducing the prospect of 
“thought, consciousness, and justice”37 through the creation of political and juridical 
institutions that reflect the nature of human fraternity.38 Here, the subject, who dedicated 
itself in responsibility for the other, is called into responsibility by many others in society. 
Levinas makes the subject extend its love for the other to all the others equally, launching 
the basis of a society based on responsibility, justice and fraternity. The turn to the 
neighbor in love that liberation theology calls for takes place, for Levinas, as a response 
                                                 
36 Sobrino, The Principle of Mercy, 11. 
37 Levinas, “Substitution,” in The Levinas Reader, 118. For Levinas’s discussion on the thematic thought as 
an exigency that makes justice concrete, see his “Diachrony and Representation,” in Time and the Other, 
165. 
38 Jacques Derrida, Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas, translated by Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 64. 
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to the call to justice that arises with the entry of the third party to the scene. Jacques 
Derrida’s rereading of Levinas, especially in Totality and Infinity and other lesser-known 
Talmudic readings, in terms of “hospitality, responsibility, and justice,” explains how in 
concrete life, Levinas “never turned his eyes away” from the “violence” and “distress” 
experienced by the “foreigner, the immigrant (with or without papers), the exile, the 
refugee, those without a country, a state, the displaced person or population.”39 This 
reinforces the view that Levinas gets inspiration for his philosophical discourse not only 
from the tradition of Jewish religious texts, but also from human concrete conditions, 
both bodily and interpersonally in society.40 Yet Levinas insists on the asymmetrical 
nature of his philosophy which is beyond ontology. 
Divine Transcendence and Responsibility for the Neighbor in Levinas’s Philosophy and 
Liberation Theology 
 
Another aspect of affinity is found in their understanding of the subject-other 
relationship as a place of divine transcendence. Levinas’s thought and liberation theology 
find divine transcendence in the subject’s life of commitment to the other human person. 
They all start from the ethical encounter with the human other and from there work 
toward the encounter with the trace of the Divine other. What comes first in Levinas’s 
philosophy and liberation theology is the notion of the human, because it is the human 
person whom they know. They think God in thinking about human relationships. For 
Levinas, the other most mysterious is the human other who is ethical mystery par 
excellence, a human whose infinity comes from God. He/she does not belong to the same 
genus as the subject. For liberation theology, the other is the other human being, the 
                                                 
39 Derrida, Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas, 64. 
40 Catherine Chalier, “The Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas and the Hebraic Tradition,” in Ethics as First 
Philosophy: The Significance of Emmanuel Levinas for Philosophy, Literature and Religion, 3-12. 
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original bearer of God’s image through Jesus Christ. Yet for both Levinas’s thought and 
liberation theology the human other is the neighbor, the stranger, the orphan, the poor, the 
marginalized, the widow, the way to approach the otherness of the divine transcendence. 
The other’s otherness and difference is tied to his/her transcendental dimension. 
Liberation theology asserts the locus of human encounter with God to be the crucified 
people of Latin America and the world. Any life of commitment to God entails the 
respect of the life of every human person who bears God’s image. According to liberation 
theology, love of neighbor is the necessary condition for encountering God. Like 
liberation theology, Levinas keeps the human neighbor between the human subject and 
God, such that we cannot too readily approach the invisible God without first 
encountering the height of our neighbor.41 To express this, Levinas asks the question:  
Is morality possible without God? I answer with a question? Is divinity possible 
without relation to the human other? Is such a thing possible in Judaism? 
Consider Jeremiah, chapter 24, or Isaiah 58:7 ‘to bring to your house the poor 
who are outcast.’ The direct encounter with God, this is a Christian concept. As 
Jews, we are always a threesome: I and you and the Third who is in our midst. 
And only as a Third does He reveal himself.42  
 
Levinas, although not speaking theologically, argues in De Dieu qui vient à l’idee43 that 
the moment at which the word of God is heard is inscribed in the face of the other, in the 
encounter with the other. He affirms that it is in the form of ethical order, an order to 
love, that the descent of God takes place. He writes: 
I can not describe the relation to God without speaking of my concern for the 
other. When I speak to a Christian, I always quote Matthew 25; the relation to 
God is presented there as a relation to another person. It is not a metaphor: in the 
other, there is a real presence of God. In my relation to the other, I hear the Word 
of God. It is not a metaphor; it is not extremely important, it is literally true. I’m 
                                                 
41 Terry A. Veling, “In the Name of Who? Levinas and the Other Side of Theology” Pacifica 12 (1999): 
283. 
42 Levinas, “Ideology and Idealism,” in The Levinas Reader, 247. 
43 Emmanuel Lévinas, De Dieu qui vient á l’idée (Paris : J. Vrin, 1982). 
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not saying that the other is God, but that in his or her Face I hear the Word of 
God.44 
 
Levinas sees the obligation or the order to act with love toward the other as 
the first word of God. For me [he argues] theology begins in the face of the 
neighbor. The divinity of God is played out in the human. God descends in the 
“face” of the other. To recognize God is to hear his commandment “thou shall not 
kill,” which is not only a prohibition against murder, but a call to incessant 
responsibility with regard to the other. It is to be unique, as if I were elected to 
this responsibility, which gives me as well the possibility of recognizing myself as 
unique and irreplaceable, of saying “I.” Conscious that in each of my human 
endeavors – from which the other is never absent – I respond to his existence as 
unique being.45 
 
Sobrino and Gutierrez also posit the encounter with the human other in love as 
constitutive of the human person and his/her relationship with divine transcendence. 
Therefore, ethical responsibility is integral to faith itself, and not a secondary by-product. 
Gutiérrez writes:  
We stand before something which challenges our categories, the mystery of God 
who will not be reduced to our mode of thinking, and who judges us on the basis 
of our concrete, historical actions toward the poor…Now we face a God who 
blocks the path of a false love which forgets sisters and brothers while claiming to 
direct itself spiritually toward God, more to domesticate God than to feel itself 
questioned by God’s word.46 
 
                                                 
44 Levinas, “Philosophy, Justice, and Love,” in Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-other, 109-110. For 
Levinas, “from the start, the encounter with the Other is my responsibility for him. That is the 
responsibility for my neighbor, which is, no doubt, the harsh name for what we call love of one’s neighbor; 
love without Eros, charity, love in which the ethical aspect dominates the passionate aspect, love without 
concupiscence.” See p. 103. 
45 Emmanuel Levinas, “On the Usefulness of Insomnia,” in Is it Righteous to be?: Interviews with 
Emmanuel Levinas, edited by Jill Robbins (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2001), 236; see 
also Emmanuel Levinas, Liberté et commandement (Montpellier: Fata Morgana, 1994), 45. “It is in terms 
of relations with the other that I will speak about God [...] I do not begin with the existence of a very great 
or very powerful being. All that I can say about him will come from this situation which is religious in the 
sense that the Ego cannot avoid it. If you want, it is Jonas which cannot flee. You are in front of a 
responsibility from which you cannot escape, you are not at all in the situation of a conscience which thinks 
and which, while thinking already moves back and hides.”(My translation) 
46 Gustavo Gutiérrez, “Hermeneutical Principle: Preferential Option for the Poor,” in Gustavo Gutiérrez: 
Essential Writings, edited by James B. Nickoloff (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1996), 105. 
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The God of liberation theology, although incomprehensible and mysterious, is always in 
relationship with his people and is fundamentally concerned with creation and the 
achievements and failures of humankind. He is not only with us and for us, but in the 
incarnation of Jesus as the Word of God, has even become one of us. For liberation 
theology the stranger, the oppressed, the poor one, is the incarnation of God. Hence, to 
know God is to love one’s neighbor and to act with justice.  
For Levinas’s philosophy and for liberation theology divinity is not possible 
without relation to a human other. Both argue for a philosophical theology of life that 
understands the subject’s self-transcendental experience in terms of love of neighbor. 
Thus, “transcendence is no longer the ascent to a heaven of the ideal or the sublime but 
the humble endurance of everyday life, touched, affected, burdened, wounded, obsessed, 
and exhausted by the other’s proximity.”47  
Levinas’s Philosophy, Liberation Theology and the Judeo-Christian Wisdom 
 
The Judeo-Christian wisdom in both Levinas’s philosophy and liberation theology 
can hardly be missed. Levinas’s thought and liberation theology find in the Judeo-
Christian’s “prophetic-ethical” call for love of neighbor a way out to a hopeful humane 
world. In the background of Levinas’s transcendental philosophy there is obviously the 
influence of Jewish theology. Levinas takes the Bible as a model of ethical transcendental 
philosophy. He affirms that all philosophy, all rationality and all intelligibility stem from 
the book of books, namely from the Hebrew Bible.48  He thinks with the Hebrew Bible in 
elaborating his philosophy. His claim that the subject’s only way toward God is to be 
                                                 
47 Peperzak, “Transcendence,” in Ethics as First Philosophy: The Significance of Emmanuel Levinas for 
Philosophy, Literature and Religion, 191. 
48 Levinas, “Philosophy, Justice, and Love,” in Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-other, 109. 
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ethically responsible for the other person echoes the God-human relationship in the 
Hebrew Bible. From the perspective of the Torah, each face represents God’s law to his 
people, more importantly, the sixth commandment Thou shall not kill. He often refers to 
this ethical responsibility as being “the essence of Jewish conscience”, which, he 
believes, is also “the essence of the human conscience”: ‘All men are responsible for one 
another, and ‘I more than anyone else,’” quoting Dostoïevsky’s Brothers Karamazov.49 
This is, for Levinas, the path to new humanism; it centers on the ethical enactment as 
bearing the trace of God at once distant and invisible (YHWH) and at the same time close 
to the world and human beings (Elohim).50 
Liberation theology is a theological method based on praxis in the light of the 
Bible, to use Gutiérrez’s words.51 Its concern for the poor and the oppressed is rooted in 
both the Old Testament and in the New Testament. In the New Testament, Liberation 
theology takes seriously Jesus’ instructions to his disciples about the love of God and 
love of neighbor (Mt. 22: 36-40). These two commandments summarize all the ethical 
teachings from the Old to the New Testament. Those who do not love one another cannot 
love God, and those who love God have to love one another (1Jn. 4: 7-8, 12, 19-21). This 
biblical reference makes clear the fact that the human person is ordained to total 
communion with God and to the fullest fellowship with all other persons. This is clear in 
Matthew’s eschatological discourse which has been interpreted as the summary of Jesus’ 
teaching.52 “Anything you did not do for one of these, however humble, you did not do 
                                                 
49 Levinas, “Philosophy, Justice, and Love,” in Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-other, 107. 
50 Levinas, “Judaism and Kenosis,” 124-125. 
51 Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation, 6. 
52 Mt 25: 31-46. Roger Mehl, “La catholicité de l’Église,” Revue d’Histoire et de Philosophie Religieuses 
48/4 (1968): 369; Wolfgang Trilling, The Gospel According to Matthew (New York: Herder and Herder, 
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for me” (Mt 25:45). Hence, Liberation theology’s association of faith in God and love of 
neighbor is an old tradition of Christianity. 
Besides, in the subject’s response to the ethical command which he/she 
encounters in the face of the neighbor, the subject is called to substitute himself/herself to 
the point of death and beyond. This, in liberation theology, corresponds to Jesus’ 
commandment to his disciples: “Love one another as I love you. No one has greater love 
than this, to lay down one’s life for one’s friends.” (John 15: 12-13). Levinas’s position, 
which is more of caring for the other than knowing God, is not essentially opposed to 
liberation theology’s appeal to respond to the objective needs of the neighbor in imitation 
of Jesus’ kenosis in the Scripture. Levinas’s thought and liberation theology, each in its 
own right, definitely agree that to be a free human person is to be always given to the 
other in responsibility, and this is a difficult freedom, to use Levinas’s words.  
Still, another rapprochement with regard to the Judeo-Christian wisdom would be 
on the issue of the “suffering servant” in the Bible, who is identified in Christian theology 
as Messiah, the Christ. The suffering servant for Levinas is a personification of the 
subject’s subjectivity. This, he makes clear in the preface of Totality and Infinity. The 
subject realizes or fulfils his/her identity by welcoming and being hospitable to the 
other.53 This is crucial for understanding Levinas’s project. For Levinas, the subject is 
from the outset elected to act as the suffering servant of Isaiah 53 who takes 
responsibility for the other to the point of persecution and death.54 The election is a 
                                                 
53 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 27. 
54 Emmanuel Levinas, Humanism of the Other, translated by Nidra Poller (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 2003). 
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surplus of responsibility, not a privilege; “it is the fundamental characteristic of the 
human person as morally responsible.”55 This is for Levinas humanity rightly understood: 
I think prophetism as a moment of the human condition itself. For every man, 
assuming responsibility for the Other is a way of testifying to the glory of the 
Infinite, and of being inspired. There is prophetism and inspiration in the man 
who answers for the Other, paradoxically, even before knowing what is 
concretely required of himself. This responsibility prior to the law is God’s 
revelation. There is a text of the prophet Amos that says: “God has spoken, who 
would not prophesy?,” where prophesy seems posited as the fundamental fact of 
man’s humanity.56 
 
With this reference to the Hebrew Bible, Levinas’s subject, as the suffering servant, takes 
upon himself/herself the sufferings of others. The subject will suffer as a result of his/her 
commitment to the task of bearing the rebukes, reproaches, and wounds of his/her 
fellows. Here comes in the idea of kenosis, the humility of God in the Christian tradition, 
which for Levinas has nothing to do with the Jesus Christ which St Paul’s letter to the 
Philippians (2:6-8) portrays. The Messiah, for Levinas, is not the intervention of the Son 
of God, Jesus Christ. 
God’s kenosis in Judaism, as interpreted by Rabbi Haim of Volozhin and also by 
Levinas, has to be understood as the humility by which the Infinite God subordinates his 
greatness to human ethical consent.57 Subjectivity is substitution; the fact of emptying 
one’s being for the sake of others. Substitution is messianic whenever the subject acts 
with love and responsibility for the other. God does not intervene in the life of humans. 
He only reigns “by the intermediary of an ethical order, an order in which one being is 
                                                 
55 Levinas, “Philosophy, Justice, and Love,” in Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-other, 119. 
56 Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 113-114. 
57 Levinas, “Judaism and Kenosis,” 114-132. 
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answerable for another…the human is the possibility of a being-for-the-other.”58 Every 
human person is urged to act as if he/she were a suffering servant, the Messiah. Levinas 
finds in the messianic texts of the Talmud a description of what it means to be human. He 
writes: “the Messiah is Myself [Moi]; to be Myself is to be Messiah… The fact of not 
evading the burden imposed by the suffering of others defines ipseity itself. All persons 
are the Messiah.”59 It takes shape here and now in the presence of the other person 
whenever one’s subjectivity in the world is questioned. Levinas would certainly reject 
Liberation theology’s view of the eschatological Messiah who is the fulfillment of 
history. He would fear that this kind of Messiah would end the subject’s state of 
insomnia/wakefulness60 or what we would call vigilant insomnia.61 It is a state of 
watchfulness characterized by an impossibility of sleep. For what keeps the subject 
awake and always in permanent responsibility for the other in love is precisely his/her 
state of watchfulness. Before even the subject could express his/her freedom, he/she is 
already met with this obligation to the other. Hence, Levinas asserts, “ethical freedom is 
difficile liberté.”62  
Levinas says of human subjectivity what liberation theology says of Jesus Christ. 
The notion of substitution in liberation theology makes reference to the life, death and 
resurrection of Christ. Christ reveals thus that the essence of human responsibility stems 
from the meaning of human life, taking the sufferings of other human beings upon 
                                                 
58 Levinas, “Judaism and Kenosis,” 126. Redemption for Levinas is accomplished by the human person 
through love and responsibility in a time that goes countercurrent to the linear time. Asymmetrical time is 
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59 Levinas, “Messianic Texts,” in Difficult Freedom, 89. 
60 Levinas, Existence and Existents, 65-67; Emmanuel Levinas and Richard Kearney, “Dialogue with 
Emmanuel Levinas,” 30 (My italics); Levinas, “On the Usefulness of Insomnia,” in Is it Righteous to be?: 
Interviews with Emmanuel Levinas, 234-236. 
61 I am indebted to Terry A. Veling for the expression vigilant insomnia; see his “In the Name of Who? 
Levinas and the Other Side of Theology,” 278. (My italics) 
62 Emmanuel Levinas and Richard Kearney “Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas,” 27. 
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oneself. The human person can only realize himself/herself or his /her true vocation by 
understanding responsibility in imitation of Christ as a radical openness to the needs of 
others, thus a self-emptying. Substitution becomes, therefore, a radical expression of 
solidarity with others, most especially, with the victims of inhumanity to others. In 
history, Gutiérrez and Sobrino argue, Christians in particular and human beings in 
general, have the responsibility to act as Christ, the suffering servant. Levinas’s idea of 
incarnation is a re-evaluation of subjectivity in terms of substitution, responsibility and 
expiation for others. To be a subject is to be for the other person. This is what Jesus 
Christ as the prophet of God did so well, and this is what Christian love is all about: to be 
human is to love one’s neighbor as God does; it is to bless, care for the poor, the 
abandoned, the orphans, and the oppressed; to pray for, and then turn the other cheek to 
the enemy.  
Now, as this dissertation does not claim a perfect matching between these two 
approaches, a couple of points can be noted in terms of divergence. For instance, while 
for liberation theology the stranger, the oppressed, the poor one, is the incarnation of 
God,63 for Levinas, he/she only manifests the height in which God is revealed as God is 
maintained in the trace. The event of revelation of the absolute other (Autre), for Levinas, 
takes place through the face of the other whenever the subject takes the prophetic stance 
which says “Here I am,” and stands accused, hostage, and responsible for the other, 
witnessing, thus, to the Infinite. The infinite discloses itself to the ethical subject through 
the trace which passes – without ever being present – in the face of the stranger, widow, 
                                                 
63 Sobrino and Gutiérrez, on their part, take the incarnation to represent the actual entry of God into 
humanity, the divinization of the human. 
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orphan for whom I am responsible.64 Levinas’s non-representable trace of God remains 
unthematizable. God comes to the idea, falls into meaning in responsibility for the 
other.65 The neighbor, in liberation theology, is sacred and holy because he/she is an 
Imago Dei. Imago Dei in Levinas is about being found in God’s trace, but it is not being 
an icon of God, for 
God who has passed is not the model whose face would be the image. To be in the 
image of God, does not mean to be the icon of God, but to be in his trace. The 
revealed God of our Judeo-Christian spirituality preserves all the infinity of his 
absence which is in order with his person. He shows himself only by his trace, as 
in chapter 33 of Exodus. To go towards Him, is not to follow this trace which is 
not a sign; it is to go towards the Others who are held in the trace.66 
 
While, for Levinas, the relation to the face takes place on the asymmetrical level, for 
Sobrino and Gutierrez, it occurs in the reality of history in conditions of extremity, each 
of which cries out for ethical engagement.  
Levinas also departs from Christian theology on the meaning of revelation. He 
criticizes theology for positing God as being and God’s revelation as the manifestation of 
being.67 For him the God of the Scriptures cannot be defined or confined in theological 
language; even the superlatives often used to approach God’s reality are all misleading. 
This, of course, is a direct attack on the Christian tradition for its use of superlatives to 
describe God and its belief in the incarnation of God in the person of Jesus Christ. Christ, 
in the Christian tradition, is incarnate in the life of Christians, while for Levinas, true 
incarnation is subjectivity rightly understood. Levinas’s God is not an omnipotent God of 
                                                 
64 Levinas, “God and Philosophy,” in The Levinas Reader, 184. 
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the Christian tradition, encountered both in a one on one contemplative experience and in 
the human other. In his philosophy, God’s self-disclosure carries first of all an ethical 
signification rather than a theological one.  
Another point of divergence is that Levinas operates on the level of philosophy 
that runs counter to much of the Western philosophical and theological tradition. He 
writes: 
The philosophical discourse of the West claims amplitude of an all-encompassing 
structure or of an ultimate comprehension. It compels every other discourse to 
justify itself before philosophy. Rational theology accepts this vassalage. If, for 
the benefit of religion, it reserves a domain from the authority of philosophy, one 
will know that this domain will have been recognized to be philosophically 
unverifiable.68 
 
Evidently, for Levinas, much theological reflection is ontologically based which, by 
privileging and celebrating the uniqueness of the thinking subject over ethical 
responsibility renders the other defenseless to whatever possible violence this subject 
might exercise on the other. Liberation theology in constructing its theological project 
lies resolutely within the ontological tradition of Western philosophy criticized by 
Levinas. It analyzes the issue of otherness within the Christian theological tradition to 
revitalize the theological agenda from where Rahner left it.  
Liberation theology, however, by focusing on the human other left the climate of 
the turn to the subject (excessive emphasis on the human subject) and moved a step 
forward toward a consideration of the turn to the human other/neighbor that Levinas 
speaks about. With liberation theology, the meaning of being is now located in 
exteriority, that is, in what is other than self. To be human in the world is to be affected 
by the neighbor à la Levinas. Against the accusation that liberation theology was a 
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“political reduction of the Gospel,”69 liberation theology has persistently maintained that 
the legitimacy of theology will always be evaluated by the practice of ethical action and 
justice. “Any attempt,” Gutiérrez says, “to separate the love of God from the love of 
neighbor gives rise to attitudes which impoverish the one or the other.”70 In its 
conceptually thematized categories of being, it posits the subject not as “ontologically 
constituted,” but rather, as “ethically enacted” through a “relativization of 
intentionality.”71 This perspective offers a new possibility for understanding human 
subjectivity. Thus, to be a subject for Gutiérrez, Sobrino, and Levinas is to go beyond 
moral obligations to the affirmation of what it means to be human. They are concerned 
with the humanity of the other person, which is infinite and cannot be contained by any 
human subject. Levinas himself referred to liberation theology as a concrete example of 
the application of his thought in the real time of history.72 Gutiérrez on his part refers to 
Levinas as a philosopher who shares liberation theology’s perspective. He writes: 
That is why we need an ethics of solidarity. An important Jewish philosopher, 
Emmanuel Levinas, has written of this matter eloquently. Based on Scripture, he 
states that the “other” comes first, as we saw in the parable of the Good 
Samaritan. For Levinas, the first philosophy is ethics, and I think it is a very 
demanding one. For Levinas and for Christians, the “other” is first because he or 
she is made in God’s image. We should have the faith to recognize Jesus Christ in 
the face of the poor. To have a Christian perspective, we should have a very deep 
commitment to this ethics of solidarity.73 
 
Thus, notwithstanding some divergences, Levinas’s thought and liberation theology are 
conceptually related in their effort to bring forward the dimension of the divine that opens 
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forth in the human face. God’s transcendence emerges not in the oppression and hatred of 
other human beings but in love of one’s neighbor. The effort of Levinas, Gutiérrez, and 
Sobrino is to redefine what justifies subjectivity, both philosophically and theologically. 
They establish that the human other is the condition for the possibility of the subject’s 
subjectivity in the world. For what constitutes the human person’s very humanity is the 
concern for the death of another, not its concern for its own death. To posit the other is to 
understand the subject whose existence is justified in his/her responsibility to others. 
Thus, the subjectivity of the subject depends on the other and that of the other depends on 
the subject’s. Heidegger’s “being-with” the other in the world is now a “being-for” the 
other, because humans are all responsible for the well-being of one another, but the 
subject more than any one else. Again, there is certainly not a perfect matching between 
these two approaches. Yet all noticeable affinities and divergences make these two 
approaches complementary and ascertain an opportunity for dialogue. In the following 
section this work will examine how these approaches could complement each other.  
III. Levinas’s Philosophy and Liberation Theology: Complementarity and Dialogue 
 
Thus far, this study has established some conceptual affinities between the 
philosophical project of Levinas and liberation theology. Our contention in this section is 
that Levinas’s philosophy and liberation theology could complement each other in their 
respective field. This work will suggest that Levinas’s philosophy presents a practical 
philosophical framework for liberation theology as it is compatible with one of the truths 
of Christianity: the concern for the neighbor. Besides, it will also show that liberation 
theology’s spirituality of conversion to the neighbor bears witness to Levinas’s ethical 
responsibility in the real time of history. Yet, the turn to the other/neighbor in Levinas’s 
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philosophy and liberation theology offers a promising perspective for human coexistence 
necessary for the prospect of a humane world. 
Levinas’s Transcendental Ethics: A Viable Philosophical Framework for Liberation 
Theology 
 
Levinas’s transcendental ethics, as it was argued in the first chapter, emerged in 
response to Western philosophy’s ontological tendency that understood the human 
subject in terms of knowledge and comprehension. In this focus on ontology, he argued, 
the consciousness of the subject in relation to the other is autonomous and occupies the 
first place in the principle of intelligibility. As he became displeased with this 
interpretation of the consciousness of the subject, he proposed a different philosophical 
framework in which the consciousness of the subject in the relationship with the other 
loses its first place. It is a new philosophical framework that keeps the subject awake to 
humanity that is no longer constituted by his/her powers, but rather, enacted by his/her 
responsibility “in passivity, in reception, in obligation with regard to the other.” Here “it 
is the other who is first and there the question of my sovereign consciousness is no longer 
the first question.”74 Levinas’s philosophical project here offers to liberation theology and 
the entire Christian common consciousness a philosophical structure of human 
consciousness which goes beyond human freedom. Levinas believes that a true human 
consciousness is a movement toward the divine through uprightness (droiture) of life, not 
a return to the self. For him consciousness is 
the urgency of a destination leading to the Other and not an eternal return to 
self…an innocence without naivety, an uprightness which is also absolute self-
criticism, read in the eyes of the one who is the goal of my uprightness and whose 
look calls me into question. It is a movement toward the Other that does not come 
back to its point of origin the way a diversion comes back, incapable as it is of 
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transcendence – a movement beyond anxiety and stronger than death. This 
uprightness is called Temimut, the essence of Jacob.75  
 
Levinas’s description of human consciousness awakens Christian consciousness to the 
infinite heteronomy in the subject’s relationship with the other. It is a philosophical 
construction that finds inspiration from the Scripture and breaks with the ontological 
autonomy of the subject’s consciousness. It posits a mode of being human for the other 
and emphasizes the subject’s consciousness of responsibility as an awakening to 
humanity.76 Liberation theology will certainly benefit from this philosophical perspective 
as it argues for the primacy of the other and calls the subject’s consciousness to love and 
responsibility for the other/neighbor. 
More pertinent to liberation theology and Christian theology would be Levinas’s 
concept of insomnia or wakefulness. The search for the anthropology of unity and 
equality, in the sense of sameness, has been the characteristic of Western philosophical 
and theological anthropology. This for Levinas, as this study argued above, has been the 
source of violence, wars and conflict of all kinds. One might see in liberation theology 
the danger of articulating its turn to the existence of the victims of history in terms of 
rights, freedom, and autonomy given to the human person by modernity’s turn to the 
subject. It might be emphasizing sameness, equality, and fusion more than the uniqueness 
of each individual in ethical responsibility for the neighbor. Liberation theology is 
challenged to reconsider its theological anthropology by opening up to Levinas’s view of 
the human person who is always in the state of vigilant insomnia. It is an expression of 
the true life of the subject in the world in which the other always keeps the subject awake 
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in an experience of rupture; he/she never gives the subject a possibility to have a feel of 
totality, rather, always a feeling of infinity – of desires that are infinite, questions that are 
always opened out eternally, longings that are never satisfied. It  keeps the human person 
away from any illusion of sameness, equality, self-centeredness, self-satisfaction, and self 
completeness, until he/she turns toward the “other,” the “elsewhere” and the “otherwise,” 
leaving the security of “at home with oneself” (chez soi), “which [we] inhabit, toward an 
alien outside-of-oneself [hors-de-soi], toward a yonder.”77 In this movement outside of 
oneself in vulnerability and exposedness, Levinas’s philosophy finds what opens up the 
subject to the revelation of God and makes him/her a prophet: “Here I am.” Hence 
Levinas describes  
ethical responsibility as insomnia or wakefulness precisely because it is a 
perpetual duty of vigilance and effort that can never slumber. Ontology as a state 
of affairs can afford to sleep. But love cannot sleep, can never be peaceful or 
permanent. Love is the incessant watching over the other; it can never be satisfied 
or contented with bourgeois ideal of love as domestic comfort or as the mutual 
possession of two people living out an egoisme-á-deux.78  
 
For Levinas, prior to all systems of reasoning, which are necessary for the development 
of thought, exists an ethical subject at all times turned toward the needs of the other. The 
idea of asymmetry is meant to emphasize the other’s transcendental dimension that 
obligates the subject to love in responsibility. This is how being justifies itself. Hence, 
ethical responsibility for the human other ought to be the ground for any possible 
ontologically based philosophical and/or theological discourse. In some sense, Levinas 
recognizes the transcendental power of human historical reality.79 This is an event of 
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meaning, not of cognition or comprehension, which characterizes the human person 
rightly understood and necessary for the re-imagining of the world. Levinas’s 
transcendental ethics provides liberation theology with a viable philosophical framework 
of human intersubjectivity that emphasizes human subjectivity as fundamentally 
orientated toward the other in love and responsibility. The subject’s responsibility for the 
other person or love of neighbor is non-reciprocal and endless. The other’s otherness and 
difference urges the subject always to do more for the other, more than anyone else; and 
no one is exempt from this ideal.  
Specifically, the dissertation argues that Levinas’s transcendental ethics is an apt, 
if not wholly adequate, approach from the Christian perspective, for representing human 
engagement with the other who bears the trace of the divine goodness that is beyond 
being. In today’s world, as Veling argues, “to turn around, to face the other, is the 
conversion required of theology.”80 This study sees in Levinas’s discovery of ethics as 
first philosophy a new direction that all serious Christian theology should consider; this 
is, as David Tracy would argue, “the prophetic-ethical form that has characterized not 
only earliest Christologies, but also liberation and evangelical Christologies.”81 And 
“surely,” he continues, “on the central question of transcendence, this ethical route to the 
Absolute Other only by way of interrelationships of human others is Levinas’ most 
original, and daring, and for Jewish and Christian theology, both promising…and 
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controversial move.”82 Since all subjectivity is prophetic, philosophy and theology may 
meet outside of both of their own homes, on a journey toward the other, in ethics.  
Liberation Theology as Conversion to the Neighbor in History: Bearing Witness to 
Levinas’s Transcendental Ethics of Responsibility 
 
The basis of Levinas’s philosophy is the ethical relationship between the subject 
and the other. It is a relationship that takes place in atemporal temporality in terms of 
sensibility, hostage, vulnerability, exposure, proximity, obsession, trauma, persecution, 
substitution, obligation, and responsibility. The other, who is totally different, has always 
already transcended, disturbed the imaginary self-centered totality of the same in a time 
that goes contrary to the linear and synchronic time of being and history.  
At this point one finds oneself faced with a recurrent question of the availability 
of Levinas’s philosophy within the real time of history. Should all genuine modes of 
encounter with the other be reduced to an unmediated, unthematized face to face 
relationship? Is this a tenable position in the world of conflicts and injustice? Is it 
possible to conceive of the human subject as ethically responsible within the ontological 
system of thinking? Can’t an ontologically based system, such as liberation theology, 
embody an ethical responsibility that recognizes the uncompromised value of the other 
human person? As such, the non-ontological dimension of Levinas’s philosophy has been 
questioned.83  
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Liberation theology, in our estimation, offers elements that can critically 
complement Levinas’s transcendental ethics of responsibility. The priority it gives to the 
human neighbor in his/her relationship with the subject over and against dogmatic 
principles and transcendental subjectivity, opens a possibility for understanding “human 
subjectivity as ethically enacted rather than ontologically constituted” in the real time of 
history.84  For liberation theology, being is not only knowledge or comprehension, but 
also sensibility and affection. A purely metaphysical discourse of the turn to the 
other/neighbor does little to advance the actual lives of the victims of human inhumanity 
to humans. The point here is that Levinas’s “ideal of holiness” over and against “the laws 
of being,” cannot of itself act; it remains on the level of an ideal. It has, obviously, the 
merit of positing Infinity as that “which cuts through and perforates the totality of 
presence and points towards the absolutely other,”85 but falls short of translating it within 
the real time of history where justice might be done for others. Humans relate to one 
another and relate to God or to God’s trace only as subjects of the historical world.  
Liberation theology bears witness to Levinas’s philosophy by arguing for 
conversion to the neighbor or love of neighbor. It articulates in the real time of history a 
possibility for the subject to act with sensibility and affection toward the other and calls 
the subject to infinite responsibility à la Levinas. Hence, love of neighbor becomes 
affective responsibility toward the other. It functions within human history as Michael 
Purcell’s being otherwise86 and breaks every inclination to totality through the dimension 
                                                                                                                                                 
Rahner and Levinas (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1998), 297-332; 314. Andrew Tallon, 
“Nonintentional Affectivity, Affective Intentionality, and the Ethical in Levinas’s Philosophy,” in Ethics as 
First Philosophy: The Significance of Emmanuel Levinas for Philosophy, Literature and Religion, 107-121; 
84 Baird, On the Side of the Angels, 87. 
85 Emmanuel Levinas and Richard Kearney, “Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas,” in Face to Face with 
Levinas, 21. 
86  See his Mystery and Method, 297-334.  
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of divine transcendence. As with Levinas, liberation theology insists that the neighbor’s 
existence (the poor, the oppressed, the orphan, the stranger etc.), takes the first place and 
awakes the subject to humanity that is no longer the subject’s powers, but rather, the 
subject’s responsibility in obligation to the other. Its insistence on love of neighbor is 
about responsibility for the neighbor in concrete history through liberation.  
Liberation theology’s spirituality of conversion to the neighbor is an unending 
process of turning toward the other person in affective responsibility. And this affective 
responsibility or love of neighbor is possible only through the ‘more’ which destroys and 
awakens the ‘less’ in the subject, turning him/her away from self-centeredness. It is a turn 
that recognizes within the real time of history the absolute presence of God in the other 
human person. It is an option that stems from the Judeo-Christian wisdom of which 
Levinas is a part and finds some inspiration. It finds full meaning primarily in the life of 
commitment to those who are subject to unjust suffering and death. This is God’s attitude 
toward humankind, mostly toward the less privileged, and it must serve as a model for all 
humans. It is an ethics of solidarity.87  
Besides, Levinas’s philosophical framework in which the consciousness of the 
subject in the relationship with the other loses its first place could find some resonance in 
liberation theology. Its call to uprightness of life, as noted above, could be read in line 
with liberation theology’s demands for theological responsibility. For liberation theology, 
theological responsibility is founded on the eschatological promises of the scriptural 
                                                 
87 Liberation theology insists that if a human person is to be consistent to him/herself as a human being and 
offspring of God, he/she must accept the fact that the whole of human being is constituted or lost in the 
acceptance or rejection of the evangelical principle that in order to find life, one must lose it, and that there 
is no greater love than this: to lay down one’s life for one’s friends (Mark 8:35; John 15:13). See Sobrino, 
Spirituality of Liberation: Toward Political Holiness, 33. 
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tradition: love, peace, justice, reconciliation, and transcendence. 88 It urges Christians to 
give account of the hope that is in them through commitment to the neighbor in human 
society. It involves practical commitment in human concerns in history and it precedes 
self-transcendence. Liberation theology certainly has the merit to have awakened to this 
call to responsibility by taking theological reflection back to its original truth of being at 
the service of love. In a sense, liberation theology’s centrality of the neighbor functions 
as a form of justification of Levinas’s philosophical framework.  
Levinas himself acknowledged the exaggerated non-ontological perspective of his 
thought and was ready to concede that his philosophical reflection, insofar as it is 
knowledge, has to be conceived ontologically. Objectively, a great part of human verbal 
communication and thought is, in one way or the other, systematic and logical. He 
comments: “I do not deny that philosophy is a knowledge, insofar as it names even what 
is not nameable, and thematizes what is not thematizable. But in thus giving to what 
breaks with the categories of discourse the form of the said, perhaps it impresses onto the 
said the traces of this rupture.”89 In the same vein, he continues “an event of unlimited 
responsibility for another certainly has a historic meaning; it bears witness to our age and 
marks it…I do think that the unlimited responsibility for another, as an enucleation of 
oneself, could have a translation into history’s concreteness.”90 Levinas here 
                                                 
88 Here, Sobrino and Gutierrez would agree with Johannes Baptist Metz on the fact that the eschatological 
promises are an integral part of human historical conditions; they cannot be made private because they 
constitute not only the basic structure of human existence, but also the meaning for the whole human 
existence when they are viewed historically and socially. For Metz, “the Christian community finds the 
theological basis of its socially critical task in the eschatological dimension of its self-understanding, which 
is at the same time a dimension of universal humanization…They force one ever anew into social 
responsibility.” See Johannes Baptist Metz, Theology of the World, translated by William Glen-Doepel 
(New York: The Seabury Press, 1969), 153. 
89 Levinas, Ethic and Infinity, 107-108. (Levinas’s italics) 
90 Levinas, “Questions and Answers,” in Of God Who Comes to Mind, 81. (Levinas’s italics) 
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acknowledges the possibility of translating what he calls the utopia of conscience91 within 
the real time of history and cites the South American student priests in Louvain as an 
example. He writes: 
I was taken one day, in Louvain, after a lecture on these ideas [ethical 
responsibility], to a student house that is there called “pedagogy.” I found myself 
surrounded by South American students, almost all priests, but above all 
preoccupied by the situation in South America. They spoke to me of what was 
happening there as of a supreme trial of humanity. They questioned me, not 
without irony: where would I have encountered concretely the Same, preoccupied 
by the Other to the point of undergoing a fusioning of itself? I replied: at least 
here. Here, in this group of students, of intellectuals who might very well have 
been occupied with their internal perfection and who nevertheless had no other 
subjects of conversation than the crisis of the Latin American masses. Were they 
not hostages? This utopia of conscience found itself historically fulfilled in the 
room in which I found myself. That history should be concerned by these utopias 
of conscience, I believe seriously.92 
 
Again, as it was shown above, it is certainly the entrance of the third party (tiers) to the 
scene, the whole of humanity that brings Levinas’s project down to earth, to the realities 
of human communities. But in so doing, it also brings to bear the subtle ambiguity of a 
human subject: good and bad. Beyond the unique singularity of the subject’s prophetic 
orientation, he/she can also be the source of violence, hatred, and war. Hence the 
inevitable need for justice through laws, institutions, and States. Love of neighbor 
without concupiscence in concrete human community demands justice. This is a more 
tangible moment where Levinas’s ethical responsibility opens up to ontological 
                                                 
91 Levinas’s utopia of conscience functions in the level of otherwise than being. In the real time of history, 
however, it would correspond to what this study calls affective responsibility or love of neighbor. The 
South American students’ concern for the sufferings of their countrymen and women renders them hostages 
for the sake of others. In Levinas’s view, they exemplify the utopia of conscience in the real time of 
history.   
92 Levinas, “Questions and Answers,” in Of God Who Comes to Mind, 81-82. Levinas goes as far as seeing 
in Marxist’s theory a concrete example of concern for the other in history, see Emmanuel Levinas and 
Richard Kearney, “Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas,” in Face to Face with Levinas, 32-33; “Philosophy, 
Justice, and Love,” 119.  
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discourse.93 Justice, Levinas argues, originates from the subject’s “Here I am”, that is, 
from “its gratuitousness or grace or unconditional charity.”94 It arises to temper the 
other’s privileges, because next to the one who is an other to the subject, is another other 
to the same subject.  
While justice arises in history to temper the other’s privileges, it does not, 
however, address the issue of human weakness and evil that Levinas recognizes in the 
human person which might prevent him/her from awakening to the human other in 
responsibility.95 To awaken to the human other is constitutive of humanity rightly 
understood. This, for Levinas, is the “ideal of holiness” expected of every human 
person.96 Yet Levinas offers no alternative to how in reality one is to deal with elements 
of weakness and evil in the human person that might prevent one from awakening to the 
human other. This is a fact of human nature as we experience it. Here again liberation 
theology could complement Levinas’s transcendental philosophy as it suggests the 
spirituality of conversion to the neighbor as the way to remain focused on the divine call 
to a life of uprightness, expressed through the prophetic attitude of “Here I am” in the 
real time of history. The spirituality of conversion to the neighbor offers Levinas’s 
transcendental ethics a possibility to keep humans in check in their daily dealings with 
                                                 
93 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 213. 
94 Levinas, “The Other, Utopia, and Justice,” in Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-other, 228-229. 
95 The view presented herein is what Levinas himself takes when he wrestles with the question of the 
human person not responding to the awakening which is obligation. He admits that “there is in man the 
possibility of not awakening to the other,” and that, he calls evil. In this context, Levinas notes “I am not 
certain that the ‘otherwise than being’ is guaranteed to triumph. There can be periods during which the 
human is completely extinguished, but the ideal of holiness is what humanity has introduced into 
being…An ideal of holiness [is] contrary to the laws of being, [and sets humans on the path of] acting 
without letting [themselves] be guided by [the menacing possibility of not awakening to the other.]” See 
Levinas, “Philosophy, Justice, and Love,” in Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-other, 114. 
96 Holiness for Levinas is concern for the other; it breaks the concern for oneself, see Levinas, “On the 
Usefulness of Insomnia,” in Is it Righteous to be?: Interviews with Emmanuel Levinas, 235. 
 165
one another, “without letting [themselves] be guided by”97 menacing possibilities of not 
awakening to the human other. While the never-ending responsibility of the subject – 
through wakefulness or unremitting watching over the other – in Levinas is expressed 
asymmetrically, Liberation theology’s spirituality of conversion to the neighbor offers 
human beings a possibility in history of redirecting everlastingly their eyes toward the 
“ideal of holiness” Levinas speaks about. It opens up a possibility for the subject to 
remain in a state of vigilant insomnia and act in ethical responsibility for the 
other/neighbor in the real time of history. Levinas’s “ideal of holiness” in liberation 
theology’s perspective would be understood in terms of a spirituality lived in the spirit of 
Jesus Christ. It is a spirituality of a life given for the sake of the neighbor. 
Besides, liberation theology’s conversion to the neighbor also offers a possibility 
for forgiveness through love of the oppressors, those who did not awaken to God’s call to 
uprightness of life in the form of ethical responsibility. The victims’ love for the 
oppressors seeks the conversion of the oppressors to the others/neighbors’ humanity. At 
the same time, it reminds the victims themselves of the unlimited nature of the prophetic 
attitude of “Here I am” that constitutes their true subjectivity. The victims of poverty, 
oppression, and marginalization become the locus of conversion to the neighbor for the 
oppressors, and their attitude calls for the universal setting for God’s question: what have 
you done to your brother or sister? Hence, for Gutiérrez and Sobrino, the non-poor, the 
oppressors, and those who participate in the oppression by their passivity are called to 
respond and correspond to the God of the poor and marginalized revealed in the biblical 
tradition. As the God of biblical revelation is known through inter-human justice, both 
                                                 
97 Levinas, “Philosophy, Justice, and Love,” in Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-other, 114. 
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the oppressed and the oppressors are invited to a never-ending conversion to the neighbor 
expressed in responsibility for the other.  
The Turn to the Other/Neighbor: A Precondition for Peace, Justice, and good Socio-
Political and Economic Order 
 
The study of the dialogue between Levinas’s transcendental ethics of 
responsibility and liberation theology, both of which propose the turn to the 
other/neighbor as an intersubjective model for the radical re-imagining of the world, 
shows their significance for addressing critical issues such as poverty, racism, terrorism, 
civil wars, oppression, marginalization, xenophobia, and intolerance in the postmodern 
world. Levinas’s ethics of responsibility and liberation theology propose a new way of 
understanding human subjectivity and take our philosophical and theological reflection to 
a dimension of ethical engagement which is necessary in today’s world.  
They propose, in our estimation, a fundamental avenue for a long-term resolution 
of crisis in today’s wounded world. Their suggestion that all subjectivity be described as 
inspired by the other and that humans see in other human persons the dimension of the 
divine could lessen the possibility of the hatred of the other person.98 The human person 
rightly understood is the one who acts in ethical responsibility toward the neighbor. 
Human eyes should always be focused on the “ideal of holiness” which is to go toward 
the other. Both philosophically and theologically, self-centeredness has to give way to the 
primacy of responsibility for the well-being of other humans, one’s neighbor who bears 
the trace or presence of God. In their separate fields, as Jacob Meskin helpfully puts it, 
liberation theology and Levinas’s transcendental ethics of responsibility “reveal to us a 
                                                 
98 Emmanuel Levinas, Autrement qu’être; ou, au-delà de l’essence (La Haye : M. Nijhoff, 1974), 180; see 
also Michel Vanni, “Messianisme et Temporalité Eschatologique dans la Philosophie d’Emmanuel 
Lévinas,’’ Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie 130 (1998) : 37-50, 45.  
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portrait of late twentieth-century intellectual work which refuses to abandon 
eschatological urgency,”99 because the kingdom of God is ethics fully realized in human 
relationships. In today’s postmodern world, Levinas’s philosophy and liberation theology 
propose a path to peace, justice, and good socio-political and economic order. Levinas’s 
philosophy and liberation theology’s approach awaken today’s world vehemently to the 
practice of responsibility, justice, and love. Their emphasis on the turn to the 
other/neighbor is most needed for any possible re-imagining of today’s world. 
Conclusion 
 
Certainly this concise synopsis of the dialogue between Levinas’s philosophy and 
liberation theology, as presented by Gutiérrez and Sobrino, does not reflect either the 
complexity or the density of their thought. Rather, in these pages this chapter has 
presented two different approaches that share some conceptual affinities and remain 
relevant to the situation of the degradation of the human other in history. The main focus 
of this chapter has been on the dialogue between Levinas’s transcendental ethics of 
responsibility and liberation theology. The thesis here is that Levinas’s humanism finds 
some conceptual affinities with liberation theology. This chapter argued that both propose 
the turn to the other/neighbor as an intersubjective model for a creation of a better world. 
The devastating experiences of Holocaust, oppression, the plight of the stranger and 
poverty, have been, this chapter had argued, the major motivation for Levinas, Gutiérrez 
and Sobrino’s attempt to reflect on the self-other relationship.100 They argued that the 
divine is encountered in a life of commitment to the neighbor and call for love of 
                                                 
99 Jacob Meskin, “From Phenomenology to Liberation: The Displacement of History and Theology in 
Levinas’s Totality and Infinity,” Philosophy and Theology 4 (1989): 119. 
100 In Totality and Infinity, Levinas expresses this in a rather helpful manner: “the face in its nakedness as a 
face presents to me the destitution of the poor one and the stranger.” 213. 
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neighbor and justice. Each in its own right insists on the centrality of the human person in 
God’s discourse. They find in the ethical readings of the prophetic nucleus of the Judeo-
Christian tradition a way forward for the creation of a world in which the hatred of the 
other person becomes less and less possible. As in the Hebrew Bible, the neighbor for 
Levinas is linked to the stranger, the widow, the orphan, and the poor, asserting their 
uniqueness as others to be faced in responsibility. Liberation theology finds in the life, 
death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ the prophetic attitude of concern for the neighbors. 
In the Scripture, the total work of God is geared toward the respect for the humanity of 
the other person. It contends that the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ 
constitute the hermeneutic principle that exemplifies the “prophetic-ethical” attitude 
needed for the re-imagining of the world. Love of neighbor is seen as dialectically linked 
with salvation, and Christian faith with the practice of justice. Levinas’s philosophy’s and 
liberation theology’s key prophetic-ethical orientation echoes a stance that seeks to 
protect the neighbor from being assimilated or dominated and, at the same time reveals 
the divine in history in the case of liberation theology, while for Levinas, it brings the 
idea of God to mind as the matching part of the justice rendered to the other human 
person in an asymmetrical relation.   
This chapter also noted that despite some affinities between these two approaches, 
they come from different philosophical and theological perspectives. A couple of 
underlining divergences were mentioned in this chapter. It was noted that liberation 
theology is ontologically based reflection, while Levinas’s thought is philosophical in the 
phenomenological tradition with the influence of the Jewish tradition. Besides, while 
Levinas was suspicious of Christian theology in general for its reliance on an 
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ontologically based system of thought, he was nevertheless more sympathetic to 
liberation theology’s approach as one of the examples, in concrete history, which bears 
witness to his transcendental ethical responsibility. As this chapter mapped out the 
thought of Gutierrez, Sobrino, and Levinas, it showed that Levinas’s transcendental 
ethics, which conceives God as the goodness that is beyond being and calls humans to 
responsibility for the neighbor, provides a viable philosophical framework that remains 
vital to a justification of one of the truths of Christianity: the concern for neighbor. It also 
argued that liberation theology’s spirituality of conversion to the neighbor bears witness 
to Levinas’s ethical responsibility.  
What is fundamental to both liberation theology and Levinas’s ethical 
responsibility is that they both bring forth one major characteristic: the dimension of the 
divine opens forth in the human face. For Levinas, Gutiérrez, and Sobrino, commitment 
to the neighbor is the necessary context for understanding God.  The ethical command of 
“love thy neighbor” which can be seen as foundational for Levinas’s ethics of 
responsibility, finds conceptual affinities with liberation theology’s concern for the non-
persons, the others. In a world of deadly ethical struggles, hardening divisions among 
people, and in the time when tens of millions of refugees have no place to call home, 
liberation theology and Levinas’s transcendental ethics, each in its own right, call for a 
redefinition of “human subjectivity as ethically enacted.”101 For Levinas, Gutiérrez, and 
Sobrino, ethical subjectivity for the human other is a primary expression of humans’ 
relationship to God.  
 From this perspective, this chapter argued that the works of Levinas, Gutiérrez, 
and Sobrino, offer great promise to our postmodern “wounded” culture. Their turn to the 
                                                 
101 Baird, On the Side of the Angels, 87. 
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other/neighbor as an intersubjective model for the radical re-imagining of the world, 
offers a possibility of a peaceful world. Their suggestion that humans see in others the 
dimension of the divine could lessen the possibility of the hatred of the other person. By 
examining Levinas’s philosophical conceptual affinities with liberation theology as a 
promising project, this dissertation hopes to contribute to on the ongoing significant and 
positive conversation between Christian theology and postmodern philosophy. What 
matters in today’s world is not so much the question of the meaning of life, but the 
question of ethics. What matters is not so much our separation from God and the desire 
for mystical participation; rather, what matters is our regard for each other, and the desire 
for sociality, for ethical responsibility.102 This provides a compelling case for rethinking 
the place of the other in the world, more importantly in Africa as this dissertation will 
argue in the fifth chapter. For the moment, the next chapter will examine how some 
scholars developed Levinas’s phenomenological insights more explicitly in a 
philosophical and theological direction, again without assuming that Levinas is a 
theologian. 
                                                 
102 Veling, “In the Name of Who? Levinas and the Other Side of Theology,” 283. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Enrique Dussel, Jean-Luc Marion, and Michael Purcell on 
Emmanuel Levinas’s Ethics of Responsibility and Christian 
Theology 
 
Introduction 
 
Having laid out the complex dimension of Levinas’s philosophy’s conceptual 
affinities with liberation theology in the third chapter, this chapter examines how such 
similarities hold up in the views of three respected contemporary Christian scholars, 
Enrique Dussel, Jean-Luc Marion, and Michael Purcell, who have been influenced by 
Levinas. Their work shows how Levinas’s turn to the other can serve Christian theology. 
Levinas’s ethics of responsibility, they argue, opens a possibility of breaking out of a 
theology developed on the basis of an anthropology and categories mainly influenced by 
nineteenth century modern philosophy.   
Enrique Dussel, a Mexican philosopher and theologian of liberation, develops his 
thought as a challenge to the neocolonialism of Eurocentrist philosophy and brings Latin 
American/Third World lived experiences to the core of critical philosophical reflection. 
He embraces Levinas’s idea of alterity as the starting point and argues for an ethics of 
liberation that places at the center of its discourse the vulnerability of the others, the poor 
and the oppressed. Jean-Luc Marion, a French phenomenologist of religion, is known for 
his attempt to address the issue of God in a more or less different direction than that of 
the metaphysical tradition. For him, theology as reflection on revelation has been too 
dependent on a traditional view of metaphysics. He proposes to overcome metaphysics, 
using a phenomenology that is nonetheless willing to dialogue with theology. In a non-
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metaphysical way, Marion articulates the notion of God in theology and philosophy, not 
in terms of Supreme Being, but in terms of agape, echoing the prophetic voice of Levinas 
for whom God gives himself to be known through one’s love for the other or through 
ethical responsibility as an event that enacts one in his/her subjectivity. Michael Purcell, a 
leading senior lecturer of theology and ethics at the University of Edinburgh, has 
published books and articles on the significance of Levinas’s philosophy for Christian 
theology. Purcell finds in certain themes of Levinas’s thought, such as infinite, 
awakening of the subject, desire, responsibility, love, justice, and holiness, a possibility 
for a fruitful dialogue. Besides, for him, Levinas’s philosophy and Christian theology 
share one major common point of departure, that is, they share the same meaning of 
human existential experience. Levinas’s insistence on the priority of ethics, Purcell 
argues, challenges Christian theology to be less theoretical and more committed to the 
service of love.  
These scholars, although interpreting the relevance of Levinas’s thought for 
theology from different perspectives, see in Levinas’s ethics of responsibility a 
philosophical framework that might illuminate or inform the content of Christian 
theology, and thus, open a possibility for a fruitful dialogue with Christian theology. In 
this, they helpfully serve the goal of this dissertation.  
I. Enrique Dussel 
 
Professor Enrique Dussel was born in Mendoza, Argentina in December 1934. In 
1975, he was exiled to Mexico where he later acquired citizenship and taught for a 
number of years. He studied philosophy, history, and theology and received several 
degrees from prestigious universities in Europe and Latin America. He is the author of 
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numerous books and articles in different languages. His teaching experience goes as far 
back as 1966, and since then, he has been a visiting lecturer to many universities in Latin 
America, Africa, Asia, Europe, and North America. His research field has been in the 
areas of history, philosophy, theology, and ethics.  
As a South American, he is concerned with the plight of the poor and the 
oppressed in that part of the world and in the entire so called Third World countries. Ever 
since he was a boy in Mendoza, Dussel was already particularly sympathetic to groups 
engaged in social activities. His first work in sociology in the Department of Philosophy 
at Mendoza was about the marginal neighborhoods in Argentina.1 Dussel later moved to 
Madrid, Spain for his doctoral studies (1957-1961). He defended his dissertation in June 
1959, and immediately traveled to Israel to join the community of manual laborers led by 
Paul Gautier (1960-1961). While in Israel, Dussel came into contact with the Jewish 
concern for the humble, the downtrodden, the poor, the miserable, and excluded. His 
experience in the Holy Land became an existential one as it informed all his future 
intellectual work. Quickly, he became suspicious of Greek philosophy for its emphasis on 
the intellectuals and the wealthy, and praised Semitic culture for its passion for the poor, 
the abandoned and the marginalized. Upon his arrival in Europe (France) from the 
Middle East to begin his theological studies, Dussel studied phenomenology, especially 
the works of Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Paul Ricoeur, and Martin 
Heidegger, before he met with Levinas in the early 70s.2 
                                                 
1 Fernando Gomez, “Ethics is the Original Philosophy or The Barbarian Words Coming from the Third 
World: An interview with Enrique Dussel,” Boundary 2 28/1(2001): 19-73, 19. 
2 For a comprehensive narrative biography of Enrique Dussel, see Linda Martín Alcoff and Eduardo 
Mendieta, editors’ introduction to Thinking from the Underside of History: Enrique Dussel’s Philosophy of 
Liberation (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 1-26; and Eduardo Mendiata, 
editor’s introduction to The Underside of Modernity: Apel, Ricoeur, Rorty, Taylor, and the Philosophy of 
Liberation, by Enrique Dussel (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities, 1996), xiii-xxxi. 
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His early interest for the marginalized of history will take a decisive turn with his 
encounter with Levinas. Dussel recalls his discussion with Levinas and a group of 
students in 1972, in Louvain, as a crucial moment of truth that shaped his philosophy of 
liberation. At this meeting, he asked Levinas whether “the fifteen million Indians 
slaughtered during the conquest of Latin America, and the thirteen million Africans who 
were made slaves” were not also the other he (Levinas) spoke about. Levinas looking at 
him in the eyes replied: “that’s something for you to think about.”3  
From then onwards, he embraced Levinas’s critique of Western philosophy and 
his turn to the other/exteriority as the starting point and argued for an ethics of liberation 
that places at the center of its discourse the turn to the other – those who are despised, 
poor, oppressed, neglected, and barred from present socio-political, economic, or cultural 
systems. His philosophy of liberation draws upon the everyday experiences of poverty 
and oppression in the Third World and rejects the Western view of modernity and 
globalization as the root cause of most inhuman behaviors in today’s world. The concept 
of the other became, for Dussel, the reference point for his interpretation of history, 
economics, philosophy, and theology. While he integrates Levinas’s concept of the other 
to a certain extent, he nevertheless disagrees with his view of history. In what follows, 
this work will examine how Dussel developed his thought in terms of Levinas’s 
phenomenology of the other and how, at the same time, he transforms and surpasses 
Levinas’s thought by locating the other in the context of Latin America, the Third World, 
and the current system of capitalist economy, globalization and postcoloniality.  
 
                                                 
3 Enrique Dussel, “‘Sensibility’ and ‘Otherness’ in Emmanuel Levinas,” Philosophy Today 43/2 (1999): 
126. 
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Embracing Levinas’s Challenge: Dussel’s Critique of the Western Ontological Horizon 
 
Before embracing Levinas’s philosophy of the other and developing his own 
philosophy of liberation, Dussel went through a cycle of change that later defined his 
anthropology. At the center of this are his studies of Hellenic and Semitic philosophical 
anthropologies, the Hegelian dialectic, and the Heideggerian account of philosophical 
anthropology. He finds in Heideggerian thought an understanding of anthropology that 
situates the meaning of the human person’s existence within the sphere of a certain pre-
comprehension of the world which diverges from one cultural group to another.4 Dussel 
appreciates Heidegger’s efforts in trying to posit human beings as already in the world. 
He even uses Heideggerian anthropology to criticize modernity, Descartes, Kant, Hegel, 
Marx Scheler and others. But in his estimation, Heidegger did not go far enough. He 
finds the Heideggerian fundamental ontology on the unity of the human person wanting 
and rejects the Western philosophical tradition for its neglect of this aspect.5  
Now, an appreciation of Dussel’s rupture with Western philosophical thought has 
to be situated in the global context from which he began his intellectual work. His ethical 
                                                 
4 Michael Barber, Ethical Hermeneutics: Rationality in Enrique Dussel’s Philosophy of Liberation (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 1998), 19-22. Within the sphere of a certain pre-comprehension that 
Heidegger argues for, the human person is understood as a unified being constituted of existentials of 
corporality, animality, temporality, and intersubjectivity. For Dussel, this pre-philosophical description of 
the world and the unitary view of the human person has been the characteristic of the Semitic and Christian 
original worldview prior to the Hellenic dualistic view of the human person (soul/body). Unfortunately, 
Christian anthropology later fell into the trap of this Hellenic dualism. Dussel sees in Heideggerian 
philosophical anthropology the possibility to liberate Christian anthropology from Greek dualism. The 
Heideggerian fundamental ontology on the unity of the human person, however, can be found exemplified 
in the thought of Thomas Aquinas. Thus, in his anthropology, Dussel is close to the Heideggerian and 
Christian-Semitic unified anthropologies which argue for the unity of the human person. 
5 Barber, Ethical Hermeneutics, 28-45. In his effort to address the insufficiencies of the Heideggerian 
ontology on the unity of the human person, Dussel engages Hegel’s dialectic method creatively and 
sympathetically. He eventually criticizes it for its positing of Absolute subjectivity of modernity as the 
“actual infinity which englobes everything in an absolute immanence without exteriority.” This type of 
understanding of subjectivity runs the risk of validating the eradication of the other person and as a 
consequence becomes an “ontological cause” of human inhumanity to humans as exemplified in various 
situations of injustice, oppression, exploitation, marginalization, and genocide in the world. See 26-27. 
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hermeneutic developed as a reaction to Latin America’s history of colonization, 
oppression, poverty, and marginalization. In today’s world, these vices are reflected in 
the present international order of globalization which, in his view, has its root in the US-
Eurocentrist desire to dominate countries of the periphery. The US-Eurocentrist alliance 
has divided the world into two different cultures: the culture of the center (US-
Eurocentrism) and the culture of the periphery (Latin America, Africa, and Asia, to which 
he includes the marginalized groups of our societies, women and children). For him, 
Western socio-political and economic domination of those who exist at the periphery is 
the result of their ontologically based system of thought. He writes:  
The conquests of Latin America, the enslavement of Africa and its colonization, 
as well as that of Asia, are the dominating dialectical expansion of “the same” that 
assassinates “the other” and totalizes “the other” in “the same.” This huge 
dialectico-ontological process of human history simply went unperceived by the 
ideology of ideologies (even though it claims to be the critic of ideologies) – 
modern and contemporary European philosophy.6 
 
 The ontologically based system has made the West believe and claim universal 
knowledge and legitimated its control of Third World nations. For Dussel, the Western 
dialectical method is incapable of envisioning the existence of alterity expressed in the 
face of the poor, the oppressed, the widow, the orphan, and the foreigner who live beyond 
or outside the world or categories of its ontological horizon. It defines itself as the center 
of the world and neglects those in the periphery.7 In view of this, Dussel argues, it 
became necessary that those in the periphery set out for themselves a method of 
philosophizing which takes its starting point from the historical situations of poverty, 
oppression, and marginalization which they were forced into by the dominating 
                                                 
6 Enrique Dussel, Philosophy of Liberation, translated by Aquilina Martinez and Christine Morkovsky 
(Maryknoll, N.Y: Orbis Books, 1985), 52. 
7 Enrique Dussel, The Invention of the Americas: The Eclipse of the ‘Other’ and the Myth of Modernity, 
translated by Michael D. Baber (New York: Continuum, 1995).  
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subjectivity of the West. The construction of a just world order is possible only through 
the liberation of nations of the periphery and the articulation of a non-ontologically based 
philosophy which focuses on the exteriority of the other. Dussel uses the concept of the 
other to make a case for his philosophy of liberation. Here he is aided by Levinas’s 
phenomenology of the other, adjusting it with insights from Marxism and dependency 
theory.  
Dussel’s Anadialectical Method in terms of Levinas’s Phenomenology of the Other 
 
It is in Levinas that Dussel finds a philosopher who made an important move 
beyond Heidegger’s helpful insight into human existence in the world. He discovers in 
Levinas’s phenomenology of the other that which outshines the entire philosophical 
tradition of the West by focusing on the human other who is beyond the horizon of being, 
the world, and ontology. Levinas’s arguments about the absolute uniqueness or otherness 
of the other set the stage for Dussel’s own philosophical method which he calls 
anadialectical or analectical.8 Dussel did not only embrace Levinas’s thought, he also, at 
the same time, gave it a new dimension by applying it to the Latin American environment 
and “developing his own analectical method, which begins with the Other, recognizes the 
analogical character of the Other’s word, unmasks false universals imposed upon the 
Other, and expands rationality through exposure to the Other.”9 He defines the analectical 
method as follows: 
                                                 
8 Eduardo Mendieta’s introduction to Enrique Dussel, Beyond Philosophy: Ethics, History, Marxism, and 
Liberation Theology, edited by Eduardo Mendieta (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003), 
5 (Mendieta’s italics). According to Roberto Goizueta, Dussel’s anadialectical or analectic method includes 
five moments: origin in the everyday, the ontological demonstration of the entities, the analectic as such, 
the ethical self-revelation of the other, and service in justice. See his Liberation, Method, and Dialogue: 
Enrique Dussel and North American Theological Discourse (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988), 68-73. 
9 See Barber’s preface to Ethical Hermeneutics, x.  
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The analectical refers to the real human fact by which every person, every group 
or people, is always situated ‘beyond’ (ano-) the horizon of totality. Negative 
dialectic is no longer enough. The analectical moment is the support of new 
unfoldings. The analectical moment opens us to the sphere (which is not the ontic 
one of the factual sciences or the ontological one of negative dialectic), referring 
us to the other. Its proper category is exteriority. The point of departure for its 
methodical disclosure (a method that is more scientific than dialectic) is the 
exteriority of the other. Its principle is not that of identity, but separation, 
distinction.10 
 
This method is intended to go beyond the Eurocentric method of dialectic, the proper 
sphere of totality. It affirms the priority of the existence of the other or exteriority as the 
very starting point of philosophy. In Dussel’s articulation of this method, Levinas’s terms 
such as other, exteriority, totality, face, proximity and sensibility, are re-appropriated and 
utilized in the context of the Third World, most especially of Latin America. Dussel’s 
anadialectical method is a combination of the Western dialectical tradition and the Latin 
American historical lived experience. The result is a new form of ontology that 
transcends the European ontology of totality so as to express and articulate a Latin 
American philosophy of the other.11  
Inspired by Levinas’s phenomenology of the other, Dussel discovers in the term 
person more than a simple unified being and argues that the concept of person evokes 
alterity, the other who is beyond the horizon of being and ontology. The other is given as 
unity and cries out to the subject prior to any philosophical considerations, be it the 
Hellenic dualistic view of the human person. He/she is the paradigm from whom the 
moral world is constituted.12 The exteriority of the other now turns out to be the place of 
the judgment of the totality and affirms his/her absolute rights that stem from the fact of 
                                                 
10 Dussel, Philosophy of Liberation, 158-159. 
11 Dussel, Philosophy of Liberation, 159; Goizueta, Liberation, Method, and Dialogue: Enrique Dussel and 
North American Theological Discourse, 64. 
12 Barber, Ethical Hermeneutics, 23. 
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being a person. This starting point is deep-seated in the Judeo-Christian tradition in which 
Dussel is a part. Thus, in Dussel’s philosophy of liberation, the exteriority of the other is 
mystery which reason can never have a hold on; it interrupts Western totality and 
exaltation of reason.13 He also insists on the prophetic nature of one’s service to the other 
in justice. The one who takes the defense of the other is a prophet, and his/her attitude 
breaks with every system of totality. In the articulation of this new philosophical method, 
Dussel sees “the relationship of the living God with the poor human being, and of this 
poor human being with the living God, [as] the theme of the Bible and theology.”14 Thus, 
the anadialectical method calls for an anadialectical theology in which faith is concrete 
and practical.15 Hence, with the help of Levinas’s philosophy, Dussel insists on the 
centrality of the exteriority of the other, that is, the other’s transcendental dimension in 
his analectical philosophy of liberation.  
Now, for Dussel the suffering of the other in history turns into an interpellation of 
the capitalist system. He sees in this system the main cause of the hardships of the Third 
World countries. Such a historical analysis led him to complete Levinas’s 
phenomenology of the other with insights from Marxism and dependency theory. Most 
important, in Dussel’s turn to Marxist’s thought, is the concept of “living labor” which he 
regards as the necessary principle of Marxist ethics and theoretical construction. “Living 
labor” is the creative source of surplus-value which exists outside of exteriority, prior to, 
and valorizes capital. For Dussel, “the logico-dialectical grounding of Marx’s concept of 
                                                 
13 Dussel, Philosophy of Liberation, 46-47. For Dussel, “what reason can never embrace – the mystery of 
the other as other – only faith can penetrate.” See 46; see also Goizueta, Liberation, Method, and Dialogue: 
Enrique Dussel and North American Theological Discourse, 67-68. 
14 Enrique Dussel, Ethics and Community, translated by Robert R. Barr (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 
1988), 236.  
15 Enrique Dussel, Ethics and the Theology of Liberation, translated by Bernard F. McWilliams (Maryknoll, 
N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1978), 19; Goizueta, Liberation, Method, and Dialogue: Enrique Dussel and North 
American Theological Discourse, 72, 80-82. 
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capital is not totality, but exteriority; the absolute exteriority to the totality of capital as a 
system is the ‘living labor’.”16 Accordingly, for Dussel, in Marx’s concept of “living 
labor” is the recognition “of the life of the other as the living labor of the worker.”17  
While Dussel acknowledges his profound debts to Levinas’s phenomenology of 
the other, he still expresses his dissatisfaction with Levinas’s reduction of history to 
consciousness, his reluctance in embracing the other of the global periphery, and his 
equivocal understanding of the absolutely other. In a couple of writings, he explains how 
and why his philosophy goes beyond Levinas’s.18 Dussel finds Levinas’s phenomenology 
of the other wanting in so far as it provides no expressive political philosophy capable of 
transforming situations of oppression and injustice into better socio-political and 
economic conditions that recognize human dignity. He insists on the concrete reality of 
ethics. Ethics of liberation should address the lived experiences of those oppressed and 
excluded from the dominant Eurocentric method of dialectic, because the present 
capitalist system and the phenomenon of globalization continue to suppress nations at the 
periphery. Furthermore, he argues for an analogical nature of philosophy over and against 
Levinas’s equivocal and univocal absolutely external other. For him, the analogical 
method offers a possibility for “conviviality,” “engagement in solidarity,” and “historical 
communication” between the “same” and the “other” in the real time of history.19  
                                                 
16 Walter D. Mignolo, “Dussel’s Philosophy of Liberation: Ethics and the Geopolitics of Knowledge,” in 
Thinking from the Underside of History: Enrique Dussel’s Philosophy of Liberation, 32. (Mignolo’s italics) 
17 Eduardo Mendieta’s introduction to Enrique Dussel, Beyond Philosophy: Ethics, History, Marxism, and 
Liberation Theology, 8-9. 
18 See Barber, Ethical Hermeneutics, 50-77, footnote, p.77ff; Walter D. Mignolo, “Dussel’s Philosophy of 
Liberation: Ethics and the Geopolitics of Knowledge,” 28-30, footnote, p. 48; Dennis Beach, “History and 
the Other: Dussel’s Challenge to Levinas,” Philosophy & Social Criticism 30 3 (2004): 315-330. 
19 Mignolo, “Dussel’s Philosophy of Liberation: Ethics and the Geopolitics of Knowledge,” 30. According 
to Mignolo, Dussel has also argued that Levinas’s philosophy somehow remained Eurocentrist, that is, “he 
never thought that the ‘Other’ (Autrui) could have been an (Amer)indian, an African, or an Asiatic.” See p. 
29. On this specific aspect, Dussel’s criticism of Levinas might be unreasonable. Levinas has always, at 
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Nevertheless, Levinas’s phenomenology of the other clearly provides Dussel with 
theoretical tools to articulate his philosophy of liberation. With Levinas’s insistence on 
responsibility for the other person, Dussel could argue for a “mutual fulfillment of the 
analectic solidarity of center/periphery, woman/man, mankind/earth, western 
culture/peripheral postcolonial cultures, different races, different ethnicities, [and] 
different classes.”20 Like with Levinas, love of the other person, especially those 
excluded from the center of modernity, and the exterior transcendence of the other 
person, are at the center of Dussel’s ethics of liberation. Dussel finds in Levinas’s 
philosophy a legacy that has much to offer to Christian theology and to humanity as a 
whole. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
least implicitly, referred to all the oppressed and persecuted people of the world as being the “others” 
toward whom ethical responsibility should be exercised. This undisputable universal dimension of his 
thought is perceptible in the preface of Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence when he writes: “To the 
memory of those who were closest among the six millions murdered by the National Socialists, and the 
millions upon millions of all confessions and all nations, victims of the same hatred of the other man, the 
same anti-Semitism.” Levinas’s preface to Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence. Thus, to accuse 
Levinas of only being focused on the plight of the Jews seems out of proportion. 
20 Enrique Dussel, “Europe, Modernity, and Eurocentrism,” Nepantla: Views from South 1:3 (2000b): 465-
478, 474. 
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II. Jean-Luc Marion 
 
Marion has often acknowledged his indebtedness to Levinas’s phenomenological 
approach in his attempt to secure, in postmodern context, a relationship between 
phenomenology and theology, with phenomenology being the groundwork for a better 
understanding of theology.21 In examining Marion’s thought this study does not intend to 
give a thorough analysis of his work and its significance for contemporary thought. It will 
suffice here to highlight some aspects of Marion’s writings that echo his use of Levinas’s 
philosophy in his rejection of the onto-theological tradition and his proposed new way for 
doing theology in terms of agape.  
The background for Marion’s philosophical theology is the French continental 
philosophical environment within which he began his career as a philosopher. Born in 
Meudon, Paris, in 1946, Marion’s philosophical project began with his meeting with 
French philosophers of the time, when he studied at the University of Nanterre, at the 
Sorbonne in Paris, and at the École Normale Supérieure. It was then that he came into 
contact with the movements known as structuralism and post-structuralism. These 
movements later became significant for the emergence of the movement called 
postmodernity, at least in French continental philosophy. Upon receiving his doctorate in 
1980, he began his profession as a philosopher and a specialist of Descartes, and has 
written comprehensively on him. He worked at the University of Poitiers which happened 
to be Descartes’ alma mater and an institution where Levinas taught between 1963 and 
                                                 
21 The jury is still out on whether or not Marion could be considered a theologian. Marion has always 
considered himself a philosopher and a phenomenologist, see his Being Given: Toward a Phenomenology 
of Givenness, translated by Jeffrey L. Kosky (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2002), 236. 
In this study, Marion is considered a phenomenologist of religion.  
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1967.  Marion will later become the director of philosophy at the University of Paris X at 
Nanterre, where Levinas had been for six years (1967-1973).22 
 Marion’s mastery of both the philosophical and theological tradition has earned 
him respect and admiration from his supporters and critics worldwide. Not only was he 
well-read in philosophy and theology and wrote several books and articles in the mid-
1980s, he also played a significant role in the field of phenomenology as he started 
research on Husserlian phenomenology which appeared to be significant for his 
understanding of the thought of Heidegger. Hence, Marion’s work is undeniably 
philosophical and phenomenological. In addition to teaching at the University of 
Sorbonne Paris IV, he is a visiting professor of philosophy at the University of Chicago 
and at Boston College. Being a Roman Catholic, his philosophical work as a whole has 
been influenced by his faith trying to address the question of the relationship between 
philosophy and theology. 
The Demise of Metaphysics: Toward Marion’s Phenomenological Approach 
 
Marion’s work emerges in the context of the questioning of traditional 
metaphysics by contemporary continental philosophy in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century. He expresses his dissatisfaction with a traditional view of metaphysics 
articulated from Aristotle to Thomas Aquinas which attempts to found knowledge of 
what is in terms of “an unchanging ousia” (substance/essence), called “being, the divine, 
the first cause, and knowing subject.”23 Such metaphysics, he argues, is onto-theology, 
                                                 
22 Robyn Horner, Jean-Luc Marion: A Theo-logical Introduction (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 
Company, 2005), 3-12. 
23 Horner, Jean-Luc Marion: A Theo-logical Introduction, 20. Jean-Luc Marion, God Without Being, 
translated by Thomas A. Carlson with a forward by David Tracy (Chicago: The University Press of 
Chicago, 1991), xxiii; In Excess: Studies of Saturated Phenomena, translated by Robyn Horner and Vincent 
Berraud (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002), 5, 8. With regard to Thomas Aquinas, in the 
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that is, it focuses on the highest being that is the source and meaning of all being and 
gives this being metaphysical attributes which serves its own purpose.24 It reaches its 
peak in the form of modernity through the claim of the will to power. Modern subjects, 
aided by scientific and technological progress, develop a dream to have everything under 
human control. There is here a manifest desire to depart from the onto-theological 
tradition and rational subjectivity that began with Descartes and was clarified by Kant. In 
this context of crisis on the issue of the foundation of knowledge, continental 
philosophers proposed phenomenology and hermeneutics as a response to the 
metaphysical question of the foundation of first philosophy, overcoming at the same time 
the distinction between subject and object developed by Kant’s metaphysics.25  
Phenomenology appears, for Marion, the only method capable of providing 
legitimacy to philosophy as a way forward for a non-metaphysical thought. As a 
discipline of philosophy, phenomenology emerged in the tradition of continental 
European philosophy in the early twentieth century and was championed by Edmund 
Husserl. Heidegger reacts to Husserl’s phenomenological reduction by redefining 
phenomenology in terms of Being.26 For Marion, not all types of phenomenological 
approach could succeed in achieving the goal of providing legitimacy to philosophy. All 
                                                                                                                                                 
English edition of his God Without Being, Marion gives some clarifications in a few arguments. He makes 
a distinction between Aquinas’ esse which Aquinas assigns to God and the metaphysical tradition ens 
commune, the objective concept of being. He insists that Aquinas’s esse “does not chain God to Being 
because the divine esse immeasurably surpasses (and hardly maintains an analogia with) the ens commune 
of creatures, which are characterized by the real distinction between esse and their essence, whereas God, 
and He alone, absolutely merges essence with esse: God is expressed as esse, but this esse is expressed only 
of God, not of the beings of metaphysics. In this sense, Being does not erect an idol before God, but saves 
his distance.” God Without Being, xxiii. 
24 It is in the Idol and Distance: Five Studies, translated by Thomas A. Carlson and edited by John D. 
Caputo (New York: Fordham University Press, 2001) and in God Without Being that Marion set the tone 
for his desire to engage modern metaphysics, criticizing the idolatrous concepts of God in modernity as 
both causa sui and as source of morality. See Horner, Jean-Luc Marion: A Theo-logical Introduction, 61-
62. 
25 Horner, Jean-Luc Marion: A Theo-logical Introduction, 18-21. 
26 Heidegger, Being and Time, 49-50, 61. 
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the great phenomenologists, after Husserl and Heidegger, in his estimation, have failed 
both to move beyond objectness and beingness and to claim phenomenology as first 
philosophy. Yet only one successor of Husserl, Levinas, has been successful. He writes, 
“it goes without saying that we owe it to Emmanuel Levinas to have ingeniously 
reconfigured phenomenology so as to let it finally reach the Other as saturated 
phenomenon.”27 Different from Husserl and Heidegger, Levinas defines phenomenology 
in terms of intersubjective relation and posits the subject’s ethical encounter with the 
other person as the original philosophical experience.28 Thus, in his articulation for a new 
direction in phenomenology, Marion embraces Levinas’s phenomenological method over 
and against certain aspects of Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology and sees in it 
foundational insights which are helpful for the renewal of phenomenology and his 
investigation into the question of God and human beings’ relationships to one another.29  
Levinas, Marion asserts, has the merit to have taken “explicitly as his 
responsibility the revindication of Husserl. For in bringing to the foreground the 
fundamental dignity of ontology, or rather in order to threaten it better, he concluded his 
                                                 
27 Marion, Being Given, 366-367, footnote 88. 
28 Horner’s words on Levinas’s type of phenomenology are here illuminating. She writes: “With respect to 
Heidegger, Lévinas again has two main areas to put in question. This time he fears that the reduction to 
being has been made absolute, with a consequent lack of attention to what resists or exceeds being, most 
particularly the other person. Further, he maintains that this overlooking of the other person shows 
Heidegger’s inexcusable lack of interest in ethics. While Lévinas sees himself within a phenomenological 
trajectory, picking up what remains unexplored in Husserl, he also goes beyond phenomenology and 
develops – perhaps confusingly – what he calls a ‘metaphysics.’ It is not, however, a metaphysics 
characterised by the same features as a traditional metaphysics. By using this title he both situates himself 
in opposition to Heidegger and what he sees as the suffocating theme of ontology, and places an emphasis 
on that part of the word that simply means ‘beyond’ [meta-]. Lévinas’ post-phenomenological style is 
exemplified in the means he uses to write about the other person, for example, where the other is not 
phenomenalised as such but addresses me (from a ‘height’) and calls me to responsibility. It is further 
exemplified in the way in which, for Lévinas, the subject (I or ego) is always subsequent to a more basic 
‘me,’ who is constituted by the call of the other rather than self-constituting.” See her Jean-Luc Marion: A 
Theo-logical Introduction, 40-41.  
29 In Horner’s view, Marion considers himself as an intermediate postmodern thinker as he joins 
Heidegger, Levinas and others to move beyond metaphysics. Marion’s “concerns include the nature and 
limits of metaphysics, and questions about hermeneutics, subjectivity, alterity (otherness), relationships, 
and responsibility.” Jean-Luc Marion: A Theo-logical Introduction, 13-17. 
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demonstration in these terms: ‘Ethics is not a branch of philosophy, but first 
philosophy.’”30 For Marion, only Levinas before him took seriously Husserl’s “principle 
of principles” in articulating a new direction for phenomenological method that would no 
longer belong to metaphysics, but would constitute a “breakthrough” for a “new start,” a 
“first philosophy.”31 What, then, does Marion draw from Levinas’s ethics of 
responsibility in elaborating his phenomenological approach that would better define 
theology as a non-metaphysical possibility? The answer to this question would require 
that Marion’s work be examined more closely. 
Marion’s Givenness, Saturated Phenomena or Paradoxes and Levinas’s Ethics of 
Responsibility 
 
In his thinking about overcoming traditional metaphysics (ontology, onto-theology) with 
phenomenology, Marion argues for a “rethinking of God: not as a conceptual ‘idol,’ and 
not through the heavy metaphysical language of ‘Being’ or substance or essence, but, 
instead, in terms of phenomena such as love, gift, and excess.”32 Marion’s method of 
phenomenological reduction is summarized in the expression: Autant de réduction, 
autant de donation (As much reduction, as much givenness), with givenness being the 
key principle for phenomenology.33 Here he proposes a new, post-metaphysical and 
                                                 
30 Marion, In Excess, 14. 
31 Marion, In Excess, 15. 
32 Dermot A. Lane, “Foreword,” Givenness and God: Questions of Jean-Luc Marion, edited by Ian Leask 
and Eoin Cassidy (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), xv. 
33 This is the principle that Marion adds to Husserl’s principles, see his Being Given, 14-19, 38; In Excess, 
16-23. Marion notes that Husserl’s principles have failed because of their limited formulations of the issue 
of the “originariness” of givenness. In those principles, objectness and beingness are the sources from 
which stems givenness. Hence, the need for the fourth principle which Marion considers to be the “first 
principle of phenomenology;” that is, “givenness”: “as much reduction, as much givenness.” This principle, 
in Marion’s view, comes in to complete the lack in the previous three as it is the only principle capable of 
efficiently defending the givenness of the phenomena. The connection between reduction and givenness is 
so important that one cannot operate without the other. The reduction is constituted to always work toward 
givenness by reducing every single appearance to givenness. It restricts, filters, measures all appearances 
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phenomenological approach that opens up the possibility of thinking otherness by way of 
givenness and saturated phenomena. From now on, Marion’s renewal of phenomenology 
is defined in terms of givenness and saturated phenomena. Givenness is the way a 
phenomenon gives itself unconditionally and on its own terms to a recipient. It is the only 
principle capable of protecting the self-giving of the phenomenon beyond objectness and 
beingness. A saturated phenomenon is a phenomenon in which the intuition always 
“exceeds and decenters” every intentionality.34 In this phenomenon, the “intuition always 
submerges the expectation of the intention, in which givenness not only entirely envelops 
manifestation but, surpassing it, modifies its common characteristics.”35 Marion identifies 
four saturated phenomena: the event, the idol, the flesh, and the icon. His rethinking of 
phenomenology by means of givenness and saturated phenomena entails an attempt “to 
show the possibilities within phenomenology to open onto thought that is excessive, 
which gives theology a new philosophical context.”36 While phenomenology is a way 
forward beyond metaphysics, theology, for Marion, is the ultimate fulfillment of all 
thought, including phenomenology. He believes that philosophy’s basic understanding of 
love in terms of lived experience and one’s own consciousness was flawed and needed 
some phenomenological redefinition that is open to the theological.37 Theology, for 
Marion, is caritas/agape, and it is resonant with Levinas’s ethical responsibility. A close 
examination of Marion’s categories of givenness and saturated phenomena will help to 
                                                                                                                                                 
that they attain real givenness before appearing. And givenness cannot be thought of without that givenness 
passing through the control of a reduction.  
34 Marion, Being Given, 225. 
35 Marion, Being Given, 225. 
36 Horner, Jean-Luc Marion: A Theo-logical Introduction, xi. 
37 Jean-Luc Marion, Prolegomena to Charity, translated by Stephen Lewis (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2002), 74-75. 
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see Levinas’s influence on Marion’s articulation of his new direction for theology or his 
“theological phenomenology”38 which is based on caritas or agape.  
For Marion, the appropriate horizon of phenomenological reduction is givenness, 
not presence or being. A phenomenon gives itself from itself as something that gives 
what is given, and defines every phenomenon through a movement of appearing and 
withdrawing without limiting it either to some horizon or to a transcendental I. To be 
sure, in Marion’s view, the horizon is no longer limited as in Kant and Husserl. It is 
quasi-absolute and yet opens to a hermeneutics of multiple possibilities.39 For Marion, 
because phenomena are given without limited transcendental conditions, the given is 
given intrinsically, irrevocably, and radically in an intuitive excess as a gift. Now, to 
whom is this givenness given? Givenness, Marion asserts, is given to the subject as to the 
l’interloqué (the receiver, the witness) or l’adonné (the gifted one); the gifted is 
constituted by the call of what gives itself, that is, the given. The subject as l’adonné or 
l’interloqué receives itself from what he/she receives. He/she is the screen upon which an 
event gives itself to be seen.40 What Marion understands by call stems from Levinas’s 
“inversion of intentionality” in terms of “responsibility for the Other, going against 
intentionality.”41 The subject receives a call, an appeal (appel) and therefore he/she is 
                                                 
38 I borrow this expression from Dermot A. Lane, “Foreword,” Givenness and God: Questions of Jean-Luc 
Marion, xvi. 
39 Marion, Being Given, 196-212, 287. On this issue of the phenomenological horizon, Marion disagrees 
with Levinas who sees the concept of the horizon as absolute to phenomenology, see his “On the Gift: A 
Discussion between Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion,” God, the Gift and Postmodernism, edited by 
John D. Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 66. For helpful 
analysis, see Horner, Jean-Luc Marion: A Theo-logical Introduction, 114. 
40 Horner, Jean-Luc Marion: A Theo-logical Introduction, 115-118; Marion, In Excess, 48-53. 
41 Marion, Being Given, 266-267. For Marion’s reference to Levinas’s texts, see footnote 29, p. 370. 
Levinas, Autrement qu’être, ou au delà de l’essence, 61, 67 and 180 [English translation, 47, 53 and 141];  
“Un Dieu-homme” in Entre-nous : essais sur le penser-à-l’autre (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1991), 75. 
[English translation, 58]. Marion writes: “Let me just call to mind a passage that juxtaposes the two 
meanings: ‘Intentionality means that all consciousness is consciousness of something, but above all that 
every object calls forth and as it were gives rise to the consciousness through which its being shines and, in 
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called “forth as gifted.” Givenness as saturated reverses intentionality, and as a result 
makes the call possible and undeniably certain. Here the gifted one goes before the 
transcendental, self-identical, self-constituting subject.42   
Thus, for Marion, every given is a gift in the sense that it is a “privileged 
phenomenon,” “the figure of all phenomenality.”43 The gift shows itself following 
different determinations and more importantly with saturated phenomena: the event, the 
idol, the flesh, and the icon. To these four saturated phenomena, Marion adds the 
phenomenon of revelation, which, for him, is central because it blends and summarizes 
all the other four and opens them up to a hermeneutics of multiple possibilities. It is the 
last possibility as it constitutes the maximum point of saturated phenomenality. It is also 
the highest point because it accomplishes the saturation of saturation that is, “saturated at 
the second degree,” even though, Marion initially, assimilated it to the phenomenon of 
the icon.44 Besides, in other writings he also defines the phenomenon of revelation 
phenomenologically to mean “what gives itself in what shows itself.” Yet, Marion sees 
this as theology’s task, not phenomenology’s.45 Here Marion sees in the epiphany of 
Christ the paradigm of the phenomenon of revelation that well-characterizes each of the 
four modes of saturation.46 Saturated phenomena are essentially pure event, without 
horizon or context. They cannot be contained, conceptualized, predicted, controlled, or 
grasped not because of any deficiency on the part of the intuition but rather because of 
                                                                                                                                                 
doing so, appears,’ En découvrant l’existence avec Husserl et Heidegger (Paris, 1949), 134 (emphasis in 
the original) [English translation, 119].” 
42 Marion, Being Given, 267; “The Final Appeal of the Subject,” in The Religious, translated by Simon 
Critchley and  edited by John D. Caputo (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 131-144.  
43 Marion, Being Given, 117-118. 
44 Marion, Being Given, 235; In Excess, xxi, footnote 3, 29; footnotes 41, 52-53. 
45 Marion, In Excess, 52-53; see also “The Saturated Phenomenon,” Philosophy Today 40, 1-4 (1996): 103-
124, 121. 
46 Marion, Being Given, 234-245, 267;  
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the excessive nature of their giving. They demand an endless hermeneutic and are 
recognized only by the effect they produce in their witness.47  
What transpires from Marion’s phenomenology is the capacity of the concept of 
saturated phenomenon to address what metaphysics failed to properly grasp as an 
exception, namely, the phenomenology of love that questioned the uniqueness of the 
thinking subject and the primacy of being. Each of these phenomena accomplishes a 
saturation or paradox in terms of quality, quantity, relation, or modality, which can never 
be constituted as objects within a horizon and by an I.48 There is no transcendental I or 
the ego who would constitute any of these phenomena as an object. There is only a “me” 
à la Levinas, in Marion’s estimation, who receives the event, the idol, the icon, and the 
flesh. In analyzing each of these phenomena one can see that Marion is a careful reader 
of Levinas in the way he incorporates some aspects of Levinas’s thought in his 
phenomenology. 
Marion defines the saturated phenomenon of the event in the form of an 
unforeseeable historical phenomenon. It has no transcendental I that would constitute its 
giving and showing when considered phenomenologically. It gives itself prior to showing 
itself and has its own self and shows itself on the basis of its own self. It occurs 
instantaneously in the happening starting from itself and arises from its own 
phenomenality as a fait accompli. Thus, the subject does not constitute it, rather finds 
itself as constituted by it.49 The subject is the “me” that receives it, reminiscent of 
Levinas’s “me voici.” As with Levinas’s ethical responsibility as an event that enacts the 
subject in his/her subjectivity, Marion’s saturated phenomenon of the event enacts the 
                                                 
47 Marion, In Excess, 113. 
48 Marion, Being Given, 228. 
49 Marion, Being Given, 267; In Excess, 30-49. 
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recipient or l’adonné or l’interloqué (the “me”) in its subjectivity as a constituted witness. 
Here the subject cannot allege to be the producer of truth; it is “stripped of the 
characteristics that gave it transcendental rank.”50 With the positing of the “me” both 
Marion and Levinas oppose Descartes’ subject and Heidegger’s effort to overcome it. For 
both Levinas and Marion, the subject “me – accusative” (Levinas) or “to me – dative” 
(Marion) is enacted into being upon receiving the event (saturated phenomenon – 
Marion) or (ethical responsibility - Levinas).51  
 The saturated phenomenon of the idol suggests “aspects of the unbearable and 
bedazzlement”52 close to what Plato describes in relation with the myth of the cave, 
where the idea of the Good offers itself as difficult to be seen, not by any imperfection or 
limitation, but rather “by excess – because the soul is incapable of seeing anything … 
saturated by an extremely brilliant bedazzlement.”53 The brilliance of this phenomenon 
impedes intentionality and characterizes what the subject’s gaze cannot bear. The idol is 
now a phenomenon capable of looking at and of displaying an excessively visible quality 
that no single hermeneutic can exhaust.54  
                                                 
50 Marion, Being Given, 217. 
51 My thanks here to Dr. Marie L. Baird for clarifying this point in one of our conversations. 
52 Marion, Being Given, 229; 229-231. 
53 Marion, “The Saturated Phenomenon,” 115; Plato, Republic, 517bc and 518a. 
54 Marion, In Excess, 54-81. Marion’s view of idol in In Excess presents a major shift from the one he 
developed in God Without Being. In In Excess, he tries to concentrate more on phenomenology, rather than 
on theological questions.  In God Without Being, the idol is theologically a false self-projection of an image 
by the subject; it is a fabrication of what the person wants to see; it only functions as result of the gazing 
person’s satisfaction, “since if the gaze did not desire to satisfy itself in the idol, the idol would have no 
dignity for it.” 10. An idol, for Marion, is the person’s self-satisfaction with a given visibility as this limits 
him/her and prevents him/her from seeing beyond his/her visibility. With this first visible, Marion argues, 
the idol admits no visibility beyond; there is no possibility of going beyond the visible, everything stops, 
freezes, settles, comes to rest at this point of visibility as beyond it “the invisable opens, rather closes up.” 
12-13. Marion uses the word invisable (from the French verb viser, to aim at) to signify “that which cannot 
be aimed at or taken into view.” See footnote 8, p. 201.” Here is, for Marion, the limit of the idol, that is, in 
which “the divine actually comes into the visibility for which human gazes watch; but this advent is 
measured by what the scope of particular human eyes can support, by what each aim can require of 
visibility in order to admit itself fulfilled.” 13-14. 
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As with the idol, the analysis of the icon as a saturated phenomenon has both 
theological and phenomenological foci. It appears under the characteristics of 
“irregardable and irreducible,”55 of the invisible that cannot be looked at because it 
breaks off visibility by excess. The icon points the person’s gaze to something beyond the 
person’s mastery, to the infinite gaze. The gaze is called upon to go beyond itself by 
never stopping, freezing, settling or resting at the point of visibility. Yet it is a visible 
reference to the invisible. The icon makes visible the gaze of the invisible other who in 
turn looks at one’s gaze, or whose look traverses one’s gaze.56  
Marion soon sees in Jesus Christ the definitive icon whom Paul depicts as “the 
image of the invisible God” (Colossians 1:15). He goes as far as to identify the icon with 
the cross of Christ/God which functions as the measure of all icons.57 In the icon, God 
gives himself to contemplation yet maintains the necessary gap with humanity. This gap 
is what Marion calls distance. The distance between the invisible God (the icon) and 
humanity in Marion’s phenomenology takes a number of meanings as his work 
progresses. Yet, the fundamental meaning expresses both the interruption of thought and 
God’s withdrawal, that is, God’s way of entering into thought. The interruption of 
thought is for Marion the human’s impossibility to think that which is absolutely 
excessive. Distance preserves the necessary and infinite difference between humans and 
                                                 
55 Marion, Being Given, 232. 
56 Horner, Jean-Luc Marion: A Theo-logical Introduction, 62-63; Marion, God Without Being, 18. 
According to Horner, Marion’s background on this understanding of the icon is found in the patristic and 
ecclesial tradition, most specifically, in the works of John Damascene, Basil of Caesaria, Gregory of 
Nazianzus, Gregory of Nyssa, Denys, and the Second Council of Nicaea of 787. God the invisible is seen in 
flesh through the image of the Son whose image makes possible the contemplation and worship of the 
invisible God.  
57 Horner takes issue with Marion on this. She believes that “the cross is a difficult example to choose in 
the context of a discussion of the constituting gaze, since the cross (and even a crucifix) need not function 
through eyes.” See her Jean-Luc Marion: A Theo-logical Introduction, 65, footnote 25. For a more helpful 
discussion on this, see her Rethinking God as Gift: Derrida, Marion, and the limits of Phenomenology 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2001), 168-171; Marion, The idol and the Distance, 118-120. 
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the divine; it also takes place among humans themselves and underlines their differences. 
It makes relationships possible and prevents any totalization of those relationships.58 Here 
Marion finds inspiration from Levinas’s use of the term distance.59 He often uses the 
word “distance,” as Horner helpfully argues, “the same way as Lévinas, trying to think 
relationship in terms of a distance that protects the infinitude of the other, whether that is 
God or a human other.”60 Paradoxically the unbridgeable gap created by this distance is 
also the place and moment of God’s self-giving to humans in a relationship of proximity 
and intimacy.61 Thus Marion’s distance is both the gap and God himself, definable and 
yet indefinable. And God is an icon of distance. Distance is what characterizes human 
beings’ relationship with God in terms of possibility of receptivity, participation and 
goodness. It surpasses the human capacity to conceptualize God as it precedes every 
conception.62  
Marion’s analysis of flesh as a saturated phenomenon expresses the way in which 
the ego and the world are phenomenalized.63 His analysis of the issue of the givenness of 
the self or flesh is to be understood in relation to the givenness of the icon/face. The ego 
“does not fix itself to its own flesh; it fixes itself to itself as flesh” and as “first self.”64 
With regard to the other person, the ego gives itself without relation as body, in passivity 
and receptivity, in suffering, pleasure and aging. This self-fixing of the ego in Marion’s 
                                                 
58 Horner, Jean-Luc Marion: A Theo-logical Introduction, 60. 
59 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 34, 38, 40, and 41. Levinas’s understanding of distance takes place in the 
context of the subject-other relationship. This relationship is made up of irreducible distance or difference. 
The other (Autrui) in a relationship cannot be reduced to thought or comprehension. 
60 Horner, Jean-Luc Marion: A Theo-logical Introduction, 53-54. See Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 215-
216. In Horner’s words Marion’s distance “defines us as one of the terms in a relationship, defining the 
other as indefinable. The poles of the relationship formed by distance are thus asymmetrical, reminding us 
very much of Lévinas.” 59. 
61 Marion, The idol and the Distance, 103-104. 
62 Marion, The idol and the Distance, 139-140, 153, 198. 
63Horner, Jean-Luc Marion: A Theo-logical Introduction, 112.  
64 Marion, In Excess, 91. 
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thought, especially his analysis of the relationship between time and flesh, is reminiscent 
of Levinas’s examination of insomnia and nausea.65 Thus the ego taking up flesh is an act 
of facticity and accomplishes his/her individuation by the “‘unanimous white conflict’ of 
the one with the other – precisely by the taking of flesh….I do not give myself my flesh, 
it is it that gives me to myself. In receiving my flesh, I received me myself – I am in this 
way gifted [adonné, given over] to it.”66 
What then links the saturated phenomenon of flesh with that of icon as Marion 
understands it? The answer is to be found in Marion’s consideration of the relationship 
between time and flesh. For Marion “the weight of time is accumulated…where my flesh 
is most openly visible – on my face. Actually, it is in my face that time prefers to leave 
traces, its traces.”67 This means that “the face shares the privilege of flesh” as “it gives 
itself to be seen in seeing itself” just like “the flesh feels in feeling itself feeling.”68 What 
differentiates the face from the flesh is the additional characteristic of the face of 
“looking without having to be looked at;” hence the definition of the face – “what looks 
at me [but] I cannot see it, nor look at it in its turn.”69 Now, Marion’s phenomenological 
icon is understood in relation to the face of the other as it is in Levinas. The icon, that is, 
the face of the other opens onto invisibility by interrupting visibility by the excess of 
intuition. It is like the subject looking into the pupils of the other’s eyes where nothing 
can be seen but invisibility.70 With regard to the analysis of the icon as the face of the 
other person, Marion acknowledges his indebtedness to Levinas’s determination of “the 
                                                 
65 Horner, Jean-Luc Marion: A Theo-logical Introduction, 112. Marion, In Excess, 95. See Levinas, 
Existents and Existence or De l’évasion (Paris: Fata Morgana, 1982). 
66 Marion, In Excess, 98. 
67 Marion, In Excess, 95. 
68 Marion, In Excess, 113. 
69 Marion, In Excess, 114. 
70 Marion, In Excess, 115. 
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mode of phenomenality proper to the face”71 that escapes the look, yet it appears as a 
voice. Levinas writes: “…the face speaks. The manifestation of the face is already 
discourse….primordial sphere, which corresponds to what we call the same, turns to the 
absolutely other only on call from the Other. Revelation constitutes a veritable inversion 
[of] objectifying cognition” 72 The face as an icon “escapes my look and envisages me in 
turn – in fact, it sees me first, because it takes the initiative.”73 So the only way it appears 
to the subject is that it shows itself in the silence of the ethical command, “Thou shall not 
kill!” It “only appears when I admit – submitting myself to him or her – that I must not 
kill.”74 There is no intention involved here but only intuition which immerses all 
intention. The saturated phenomenon thus appears not visible, but by excess. Similar to 
Levinas, the transition from seeing to speaking – reversed intentionality – is of greatest 
phenomenological significance for Marion.75 For both Levinas and Marion, the other, in 
the reversed intentionality, is completely actualized in the voice that addresses the 
subject. The subject’s self-sufficiency is challenged and questioned by the other’s 
look/face. In this regard the manifestation of the face depends on the powerlessness of the 
subject to constitute it. 
It becomes clear, in our estimation, that each of the saturated phenomena (the 
event, the idol, the icon, and the flesh) developed above is characterized by a saturation 
of love that obliges the “me” à la Levinas to open up to the other as such. It refuses to let 
the “me” be self-centered, precisely because it appears with a multiple and inexpressible 
                                                 
71 Marion, In Excess, 115. 
72 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 66-67. 
73 Marion, In Excess, 116. 
74 Marion, In Excess, 115-116; Emmanuel Levinas, Humanisme de l’autre homme (Montpellier : Fata 
Morgana, 1972), 47ff.  
75 Marion, In Excess, 37, 44, 61, 87, 99, 113-114, 117, 119. 
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excess that suspends any effort at constitution. It is at the center of Marion’s rejection of 
onto-theology and his articulation of the phenomenology of the other person that gives 
the subject his/her subjectivity.76 Here, in explaining how precisely the subject can 
experience the human other, Marion, as Horner argues “develops a quasi-Levinasian 
intentionality of love that depends, not on seeing the other (and thereby reducing the 
other to the scope of my own gaze), but on feeling the weight of the other’s 
unsubstituable gaze as it crosses my intentional aim. This weight is experienced as an 
always-prior injunction that exposes and obliges me.”77 Love, for Levinas, “designates a 
movement by which a being seeks that to which it was bound before even having taken 
the initiative of the search and despite the exteriority in which it finds it.”78  Following 
Levinas, Marion argues for a non self-centered love, stimulated by the invisible other 
who destitutes and exposes the self and directs him/her toward the other in ethical 
responsibility. The order which elects the self to become an object of another’s gaze that 
is intended at the self and exposes him/her constitutes the initial move toward love 
without being.79 This is what Marion calls an “erotic reduction”80 that occurs only in the 
context of the counter-intentionality of the face. It makes sense then that Marion would 
see his project as being in the mid-way to postmodernity as all thoughts (pre-modern, 
modern, and post-modern) are subordinated to the agape/the gift. Furthermore, due to the 
                                                 
76 In his attempt to think theology otherwise, Marion is aided by his faith in the Christian God and by 
Levinas’s use of the phenomenological method. He is committed to finding a way to approach the question 
of God contrary to metaphysics by announcing the defeat of the god of metaphysics through a belief in the 
God of love. 
77 Horner, Jean-Luc Marion: A Theo-logical Introduction, 70; Marion, Prolegomena to Charity, 83ff. 
78 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 254. The idea of the divine or “the affection of the finite by the Infinite” is, 
for Levinas, what inspires the subject’s love for the other which is not his/her anxiety for his/her own well-
being. See also “The Idea of the Infinite in us,” in Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-other, 220-221; “God 
and Philosophy,” in The Levinas Reader, 173-175. 
79 Marion, Prolegomena to Charity, 83-85. 
80 For a helpful understanding of what Marion means by “erotic reduction” see Horner, Jean-Luc Marion: 
A Theo-logical Introduction, 136-146. 
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saturated love of intuition, the precise meaning of the subject’s love for the other 
becomes clear, in Marion’s estimation, when the other whom the subject loves shows 
him/herself to the subject in a reversed intentionality of the face as “pure exteriority” à la 
Levinas’s ethical command.  
Marion’s understanding of love seems to suggest an account of the other 
dependent on a phenomenology of love that is eventually nurtured by a theological 
analysis of charity. For him, Christian love prevails over both metaphysics and non-
metaphysical thought. He writes that his work “claims in the end to be able to refer to 
charity, the agape, properly revealed in and as the Christ, according to an essential 
anachronism: charity belongs neither to pre-, nor to post-, nor to modernity; but rather, at 
once abandoned to and removed from historical destiny, it dominates any situation of 
thought.”81  
While Marion acknowledges his indebtedness to Levinas for having established 
“for the first time the mode of the phenomenality proper to the face,”82 he, however, 
distances himself from Levinas for having limited the notion of the face to an ethical 
hermeneutic. For him, Levinas’s ethical phenomenon of the face could certainly “work 
here a phenomenological deployment more originary than it, and which would 
consequently render possible the description of other phenomena, or other descriptions of 
this same phenomenon – the face.”83 Nevertheless, as a particular saturated phenomenon, 
this face, Marion argues, stems from a call that originates in the icon and it goes beyond 
Levinas’s other person of ethics. And this icon achieves its phenomenality only by 
making itself to be seen by being heard. Hence, in his analysis of the face as icon, Marion 
                                                 
81 Marion, God Without Being, xxi-xxii. 
82 Marion, In Excess, 115. 
83 Marion, In Excess, 118. 
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describes the face, as “an icon addressing a call… that envisages me” and calls me to 
ethical responsibility.84  
Besides, Marion finds Levinas’s notion of the face as being too universal and 
representing any face of the other as such. Levinas’s face is no one, unnamed and only 
leads to unspecified alterity. The notion such as hostage or substitution also describes the 
universality of Levinas’s ethical command whereby anyone can take the place of any 
other. Thus, he asserts, Levinas’s ethical injunction is unable to account for the 
individuation of the other. The face of the other in this sense calls for an infinite 
hermeneutic in terms of love without end and makes possible the individuation or 
particularity of both the self and the other. He suggests finding this individuation in the 
submission to the other and to his/her call as love.85 The subject in his/her commitment to 
love allows the other to emerge as phenomenon; hence, in this “erotic reduction” (a 
crossing of the gazes) the subject and the other leave the universal, even the ethical 
universal, in order to achieve individuation and particularity in a relationship that 
concerns only both of them and undoubtedly not the generally forcing neighbor.86 Hence, 
love, for Marion, cannot be limited to Levinas’s ethics of responsibility; it makes possible 
the subject’s relationship with an individuated and personal other through a crossing of 
the gazes. 
                                                 
84 Marion, In Excess, 119. 
85 Jean-Luc Marion, “From the Other to the Individual” in Transcendence: Philosophy, Literature, and 
Theology Approach the Beyond, translated by Robyn Horner and edited by Regina Schwartz (New York: 
Routledge, 2004), 43-59. The French original reads “D’autrui à l’individu: Au delà de l’éthique,” Actes du 
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Homage to Emmanuel Levinas,” in Prolegomena to Charity, 71-101; see especially 92-96;  “The Face: An 
Endless Hermeneutics,” Harvard Divinity Bulletin 28 2/3 (1999): 9-10; Le phénomène érotique: six 
méditations (Paris: Grasset, 2003), 131, 143-161, quoted by Horner, Jean-Luc Marion: A Theo-logical 
Introduction, 137.  
86 Marion, Le phénomène érotique, 198 quoted by Horner, Jean-Luc Marion: A Theo-logical Introduction, 
138.   
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Although Marion’s criticisms of Levinas have some relevance, considering that 
Levinas’s love dimension is bound by ethical injunction, one still wonders whether 
Marion does not overlook some dimension of individuation attached to Levinas’s ethics 
of responsibility. Levinas would certainly resist speaking of individuation as Marion 
understands it, because such language might, without a doubt, suggest a return to totality. 
Yet, there is, we would argue, in Levinas’s insistence on “exclusive singularity without 
appearing” of each being in the form of assignation, some degree of individuation that 
emphasizes the uniqueness of both the subject and the other.87 This individuation in 
Levinas takes a sense of differentiation (absolute alterity) and “extreme singularity” as 
necessary conditions for true love of neighbor.88 The subject, Levinas insists, is bound to 
the neighbor not on the basis of biological logic (“belonging from the same genus as me 
that he/[she] concerns me”) but because of his/her relation of “kinship” with the other.89 
In this sense the other person appears to the subject when the subject exposes him/herself 
to the other person in responsibility as separate being. Ethical responsibility becomes 
recognition of the other person’s singularity. The other in his/her absolute uniqueness 
cannot be contained within conceptual categories of representation and consciousness. In 
a sense, for Levinas, individuation or particularity is not based on “mutual eroticization” 
as it is in Marion, but rather on the acknowledgment of the subject’s and the other’s 
singularity which constitutes their uniqueness.   
                                                 
87 Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, 86-87; see also Totality and Infinity, 104. For an 
interesting critique of Marion’s misreading of Levinas’s ethical injunction, see Christina M. Gschwandtner, 
“Ethics, Eros, or Caritas? Levinas and Marion on Individuation of the Other,” Philosophy Today 49/1 
(2005):70-87.  
88 Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, 86. 
89 Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, 87. 
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In conclusion, Marion’s phenomenological approach opens up a possibility of 
thinking otherness by way of givenness and saturated phenomena which would guarantee 
the primacy of philosophy and the possibility of a genuine theological approach based on 
love. In arguing for a phenomenology that remains open to the theological, he joins 
Levinas in rejecting onto-theology and proposes a new direction for theology which is 
centered on the horizon of “love without being.”90 Marion sees a possibility of dialogue 
between Christian theology and Levinas’s thought. Thus, in so doing, he argues for the 
relevance of Levinas’s phenomenology for postmodern philosophical and theological 
discussion. The question of whether or not Marion has been successful in this new 
approach has been, and still is, an issue of heated debate among scholars. Can we really 
move away completely from metaphysics’ concept of being? We are inclined to think 
that the being of metaphysics can be understood as in Purcell’s being otherwise whereby, 
through the dimension of transcendence, human beings are made capable of breaking 
inclinations of totality or self-subsistent autonomy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III. Michael Purcell 
 
                                                 
90 Marion, Le phénomène érotique, 22-23 quoted by Horner, Jean-Luc Marion: A Theo-logical 
Introduction, 135. 
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Michael Purcell is a Scottish theologian and a senior lecturer in systematic 
theology at the University of Edinburgh, school of Divinity in Scotland. His research 
field has been mainly in the area of philosophical and theological studies with special 
emphasis on fundamental theology, mostly the relation of French phenomenology and 
theology. Most of his writings deal with elements of Levinas’s thought that could 
correlate to Christian fundamental and practical theology.  
His first attempt at this correlation is found in his book Mystery and Method: The 
Other in Rahner and Levinas91 in which he tries to confront Rahner’s theology with 
Levinas’s thought. He finds in Rahner’s and Levinas’s understanding of the other 
differences that call for complementarity. For Rahner, the other is the incomprehensible 
mystery of God who is central for understanding the human other. For Levinas, the other 
is the human other whose infinity comes from God. Levinas and Rahner, he concludes, 
need each other as they both recognize, each in its own right, the dimension of the divine 
in human encounters. Purcell’s most recent book, Levinas and Theology,92 attempts some 
connections between Levinas’s thought and Christian theology. The task of this section 
will be to present Purcell’s reading of Levinas for theology. Two aspects will be 
examined: the correlation between phenomenology and theology and the connection 
between the theologies of grace and sacraments with Levinas’s phenomenology of 
awakening, desire, and the face. 
 
 
                                                 
91 Mystery and Method: The Other in Rahner and Levinas. For full reference, see p. 41. 
92 Levinas and Theology. For full reference, see p. 16. 
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The Correlation between Phenomenology and Theology 
 
Ever since the introduction of Edmund Husserl's phenomenology in Europe, 
European scholars have been keen to see how Husserl’s phenomenology can relate to 
theology. This of course has motivated unrelenting debate and interest among the leading 
figures in phenomenological philosophy. French phenomenologists such as Jean-Luc 
Marion, Michel Henry, and Jean-Louis Chrétien have been prominent in analyzing a 
possible relation between theology and phenomenological thinking along the line of 
Levinas’s transformation of Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology.93 Purcell 
joined the debate with the publication of his Method and Mystery. His argument that 
Rahner and Levinas’s thought, notwithstanding some divergences, should be tackled by 
each other was an acknowledgement of a possibility for a relationship between Levinas’s 
phenomenology and Christian theology. It is this argument that he attempts to articulate 
in his book Levinas and Theology.  
What Purcell believes to be of critical significance in the relationship between 
Levinas’s phenomenology and Christian theology is their common point of departure, 
namely, their concern with human existential experience.94 The human existential as the 
central aspect for the correlation between phenomenology and theology presupposes an 
existence of a real world in which this human existential can be experienced; hence the 
idea of the incarnate existence as a place where human beings exist and where God’s 
existence becomes a question for them. For Levinas, Purcell contends, it is in the world 
that human beings exist, find fulfillment, and commit themselves to one another. How 
                                                 
93 For an insightful critique of a possible relationship between theology and phenomenology, see Janicaud 
Dominique et alü, Phenomenology and the “Theological Turn”: The French Debate (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2000); Phenomenology “Wide Open”: After the French Debate (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2005). 
94 Purcell, Levinas and Theology, 2. 
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does Levinas understand incarnate existence and how is it significant for the correlation 
between Levinas’s phenomenology and theology?  
The phenomenology which Purcell refers to is the one that Levinas transforms 
from Husserl’s insights and which rejects naive realism that takes for granted the 
relationship between meaning and reality.95 Levinas, referring to Husserl, contests the 
position of the natural attitude as it fails to account for the link between the world “out” 
there and subjectivity.96 He supports Husserl’s view that the way things appear in 
consciousness are given as they appear, and their meanings are unpredictable and not 
everywhere the same; and this is expressed in terms of intentional consciousness.97 
Levinas, however, with respect to the subject does not limit the function of intentionality 
to purely representational and theoretical dimensions, like Husserl. He expands the 
phenomenological possibilities of intentionality to life in general, most importantly to 
human relations with the world, including the transcendental, volitional and affective 
dimension of human subjectivity. For Levinas, Purcell argues, phenomenology has to go 
beyond abstraction, egological reduction, and theoretical and cognitive dimension toward 
an intersubjective reduction that takes place in concrete lived experience in which 
“others” are associated.98 Unlike Husserl, who bracketed the existence of the other in the 
phenomenological époche, Levinas acknowledges the presence of the other in the 
                                                 
95 Purcell, Levinas and Theology, 9. Husserl’s naïve realism presumes that the reality of objects, the 
relations between them, and the categories of thought are always and everywhere the same and identical. 
For Purcell, Levinas finds in Husserl three valuable insights that help understand phenomenology as a 
science of meaning and existence: the relation between appearing and reality (as much appearing, as much 
being), the concern with concrete life (return to things themselves), and the notion of intentionality (objects 
appear in a particular mode in conformity with a particular intention). 
96 Purcell, Levinas and Theology, 12. 
97 Purcell, Levinas and Theology, 11-14. In the relationship between a subject and an object, there are three 
elements: the act by which the object is perceived, the perception of that object, and the actual object itself, 
which in actual fact is beyond consciousness, that is, transcendent yet only available to the subject in terms 
of consciousness.  
98 Purcell, Levinas and Theology, 15-23. 
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intentional and transcendental dimension of consciousness. He is committed to a 
phenomenology of life that takes seriously human existence, both of the subject and the 
other. 
Levinas finds in Heidegger’s thought, Purcell contends, the most important 
potentialities of the phenomenological method, most especially with regard to his 
appreciation of incarnate existence. Heidegger was the first, in Being and Time, to open 
Levinas’s eyes on this issue.99 Yet, Levinas still departs from Heidegger’s existential 
phenomenology for its confused understanding of the meaning of the world and its 
neglect of the ethical dimension in his understanding of Dasein. He argues for a positive 
view of the world whereby human beings, who exist in the world among other things, 
would not be reduced to Dasein’s own self project, but rather would be defined by ethical 
responsibility that disrupts ontology. For Levinas, the world of humans is the world of 
lived experience in which consciousness finds itself already incarnated (here in the 
world) in the everydayness of existence at once opened to both phenomenological and 
theological elucidation.100 Here Levinas draws attention to the importance and the 
sincerity of everyday actions which characterize human existence. Each everyday 
experience is a phenomenon à la Marion, that is, often saturated and excessive which 
                                                 
99 Purcell, Levinas and Theology, 74-77. Heidegger was concerned with the identity of being which he 
defined as Dasein. Dasein which means “being-there” in the world is not reducible to the human being but 
is inclusive of it; it is an ontological entity which signifies human life and raises the question of Being in its 
being-in-the-world. For Heidegger, Purcell argues, human existence is “mine” in the world, as an incarnate 
existence in terms of Dasein. Now, Dasein as an existential project is characterized by an existence in 
terms of possibilities for realizing itself. It has two modes of existence in its being-in-the-world. It exists 
either inauthentically or authentically. Now, everything Dasein encounters in the world is seen in terms of 
possibility for Dasein’s own realization or their utility to Dasein. Things exist the way they are for the use 
of Dasein and its possibilities. 
100 Purcell, Levinas and Theology, 78-80. 
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from the outset already puts one “in a prevenient ethical situation without” one’s 
choosing or knowing.101  
Now for Levinas, Purcell argues, the incarnate existence is the point of departure 
for any phenomenological inquiry. Such a perspective is not without theological 
significance, considering the fact that theology starts as theological anthropology. In the 
incarnate existence, the subject’s consciousness is awakened to the reality of the world, 
facilitating thus a shift from subjectivity to intersubjectivity. The subject is awakened 
from sleep, a mode of refuge or escape from the excessive demands of responsibility, to 
the mode of vigilance, fear, and threat that characterizes wakefulness and the insomnia of 
there is from which being arises.102 The subject’s consciousness (interiority) finds itself 
here already constituted in incarnate existence and geared toward the event of the other 
person (exteriority) that provokes his/her conscience. There is here a reconsideration of 
subjectivity in terms of ethical responsibility for the other. To be a subject is to exist not 
as a pour soi but as a pour l’autre.103 According to Purcell, Levinas leaves the climate of 
the Husserlian and Heideggerian ontology to move toward an ethics where “the event of 
the other person – which may be described as an ethical awakening – predates the 
subject, but is only discovered ‘after the event’ of subjectivity, as it were. For Levinas, 
however, such an ethics can also be ‘first theology,’ properly understood.”104 The 
question to be answered is how precisely has Levinas made the move from the ethical 
awakening of the subject to theological reduction. 
                                                 
101 Purcell, Levinas and Theology, 82-86. 
102 Purcell, Levinas and Theology, 88-94. 
103 Purcell, Levinas and Theology, 73-74. The world Levinas argues for is not a pour soi type of world 
rather a pour l’autre type, a world that recognizes the transcendental nature of the other human person and 
renders the subject ever responsible for the other’s well-being. 
104 Purcell, Levinas and Theology, 49. 
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For Purcell, Levinas made this move by seeing in the ethical awakening a new 
humanism that echoes the humanism of the Hebrew Bible from which originates part of 
Western thought. While Levinas has been critical of Christian theology for its reliance on 
a Western ontological foundation, its tendency toward the theoretical, making the 
transcendence of the divine accessible to thought, and its neglect of humans, Purcell 
argues, he still sees the need for the revitalization of certain themes of theology as it 
pertains to holiness. Purcell’s underlying argument is that, for Levinas, ethics is not only 
“first philosophy” but also “first theology,” as it addresses the issue of holiness of life 
which precedes any ethical question. As long as it is a human person, who in history 
raises the question of God, Levinas believes that ethical engagement as opposed to a 
purely theoretical approach is an essential component for theological reflection. The 
ethical engagement that marked both Levinas’s phenomenology and revealed theology is 
motivated by “a first revelation of the other person” and “the ethical intent of 
scriptures.”105 The Hebrew Bible is the place where the first things about human life and 
meaning are said; things said in philosophy find their meaning from the “Book of books,” 
and the principle thing said in the Hebrew Bible is the fundamental human responsibility 
for the other person. Because philosophy stems from the “Book of books,” all thinking, 
all meaning, and all quests for knowledge are subjected to the anteriority of ethics 
inscribed in the Torah. Biblical humanism argues that subjectivity is intersubjectivity as it 
                                                 
105 Purcell, Levinas and Theology, 33. With regard the relationship between theology and phenomenology, 
he embraces Jean-Luc Marion’s revealed theology over and against traditional metaphysical theology. 
Revealed theology is linked to phenomenology because revelation always takes place in the mode of 
phenomenality. This means that the “given facts” of revealed theology, “which are given positively as 
figures, appearances, and manifestations (indeed, apparitions, miracles, revelations, and so on) takes place 
in the natural field of phenomenality and is therefore dependent on the competence of phenomenology.” 
See 31-33. Purcell’s reliance on the thought of Jean-Luc Marion and Jean-Louis Chrétien can be found in 
the following passages:  Jean-Luc Marion, 18, 31-32, 109, 147-148, 170-171; and Jean-Louis Chrétien, 32, 
144, 146, 157. 
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is prescribed in the Torah, the text of divine law. The Torah gives direction by way of 
ethical rule to all humans so that human life may prosper. God’s law is written in the face 
of the other person and calls humans to ethical responsibility toward the other person. In 
keeping God’s law or commandments presented in the Torah, one meets the trace of God 
that comes to mind.106 In this sense philosophy, through phenomenology, shares with 
theology a concern to articulate the meaning of existence in terms of responsibility for the 
other – an ethical humanism which is the main point of Levinas’s philosophical 
project.107 And what comes first and defines meaning and understanding in terms of 
philosophy is therefore the human person’s original and unconditional acceptance of the 
ethical commands of the Law. Without the meaning that philosophy and theology draw 
from ethical commands of the Law that surpasses human freedom, their thoughts remain 
empty and meaningless. The ethical command of responsibility for the other is now the 
central aspect of the correlation between phenomenology and theology. The subject is 
awakened to ethical responsibility, to his/her genuine humanity, which is a reflection of 
the divine life; and this for Levinas, Purcell argues, is “first theology;”108 it takes its root 
                                                 
106 Levinas, Of God Who Comes to Mind. 
107 Purcell, Levinas and Theology, 49-55. 
108 Purcell, Levinas and Theology, 60-63; 71, 155. Levinas’s theology would be defined as ethical 
attentiveness to the neighbor in the world where the human person asks the question about God. It is justice 
rendered to the neighbor that “brings” God closer to the subject. In a sense, belief in God takes place in a 
social world and therefore, it has to be intersubjective, communitarian, and ecclesial. This is the theological 
perspective that Levinas would be comfortable with and would call atheism as opposed to theism. Now, 
according to Purcell, Levinas understands theism as a way of belief in God that is neglectful of the social 
world. It concentrates on the individual, theoretical, abstract, and mystical relationship with God to the 
detriment of human relationship. This form of belief seeks to protect the integrity of divine transcendence 
and unknowability. Levinas, Purcell argues, opts for a theology of atheism, the one that, without denying 
the existence of God, recognizes the need for God’s absence and separation with humans so as to make 
possible the meeting with God through ethical encounter with the “holiness and transcendence” of the other 
person. This theology “is presented as a positive and responsible” theology which “draws attention to 
human responsibility as the locus of divine presence.” God’s absence or distance and separation from 
humans is not meaningless; it expresses the holiness and the absolute transcendence of God, and enables 
humans to be responsible and render justice to one another. God hides his face so as to create a possibility 
for ethical humanity whereby to encounter him will depend on one’s affective responsibility for the other 
person. Hence, theology and the question of God for Levinas, Purcell argues, is responsibility for the other. 
 208
in the biblical humanism of Torah whereby “God arises as the counterpart of the justice 
we render to the other person.”109  
For Purcell, Levinas’s phenomenology, by emphasizing the ethical engagement, 
helps theology achieve its goal of defending the holiness of life through ethics. Levinas’s 
phenomenological method “offers theology a new voice, a new grammar of response and 
responsibility, a new lexicon for articulating the human in its tendency towards the 
divine, which for Levinas, cannot avoid an ethical commitment to the other person here 
and now.”110 In a sense, phenomenology and theology should work together and need 
each other as they both attempt to answer the same question.  
Hence, according to Purcell and following Jeffrey Kosky’s arguments, Levinas’s 
phenomenology offers a possibility for a philosophy of religion or fundamental theology 
as it opens a religious possibility in a postmodern or post-metaphysical age for a 
consideration of the phenomenon of the human subject as responsible for the other 
person. Interesting here is “the fact that the religiosity of the subject is discovered by way 
of a phenomenological reduction which Levinas pushes beyond its Husserlian limits.”111 
Levinas recovers the transcendental dimension of subjectivity bracketed by Husserl as he 
understands the reduction to occur through a consciousness that goes beyond itself in the 
transcendence of intentionality. Subjectivity is affirmed in terms of exteriority. To be a 
subject phenomenologically is to be ethically attentive to the other person. Here for 
Purcell, Levinas’s phenomenological perspective is of significance for fundamental 
                                                                                                                                                 
It takes place in the context of incarnate existence and ethics where the idea of God is linked to love and 
justice toward the neighbor.  
109 Purcell, Levinas and Theology, 37. 
110 Purcell, Levinas and Theology, 3. 
111 Purcell, Levinas and Theology, 58. 
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theology “in reconsidering the subject in terms of ethics and as responsibility for the 
other person.”112  
The Theologies of Grace and Sacraments and Levinas’s Phenomenology of Awakening, 
Desire, and the Face 
 
Purcell continues his inquiry into a possibility of dialogue between Levinas’s 
ethics of responsibility and Christian theology by examining aspects of Levinas’s 
philosophy that provide a possible rapprochement with the theologies of grace and 
sacraments. He seems to find it in Levinas’s phenomenology of Desire, Awakening, and 
the Face. For Purcell, Levinas’s understanding of desire and awakening can be translated 
into a theology of grace and the notion of the face into a theology of the sacrament. 
Levinas’s Phenomenology of Desire and Awakening and the Theology of Grace 
 
 For Purcell, Levinas’s phenomenology of desire and awakening constitute two 
important existential experiences that could be linked to a theology of grace whereby 
consciousness is called upon to become moral consciousness. In Levinas’s 
phenomenology, desire and awakening are the fruits of a phenomenological journey that 
originates in the existential experience in which the self, caught up in the sleeplessness of 
Insomnia (the burden of existence), had no other choice than to flee by ‘getting out of 
being by another way’ – the way of exteriority or of the advent of the other person.  
What characterizes Levinas’s phenomenology of desire and awakening, Purcell 
asserts, has much to do with existence as transcendence or the call of the infinite, the 
other person. Existence as transcendence begins in the existential experience of the 
subject when he/she escapes a self-enclosed state of being toward an otherwise than 
                                                 
112 Purcell, Levinas and Theology, 60. 
 210
being. This escape, for Levinas, takes place in the structure of the hypostasis of existence 
and existent whereby the subject emerges from the “enchainment of the bare 
existence”113 of the there is (il y a) toward subjectivity as ethical responsibility.114 Within 
this structure, he identifies two movements: the first is from non-being to being, a 
situation of impersonal anonymity of the there is or Insomnia from which being arises 
and there is no escape. The second is an ethical journey from being toward otherwise 
than being.115 In the first movement, the subject is involved in the kind of self-
relationality to itself. Nothing actually exists or is definite, yet there is not nothing; it is a 
state of wakefulness and darkness, a fact of there is (il y a) – a sort of being/existence in 
its extraordinary obscurity, unknown to itself except through what it causes, namely 
threat, fear, and vigilance. The notion of there is (il y a) as wakefulness without 
intentionality is a phenomenon of impersonal or pure being. This non-being is expressed 
through sluggishness, weariness, or the incapacity to face Being. The second movement 
comes to the rescue of the first. It offers a possibility for the subject to leave the mode of 
indetermination of there is (il y a). It is a moment of escape from threat, fear, and 
vigilance with the advent of the other person. The arrival of the other person in the form 
of transcendental movement disrupts “a subjectivity which is self-closed; it releases the 
self from its enchainment to bare existence, and enables the emergence of ethical 
                                                 
113 Purcell, Levinas and Theology, 96. 
114 Purcell, Levinas and Theology, 90-92. 
115 Purcell, Levinas and Theology, 86-94. The two movements mentioned here, according to Purcell, also 
correspond to two philosophical itineraries: the Abrahamic and the Odyssean. The Abrahamic itinerary is 
an outgoing movement toward exteriority, toward an unknown place other than self, in a response to a call. 
It escapes the ontological world by going beyond system and totality – getting out of being by another way 
– hence, it is otherwise than being. The Odyssean on its part is a self-return movement toward one’s 
interiority and characterizes a system of totalization. Now the philosophical itinerary which Levinas adopts, 
Purcell asserts, and which offers a possibility to escape the state of the il y a, is the Abrahamic as it opens 
up to the encounter with the other person. See 100-101. 
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subjectivity.”116 The subject distances itself from itself by way of a transcendental 
movement that takes place in the mode of separation. And “separation gives the 
possibility of transcendence and a relation to alterity.”117 The threat, fear, and vigilance of 
the darkness of the there is, “in which no one may sleep, is overcome by the advent of the 
other person who saves the self from itself and its enchainment to solitary existence.”118 
The subject withdraws from itself to allow the possibility of another person, other than 
itself, opening thus the possibility of ethical existence expressed as responsibility for the 
other. 
Now, the escape from being or the ‘getting out of being by another way’ – the 
way of exteriority – evokes a dimension of transcendence that has ethical implications. 
Transcendence for Levinas, Purcell argues, always suggests a move toward the excessive; 
it surpasses and goes beyond the aptitude of thought, it is a desire for the infinite.119 The 
infinite, the other person “whom thought cannot contain is in the realm of the infinite – 
provokes thought, and provokes thought preveniently.”120 The idea here is the possibility 
for the self to escape the state of there is or pure being toward the Illeity of the other 
person. Illeity is the origin of alterity and opens up the subject as responsible for the 
other. To exist as a subject, phenomenologically, is to be awakened to responsibility by 
the other’s absolute excess or infinity. And what causes this awakening is the insatiable 
desire that the other provokes in the subject. What this means in terms of the theology of 
                                                 
116 Purcell, Levinas and Theology, 96.  
117 Purcell, Levinas and Theology, 99-100. 
118 Purcell, Levinas and Theology, 100. 
119 Purcell reads Levinas’s idea of the infinite in the sense of Marion’s notion of excessive or saturated 
phenomenon. He writes: “what the idea of the Infinite introduces is the notion of an excessive or saturated 
phenomenon which is described not simply as phenomenal because of its restriction to the phenomenal 
world, but rather is described as ‘phenomenal’ because in its very phenomenality it is excessive and 
overwhelming, and confounds the capacity of thought to contain or to comprehend.”  See Levinas and 
Theology, 108. 
120 Purcell, Levinas and Theology, 109. 
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grace is that Levinas’s subject – through the second movement of the structure of the 
hypostasis, from being to otherwise than being – awakens to a transcendental graced 
existence in terms of desire for the other which is excessive and infinite. This is the 
hypostasis of the other in the subject.121  
The subject in order to escape the indeterminacy of the il y a enters into a 
relationship that is always and already beyond its power and capacity. It is a “graced 
relationship” that is always in a transcendental movement toward infinity in terms of the 
dynamic of desire. The subject always desires what is beyond, the other person, the 
infinite. And because the person is excessive, ungraspable, infinite, and eminently other, 
desire is inextinguishable and inaccessible, and does not originate in the subject. Thus, 
the dynamism of desire as grace, establishes the subject as no longer “for itself” but as 
“for the other.” Thus, within the ethics of desire, the other, “like grace,” remains 
antecedent with respect to the subject, “too close to grasp and too far away to reach.”122 
Thus, the dynamism of desire as grace in Levinas presents itself in a “paradox of infinity 
in proximity.”123  
The phenomenology of desire that constitutes subjectivity as intersubjectivity, 
takes place in the incarnate existence through the phenomenology of awakening to 
alterity. Here the consciousness of the subject is awakened to intersubjectivity as the 
hypostasis of the other-in-the subject. This becomes the subject’s original experience as 
the one-for-the-other in responsibility.124 This is the definitive meaning of human life. 
                                                 
121 Purcell, Mystery and Method, 247. “This Other, like grace, draws close in absolute proximity and is 
experienced in the desire which is aroused in the subject who, in response to the grace and graciousness of 
the Other’s approach, is able to transcend himself or herself, and fully awaken as an ethical person. Gloria 
Dei, Homo vigilans.” 
122 Purcell, Mystery and Method, 223-224. 
123 Purcell, Mystery and Method, 225. 
124 Purcell, Mystery and Method, 210. 
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For Purcell, Levinas’s phenomenology of desire and awakening can be read in the light 
of the theology of grace. What actually facilitated this possibility is a “graced existence” 
which could be identified with Irenaeus’ theological conviction that “the glory of God is 
the human person fully alive;” and phenomenologically this could be expressed as the 
“glory of God is the human person fully awake.”125  
To explain his claim, Purcell presents the thought of Aquinas, Maréchal, Rahner, 
and De Lubac on desire for God as witness.126 All start with Aquinas’ consideration of 
the human subject as having within its being “a natural desire for the beatific vision” 
(desiderium naturale visionis beatificae). For Aquinas, Purcell argues, the human person, 
in his/her intellect is naturally constituted to desire to see the divine substance. Maréchal, 
building on Aquinas, insists that such natural dynamism to see the infinite and absolute 
God can only be met by God’s grace freely given to the human subject. This position 
suggests, firstly, the existence of an exterior agent that is capable of communicating 
itself, and secondly, on the part of the human person, the capacity for receiving this 
communication. Rahner agrees with Maréchal’s argument but also insists on the 
gratuitous nature of grace. He understands the natural desire for the beatific vision as 
coming from human existential experience as a supernatural existential whereby the 
dynamic orientation in the finite spirit toward what is other stems from a transcendental 
horizon of an absolute (supernatural existential), but not from any lack on its part. In this 
sense, for Rahner, in the transcendental horizon, the finite spirit is constituted as 
                                                 
125 Purcell, Levinas and Theology, 125-126. 
126 The theology Purcell seems to be referring to in his argument about Levinas’s phenomenology of desire, 
awakening and face, is a theology as presented by Augustine, Aquinas, Joseph Maréchal, Henri de Lubac, 
Karl Rahner. See his Levinas and Theology - Augustine and Aquinas, 113-114; Joseph Maréchal, 114-116; 
Henri de Lubac, 118-122; Karl Rahner, 16-17, 114, 117-122. 
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“openness,” a potentia oboedientialis, to alterity.127 For De Lubac, the desire for God in 
the human person is both natural (because it is found in human nature) and supernatural 
(because it does not stem from the human person but God), and the human person cannot 
on his/her own without God’s grace fulfill his/her goal. Rahner and de Lubac agree that 
the desire for God in the human person is stirred by God’s grace freely given.128 The 
human person can never fulfill the desire for God for which he/she is not the author. This 
desire is beyond the human capacity to bear. Thus, desire as grace in the subject is always 
and already opened to a transcendental movement, to exteriority, outside-of-oneself, and 
toward God, “the infinite who can never be possessed or consumed by the one 
desiring.”129 Purcell sees in this theological perspective on desire as grace a possible 
correspondence with Levinas’s phenomenology of desire and awakening. For, what 
characterizes desire for Levinas “is insatiable longing for the Other who, on account of 
his or her excess, sustains the Desire as radically and always unfulfilled and 
unfulfillable.”130  
While in the theology of grace it is God who awakens the desire in the human 
person, in Levinas’s phenomenology “an understanding of grace as desire and 
awakening” is provoked by “the advent of the other person, always prevenient, who 
excites an insatiable desire for the other who is always excessive and 
unencompassable.”131 The theology of grace in Levinas, Purcell contends, can be read in 
terms of “the phenomenology of desire which tends to be excessive, and in terms of the 
phenomenology of awakening, whereby the glory of God is not only the human person 
                                                 
127 Purcell, Mystery and Method, 245. 
128 Purcell, Levinas and Theology, 113-122; Mystery and Method, 238-243; 245. 
129 Purcell, Mystery and Method, 228. 
130 Purcell, Mystery and Method, 247. 
131 Purcell, Levinas and Theology, 134. 
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fully alive (Gloria dei homo vivens), but also the human person fully awake (Gloria dei, 
homo vigilans).”132 Levinas offers here a possibility of dialogue with Christian theology 
in terms of grace as desire and awakening. Purcell, however, in suggesting that Levinas’s 
phenomenology of desire and awakening is close to a theology of grace might still have 
to show how one could reconcile the idea of grace as God’s presence and assistance in 
Christian theology with Levinas’s God who takes no part in the subject’s responsibility 
for the other, except that He only passes by as a trace. 
Levinas’s Phenomenology of the Face and the Theology of Sacrament 
 
Purcell sees in Levinas’s phenomenology of the face an affinity with a theology 
of sacrament as developed by Karl Rahner. Rahner understands the sacraments in general 
in terms of a transcendental relationship between humanity and divinity by which the 
sacraments as signs effect grace (what they signify) in as much as grace is bestowed by 
being signified. The sacramental sign is intrinsically related to the grace it communicates 
by virtue of its created nature and purpose. Hence, the efficacy of the sacraments derives 
not from any human capacity, effort or merit, but from God’s gift to humans. Thus, 
sacraments as signs are a suitable medium for the manifestation of God’s grace in the 
human person.133 The significance of the sacramental sign (sacramentum) comes not 
from the signified, but from the symbolic reality or mystery whose presence is caused or 
signified by the consecrated material sign. The sacramental sign or sacramentum tantum 
by signifying effects the reality of grace (res). The ontological reality of sign guarantees 
the effectiveness and objectivity of the sacraments. Rahner calls these material signs real 
or intrinsic symbols. 
                                                 
132 Purcell, Levinas and Theology, 112. 
133 Purcell, Mystery and Method, 263. 
 216
Purcell sees in the relationship between sign and reality in Rahner’s sacramental 
theology an affinity with Levinas’s phenomenology of the face. The face is the “way” the 
other appears to the subject in a transcendental dimension, exceeding the subject’s gaze 
by which he/she would objectify it. It “signifies, beyond signification, a relation with an 
absolute absent, an ‘au delà de l’être’” and passes away as a trace.134 In this dimension of 
the face as presence (proximity and distance) of that which does not present itself and 
who passes away as trace; Purcell sees a Rahnerian sacramental distinction between sign 
and symbol. He argues that “to speak of the face as the trace of the other – beyond 
representation – is to speak of the sacramentality of the face.”135 In Rahner, according to 
Purcell, material elements such as bread, wine, water, etc, can never function on their 
own as sacramental signs without transcendental referent. God’s grace is the cause of the 
sign, bringing it about and making it present. In terms of the sacramentality of the face, 
the face of the other would be the symbolic reality or mystery whose presence-absence as 
a trace is signified by the other person’s absolute transcendence. Thus, what the subject is 
left with in the absence of the other is the sacramental face as trace (symbolic reality or 
mystery) of the other caused by the reality of the other person’s absolute transcendence.  
In this sense, Levinas’s face can be read as a sacramental sign. For a face as sign 
“signifies something other than itself which is irreducible to itself, and irreducible in view 
of the fact of the transcendence of the Other person who gives the sign, an absolute 
transcendence which, for Levinas, is ultimately guaranteed by God as ‘the other of the 
Other.’”136  For the face of the other as trace to function as sign (symbolic reality or 
mystery) it needs a transcendental referent which the other brings by virtue of its 
                                                 
134 Purcell, Mystery and Method, 261. 
135 Purcell, Mystery and Method, 262-263. 
136 Purcell, Mystery and Method, 272. 
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association with God as the other of the other. Thus, Purcell could say that for both 
Rahner and Levinas, each in his own right, “exteriority as well as materiality belongs to 
the meaning of the sacramental sign.”137 They both “assert the transcendental value of the 
signified.”138 There is in a sign an embodiment of God’s grace. For Rahner and Levinas, 
Purcell argues, “the relationship between the finite and infinite is expressed symbolically 
due to the symbolic nature of reality;” for “there is distance between image and reality, 
not confusion.”139 Levinas’s reflection on the subject who is being faced by the face of 
the other is expressed in ethical terms enabling, as it were, Rahner’s emphasis on 
symbolic reality to be sufficiently humanized.140  
There is in Levinas and Rahner, Purcell suggests, a move from sign to the 
symbolism of sign as the “other-in-me.” For Rahner, Purcell contends, finite being is 
relational in the sense that, as multiple in itself, it realizes itself only in expressing itself 
through the conversio ad phantasmata. Levinas’s being also shares the same relationality 
in itself, because finite existence is best expressed in terms of reflexivity of the verb ‘to 
be’: ‘it is not just that one is, one is oneself (on n’est pas, on s’est)’.141 Because 
“existence is primarily reflexive[…], each being forms, in its own way, more or less 
perfectly according to its degree of being, something distinct from itself and yet, one with 
itself, ‘for’ its own fulfillment.”142 Consequently, the meaning of symbol for both Rahner 
and Levinas is the subject’s self-realization in its own intrinsic otherness. The subject 
finds itself always and already absorbed in the other, in whom, it finds its fulfillment. 
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138 Purcell, Mystery and Method, 292. 
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This other-in-me for Rahner is the one spoken about in sacramental sign, yet remains 
hidden and excessive in the spoken words of the sacraments.  
In terms of the Eucharist, the church remembers Christ’s words and actions. Now, 
the words spoken by the church in the sacrament of the Eucharist are in memory of Christ 
and make him present. Christ is the one spoken about in the sacramental sign. The 
Eucharist makes Jesus Christ sacramentally present in a memorial sacrifice. In Levinas’s 
language, this would correspond to the distinction between Saying (le Dire) and the Said 
(le Dit), with Saying remaining excessive with regard to what is Said. The Eucharist as 
memorial would be situated in the time of the other, that is, the now of the subject. This 
Eucharistic time which stems from the other is a liturgical time that calls for diakonia 
(service).143 The liturgical theology of the church involves two major aspects: the 
glorification of God and the sanctification of humanity. The subject in glorifying God is 
invited to act justly toward the other; worship and service are interrelated. Hence, Purcell 
asserts, “the theological structure of the liturgy is ‘other-oriented’ just as, for Levinas, the 
philosophical structure of liturgy is ‘a movement of the Same towards the Other which 
never returns to the Same’.”144 Philosophically, to participate in the liturgy, defined as a 
work for the people, is to respond in responsibility for the other in a non-reversible 
movement in which the other, “like the work of grace in us, preveniently precedes and 
enables the self to move beyond the self.”145 Liturgy is inseparable to the service one 
renders to the neighbor. As a result, according to Purcell, the church in celebrating the 
mystery of the Eucharistic memorial enters into the time of the other who “gives time” 
and makes it meaningful.  
                                                 
143 Purcell, Mystery and Method, 269-270; Levinas and Theology, 147-154. 
144 Purcell, Levinas and Theology, 138. 
145 Purcell, Levinas and Theology, 139-140. 
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For the subject to respond in responsibility for the other, Purcell argues, is to be 
Eucharist in the sense of substitution. Jesus Christ, in the mystery of the Eucharist, gave 
himself in substitution for you and for many, in reference to the words of the institution 
narrative. Read ethically, the Eucharist is both responsibility and working for justice. The 
unique other calls the subject to responsibility. This invitation also opens up to many 
other’s (humanity) in such a way that through the face of this one other person, the whole 
of humanity appeals for justice in the world.146 Levinas’s incarnation (Man-God), unlike 
Christian theology’s (God-Man), centers on the human person’s role and responsibility in 
the world. To be a subject is to be incarnate “for-the-other-person.” Incarnation for 
Levinas is now the human person’s divine intentionality, in terms of “expiation for 
others” or “substitution” “for-the-other-person.” Subjectivity is understood in terms of 
kenosis, passivity, and expiation. And God’s proximity manifests itself in the subject’s 
ethical responsibility and in the workings of justice.147 The other-in-me as symbolism of 
sign derives its surplus of meaning or incomprehensibility from its association with God, 
“the other than the other.” Hence, subjectivity is now defined in terms of the “for-the-
other” or openness to the other human person. For Purcell, Rahner and Levinas affirm the 
necessity of love of neighbor as the most important act of the love of God.  
Purcell, however, raises some concerns about Levinas’s understanding of 
ontology which, in his estimation, creates a rift between being and good, thus provoking 
a risk of “a metaphysical responsibility without an ontological commitment.”148 He 
suggests a reading of Levinas’s ethical responsibility as a being otherwise instead of an 
otherwise than being. For him, although Levinas’s Otherwise than being affirms, “the 
                                                 
146 Purcell, Levinas and Theology, 156-158; Mystery and Method, 286-287. 
147 Purcell, Levinas and Theology, 159-164. 
148 Purcell, Mystery and Method, 329. 
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absolute uncompromisable value of the other ... offers no way of linking responsibility 
with practical commitment to the other;”149 it locates the good, not in being, but rather 
beyond being. Purcell argues rather for a possibility of finding the good in being and that 
being also has the capacity to actualize it.150  
Purcell’s merit, one has to admit, is to have tried to establish some connection 
between Levinas’s transcendental ethics of responsibility and Christian theology. He sees 
in Levinas’s thought “the possibility for ethical redemption of the ontological which is so 
prevalent in theological thinking.”151 Although Levinas has been critical of Christian 
theology, he has also expressed the need for the recovering of certain theological themes. 
The theology Levinas accepts, Purcell argues, is the one that shows consideration for the 
neighbor, that is, the one that takes ethics seriously. It is important to note that theology 
cannot be reduced to ethics, yet the insistence on the perfection of charity and the service 
for neighbor as a manner of human living, are the characteristics of holiness of life that 
Christian theology teaches. Thus, communion with God would be meaningless without 
ethical responsibility for the neighbor as it is in Levinas. Hence, Purcell claims that ethics 
is both first philosophy and “first theology” could be justified on the basis of a true 
Catholic spirituality that connects contemplation with perfection of charity. Levinas, 
however, Purcell insists, is not a theologian and it is not theology that he does, yet, what 
he proposes can be seen as a preliminary instruction for theology. While Levinas does not 
offer a theology of grace, his phenomenology of desire and awakening point in the 
direction of the theology of grace. In Levinas’s notion of face, Purcell sees a 
                                                 
149 Purcell, Mystery and Method, 329. 
150 Purcell, Mystery and Method, 329-332. 
151 Purcell, Mystery and Method, xv. 
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sacramentality of the face of the other which is close to Rahner’s theology of sacraments 
and the Church’s doctrine of the mystery of the Eucharist.  
Conclusion 
 
This fourth chapter examined Dussel, Marion, and Purcell’s attempt to use 
Levinas’s thought for theological discourse. What transpires is a general consensus that 
Levinas’s philosophy offers an opportunity for dialogue with Christian theology in the 
postmodern world because his philosophical project is guided by a concern for the human 
other as the condition of possibility for the human subject’s subjectivity. Subjectivity is 
being for the other in affective responsibility that precedes all acts of thinking, knowing, 
and willing. Philosophically speaking, a free human person is fundamentally given to the 
other in love and responsibility. Dussel, Marion, and Purcell, each in his own right, argue 
that Levinas’s focus on a God accessible in love and justice calls to mind Christian 
theology’s relating of love of God with love of neighbor.  
Dussel’s main argument as it relates to the question of alterity is his desire to 
liberate philosophy from the center of colonial power toward the periphery or the 
underside of history. He embarks in a task of explaining the uniqueness of Latin 
American philosophy as opposed to US-European philosophy. He argues for a 
philosophical theology of liberation that takes seriously insights from Levinas’s 
philosophy of the other or exteriority. 
Marion’s thought as it relates to Levinas is committed to denouncing traditional 
metaphysics’ view of being as substance, presence, and causa sui. He questions 
traditional metaphysics’ inability to think alterity or otherness, without turning it into 
more of the selfsame. He claims phenomenology as first philosophy that opens to the 
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theological and acknowledges his indebtedness to Levinas’s philosophy. Like with 
Levinas, the concept of reversed intentionality is significant for Marion’s 
phenomenology. Givenness and saturated phenomenon result in the displacement of the 
transcendental ego, which can no longer be considered the source of meaning. The 
subject’s self-sufficiency is put into question by the look of the face of the other as with 
Levinas. Marion joins Levinas in rejecting onto-theology and argues for a theology of 
caritas/agape in the sense of Levinas’s ethical responsibility.  
Purcell attempts a correlation between Levinas’s philosophy and Christian 
theology. The point of departure that facilitates this possible connection is their common 
anthropological perspective. Human existence, he argues, is the crossing point between 
phenomenology and theology. First, phenomenology and theology share the same point 
of departure, human existence. They both focus on the human person who is capable of 
asking the question of God and/or for whom God can become a possible question. 
Second, all meaning and part of Western knowledge come from the Hebrew Bible, in 
particular from the ethical commands of the Torah. Hence, phenomenology is empty and 
meaningless without biblical humanism. At the same time, theology would also be empty 
and meaningless without the natural field of phenomenology that facilitates the 
manifestation of the given facts or events of revelation in a particular figure of 
phenomenality. Besides, Purcell finds in certain aspects of Levinas’s philosophical 
thought some similarities with the writings of some theologians, specifically with regard 
to the theology of grace and sacraments. He sees in Levinas’s notions of desire and 
awakening something that points in the direction of the human desire for God in the 
theology of grace.   
 223
While each of these scholars interprets aspects of Levinas’s philosophy along 
different lines; all delineate the importance of his thought for theological anthropology. 
They all agree that Levinas is not a theologian, but rather a philosopher of the other, who, 
inspired by his experience as prisoner of war (World War II) and by the assassination of 
all of his family members by the Nazis, articulates an ethical relation born of 
responsibility for the other human person. Dussel, Marion, and Purcell, as this chapter 
has shown, see in Levinas an authentic philosopher and a dialogical partner for Christian 
theology. In a sense, they argue that his philosophy is a valuable resource that Christian 
theology should consider.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Levinas’s Philosophy, Liberation Theology, and Contemporary 
Sub-Saharan Africa Socio-Political and Ethnic Conflicts 
 
Introduction 
 
This dissertation ends with a praxis issue. We have shown throughout this work 
that Levinas’s philosophy and liberation theology reveal that humankind can overcome 
the history of the hatred of the other person if each person recognizes a dimension of the 
divine in every human person. Levinas’s philosophy and liberation theology emerged 
within the context of human suffering; they search for the divine transcendence in the life 
of commitment to the human person, and view the turn to the other/neighbor as a 
prospect for the re-imagining of the world. Levinas, Gutiérrez, and Sobrino, therefore, 
describe subjectivity primarily in terms of the one-for-the-other. The goal of this final 
chapter is to examine the significance of these two approaches for addressing 
contemporary sub-Saharan Africa socio-political and ethnic conflicts.1  
Speaking of sub-Saharan Africa, this study is aware of the danger of 
generalization because of the obvious historical, socio-political, cultural and ethnic 
differences between countries. Nonetheless, it is our argument that these differences are 
                                                 
1 While the concern for the humanity of every human person should be a preoccupation of every human 
being living on this planet, the focus in this chapter will limit this discussion to the African continent which 
constitutes the social location of concern to this study. On the association of the ethnic conflict and African 
politics, see Harvey Glickman, ed., Ethnic Conflict and Democratization in Africa (Atlanta, Georgia: The 
African Studies Association Press, 1995). For a couple of examples of this association, see Jean Francois 
Bayart The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly, translated from the French by Mary Harper, 
Christopher and Elizabeth Harrison (London and New York: Longman, 1993), 41-59; the French original is 
titled, L’Etat en Afrique : la politique du ventre (Paris: Libraire Arthème Fayard, 1989). This work is aware 
of the divergences of views in defining the terms ethnicity, ethnic group, or ethnic identity. However, this 
work will use these three terms synonymously to mean “the consciousness among people who share 
cultural and linguistic, sometimes kinship and religious, roots, and who conditionally affiliate for purposes 
of political mobilization and political action.” See Githu Mugai, “Ethnicity and the Renewal of Competitive 
Politics in Kenya,” in Ethnic Conflict and Democratization in Africa, 161. 
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not sufficient reasons to justify the suffering of any human person; neither are poverty 
and economic inequality.  The suffering of a human person is always and everywhere the 
same no matter the reasons or socio-political and cultural differences. Today, attentive 
observers of sub-Saharan Africa share the view that socio-political and ethnic violence 
seems to be the characteristic of contemporary sub-Saharan African societies.2 In most 
cases, the struggle for political and economic power and the role played by sub-Saharan 
political leaders in creating and triggering group identity, have been the cause of most of 
these conflicts. The wealth of ethnic differences has been transformed into violent 
conflicts.3 It is the same human other whom Levinas, Gutiérrez, and Sobrino speak about 
who is poor, marginalized, oppressed and killed in the mass murder in Rwanda, the 
Apartheid in South Africa, the civil wars in the two  Congos, Angola, Liberia and Sierra-
Leone, the rebel movement in Chad and Central Africa Republic, Somalia, the crisis in 
Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Cost), and more recently the political instability in Guinea Conakry, 
in Zimbabwe, and of course in the ongoing crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan. The 
suffering of the human other that Levinas, Gutiérrez, and Sobrino talk about is real in 
contemporary sub-Saharan Africa.  
This chapter proposes that Levinas’s philosophy and liberation theology’s turn to 
the other/neighbor provides a fundamental path toward a flourishing sub-Saharan Africa. 
                                                 
2 Einar Braathen, Morten Boas and Gjermund Soether, eds, Ethnicity Kills? The Politics of War, Peace and 
Ethnicity in SubSaharan Africa (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000); Henri Bienen, “Leaders, Violence, 
and the Absence of Change in Africa,” Political Science Quarterly, vol. 108, 2 (1993): 271-282; David L. 
Huff, James M. Lutz, “The Contagion of Political Unrest in Independent Black Africa,” Economic 
Geography 50, 4 (1974): 352-367; Jean Pierre Chrétien, “Les racines de la violence contemporaine en 
Afrique,” Politique Africaine: Violence et Pouvoir  42 (1991): 15-27.   
3Anna-Maria Gentili writes: “Ethnic identity together with power seeking has played a key role in many 
conflicts, old and new, and has ideologically informed the perpetuation of wars to the point of near anarchy 
in many African countries.” See her “Ethnicity and Citizenship in Sub Saharan Africa,” in Is Violence 
Inevitable in Africa? Theories of Conflicts and Approaches to Conflict Prevention, edited by Patrick 
Chabal, Ulf Engel, Anna-Maria Gentili (Leiden, The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2005), 39. 
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What sub-Saharan Africa needs is a rethinking of the human other as the condition for the 
possibility of human subjectivity, a proposition that Levinas, Gutiérrez, and Sobrino 
would agree with. This work argues that Levinas’s philosophy’s and liberation theology’s 
redefinition of subjectivity in terms of the other (love of neighbor) carries something of 
lasting value for addressing the sub-Saharan African socio-political and ethnic conflicts. 
In chapter four we demonstrated how Dussel, Marion, and Purcell showed the relevance 
of the turn to the neighbor for Christian theology and found in the analysis of the self-
other relationship an essential path for a construction of a better world. While Levinas 
situates this turn primarily in a non-ontological realm, offering liberation theology a 
viable philosophical framework of human intersubjectivity, it nevertheless falls short of 
explaining how this asymmetrical turn is played out in history. Liberation theology 
rescues Levinas’s thought and bears witness to it in the real time of history through the 
concept of conversion to the neighbor. It expresses in history a possibility for every 
subject to act with affective responsibility toward the other and functions in the sense of 
Purcell’s being otherwise.4 Dussel and Purcell, as shown in chapter four, criticized the 
non-availability of Levinas’s ethical responsibility to the real time of history. They 
insisted on the fact that it is in history that the subject should recognize the humanity of 
the other human being. Liberation theology complements Levinas’s philosophy and 
illustrates how his ethical responsibility could be implemented in concrete history. 
Levinas’s philosophy and liberation theology and its turn to the neighbor calls on each 
African and/or African political leader to do what no one else can do for them: to bear the 
burden of another person’s existence and supply for his/her wants. The emphasis is on the 
turn to the other or love of neighbor that makes the subject fully human.  
                                                 
4 For our discussion on this, see chapter three, 159-164. 
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A concrete experience of a life lived otherwise than being of Levinas’s ethical 
subjectivity is impossible. However, in chapter three this work argued for the possibility 
to conceive of the human subject as ethically responsible within the time of history in the 
sense of Purcell’s being otherwise that breaks any tendency to totality through the 
dimension of divine transcendence. As a result, this work points to the lives of those men 
and women who rose above their times and their circumstances to live out a life of self-
sacrifice and sincere concern for others, be it for religious and/or political reasons, as 
concrete experiences that illustrate Levinas’s “ideal of holiness” in the sense of Purcell’s 
being otherwise. Among so many examples of saints and heroes, this study focuses on the 
stories of Nelson Mandela in South Africa and Jacques Désiré Laval in the Island of 
Mauritius because of their connection to the African continent.  
I. An Overview of Contemporary Sub-Saharan African Socio-Political and Ethnic 
Conflicts 
 
The focus in this section is on sub-Saharan Africa with its multiple socio-political 
and ethnic problems. Most traditional sub-Saharan African worldviews acknowledge that 
human life is the greatest gift; a gift desired and treasured above all material goods. 
Ultimate joy and fulfillment derive from the propagation, promotion and protection of the 
life of the other. African philosophical anthropology focuses on relationship, that is, on 
the human person as essentially “living in solidarity with.”5 Sadly, the picture of most 
sub-Saharan African countries today is an ugly one. The daily violation of the human 
person by hunger, unemployment, disease, civil war, unjust socio-political and 
economical structures, and environmental degradation scourges the human condition.  
                                                 
5 Elochukwu E. Uzukwu, A Listening Church: Autonomy and Communion in African Churches, 2nd edition 
(Enugu, Nigeria: Snaap Press, 1996), 42-44. 
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While not denying the existence of conflicts in pre-colonial sub-Saharan Africa, 
one cannot overemphasize the influence of slavery and colonialization on the African 
history.6 The disordering of Sub-Saharan Africa by the Western colonial expansion and 
domination reached its apex in the system of apartheid in South Africa.7 Explorers 
reported to colonial administrators the existence of lands without owners, uncultured and 
uncultivated. Immediately, groups of Europeans were sent to conquer this new continent. 
Colonial administrators and missionaries worked hand-in-hand to bring European 
knowledge and Christian faith to these indigenous people. Africans learned European 
history that laid emphasis on the centrality and primacy of the European subject over and 
against the Africans;8 after all, Africa “is no historical part of the World; it has no 
movement, no development to exhibit.”9 In addition to the effects of slavery and 
colonialization, and even after the so-called independence of sub-Saharan African 
countries, Western powers continue to turn sub-Saharan Africa into a favorite field for 
their struggle of influence. Without exonerating African leaders for their responsibility in 
creating a wretched situation for the people of sub-Saharan African nations, most often, 
these leaders are manipulated to the extent that they have no control of their nation’s 
natural resources. The establishment of structures of domination and control limit more 
                                                 
6Abdalla Bujra, “African Conflicts: Their Causes and Their Political Environment,” in Development Policy 
Management Forum, Occasional paper, no. 4, a paper presented at the Ad Hoc Experts Group Meeting on 
the Economics of Civil Conflicts in Africa, held at UNECA, Addis Ababa, 7-8 April 2000, 28-29. 
According to Arrighi G., “in sharp contrast to East Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa inherited from the pre-
colonial and colonial years a political-economic configuration that left little room for the construction of 
viable national economies or robust nation states.” See his “The African Crisis,” New Left Review 15 
(2002): 5-36, 29. 
7 Apartheid is a system of socio-political and racial segregation and discrimination that was put in place in 
South Africa from 1948 to 1994. 
8 Mario I. Aguilar, “Postcolonial African Theology in Kabasele Lumbala,” Theological Studies 63/2 
(2002): 306. 
9 G.W.F Hegel, The Philosophy of History (New York: Dover Publications, 1956), 99. 
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and more the range of choice left to sub-Saharan Africa. As Anna-Maria Gentili 
contends, 
structural adjustment policies and programmes originating in the 1980s, which 
were meant to introduce Africa to a mainstream market economy, have 
contributed to the imbalance and dependency of African polities, along with 
excessive economic extraversion and unequal access to resources in already very 
asymmetrical societies, characterized by weak local entrepreneurship.10  
 
The unjust and unethical programs of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank also should not pass unnoticed.11  
Indeed, most socio-political and economic changes in sub-Saharan Africa today 
are influenced by encounters with the realities of modernity and postmodernity. Sub-
Saharan Africa, in one way or the other embraced both the positive and negative socio-
political, economic, and cultural aspects of the Western world. In the aftermath of the 
Enlightenment, contemporary sub-Saharan Africans came to embrace the project of 
modern philosophical anthropology which established freedom, self-consciousness, and 
self-subsistent autonomy as fundamental features of what it is to be human in the world. 
The globalization of the world and the unbalanced changes in socio-political, economic 
and cultural relations has created a fuzzy kind of situation in sub-Saharan Africa. All 
consistent sub-Saharan African value systems apparently have collapsed as new 
meanings are being born rapidly at the meeting of different cultures. The result is a 
perceptible fragility of behaviors visible in most contemporary sub-Saharan African 
societies for reasons which could be different from one place to another. The fragility of 
behavior takes the form of corruption of every kind. These include contempt of human 
                                                 
10 Gentili, “Ethnicity and Citizenship in Sub Saharan Africa,” 39. 
11 Uzukwu, A Listening Church: Autonomy and Communion in African Churches, 2; Howard Stein, The 
Development of the Developmental State in Africa: A Theoretical Inquiry (University of Copenhagen: 
Center of African Studies, 2000). 
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dignity, violations of human rights, ethnicity, prostitution, embezzlement of public funds, 
wasting of national wealth on prestigious projects, and the poor administration of public 
property. Today, most sub-Saharan African countries live in a situation where the will of 
one’s self-realization has led to a degrading of the value of the human other. While this 
study recognizes the diversity of situations in each country, it is not too difficult to 
characterize contemporary sub-Saharan Africa as a place of conflict.  In most cases, 
groups of self-centered political leaders contribute to this intolerable situation. 
It has become standard for thinkers of Third World countries to hold European 
nations and the United States responsible for their socio-political and economic hardship. 
Obviously, the ascendance of Europe and the United States remains one of the major 
causes of privation for most sub-Saharan African countries. This study, however, wishes 
to pay more attention to the responsibility of sub-Saharan Africans themselves, especially 
the inhumanity of their leaders to their fellow human beings. The leveling of accusations 
against several Western nations often provides a source of cover for local politicians who 
have implemented “Machiavellian” plans to gain profit at the expense of their own 
people.  Even in the exceptional cases where an extreme conflict bursts out between two 
neighboring countries, the spring of armed violence is always bound to internal political 
stakes. It is a question either of preserving or reinforcing an established power, or of 
entering into dissidence with it. As a result, the sources of conflict in contemporary 
Africa are primarily civil and indigenous. The nature of the state system is thus at the 
heart of conflicts.12 Examples of this problem can be found in many sub-Saharan African 
countries such as Congo Brazzaville, Central Africa Republic, Gabon, Nigeria, 
Cameroon, Ghana, Togo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire, 
                                                 
12 Chrétien, “Les racines de la violence contemporaine en Afrique,” 19. 
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Somalia, Sudan, Chad, and Zimbabwe to name but a few.13 Political and economical 
fragility comes from non-recognition of the human other and to a blind imitation of 
foreign models that do not reflect a deeper and real aspiration of the people. The roots of 
the current situation of poverty and violence in sub-Saharan Africa are both Western 
interference in African politics and the struggle for political and economic power among 
Africans elites, who desire to amass wealth.14 To examine this issue, this work provides 
three case studies whereby the struggle for political and economic power and the 
accumulation of wealth for one’s self realization and/or one’s ethnic group seemed to 
have been the source of socio-political and ethnic conflicts. The case studies we focus on 
are Congo Brazzaville, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya. It is to these that we now turn. 
Congo Brazzaville 
 
The Republic of the Congo or Congo Brazzaville is a heavily forested country 
located in central Africa. It shares borders with Gabon on the west, Cameroon and 
Central African Republic on the north, and Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) on 
the east and south.15  The country is a multi-tribal society whose members largely belong 
                                                 
13 Bayart, The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly. 
14 Achille Mbembe, L’Afriques Indociles (Paris : Karthala, 1988); “Pouvoir, violence, et accumulation,” in 
Politique Africaine 39 (1990) : 7-24; Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence : A Contemporary 
Critique of Historical Materialism, vol. 2 (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1981); 
Xavier Harel, Afrique, Pillage à huis clos: comment une poignée d’initiés siphonne le pétrole africain 
(Paris : Libraire Arthème Fayard, 2006); Vincent Hugeux, Les sorciers blancs : enquête sur les faux amis 
français de l’Afrique (Paris : Libraire Arthème Fayard, 2007); François-Xavier Verschave, De la 
françafrique à la mafiafrique (Paris : Tribord, 2005) ; Guillaume olivier, Saïdou Sidibé, François-Xavier 
Verschave, L’aide  publique au développement : un outil à réinventer (Paris : Charles Léopold Mayer, 
2004) ; Bayart, The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly. 
15 Representative works consulted: John Frank Clark, David E. Gardinier, eds., Political Reform in 
Francophone Africa (Colorado, Westview Press, 1997); René Gauze, The Politics of Congo Brazzaville, 
translated, edited, and with a supplement by Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff (Stanford: Hoover 
Institution Press, 1973); Rémy Bazenguissa- Ganga, “The Spread of Political Violence in Congo-
Brazzaville,” in African Affairs 98, 390 (1999): 37-54; “Les Ninja, les Cobras, et les Zoulous crèvent 
l’écran à Brazzaville: le rôle des medias et la construction des identités de violence politique,” Canadian 
Journal of African Studies/Revue Canadienne des Etudes Africaines, vol. 33, 2/3 (1999) : 329-361. Henri 
Ossebi, “De la galère à la guerre: jeunes et « Cobras » dans les quartiers Nord de Brazzaville” in Politique 
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to the Kongo, Téké, Bémbé, Mbochi, Kouyou, Vili, and other groups. Within these 
groups, one finds subdivisions such as tribes and clans. Unfortunately, this ethnic identity 
in the Congo became the “backdrop of all political conflicts.”16 Since the independence in 
1960, the country remained relatively peaceful while Albert Youlou served as its first 
president. The workers’ unions and rival political parties initiated an uprising that 
deposed him in 1963. Youlou’s regime was “best described as mildly corrupt, 
directionless in domestic policy, and deferential to France.”17 Immediately after Youlou’s 
defeat, the army temporarily took charge of the country. It put in a civilian interim 
government headed by Alphonse Massamba-Débat, a Lari similar to his predecessor 
Youlou.18 After some six years in office, Massamba-Débat was also forced to give up 
power to an officer named Marien Ngouabi, who hailed from the Kouyou tribe in the 
northern part of the country. His term in office constituted a shift in Congo’s political 
orientation. Marien Ngouabi declared the country a Marxist-Leninist state under the 
banner of one-party state, the Congolese Labor Party (Parti Congolais du Travail, PCT). 
The PCT controlled the country until June 1991. After the murder of Ngouabi, Joachim 
Yhombi-Opango replaced him. He was a northerner of mixed ethnicity.19 Once again, 
Yhombi-Opango was forced to relinquish power to Colonel Denis Sassou-Nguesso, from 
                                                                                                                                                 
Africaine 72 (1998):17-33; Bujra, “African Conflicts: Their Causes and Their Political Environment,” 26-
27; Kajsa Ekholmand, Anne Sundberg, “Ethnic War and Ethnic Cleansing in Brazzaville,” Unpublished 
manuscript, n.d. These Swedish scholars conducted research in Brazzaville in May 1994, and their report is 
one of the most detailed and authentic account of Brazzaville’s 1993-1994 ethnic violence; CIA – The 
World FactBook – Congo, Republic of [data base on-line] available from 
https://cia.gov/cia//publications/factbook/geos/cf.html, accessed February 23, 2007. 
16 John F. Clark, “Congo: Transition and the Struggle to Consolidate,” in Political Reform in Francophone 
Africa, 63. For a better grasp of ethnicity in Congo Brazzaville, see Marcel Soret, Histoire du Congo, 
capitale Brazzaville (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1978), 19-29. It is important to note here that this issue of 
ethnic identity is not only peculiar to Congo Brazzaville; it is the case for most sub-Saharan African 
countries. 
17 Clark, “Congo: Transition and the Struggle to Consolidate,” 63. 
18 For an understanding of Congo’s ethnic groups and their leaders, see Gauze, The Politics of Congo 
Brazzaville, 1-8. 
19 Clark, “Congo: Transition and the Struggle to Consolidate,” 64-65. 
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the Mbochi tribe. At the center of this turmoil was the struggle for power and the control 
of the state for one’s own self-interest. With the introduction of the multiparty system in 
1991 and the convening of an all-party national conference to discuss the nation’s 
political future, ended the Marxist system and Sassou-Nguesso’s twelve years in power. 
Since 1991, Congo has undergone multiple socio-political and ethnic crises. The spark 
for most of these conflicts has been electoral disputes, which shook the Congo in the 
second half of 1993, 1994 and 1997. This was not surprising for a nation which was 
lacking “democratic culture.”  
The issue of ethnicity was more pronounced in the 1993-94 civil wars than in 
1997. Conflict between political parties led to a disappearance of a central state with 
supreme power to use force and restore order. Instead, the Congolese people witnessed 
the emergence of violence and hatred of the other along historical tribal fault lines, with 
the northern Mbochi ethnic group on one side and the southern pool Lari and Vili groups 
on the other. The emergence of ethnic cleansing led to the division of Congo into three 
ethno-political groups in Brazzaville, each of them claiming supremacy and control of 
territories.20 Every political leader – to seize power – formed his own militia (Ninjas, 
Cobras, Cocoyes, Zoulous, Mamba, and Obevillois). Each militia group enlisted young 
men to achieve their goal of political domination. The young men who joined these 
militia groups mostly were uneducated and unemployed.21 The cessation of hostilities 
between these groups came in 1999.  Today, Congo is surprisingly peaceful, even though 
there is still a rebel group in the southern part of the country.  In March 2003, this group 
                                                 
20 Rémy Bazenguissa- Ganga, “The Political Militia in Brazzaville,” A Journal of Opinion 26, 1(1998): 37-
40.  
21 Ossebi, “De la galère à la guerre: jeunes et « Cobras » dans les quartiers Nord de Brazzaville,” 17-33.  
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signed a peace treaty with the current administration.  However, the peace remains 
fragile.  
The years 1993-1994 and 1997-1999 were periods of socio-political, economic 
and ethnic unrest in Congo Brazzaville. Political and ethnic violence remains one of the 
preoccupations of the Congolese people. The years of civil war showed the people of 
Congo that there remain important ethnic and political differences within the nation. 
Southerners, dominated by the Lari, believe that the Mbochi controlled north would never 
relinquish power. Political theorists claim there are secret documents of the banned 
political parties that show how deep-seated are the desire of the north to remain in power 
and the goal of the south to capture power. Politics and ethnic rivalry fuel each other. 
Ethnicity and politics thus constitute important variables for understanding life in Congo 
Brazzaville today. The greatest problem the Congolese people face today is the struggle 
for power and wealth. The ministerial posts and civil service jobs in post-war Congo have 
become a battleground to loot the treasury and exploit the Congolese population. The 
unemployment rate increases daily. Prices of basics commodities are simply unheard of, 
and yet billions of Franc CFA from oil revenue and other resources are misused and kept 
away in Euro-American banks. At the heart of the socio-political and ethnic crisis in 
Congo Brazzaville was a series of violent clashes in the country since December 1993 
organized by political leaders for their own self-interest. These events have jeopardized 
the country’s socio-economic development and just social order. Today, the Congolese 
people seem to have lost hope in political leaders in building the nation.  
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Côte d’Ivoire 
 
Côte d’Ivoire is located in West Africa and shares a border with Mali and 
Burkina-Faso in the north, the Gulf of Guinea in the south, Liberia and Guinea Conakry 
in the west, and Ghana in the east. It remains one of the most prosperous and stable 
countries in West Africa. After the death of its longtime president Félix Houphouët-
Boigny, Côte d’Ivoire experienced two destabilizing coups in 1999 and in 2001 and a 
harmful civil war in 2002.22 According to François Roubaud, the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire is 
both economic and political, which can be more or less combined or exclusive. On the 
economic front, nearly two decades of mismanagement and structural adjustment led to 
the collapse of the nation’s economy. Today, the country remains in a state of 
impoverishment that has led to the destabilization of the family and the community 
network of solidarity. Côte d’Ivoire’s political turmoil is the result of the violent 
competition for power that emerged when Félix Houphouët-Boigny died in 1993.23 His 
successor Henri Konan Bédié tried to revive the economy, but this created more problems 
politically because his concept of ivoirité24 excluded many opponents from the political 
process, among which, Alasane Dramane Ouattara. The dissatisfaction with Bédié’s 
administration led a group of unruly soldiers to orchestrate a coup d’état, which forced 
                                                 
22 For an in-depth understanding of the socio-political and turmoil in Côte d’Ivoire, the following are 
helpful studies: Robert J. Mundt, “Cote d’Ivoire: Continuity and Change in a Semi-Democracy,” in 
Political Reform in Francophone Africa, 182-203; Jacques Baulin, La Succession d’Houphouët-Boigny 
(Paris: Karthala, 2000); Alice Hellenbogen, La Succession d’Houphouët-Boigny entre tribalisme et 
démocratie (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2002); Marc Le Pape et Claudine Vidal (dir.), Côte d’Ivoire. L’année 
terrible 1999-2000 (Paris: Karthala, 2002); Côte d’Ivoire 2025 (Abidjan: Editions Neter, 1997); Dossier 
Côte d’Ivoire, Afrique Contemporaine 206, 2 (2003):3-203, 223-225.  
23 François Roubaud, “La crise vue d’en bas à Abidjan : ethnicité, gouvernance, et démocratie,” Afrique 
Contemporaine 206, 2 (2003):57-58.  
24 The concept ivoirité or ivoirianness was introduced in the Ivorian political vocabulary under the 
presidency of Henri Konan Bédié. It aims at defining nationality of the Ivory Coast in a context of 
economic crisis, democratization and national unification. Politically, it took a xenophobic overtone and 
was used, as it is often argued, as a way to deny Alasane Outtarra, a former primer minister of the country, 
the right to run for presidential election on the assumption that he is not an Ivorian. 
 236
president Bédié into exile in France. After the coup, Général Robert Guei seized power in 
1999. In 2000, he organized the elections which he manipulated and won. His political 
ineffectiveness caused outrage among the people.  The people of Côte d’Ivoire forced 
him to step down and Laurent Gbagbo eventually became the democratically elected 
president. In 2002, some unruly members of the army, but without success, initiated 
another coup. The same year saw the rise of a rebel group called “Les Forces Nouvelles,” 
which controlled a large segment of the northern side of the country. Forced by the 
international community to negotiate with the rebel group, Laurent Gbagbo and other 
political opposition leaders met at Linas-Marcoussis, France to sign a peace accord. The 
accord granted the rebel movement a couple of ministerial positions in a unity 
government.  
For many observers, it is Article 35 of the Ivorian Constitution, which set the 
eligibility requirements for the office of president that constituted the catalyst of all the 
political confrontations, ethnic and religious.25 Since the early 1990s, the political factor 
was crystallized around the conditions of eligibility, the code of nationality, and the 
residence permits or the land code. The four presidential candidates (Laurent Gbagbo, 
Robert Gueï, Henri Konan Bédié and Alasane Dramane Ouattara) and their respective 
clans instrumentalized these issues in their merciless fight for the control of power.26 
Hence, politicians of both sides of the socio-political and ethnic divide fuelled, exploited, 
and maintained the civil war for their own ends. Today, tensions remain between the 
government and the opposition leaders. There remain a number of unknown factors and 
obstacles that need to be addressed. More importantly, questions that ignited the civil war 
                                                 
25 Marc Le Pape, “Les politiques d’affrontements en Côte d’Ivoire 1999-2003,”  Afrique Contemporaine 
206, 2 (2003) :41-55. 
26 Roubaud, “La crise vue d’en bas à Abidjan : ethnicité, gouvernance, et démocratie,” 58.  
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such as identification of illegal immigrants, land reform, the disarmament and control of 
equitable elections remain. French and West African soldiers are still in Côte d'Ivoire to 
preserve peace and security.27 The socio-political and ethnic crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, since 
December 1999, has been the consequence of coup attempts, military and civil by 
political leaders. These crises have affected the country’s long period of political 
stability. President Laurent Gbagbo and Forces Nouvelles’ leader, Guillaume Soro 
recently signed a new peace-accord in Burkina-Faso. It is our hope that this will put an 
end to the crisis. 
Kenya 
 
The Republic of Kenya shares borders with Tanzania in the south, Somalia in the 
east, Uganda in the west, and Ethiopia in the north. This country has been one of the most 
economically prosperous and politically stable countries in East Africa. A couple of 
months after its independence, the country was en route to democratic culture and held 
parliamentary and local elections between 1963 and 1974, in spite of the declaration of a 
one-party state, the Kenya African National Union (KANU). Two major ethnic groups, 
the Luo and the Kikuyu, constituted this one-party state and Jomo Kenyatta served as its 
first leader.28 Meanwhile, other smaller ethnic groups came together to constitute another 
party, Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), which existed under the leadership of 
Daniel Arap Moi, in reaction to the bigger party. The KADU feared the ascendancy of 
KANU in the newly independent country. This dynamism continued even after KADU 
                                                 
27 CIA – The World Fact Book – Cote d’Ivoire, Republic of [data base on-line] available from 
https://cia.gov/cia//publications/factbook/geos/cf.html, accessed February 26, 2007. 
28 David Troup, “Elections and Political Legitimacy in Kenya,” Africa: Journal of the International African 
Institute 63, 3 (1993): 371. 
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merged with KANU.29 Jomo Kenyatta, the first president after the independence 
appointed Moi as his vice-president. Unfortunately, this did not change reality on the 
ground. With the blessing of Jomo Kenyatta, the Luo-Kikuyu alliance still controlled 
power in the government and the whole political arena. Thus, before his death, as Abdalla 
Bujra explains, Kenyatta “had already secured for his people the state government, a vast 
homeland in the Rift Valley and along the Kenya Coast, put commerce in their hands, 
inappropriate alliance with Asian and European bourgeoisies, and the brutalizing 
apparatuses such as the general service unit.”30  Ethnic violence throughout the 1990s 
eventually took place in the Rift Valley and the Coastal Region. 
The political situation in Kenya began to deteriorate rapidly with the death of its 
first president Jomo Kenyatta in 1978. By the time Arap Moi succeeded Kenyatta, he 
immediately tried to remedy the discrimination suffered by his tribe: the Kalenjin ethnic 
group and its allies. In 1983 and 1988, he organized elections to get rid of the barons of 
the Luo-Kikuyu alliance with members of his ethnic group and their allies; he did the 
same in the private sector, taking away business from the Luo-Kikuyu. He later made 
sure to build modern schools and universities in the Rift Valley and in the Coastal region 
to attend to the educational needs of his ethnic group. Politically, the Kenyan people 
forced him to adopt a multi-party system, which produced an important new factor of 
political insecurity for him and his party’s power. According to Human Rights Watch, 
“since the end of one-party rule in Kenya, election years have been consistently 
characterized by political violence. Politicians who have been implicated in past incidents 
                                                 
29 Stephen Orvis, “Morality and Political Tribalism in Kenya’s ‘Virtual Democracy’,” Africa Issues 29, 1/2 
(2001): 8. 
30 Bujra, “African Conflicts: Their Causes and Their Political Environment,” 23. 
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of political violence have not been held to account.”31 The improved economy during the 
presidency of Arap Moi sharpened social exclusion, marginalization and discontent 
among the poor in cities and villages. Intermittent clashes between ethnic groups took 
place over land throughout the decade of the 1990s. Thus, as Abdalla Bujra rightly 
argues, “it can be safely argued that by 1990, two decades of policies to advance ethnic 
and individual economic interest, has created a volatile ethnic situation in Kenya.”32 
Today, Bujra continues, 
the issue of the distribution between the ethnic groups of the wealth to be 
generated from the private sector has not yet been resolved. Clearly, the history of 
independent Kenya has been a struggle between [political leaders who use] the 
ethnic groups to capture state power in order to siphon off wealth [for their own 
interest] or to their region or ethnic group.33 
 
In Congo Brazzaville, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya, the struggle for power, the desire for 
self-aggrandizement along with the accumulation of wealth for oneself and/or for one’s 
family, tribe, ethnic group, or to use Jean-Francois Bayart’s expression “the politics of 
the belly,”34 has been and continue to be the primary causes of conflict in these nations. 
The picture of this observable hopelessness, shared both by Westerners and Africans, is 
troubling. Yet, not all hope is lost. Sub-Saharan Africa can still enjoy peace and 
meaningful life in spite of the continuing socio-political and ethnic conflicts. This would 
occur when a human person is placed at the center of all policies. The question becomes: 
how can Sub-Saharan Africans, in the context of poverty, injustice, oppression, struggle 
for power, dictatorship, and frequent ethnic and civil wars, seek answers to the question 
                                                 
31 Human Rights Watch, May 31, 2002. 
32 Bujra, “African Conflicts: Their Causes and Their Political Environment,” 24. 
33 Bujra, “African Conflicts: Their Causes and Their Political Environment,” 25. For studies that reinforce 
this view, see Githu Mugai, “Ethnicity and the Renewal of Competitive Politics in Kenya,” 161-195; 
Bayart, The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly, 54. 
34 Bayart, The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly. 
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of what it is to be human? How can they find within the intersubjective relation 
obligation and responsibility for the other human person? Again, this chapter suggests 
that the turn to the other/neighbor in Levinas’s philosophy and liberation theology offers 
better prospects for a more peaceful and flourishing contemporary sub-Saharan Africa. 
II. The Turn to the Other/Neighbor: A Road Map for Better Contemporary Sub-
Saharan African Societies. 
 
The promise of a flourishing and prosperous sub-Saharan Africa cannot come 
with the application of Western socio-political and economic models of economic and 
political development.  Rather, sub-Saharan Africa must take a path that values and 
places the human person at the center of its socio-political and economic models. The 
study of the conceptual affinities between Levinas’s ethics of responsibility and liberation 
theology shows that these two approaches address this issue. Both are characterized by 
their rejection of a certain conception of human subjectivity as that which gives an 
inadequate meaning to the human other.  
Levinas’s philosophy, as it has been argued throughout this work, seeks to 
develop a phenomenological alternative to the ontology of Husserl and Heidegger, which 
reduces the subject’s relation to the other person to knowledge. His argument is that 
ethics, that is, intersubjectivity and responsibility for the other human person, should 
replace traditional metaphysics as first philosophy. Indeed, the type of metaphysics 
Levinas associates with relates to the world and  
centralizes our experience and opens us to the infinite otherness of 
transcendence…it endorses the primacy of an ethical philosophy which shows 
how man’s relationship to man can transcend the natural rapport of possession, 
power, and belongingness, in search of a Good beyond Being.35  
                                                 
35 Richard Kearney, “Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas,” in Dialogues with Contemporary Thinkers: The 
Phenomenological Heritage (Manchester, NH: Manchester University Press, 1984), 48. 
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Levinas, therefore, is closer to Plato’s concept of the Good and Descartes’ Idea of the 
Infinite. For Levinas, this implies an appreciation of a human subject as fundamentally 
ordered toward the other human person who bears the trace of the Good and the Infinite. 
The subject’s encounter with the other is expressed in terms of responsibility to the point 
of substitution, sensibility, hostage, proximity, and vulnerability. The ethical relation of 
infinite responsibility enacts the human person into subjectivity itself. Humanity at its 
best is enacted rather than a state of being; to be human is to act ethically.  
The struggle for political power among African elites continues to play a major 
role in socio-political and ethnic conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa and in its inability to 
become politically and economically stable. It substantiates a fragility of behaviors 
among most Africans and African leaders in particular.36 In Levinasian terms, this 
fragility of behaviors would be an expression of the attitude of the “same.” The same, for 
Levinas, suggests a totalizing system in which the subject, not only identifies 
himself/herself in opposition to the other, but also displays his/her concrete egoistic 
attitude in relation to any exteriority. In this sense, in the subject’s séjour (sojourn) in the 
world, he/she “feels” free and in control of everything because he/she is at home (Chez 
soi dans sa Maison), in his/her dwelling. This is the way or structure of identification of 
the same which is “the concreteness of egoism.”37  
In recent years, most sub-Saharan African countries have suffered a greater 
degree of violence due to some individuals’ desire for self-realization and misuse of 
institutional power. The cause of most national conflicts stems from harmful actions of 
                                                 
36 The following are the expressions of the fragility of behaviors: corruption, contempt of human dignity, 
tribalism and/or ethnicity, embezzlement of pubic funds, wasting of national wealth on prestigious projects 
and the poor administration of public property. 
37 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 37-38. 
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political leaders and people entangled in compound social realities. The desire of some 
political elites to gain power, control the ministrations of the state, and accumulate large 
sums of personal wealth by killing have led many Africans to embrace an ontological 
dexterity of self-enjoyment that consists in the satisfaction of one’s own needs. Everyone 
longs to possess, to have a measure of control for himself/herself, for his/her tribe and/or 
ethnic group, etc., because of the unforeseeable nature of the future. By so doing, he/she 
suspends the independence, the otherness and difference of other human beings. He/she 
tries to comprehend, grasp other human beings by the hand and to make sure that they are 
under his/her control.38 Ultimately, here we reduced otherness to ourselves, to our desire 
to satisfy our needs, because, “needs are in my power; they constitute me as the same and 
not as dependent on the other.”39 The relation with the other, for Levinas, is not 
characterized by needs. This other, who disrupts my comfort in being at home, “over him 
I have no power; [h]e escapes my grasp by an essential dimension even if I have him at 
my disposal. He is not wholly in my site. But I, who have no concept in common with 
[him], am, like him, without genus. We are the same and the other.”40 The subject’s 
relation with the other is desire. In Levinas’s work, desire is always far reaching and can 
never be satisfied due to its own structure. It is like goodness, which in its remoteness and 
separation from the subject does not fulfill him/her, but further deepens it because it is 
“the alterity of the other and of the Most-High.”41 It expresses “the very dimension of 
height [that] is opened up by the metaphysical of desire.”42  
                                                 
38 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 158-159. 
39 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 116. 
40 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 39. 
41 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 34. 
42 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 34-35. 
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Pre-originally, before all freedom, a true human person or subject is commanded 
to say hineni (Here I am, me voici), that is, to respond with infinite responsibility for the 
other. This prophetical attitude becomes for Levinas an expression of a human person 
rightly understood as it is “a moment of the human condition itself [and] the fundamental 
fact of man’s humanity.”43 It is a difficult freedom of the individual subject which 
constitutes his/her humanity; it has the merit, in history as eschatological infinity, of 
breaking any tendency to self-centeredness and calling for infinite commitment to the 
other’s well-being in terms of affective responsibility or love of neighbor. Thus, every 
human person is responsible for one another, but I more than any other. It is possible to 
argue that Levinas might say regarding the situation in sub-Saharan Africa that what 
matters is one’s “unlimited responsibility”44 for one’s compatriot regardless of one’s 
ethnic group and/or social status for the construction of a lasting peace between people 
and nations. The course ahead for sub-Saharan Africa lies in thinking a human other 
otherwise. It is vital that the human other receives acceptance into the community.  No 
person should be allowed to go hungry or be marginalized to satisfy one’s selfish socio-
political and economic interests. Levinas’s argument suggests that sub-Saharan Africa 
could overcome its contemporary history of socio-political and ethnic violence if each 
African recognizes in his/her neighbor a transcendental dimension expressed through the 
face of the other that cries out: “Do not kill me!” His work offers a significant 
philosophical framework for an establishment of a better sub-Saharan Africa. It keeps the 
subject everlastingly awake to the humanity of the other in an experience of interruption 
that goes beyond human consciousness and freedom. The redefinition of human 
                                                 
43 Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 113-114. 
44 Levinas, Of God Who Comes to Mind, 81.  
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subjectivity in Levinas’s work, as it was argued earlier, provides a philosophical 
framework that relegates the subject’s intentional consciousness to the second place. It 
aims at keeping the human subject awake to the humanity of others. He/she is constantly 
in the state of vigilant insomnia, watching over the needs of the human other that can 
never be satisfied. In this way, the subject’s humanity is no longer constituted by his/her 
knowing and willing or self-centeredness, but, it is enacted by his/her affective 
responsibility or love of neighbor. Levinas’s philosophical rethinking of human 
subjectivity offers a possibility for lessening the hatred of the human other that remains 
one of the factors for the socio-political and ethnic crisis in nations such as Congo 
Brazzaville, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, and other sub-Saharan African countries. It offers a 
better prospect for dealing with the issues of corruption, excessive power, wealth 
accumulation, ethnicity, and civil strife in the continent. 
The closest Levinas’s philosophy gets to addressing concrete socio-political 
issues is through the introduction of the third party. His view on politics could be said to 
be analogous to the entrance of the third party on the scene; as such, it lays the foundation 
for a good political practice. He writes: 
The extraordinary commitment of the other to the third party calls for control, a 
search for justice, society and the State, comparison and possession, thought and 
science, commerce and philosophy, and outside of anarchy, the search for a 
principle. Philosophy is this measure brought to the infinity of the being-for-the-
other of proximity, and is like the wisdom of love.45 
 
The third party (le tiers) requires a re-organization within the ethical relation, which he 
uses as a basis for political reflection. The duo self-other private relation is interrupted so 
as to open up to a relation with other human neighbors. With the arrival of the third party 
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comes the necessity for justice and human fraternity in the political sphere. It brings 
Levinas’s thought to concrete human societies where justice should be done for the other. 
This, however, does not restore reciprocity between the duo self-other as “it arises from 
the fact of the third who, next to the one who is an other to me, is ‘another other’ to 
me.”46 Levinas calls this moment, “the hour of inevitable justice – required, however, by 
charity itself.”47 Levinas is aware of the imperfection of political institution or system; 
“left to itself,” he argues, it “bears a tyranny within itself; it deforms the I and the other 
who have given rise to it, for it judges them according to universal rules, thus, as in 
absentia.”48 Levinas suggests that the multiplicity of human beings, living together in a 
society whereby one’s presence necessarily limits the other’s, while a significant factor in 
human relationships, is by no means the sole determinant for most wars and violence in 
human society.49 Indeed, the tyranny of political systems also plays a substantive role. 
Wars and violence do not have a final word in human history. But the only way this 
statement would be true is through human subjects whose moral consciousness embraces 
the “certitude of peace” over and against “the evidence of war.”50 Hence, “morality will 
oppose politics in history and will have gone beyond the functions of prudence or the 
canons of the beautiful to proclaim itself unconditional and universal when the 
eschatology of messianic peace [prophetic eschatology of peace] will have come to 
superpose itself upon the ontology of war.”51 To the logic and “objectivism” of wars and 
violence, Levinas opposes “a subjectivity born from the eschatological vision of peace,” 
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which everlastingly opens up to the human other.52 The goal of any political institution 
should always be a building up of a society rooted in values such as freedom, equality, 
tolerance, solidarity, and above all love of neighbor.53 For Levinas, “politics must be able 
in fact always to be checked and criticized starting from the ethical.”54 He insists that true 
justice for the other would be possible only if it is guided by affective responsibility or 
love of neighbor which takes place in a kind of mauvaise conscience.55 Thus, Levinas’s 
philosophy challenges real time situations in light of what his philosophical model of true 
subjectivity calls the ethically responsible subject to be. Again, it lays the foundation for 
a good political practice. 
The implication of Levinas’s rethinking of the human other calls for a rethinking 
of political practice in sub-Saharan Africa. Levinas’s critique of totality has been a 
consequence of his “political experience,” which he was not ready to forget.56 Levinas 
referred to his experience of the World War II, where he endured as a prisoner of war. 
During the years of Nazi tyranny, humanity was completely discredited because of bad 
political choices. Without affirming that Levinas was indifferent to political reflection, it 
is important to note that he did not put forward a clear political system.57 To be sure, in 
                                                 
52 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 25. 
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conscience of justice! It knows it is not as just as the kindness that instigates it is good. But when it forgets 
that, it risks sinking into a totalitarian and Stalinist regime, and losing, in ideological deductions, the gifts 
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Levinas’s ethical responsibility, the subject’s responsibility is directed to others – as 
particular individuals – and not to others socially and politically localized. This remains 
one of the major criticisms of his thought. The crucial issue that his philosophy addresses 
has been the issue of true subjectivity – to be for others – which is at the foundation of all 
concrete social and political engagement.  
Levinas’s concern for the human other, as it has been shown throughout this 
work, shares some affinities with liberation theology’s commitment to the love of 
neighbor. While Levinas’s ethics of responsibility defines subjectivity in terms of the 
encounter with the face of the other that takes in an asymmetrical relation both beyond 
and within human experience, and represents a viable philosophical anthropology for 
liberation theology, it is, however, never readily available to the real time of history. This 
non-intentional consciousness has been questioned. How can his philosophy address the 
socio-political and ethnic crisis, in real time, in sub-Saharan Africa? Here, liberation 
theology complements what is lacking in Levinas’s ethics of responsibility. It analyzes 
the significance of the turn to the neighbor from where Levinas’s thought left it, that is, in 
its inability to explicitly translate into the real time of history the transcendental 
philosophical category of otherwise than being. Liberation theology emphasizes the turn 
to the neighbor in the concrete situation of injustice in the world. Its concept of 
conversion to the neighbor, which opens up a possibility for the subject to act with 
affective responsibility in history in terms of Purcell’s being otherwise, is the closest one 
can get to Levinas’s otherwise than being. Levinas makes reference to liberation theology 
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as a concrete example of the application of his thought in history.58 His endorsement of 
liberation theology might suggest Levinas’s openness to a transformation of his otherwise 
than being into a historicized being otherwise. Liberation theology, in its conceptually 
thematized categories of being, analyzes the issue of otherness within the Christian 
theological tradition and addresses a reality of poverty, oppression, and marginalization 
in the concrete history of Central and Latin America. Gutiérrez and Sobrino take their 
distance from theory and metaphysics and confront social systems of distortion and 
replace the theoretical cognition of God with personal commitment to the other that leads 
to social-political responsibility. Ontologically, it posits the subject as “ethically enacted” 
through a “relativization of intentionality.”59  
Dussel, Marion, and Purcell are indebted to Levinas’s phenomenology for the 
possibility of a relationship between philosophy and theology. Each of these thinkers, 
however, engages in a critical use of Levinas’s insights and sees the significance of his 
thought for theological anthropology. Marion mirrors Levinas in rejecting onto-theology. 
He proposes a theology of agape/caritas, which echoes Levinas’s ethical responsibility as 
an event that enacts the human subject in his/her subjectivity. Dussel and Purcell, 
however, while insisting on the relevance of Levinas’s turn to the other/neighbor that 
reveals God, regret the fact that his otherwise than being is not readily available to the 
real time of history. Dussel, who develops his philosophical theology of liberation in 
terms of Levinas’s concept of the other, has been critical of Levinas’s reduction of 
history to consciousness. He deplores the fact that Levinas’s philosophy does not offer an 
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expressive political philosophy that addresses concrete socio-political and economic lived 
experiences. Hence, he fears that it might be inadequate for the task of changing 
situations of oppressions and injustice in the Third World. Purcell’s dissatisfaction with 
Levinas’s ontology of being cannot be overemphasized. He laments Levinas’s inability to 
see ethical responsibility, which would correspond to Plato’s idea of the Good within 
human beings’ ontological existence. For him, Levinas’s otherwise than being while 
asserting “an absolute uncompromisable value of the other offers no way of linking 
responsibility with practical commitment to the other.”60 Human beings, notwithstanding 
their weaknesses, also are capable of actualizing the good in them. Dussel’s and Purcell’s 
observations support this dissertation’s argument that liberation theology historicizes 
Levinas’s ethics of responsibility. Liberation theology offers Levinas’s philosophy a 
possibility to conceive of the human subject as ethically responsible within the 
ontological system of thought. For liberation theology, the spirituality of conversion to 
the neighbor is a never-ending turning toward the other human in affective responsibility. 
This experience calls for a permanent turning to the other human person with sensibility 
and affection in the real time of history. 
Levinas’s utopia of conscience corresponds to the being-human of a Christian as 
an expression of the utopia of the kingdom of God.61 For liberation theology, the utopia of 
the kingdom of God consists in the already and not yet of salvation. It addresses real 
problems and the hopes of real men and women who, in spite of the existence of evil in 
history, continue to hope for a better life here on earth. The historical evil takes the form 
of poverty, injustice, oppression, marginalization, and corruption. Jesus himself in the 
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scriptures fought against all kinds of evil; he proclaimed the kingdom of God in words 
and service to the neighbor. He directed his ministry to the utopia of the kingdom, that is, 
“the triumph of justice over injustice.”62 The historical dimension of the kingdom of God 
would be connected to “the triumph of the justice of God, and the practice of that 
justice.”63 The utopia of the kingdom of God calls for the recognition of the dimension of 
the divine that opens forth in the human other’s face and takes the form of the “practice 
of love.”64 Liberation theology, however, is aware that the eschatological nature of the 
praxis of salvation, while anticipated in history, takes place definitively at the end of 
history. Hope is a requirement to journey forward. The here and now of history has also 
to be understood as having a basic orientation toward the future.65 For liberation 
theology, the human person realizes him/herself only through love of neighbor in 
imitation of Christ. Liberation theology supplements the deficiencies in Levinas’s 
philosophy, which lacks the ability to address concrete situations of injustice and 
inhumanity in history.  
Latin American liberation theology served as a model for the emergence of 
African theology of liberation in the 1980s. African theology of liberation emerges from 
a desire to condemn structures of poverty, oppression, injustice, and marginalization in 
sub-Saharan Africa. These structures, as Jean Marc Ela argues, are not natural or beyond 
human beings’ control; they are not a consequence of any human limitations; but rather, 
“they are produced by people, by groups in power, and by models of society and 
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culture.”66 African theology of liberation calls for a re-reading of the Gospel message of 
love through a re-appropriation of African anthropological values. Again, African 
philosophical anthropology focuses on relationship and solidarity in the concreteness of 
lived experience in time and space. This conception of the human person in sub-Saharan 
Africa provides a crucial link between Christian anthropology and Christological 
formulation. The gospel of Jesus that the church in Africa preaches is the good news of 
the kingdom of God. It is a proclamation of a new social order in which the horizontal 
dimensions of the message are expressed: feeding the hungry, visiting the sick, setting 
prisoners free etc. Indeed, Jesus’ message takes into consideration both people’s bodily 
and spiritual needs. This stance echoes the turn to the other/neighbor in Levinas’s ethical 
responsibility and liberation theology. 
What sub-Saharan Africa can learn from Levinas’s philosophy’s and liberation 
theology’s turn to the other/neighbor is the recognition of the dimension of otherness and 
difference in the human other. The other human person should be seen and appreciated in 
his/her uniqueness as a human other that bears the trace of God’s transcendence, but not, 
according to people’s ethnic groups. In Congo Brazzaville, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya, the 
human other is more than just a “Mbochi,” “Lari,” “Batéké,” “Vili,” “Bémbé;” “Baule,” 
“Akan,” “Anyi,” “Akye,” “Dan,” “Senufo,” “Aowin;” “Kikuyu,” “Luo,” and “Luhyia.” 
Wherever the human other is seen just according to his/her socio-political and ethnic 
identity, this penchant has often led into economic and/or physical violence that is still 
very much present in today’s twenty-first century sub-Saharan Africa. The regionalism 
that is connected with the politics of ethnicity has in many cases given birth to corruption, 
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contempt of human dignity, wasting of national resources, embezzlement of public funds, 
and the killing of the human other. This characterizes a concrete egoistic attitude of 
Levinas’s “same,” preoccupied by his/her self-enjoyment. Sub-Saharan Africans should 
appreciate ethnic difference without hostility or violence by seeing in a human other what 
is absolutely transcendent. The transcendental dimension Levinas, Gutiérrez, and Sobrino 
speak about is that of the face of the other as he/she reveals him/herself to the subject in 
his/her absolute otherness and difference; it opens a dimension of height that goes beyond 
being and knowledge. The face of the other is what disturbs the subject’s good 
conscience and provokes his/her ethical movement; the subject is not an I unto 
himself/herself, but an I standing before the other who commands him/her and gives 
meaning to his/her existence.  
As we have argued throughout this chapter, rethinking human subjectivity is the 
necessary direction toward a construction of more flourishing sub-Saharan African 
societies. It calls for an appreciation of an authentic human other. The turn to the 
other/neighbor in Levinas’s ethics of responsibility and liberation theology puts forward a 
hopeful way for rethinking the place of the human neighbor in contemporary sub-Saharan 
Africa. Levinas’s philosophy and liberation theology need each other to present a 
balanced perspective to an intersubjective approach that would prove meaningful to 
address socio-political and ethnic conflicts in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa. For 
Levinas, Gutiérrez, and Sobrino, as it has been argued, subjectivity rightly understood is 
substitution, responsibility, and expiation for others. It is a road map to help sub-Saharan 
Africa find its way back to an African philosophical anthropology that focuses on human 
relationships and solidarity with one another. This way of thinking offers an opportunity 
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to alter its policies and rewrite its future by placing the human person at the center of all 
socio-political and economic concerns. This dissertation formulates a hope that one day 
things will be different in sub-Saharan Africa. Our hope is not in vain because history is 
replete with examples of people, who have turned toward their neighbors in love and 
responsibility during moments of crisis. It is a mark of admiration that the community of 
faith calls these people saints; for others, they are heroes and/or models of what it means 
to be human. In a world where various socio-political, economic, religious, and cultural 
powers seek to exercise total control over human life, these “great souls”67 teach us that it 
is possible to live our lives otherwise than in the sense of Purcell’s being otherwise, that 
is, to center it on a truth (“the divine ground”) which is beyond all human powers and 
which calls humans to love and solidarity.68 At this point, this study would give two 
examples of the turn to the other/neighbor in Levinas’s ethics of responsibility and 
liberation theology that take place in the real time of history. 
III. Two Examples of the Turn to the Neighbor in the Real Time of History 
 
This dissertation concedes that a direct applicability of Levinas’s otherwise than 
being is not possible unless a human being first exists. In chapter three, we argued that 
for Levinas’s ethical responsibility to be more meaningful, it must be translated into a 
real time of history in terms of Purcell’s being otherwise. Levinas articulated his ideas in 
writing, as it was shown, because of his experience of unjust suffering and death of the 
human other during the World War II. He never turned his eyes away from violence, 
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oppression, and marginalization that he saw throughout his life. He saw in liberation 
theology an embodiment of his ethical responsibility, aware that it is in history that 
justice should be done. Our view is that it is possible to find in contemporary history 
people who model Levinas’s ethical responsibility or utopia of conscience.69 Recent 
history has many examples of “great souls” who arose above their times and their 
circumstances and tried to live out Levinas’s “ideal of holiness” and liberation theology’s 
conversion to the neighbor through a life of courage, self-sacrifice, and sincere concern 
for others, be it for religious and/or political motivations. Their lives historicize Levinas’s 
otherwise than being in terms of being otherwise through affective responsibility. Among 
so many, two of the most poignant contemporary examples are Jacques Désiré Laval, 
C.S.Sp (religious motivation) and Nelson Mandela (political motivation).  
Nelson Mandela 
 
Nelson Mandela was born on July 18, 1918 at Qunu, Umtata.70 His life of struggle 
against apartheid in South Africa presents an example of affective responsibility in the 
real time of history. Here, this affective responsibility takes the form of political protest 
for the establishment of justice, freedom, and peace in South Africa. The necessity for 
justice and human fraternity in the political sphere, for Levinas, is an imperative, 
considering the reality of the arrival of the third party on the scene. Mandela’s 
involvement in politics (political awakening) began in 1942 when he joined the African 
National Congress (ANC) while studying in Johannesburg. After some years, he became 
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the leader of the movement and together with others, elaborated a peaceful plan for 
political actions in defense of his people from many years of dictatorship, domination and 
exploitation by the white minority. South African blacks during the apartheid era were 
denied any political and civil rights. Mandela called for boycotts and strikes. He 
understood his leadership role as an opportunity to serve his people and make his own 
contribution to the struggle for freedom. In 1962, the ruling South African government 
arrested him. They charged Mandela with instigating a strike and protest against the 
ruling National party’s government. At the infamous Rivonia trial in 1964, the South 
African government sentenced him to life imprisonment with some of his colleagues. 
While in prison, he continued his struggle by rejecting any concession for his liberation. 
The South African government released Mandela on February 11, 1990.  In 1991, the 
people of South Africa elected him president.  After four years in power, he stepped 
down and retired from politics.  
Mandela’s personal struggle to gain independence led him to become a leader to 
free all people of color to live as dignified human beings. Gradually, this freedom for 
himself and the people who looked like him was transformed into a hunger for the 
freedom for all people, white and black.71 His closing remarks at the Rivonia trial 
eloquently express what it means to be human, that is, to be for the other. He said, 
During my lifetime I have dedicated myself to the struggle of the African people. 
I have fought against white domination, and I have fought against black 
domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which 
all persons live together in harmony with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which 
I hope to live for and to achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am 
prepared to die.72 
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When he was released from prison at age seventy-two, he pledged to continue to serve all 
South Africans, white and black, and liberate them all “from the continuing bondage of 
poverty, deprivation, suffering, gender, and other discrimination.”73 Mandela sought to 
transform South Africa into a new nation; “never, never, and never again [he argues] 
shall it be that this beautiful land will again experience the oppression of one by 
another…The sun shall never set on so glorious a human achievement.”74 Mandela 
recognized that with freedom comes responsibility for himself and for all. He insists that 
his long walk is just a first step toward a full humanity for all. The road is still long, it is 
not yet ended. He invites people perpetually to keep their eyes wide open toward the 
needs of all.75 Since his retirement from politics, Mandela remains critical of some 
African leaders. He criticizes those who despised their people by changing their 
constitution to remain in power and those who initiate public programs that do not aim to 
meet everyone’s basic needs. 
Mandela, therefore, is a symbol of Levinas’s utopia of conscience. His struggle 
for freedom and liberation is a call to see in every human person a dimension of 
transcendence that cries out for ethical responsibility. Mandela’s political struggle was a 
fight for the recognition of the human other and political values. What matters is the other 
human person, not his/her color and/or his/her status as a person. The story of this 
ordinary man reminds people that it is possible to be a being in the world otherwise than; 
and only through this way of being can we build up a society rooted in values such as 
freedom, equality, tolerance, solidarity, and above all, love of neighbor. 
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Jacques Désiré Laval 
 
Throughout the Catholic Church’s long history of evangelization, its concern for 
the poor, the oppressed, the marginalized, the abandoned continues to serve as a source of 
inspiration for men and women to found religious congregations to work to meet the 
needs of these people. It has led them to take action through service to others. This is true 
for the founder and reformer of the Holy Spirit Congregation, Poullart des Places (18th 
century) and Libermann (19th century), respectively, who committed their lives to 
educating the poor students and marginalized people mainly in poor black communities.76 
Many Spiritans, including Jacques Désiré Laval, followed their example and became 
servants to the poor and downtrodden.  
Jacques Désiré Laval’s story provides an example of an affective responsibility 
based on religious motivation. Laval, born in Croth, Normandy, on September 18, 1803, 
learned at an early age from his parents to have a concern for others, especially for the 
less fortunate. At the age of seventeen, Laval joined the seminary-college of Evreux. He 
did not stay long because of poor academic performance. When he returned home, his 
father made him work at a strenuous job that required manual labor, which motivated the 
young Laval to go back to school. After high school, Laval went to Paris to study at Saint 
Stanislaus, where he graduated with a bachelor’s degree in 1825. He later earned a 
doctoral degree in medicine at Sorbonne in Paris.77 As a medical doctor, people admired 
him in his village “because he was not in the least concerned about payment for his 
services. Instead, he preferred to live on the income of the legacy his deceased parents 
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had left him.”78 Spiritually, the young doctor was no longer strictly adhered to the 
practices of the Catholic Church; yet, his conscience gave him no peace. After a 
prolonged spiritual crisis, he re-converted to the practice of the Catholic faith. Eventually, 
Laval expressed a desire to enter religious life as a priest. In 1835, he joined the seminary 
of St. Sulpice in Paris. Laval received ordination to the priesthood in 1838. After 
ordination, he returned to work in his native Normandy. After two years of pastoral work 
in his diocese, Laval joined the project of his old friends, Le Vavasseur and Tisserant, to 
start a religious order with the main purpose of working for the emancipation of the 
ignored slaves in the colonies. The French medical doctor by profession joined the Holy 
Spirit Congregation and went on his first mission to the Island of Mauritius.79 
Motivated by the example of Jesus Christ and by the suffering of so many, Laval 
spent twenty-three years of his life as a missionary in multi-racial, multi-lingual, and 
multi-religious Island of Mauritius. He identified himself with the recently freed African 
slaves by sharing lodging, food, and other conditions with these people. In the wake of 
the abolition of slavery in 1835, there was a need to guarantee freedom and equality 
among citizens. Jacques Désiré Laval dedicated his life to serve the emancipated slaves 
by defending their dignity and rights against those who wanted to maintain the status quo. 
Laval sought in his personal ministry to love and care for the black people of Mauritius, 
whom nobody wanted to give this kind of treatment. Laval’s affective response to the 
poor emancipated slaves of Mauritius expressed his faith in the life, death, and 
resurrection of Christ. He translated his faith into concrete commitment. He spoke their 
language (Creole) and committed himself completely to their service. The people of 
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Mauritius recognized Laval as a “national saint” and they called him, “Apostle of the 
Blacks.” For people of Mauritius, he is a symbol of Christ’s love and compassion for 
others. Pope Jean-Paul II beatified him on Sunday April 29, 1979 in the Basilica of Saint-
Peter’s in Rome. In Mauritius, Christians and non-Christians, including Hindus, 
Buddhists, Confucianists, and Muslims, see in his commitment to the poor and 
marginalized blacks an example of a life lived for the sake of others.80 In Levinas’s 
terms, Jacques Désiré Laval understood the nature of what it meant to be a human being 
otherwise than being through affective responsibility. 
In Jacques Laval’s and Nelson Mandela’s life, this study finds “great souls” who 
express what Levinas and liberation theology say of human subjectivity and Jesus Christ 
respectively. Here human responsibility or the turn to the other human person is 
motivated essentially by the transcendental dimension of the human other.  
Conclusion 
 
It is our contention in this chapter that the re-imagining of sub-Saharan Africa 
requires a redefinition of human subjectivity as the one-for-the-other by using the work 
of Levinas and liberation theology. The socio-political and ethnic conflicts that affect 
most sub-Saharan African nations today is the result of a philosophical anthropology that 
establishes freedom, self-consciousness, and self-subsistent autonomy as fundamental 
aspects of what it is to be human. This philosophical anthropology reflects itself in the 
relationships between the Western world and sub-Saharan Africa and among Africans 
themselves and their political leaders. It is sad to see that after almost fifty years of 
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independence of many sub-Saharan African nations many of them remain politically 
unstable. The non-recognition of the human other receives expression through greed, 
corruption, dictatorship, and ethnic violence. The totalizing effects of these discordant 
elements have generated circumstances that deny sub-Saharan African nations a chance 
to live a meaningful life together in peace. We presented in this chapter the turn to the 
other/neighbor in Levinas’s thought and in liberation theology as a possible path toward a 
more flourishing sub-Saharan Africa. We also argued that liberation theology historicizes 
Levinas’s ethical responsibility as it provides a more concrete example of the affective 
responsibility in tangible ethical acts of concern for the poor and the oppressed. 
Liberation theology has also been instrumental in the emergence of African liberation 
theology.  
What Africans, more importantly African leaders, need is Levinas’s and liberation 
theology’s redefinition of human subjectivity. It is our conviction that Levinas’s ethics of 
responsibility and liberation theology both put forth, each in its own right, a hopeful way 
for the articulation of human subjectivity as the one-for-the-other in love and 
responsibility. The ability to rethink human subjectivity in sub-Saharan Africa calls for 
an appreciation of the human other as the condition of possibility for the subject’s 
subjectivity both philosophically and theologically.  
A commitment to good political leadership that promotes values such as integrity, 
honesty, justice, and peace calls for responsibility for the other without reciprocity. The 
leader remains the one who supports the people because he/she always has “one 
responsibility more than all the others.”81 The lives of Jacques Désiré Laval (religious 
motivation) and Nelson Mandela (political motivation) exemplify Levinas’s utopia of 
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conscience in the real time of history. Affective responsibility in terms of Purcell’s being 
otherwise than self-centered, is an attitude required of all Africans, especially of their 
political leaders. A commitment to this project would, hopefully, lessen the hatred of the 
human other already experienced in a number of sub-Saharan African nations.  
At this point we are left with one of question: how do we get people to follow this 
pathway or intersubjective model? How do we convince people to be otherwise? This 
challenging question calls for existential, concrete and as many practical answers as 
possible. We saw in the lives of Nelson Mandela and Jacques Désiré Laval concrete 
attitudes of an enactment of love of neighbor and justice. The articulation of this 
intersubjective model into the contemporary real time of history passes through education 
in families, schools, churches, and the larger society. In this regard, the continuing 
commitment of the Catholic Church toward the less privileged and suffering sub-Saharan 
Africans cannot be overemphasized. Her practice of solidarity, hospitality and justice, 
bears witness to ethical responsibility which can serve to promote social, political, and 
even legal change.  
In contemporary sub-Saharan Africa examples of individuals and/or groups that 
serve as role models and educational resources can be multiplied. Suffice it here to 
mention the work of Missionary Congregations and some non-governmental 
organizations (NGO). Their concern and commitment toward the poor, the despised and 
exploited people and/or communities in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa would be one 
of the ways we could get people to act otherwise and work for social justice. They offer 
credible examples of enactment of the turn to the neighbor or ethical responsibility. For 
these groups, ethical responsibility or love of neighbor is a manifestation of God’s love, 
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mercy, and compassion. Most of these missionaries and people of good will leave behind 
their countries, families, friends, and/or comfortable life style to work in difficult rural 
areas in solidarity with local people. Their unwavering commitment to the needs of other 
human beings exposes people around them to situations of the degradation of the lives of 
other human beings and invites them to respond with affective responsibility by attending 
to their needs and taking a position against any intolerable plan to oppress, marginalize, 
and/or murder the other person. The major strength of these groups is that it educates 
people in their respective fields of work to serve as leaders and mentors for the concern 
of the other human person within their own local communities and within the larger 
socio-political and economic structure of nations.  
The work of the members of the Holy Spirit Congregation (Spiritans) in Sub-
Saharan Africa and throughout the world testifies to it. For three hundred years  plus, the 
Spiritans have been engaged, on behalf of the Gospel, in fighting poverty, injustice and 
the degradation of the human other. For the Holy Spirit Congregation, mission is not only 
about converting people to Christianity, but more importantly, it is about affective 
responsibility and solidarity toward “… those whose needs are the greatest, and to the 
oppressed”82 so that they will live in full dignity as human beings. Constitutive of this 
mission is the promotion of justice and solidarity among people, the education and 
formation of committed and responsible leaders that would work for the respect of the 
human other and the promotion of social change. 
In most Spiritan missions, the turn to the other/neighbor is about setting the 
standard of moral obligation on behalf of Jesus Christ for the triumph of love over hatred, 
justice over injustice, peace over violence, so as to influence people’s socio-political 
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actions. In Eastern Cameroon, for instance, Spiritans have been instrumental in bringing 
to an end the mistreatment of the Baka Pygmies by the Bantus.83  The Baka Pygmies and 
the Bantus are peoples who live in the heart of the equatorial forest in Eastern Cameroon. 
The Baka are semi-nomadic and hunter-gatherers; they are estimated to be around 60.000 
in a population of 400.000 Bantus and rely mainly on the forest for their food and other 
necessities. Bantus are mostly farmers and rely mainly on agriculture for foodstuffs. For 
centuries, these two ethnic groups have been living in a kind of alliance of blood pacts. 
Over the years, the Baka have been marginalized by the Bantu population. The Baka 
strongly believe in the blood pact to the point of thinking that they are the Bantu 
headmen’s natural slaves. The Bantus treat them as slaves, hire them to work on their 
farms for insignificant salaries, and exclude them from any form of development and 
justice.84 Spiritans, working in this area, are committed in changing the mentality and 
improving the relationship between them. They put in place a structure of development 
called “Activities for the self-development of the populations of Eastern Cameroon” 
(AAPPEC) that serves as a forum for the education of both the Baka and the Bantus on 
issues of rights and dignity of the human person, solidarity, social justice and 
development. Today both groups understand better their duties and rights as full citizens 
of the country, and are encouraged to acquire official documents such as birth certificates 
and national identification cards. Positions of leadership and responsibility in different 
activities (health care, primary education, agriculture, justice and peace, formation, 
communication and catechetic) are shared among them. For instance, in the area of 
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healthcare, Baka and Bantu nurses and assistants travel together by motorcycle or by car 
to give treatment to patients in the Bantu and Baka villages.85  
In conflict and post-conflict situations such as in Congo Brazzaville, Congo 
Kinshasa, and Sierra-Leone, Spiritans are promoting affective responsibility, using basic 
Christian communities, youth ministry, education and human formation, as media for 
national reconciliation and the rebuilding of interrelationships. In these various 
communities and activities, they try to awaken in people a sense of service to one’s 
fellow human person and the capacity to be critical and to condemn all types of injustice, 
whether cultural, religious, political or economic. They are also involved in social 
outreach in areas of education, heath-care, orphanage, and personal care of the displaced 
refugees.86  
In Congo Brazzaville, the Spiritans run two centers of formation for children and 
youth. The first is “Le Centre Espace Père Jarot” in Brazzaville that serves as a home and 
training center for street children. The stress is on their reintegration in the society 
through school and job-training. The second is called “Centre de Formation 
Professionelle de Sala Ngolo” in Dolisie. Established in 1996, this center was partly 
plundered and destroyed in 1999, at the time of the civil war. Its main goal is human 
formation and job-training center for youth who have dropped out of the school system. 
In Congo Kinshasa, from the year 2000 up to the present, Spiritans are healing 
wounds of years of civil war through attentive presence to the displaced people and the 
education and formation of children and youth. Today, Spiritans are assisting the 
displaced population in Lubumbashi, Kinshasa, and Kongolo. With regard to education, 
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in the Kongolo region, they have established primary and secondary schools to give poor 
children an opportunity for education. A new school will open this year in the Manono 
region.87  
In Sierra Leone, Spiritans are participating in the country’s reconstruction 
program through humanitarian works and education. In Freetown, they are working with 
the UN in the rehabilitation program for war-affected children and in the structure of 
distribution of food aid to refugee camps in Kissi, Waterloo, Bo, etc. In the area of 
education, they established “Pre-school” programs for refugee children in Freetown and 
around the country. Small Christian communities are serving as places for healing, 
reconciliation, and discussion on the peace process. It is also there that people come to 
seek information about their displaced family members and friends.88    
Worth mentioning also is the ministry of some Spiritan confreres in the refugee 
camps in the diocese of Kigoma, Tanzania where they continue, along with other groups, 
to defend and assist refugee communities. They are in constant dialogue with the 
Tanzanian government so that it facilitates the return home of some of the refugees from 
Burundi or to give legal status to those who have been on Tanzanian soil for more than 
thirty years if they so wish. Efforts are being made to get the Burundian government to 
change the land laws that would allow refugees who return home to reclaim their land.89 
We make no claim to have exhausted here all aspects of Spiritan commitments toward the 
other human person in sub-Saharan Africa. These few examples are representative of 
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their dedication to the values of love, justice and peace in imitation of Jesus Christ and 
their founders that constitute examples of an enactment of the turn to the neighbor.  
Many people have joined the Spiritans in this mission. Today, Spiritan lay 
associates as well as members of Spiritan fraternities in sub-Saharan Africa, share in this 
noble service to the human other. The participation of the laity in this mission offers a 
chance of getting more people on board and stimulates in them attitudes of affective 
responsibility toward other humans. These laywomen and men are themselves living 
examples of ethical enactment and symbols of inspiration in their various milieus. Their 
closer ties with families, friends and the wider society, gradually create a network of 
people convinced of the need for justice, hospitality, and solidarity. Whether or not these 
friends and families identify themselves as Christians and/or believers, their concrete 
commitment toward the other person’s needs contribute more directly and in various 
ways to an effort of encouraging awareness on the centrality of the issue of ethical 
responsibility. And progressively, more people in the society would be exposed to stories 
and situations of degradation of the lives of human others, and would feel the need to 
respond with affective responsibility in the real time of history. The key attitudes are: 
respect for human life, human freedom, human dignity, solidarity, hospitality, and social 
justice. What is demanded of believers and non-believers today are concrete acts of 
respect of the sanctity of every human life, especially of the lives of those others who are 
poor, marginalized, and oppressed.  
It is our conviction that the missionary groups, non governmental organizations, 
and people of good will who work daily in difficult situations in sub-Saharan Africa are 
living examples of an enactment of ethical responsibility or love of neighbor. They offer 
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a possibility to build communities where every human person will flourish. Again, in the 
context of sub-Saharan Africa, the defense of the human person will be of no relevance 
unless it can be translated into concrete situations. A better socio-political and economic 
future is possible in sub-Saharan Africa and it passes through recognition of the face of 
the neighbor who bears the trace of the divine and begs us not to kill him/her.   
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Conclusion 
 
This dissertation has been an analysis of Emmanuel Levinas’s conceptual 
affinities with liberation theology as presented by Gustavo Gutiérrez and Jon Sobrino. It 
has been carried out with a presupposition that the twenty-first century in which we live 
is a postmodern world, characterized by the obvious reality of the degradation of the life 
of the human other in history; hence, the questioning of modernity’s overemphasis on the 
human subject’s self-subsistent autonomy. Our intention was to show that Levinas’s 
transcendental ethics of responsibility, which conceives God as the goodness that is 
beyond being and calls humans to responsibility for the neighbor, is a pertinent and 
adequate philosophical approach compatible to one of the truths of Christianity: the 
concern for humanity of the neighbor as articulated in liberation theology.  
We began this dissertation by providing, in the first chapter, a survey of Levinas’s 
transcendental ethics of responsibility, situating it within the phenomenological tradition 
of continental philosophy. We argued that while Levinas remains indebted to Plato, 
Descartes, Kant, Husserl, and Heidegger, he was nevertheless displeased with Western 
philosophy’s inclination to base all knowing, willing, and meaning on the intentional 
consciousness of the subject. In a specific way, he takes issue with Husserl’s and 
Heidegger’s phenomenology for not explicitly addressing the question of 
intersubjectivity and responsibility for the other. His effort was geared toward replacing 
metaphysics with ethics as first philosophy. The face of the other is what determines 
one’s subjectivity and reveals the trace of the infinite God. God is encounter in the ethical 
command of love of neighbor. For Levinas, subjectivity rightly understood is always a 
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state of wakefulness or insomnia. It is defined in terms of ethical responsibility to the 
point of substitution, proximity, obsession, sensibility, hostage, and maternity.  
Chapter two discussed Gutiérrez’s and Sobrino’s theological project. It was 
argued that their theologies emerge in the context of socio-political and economic 
oppression of the poor, the exploited, and the marginalized of Latin America. Their main 
theological focus is an invitation to Christian theology to take the turn to the subject to its 
ultimate level, that is, to a commitment to one of the truths of Christianity: concern for 
the human neighbor created in God’s image. The human neighbor’s humanity is seen as a 
fundamental aspect for theological reflection. 
The third chapter centered on the point of affinities between Levinas’s philosophy 
and liberation theology. We established the following affinities: Levinas’s philosophy 
and liberation theology emerged as a response to the twentieth century’s tragic human 
situation, search for the divine transcendence in the life of commitment to the other 
human person, find in the Judeo-Christian wisdom a distinct way of thinking of the 
subject-other relationships, and call for love of neighbor and justice. They both view the 
turn to the other/neighbor as a power of genuine love, opening new avenues for the 
radical re-imagining of the world. For Levinas’s philosophy and liberation theology, the 
creation of a better world requires a “prophetic-ethical” attitude from every human person 
in his/her daily encounter with the other human. This attitude values and protects the 
other and opens up a dimension of the divine in history. The affinities noted do not, 
however, suggest a perfect matching between these two approaches. While the neighbor 
in liberation theology is an image of God, in Levinas, he/she, only manifests the height in 
which God reveals God’s self as a trace. Levinas’s God is not the omnipotent God of 
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liberation theology. Besides, Levinas situates his philosophy on the asymmetrical level 
while liberation theology is historically based. Levinas has been suspicious of Christian 
theology in general for its dependence on Western philosophical tradition. Yet, he has 
been sympathetic to liberation theology for its emphasis on the human other’s humanity. 
Levinas’s philosophy, this dissertation argued, enhances liberation theology 
philosophically through the concept of vigilant insomnia. This concept keeps the human 
subject everlastingly awake to the needs of others. Liberation theology, on its part, 
historicizes Levinas’s transcendental ethics of responsibility in terms of conversion to the 
neighbor. It functions in history as Purcell’s being otherwise or affective responsibility 
and interrupts the subject’s tendency to totality.  
The fourth chapter examined three Christian scholars’ use of Levinas’s 
philosophy for Christian theology. For these scholars, Enrique Dussel, Jean-Luc Marion, 
and Michael Purcell, each in his own right, Levinas’s thought offers a possibility for 
dialogue with Christian theology. Dussel argues for a philosophical theology of liberation 
that takes seriously Levinas’s turn to the other or exteriority. Jean-Luc Marion argues for 
the demise of traditional metaphysics by means of phenomenology as first philosophy 
that remains open to the theological in terms of agape, echoing Levinas’s ethical 
responsibility or the subject’s love for the other. Purcell sees in Levinas’s 
phenomenology some elements such as holiness, infinite, awakening, desire, love, and 
justice, that could fruitfully engage Christian theology. For him, Levinas’s notions of 
awakening, desire, and face point to the direction of the theology of grace and 
sacraments. For these scholars, Levinas’s philosophy is worthy of consideration by 
Christian theology.  
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The fifth and last chapter examined the contribution Levinas’s philosophy and 
liberation theology could offer to contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa as it faces 
unprecedented socio-political and ethnic conflicts. The struggle for political and 
economic power and the non-recognition of the human other, through whom God’s trace 
passes, have been the major reasons for most of these conflicts. This chapter argued that 
Levinas’s thought and liberation theology’s turn to the other/neighbor offer a possibility 
for lessening the hatred of the human other through a redefinition of human subjectivity 
as the one-for-the-other; hence, a rethinking of the place of the other.  
Levinas, Gutiérrez, and Sobrino, writing from the perspective of philosophy and 
theology, bring forth one fundamental element, namely, the in-breaking of the dimension 
of the divine opens forth in the human face. They call all humans to embrace a 
“prophetic-ethical sense for the other, especially the preferred other of the prophets, the 
poor, the marginal, and the oppressed.”90 What we have here is an exemplification of a 
significant and positive parallel between Christian theology and postmodern philosophy. 
The common ground between these two apparently opposing areas of thought is that they 
both takes issue with modernity’s certain conception of the subject as independent and 
secluded self. They posit an “uncompromisable value” of the human other as the 
possibility of the subject’s subjectivity. The stress is on a subject’s movement toward 
exteriority, the other, not a self-sufficient subject, but rather the one, who finds its 
identity or humanity in relation to the other who bears the trace of, or carries the image of 
God. This analysis of the subject is one that sits comfortably with postmodernity and 
Christian theology. It is a path which contemporary philosophy and theology should 
consider in addressing the issue of inhumanity in the world. It is our hope that both the 
                                                 
90 Tracy, “Forms of Divine Disclosure,”55. 
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thought of Levinas and liberation theology would advance the recognition of the 
neighbor, who is both God’s mystery and the human other, as the precondition for peace, 
justice and good order in today’s world. The radical transcendence of the other stands 
over and above the subject; this is a revalidation of one of the truths of Christianity and 
Christianity’s vision of human life and existence that constitutes a central response to the 
question of human existence and authenticity. Obviously, this dissertation does not have 
the pretention to have exhausted this topic; it is only one among many contributions to 
the ongoing conversation between Christian theology and postmodern philosophy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 273
Bibliography 
 
Selected Bibliography for Emmanuel Levinas 
 
Levinas Emmanuel. Totalité et Infinité. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961. 
 
______. Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority. Translated by Alphonso Lingis. 
Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969. 
 
______. Autrement qu’être; ou, au-delà de l’essence. La Haye: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974. 
 
______.Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence. Translated by Alphonso Lingis. 
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991. 
 
______ and Richard Kearney. "Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas." In Face to Face with 
Levinas, ed. Richard A. Cohen, 13-33. New York: Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1986. 
 
______. Collected Philosophical Papers. Translated by Alphonso Lingis. The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1987. 
 
______. De Dieu qui vient à L’idée. Paris: J.Vrin, 1982. 
 
______. De l'Existence à l'Existant. Paris: Fontaine, 1947. 
 
______. Difficile Liberté: Essais sur le Judaïsme. 2ème édition. Paris: Albin Michel, 
1976. 
 
______. Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism. Translated by Seán Hand. Baltimore: The 
John Hopkins University Press, 1990. 
 
______. Discovering Existence with Husserl. Translated by Richard A. Cohen and 
Michael B. Smith. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1998. 
 
______. Entre-Nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other. Translated by Michael B. Smith and 
Barbara Harshav. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998. 
 
______. Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo. Translated by Richard 
A. Cohen. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1985. 
 
______. Existence and Existents. Translated by Alphonso Lingis. The Hague-Boston: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1978. 
 
______. Four Talmudic Readings. Translated by Annette Aronowicz. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1990. 
 
 274
______. "Judaism and Kenosis," translated by Michael B. Smith. In In the Time of the 
Nations, 122-27. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indianapolis University Press, 
1994. 
 
______. "La Laïcité dans L’Etat d’Israël." In La Laïcité, ed.  A. Audibert et al. Paris: 
Presses Universitaires de France, 1960. 
 
______. The Levinas Reader. Edited and Translated by Sean Hand. New York: Basil 
Blackwell, 1989. 
 
______. Liberté et Commandement. Montpellier: Fata Morgana, 1994. 
 
______. "Le Moi et la Totalité." Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 59 (1954): 353-73. 
 
______. Of God Who Comes To Mind. Translated by Bettina Bergo.  Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1998. 
 
______. Quatre Lectures Talmudiques. Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1968. 
 
______. "Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism." Critical Inquiry (1990) : 64-71. 
 
______. La Théorie de l'Intuition dans la Phénoménologie de Husserl. Paris: Librairies 
Philosophiques J. Vrin, 1963. 
 
______. Time and the Other. Translated by Richard A. Cohen. Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
University Press, 1987. 
 
______. "The Trace of the Other," translated by Alphonso Lingis. In Deconstruction in 
Context, ed.  Mark Taylor, 345-59. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1986. 
 
______. "Transcendence and Height." In Emmanuel Levinas: Basic Philosophical 
Writings, ed. Adriaan T. Peperzak, Critchley, Simon Critchley, and Robert 
Bernasconi, 11-31 .Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996. 
 
______. "Transcendence et Hauteur." Bulletin de la Société Française de Philosophie 56 
(1962): 108-20  
 
______. En Découvrant L’existence avec Husserl et Heidegger. 3ème édition. Paris: 
Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1974. 
 
______. "Nameless," translated by Michael B. Smith. In Proper Names. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1996. 
 
______. The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology. Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1973. 
 
 275
______. Entre-Nous: Essais sur le Penser à L’autre. Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1991. 
 
———. Humanism of the Other. Translated by Nidra Poller. Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 2003. 
 
______. Humanisme de L’autre Homme. Montpellier: Fata Morgan, 1972. 
 
______. Is It Righteous To Be? Interview with Emmanuel Lévinas. Edited by Jill Robbins. 
Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2001. 
 
______. On Escape = De L'Evasion. Translated by Bettina Bergo. Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 2003. 
 
Selected Bibliography for Gustavo Gutierrez and Jon Sobrino 
 
Gutiérrez, Gustavo. "Hermeneutical Principle: Preferential Option for the Poor." In 
Gustavo Gutierrez: Essential Writings, ed.  James B. Nickoloff. Minneapolis: 
Fortress, 1996. 
 
______. "Liberation, Theology and Proclamation." In The Mystical and Political 
dimension of the Christian Faith, ed.  Claude Geffré and Gustavo Gutierrez. 
Concilium: Theology of Liberation, vol. 6, no. 10, 57-77. New York: Herder and 
Herder, 1974. 
 
______. A Theology of Liberation: History, Politics, and Salvation. Translated by 
Caridad Inda and John Eagleson. Revised edition. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 
1988. 
 
______. Las Casas: In Search for the Poor of Christ. Translated by Robert R. Barr. 
Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1993. 
 
______. The Density of the Present: Selected Writings. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 
1999. 
 
______. Essential Writings. Edited by James B. Nickoloff Gustavo Gutierrez. Maryknoll, 
N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1996. 
 
______. The God of Life. Translated by Matthew J. O’Connell. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis 
Books, 1991. 
 
______. Liberation and Change. Edited by Ronald H. Stone. Atlanta: John Knox Press, 
1977. 
 
______. "Liberation Movements and Theology." Concilium 93 (1974): 135-46. 
 
 276
______. "Liberation Praxis and Christian Faith." Translated by John Drury. In Frontiers 
of Theology in Latin America, ed.  Rosino Gibellini. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis 
Books, 1979. 
 
______. On Job: God-Talk and the Suffering of the Innocent. Translated by Matthew J. 
O'Connell. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1987. 
 
______. "The Poor and the Third Millennium." In Believing Scholars: Ten Catholic 
Intellectuals, ed.  James L. Heft. 1st edition, 36-46. New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2005. 
 
———. The Power of the Poor in History: Selected Writings. Translated by Robert R. 
Barr. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1983. 
 
______. "The Task and Content of Liberation Theology." Translated by Judith Condor. 
In The Cambridge Companion to Liberation Theology, ed.  Christopher Rowland, 
19-38. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
 
______. The Truth Shall Make You Free: Confrontations. Translated by Matthew J. 
O'Connell. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1990. 
 
______. We Drink from Our Own Wells: The Spiritual Journey of a People. Translated 
by Matthew J. O'Connell. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1984. 
 
Sobrino, Jon. "Central Position of the Reign of God in Liberation Theology." In 
Mysterium Liberationis: Fundamental Concepts of Liberation Theology, ed.  
Ignacio Ellacuria and Jon Sobrino. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books/Collins Dove, 
1993. 
 
______. Christ the Liberator: A View from the Victims. Translated by Paul Burns. 
Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 2001. 
 
______. Christology at the Crossroads: A Latin American Approach. Translated by John 
Drury. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1978. 
 
______. Globalizations and Its Victims. Edited by Jon Sobrino and Felix Wilfred. 
London: SCM Press, 2001. 
 
______. Jesus in Latin America. Translated by Robert R. Barr. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis 
Books, 1987. 
 
______. Jesus the Liberator: A Historical-Theological Reading of Jesus of Nazareth. 
Translated by Paul Burns and Francis McDonagh. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 
1993. 
 
 277
______. The Principle of Mercy: Taking the Crucified People from the Cross. Maryknoll, 
N.Y: Orbis books, 1994. 
 
______. Spirituality of Liberation: Toward Political Holiness. Translated by Robert Barr. 
Maryknoll, N.Y: Orbis books, 1988. 
 
______. Systematic Theology: Perspectives from Liberation Theology: Readings from 
Mysterium Liberationis. Edited by Jon Sobrino and Ignacio Ellacuria. Maryknoll, 
N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1996. 
 
______. The True Church and the Poor. Translated by Matthew J. O’Connell. Maryknoll, 
N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1984. 
 
______. Where is God?: Earthquake, Terrorism, Barbarity, and Hope. Translated by 
Margaret Wilde. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 2004. 
 
______. Witnesses to the Kingdom: The Martyrs of El Salvador and the Crucified 
Peoples. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 2003. 
 
______ and Pico Hernandez Juan. Theology of Christian Solidarity. Translated by Philip 
Berryman. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1985. 
 
General Bibliography 
 
Aguilar, Mario I. "Postcolonial African Theology in Kabasele Lumbala." Theological 
Studies 63, no. 2 (2002): 302-23. 
 
Aikman, David. Great Souls: Six Who Changed the Century. Nashville: World 
Publishing, 1998. 
 
Albano, Peter J. "The Cogito, Human Self Assertion and the Modern World." Philosophy 
Today 44, no. 2 (2000): 184-89. 
 
Alcoff, Linda. Thinking from the Underside of History: Enrique Dussel's Philosophy of 
Liberation. Edited by Linda Martin Alcoff and Eduardo Mendieta. Lahman, Md: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000. 
 
Atterton, Peter.  "Levinas's Skeptical Critique of Metaphysics and Anti-Humanism." 
Philosophy Today 41, no. 4 (1997): 491-506. 
 
Baird, Marie L. "Divinity and the Other: The Ethical Relation as Revelatory of God." 
Eglise et Théologie 30 (1999): 93-109. 
 
_____. "The Movement Toward Personalism in Israel and Revelation and Emmanuel 
Levinas’ Ethics of Responsibility: Toward a Post-Holocaust Spirituality." In 
Voegelin's Israel and Revelation: An Interdisciplinary Debate and Anthology, ed.  
 278
William M. Thompson and David L. Morse, 140-63. Milwaukee: Marquette 
University Press, 2000. 
 
______. On the Side of the Angels: Ethics and Post-Holocaust Spirituality. Leuven:: 
Peeters, Bondgenotenlaan, 2002. 
 
______. "Revisioning Christian Theology in Light of Emmanuel Levinas' Ethics of 
Responsibility." Journal of Ecumenical Studies 36, no. 3/4 (1999): 341-51. 
 
Barber, Michael D. Ethical Hermeneutics: Rationality in Enrique Dussel's Philosophy of 
Liberation. New York: Fordham University Press, 1998. 
 
Barre, Raymond. Le Développement Économique: Analyse et Politique. Paris: Cahiers de 
l’Institut de Science Economique Appliquée, 1958. 
 
Baulin, Jacques. La Succession d’Houphouët-Boigny. Paris: Karthala, 2000. 
 
Bauman, Z. "The World Inhospitable to Lévinas." Philosophy Today 43, no. 2 (1999): 
151-67. 
 
Bayart, Jean Francois. L’Etat en Afrique : La Politique Du Ventre. Paris: Libraries 
Arthème Fayard, 1989. 
 
_______. The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly. Translated by Christopher and 
Elizabeth Harrison Mary Harper. London and New York: Longman, 1993. 
 
Bazenguissa- Ganga, Rémy. "Les Ninja, les Cobras, et les Zoulous Crèvent L’écran À 
Brazzaville: Le Rôle Des Medias et la Construction Des Identités de Violence 
Politique." Canadian Journal of African Studies/Revue Canadienne Des Etudes 
Africaines 33, no. 2/3 (1999): 329-61. 
 
______.  "The Political Militia in Brazzaville." A Journal of Opinion 26, no. 1 (1998): 
37-40. 
 
______. "The Spread of Political Violence in Congo-Brazzaville." African Affairs 98, no. 
390 (1999): 37-54. 
 
Beach, Dennis. "History and the Other: Dussel’s Challenge to Levinas." Philosophy & 
Social Criticism 30, no. 3 (2004): 315-30. 
 
Beavers, Anthony F. Levinas Beyond the Horizons of Cartesianism: An Inquiry into the 
Metaphysics of Morals. New York: Peter Lang, 1995 
 
Benson, Mary. Nelson Mandela, the Man and the Movement. New York: W.W Norton & 
Company, 1989. 
 
 279
Bernasconi, Robert. "Rereading Totality and Infinity." In The Question of the Other: 
Essays in Contemporary Continental Philosophy, ed.  A. Dallery and C. Scott, 23-
34. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989. 
 
______.  "The Third Party: Levinas on the Intersection of the Ethical and the Political." 
In Emmanuel Levinas: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers, ed. Claire 
Elise and Lara Trout Katz, vol. 1, 45-57. New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis 
Group, 2005. 
 
______. "Who is My Neighbor? Who is the Other? Questioning the Generosity of 
Western Thought." In Ethics and Responsibility in the Phenomenological 
Tradition, 1-31. Pittsburgh: Simon Silverman Phenomenology Center, Duquesne 
University, 1992. 
 
Bernet, Rudolph. "The Encounter with the Stranger: Two Interpretations of the 
Vulnerability of the Skin." In The Face of the Other & the Trace of God: Essays 
on the Philosophy of Emmanuel Lévinas, ed.  Jeffrey Bloechl, 43-61. New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2000. 
 
Bernier, Paul. Père Laval. Translated by Michael O’Carroll. Turin: Rotocalco Caprotti, 
1978. 
 
Bienen, Henri. "Leaders, Violence, and the Absence of Change in Africa." Political 
Science Quarterly 108, no. 2 (1993):  271-82. 
 
Blanchot, Maurice. "Our Clandestine Companion." In Face to Face with Levinas, ed.  
R.A. Cohen, 41-50. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986. 
 
Bloechl, Jeffrey. "Levinas, Daniel Webster, and Us: Radical Responsibility and the 
Problem of Evil." International Philosophical Quarterly 38, no. 3 (1998): 259-73. 
 
Blum, Paul R. "Emmanuel Lévinas’ Theory of Commitment." Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research XLIV, no. 2, no. 157 (December 1983): 145-68. 
 
Bouckaert, Luk. "Ontology and Ethics: Reflections on Levinas Critique of Heidegger." 
International Philosophical Quarterly 10, no. 3 (September 1970): 402-19. 
 
Bouillard, Henri. "Human Experience as the Starting Point of Fundamental Theology." In 
Concilium, 79-91. New York: Paulist Press, 1965. 
 
Breuning, Wilhelm. "Experience of God." In Handbook of Catholic Theology, ed.  
Wolfgang Beinert and Francis Schüssler Fiorenza, 247-48. New York: Crossroad, 
1995. 
 
Brown, Robert McAfee. Gustavo Gutierrez: An Introduction to Liberation Theology. 
Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis books, 1990. 
 280
 
______. Gustavo Gutiérrez. Atlanta, Ga: John Knox Press, 1980. 
 
Bujra, Abdalla. "African Conflicts: Their Causes and Their Political Environment." In 
Development Policy Management Forum. Occasional Paper, No. 4, a Paper 
Presented at the Ad Hoc Experts Group Meeting on the Economics of Civil 
Conflicts in Africa, Held at UNECA. Addis Ababa,  7-8 April, 2000. 
 
Burggraeve, Roger. Levinas: Une Bilbliographie Primaire et Secondaire (1929-1985). 
Leuven: Peeters, Bondgenotenlaan, 1990. 
 
______. "Violence and the Vulnerable Face of the Other: The Vision of Emmanuel 
Levinas on Moral Evil and Our Responsibility." Journal of Social Philosophy 30, 
no. 1 (1999): 29-45. 
 
______. The Wisdom of Love in the Service of Love: Emmanuel Levinas on Justice, 
Peace, and Human Rights. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2002. 
 
Cadorette, Curt. From the Heart of the People: The Theology of Gustavo Gutierrez. Oak 
Park, IL: Meyer Stone Books, 1988. 
 
______. From the Heart of the People: The Theology of Gustavo Gutiérrez. Oak Park, 
IL: Meyer-Stone Books, 1988. 
 
______. "Peru and the Mystery of Liberation: The Nexus and Logic of Gustavo 
Gutiérrez’s Theology." In The Future of Liberation Theology: Essays in Honor of 
Gustavo Gutiérrez, ed.  Marc H. Ellis and Otto Maduro, 49-58. Maryknoll, N.Y.: 
Orbis Books, 1989. 
 
Caygill, Howard. Levinas & the Political. London and New York: Routledge, 2002. 
 
______.  "Levinas's Political Judgment: The Esprit Articles 1934-1983." Radical 
Philosophy 104 (Nov/Dec 2000): 6-15. 
 
Chalier, Caterine. "The Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas and the Hebraic Tradition." In 
Ethics as First Philosophy: The Significance of Emmanuel Levinas for 
Philosophy, Literature, and Religion, ed.  Adriaan T. Peperzak, 3-12. New York: 
Routledge, 1995. 
 
Chenu, Bruno. Dieu est noir: histoire, religion et théologie des noirs américains. Paris : 
Editions du Centurion, 1977. 
 
Chopp, Rebecca S. The Praxis of Suffering: An Interpretation of Liberation and Political 
Theologies. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1986. 
 
 281
Chrétien, Jean Pierre. "Les Racines de la Violence Contemporaine en Afrique." Politique 
Africaine 42 (1991): 15-27. 
 
CIA – The World Fact Book – Congo, Republic of [data base on-line] available from 
https://cia.gov/cia//publications/factbook/geos/cf.html, accessed February 23, 
2007. 
 
CIA – The World Fact Book – Cote d’Ivoire, Republic of [data base on-line] available 
from https://cia.gov/cia//publications/factbook/geos/cf.html, accessed February 
26, 2007. 
 
Clark, John F. "Congo: Transition and the Struggle to Consolidate." In Political Reform 
in Francophone Africa, 62-85. Colorado: Westview Press, 1997. 
 
Cohen, Richard A. "Post-Modern Jewish Philosophy." In History of Jewish Philosophy, 
Routledge History of World Philosophies, ed. Daniel H. Frank and Oliver 
Leaman, vol. 2, 875- 884. New York: Routledge, 1997. 
 
______. Elevations: The Height of the Good in Rosenzweig. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1994. 
 
______. Face to Face with Levinas. New York: State University of New York Press, 
1986. 
 
Comblin, José. Called for Freedom: The Changing Context of Liberation. Maryknoll, 
N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1998. 
 
Congar, Yves. Situation et tâches présentes de la théologie. Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 
1967. 
 
"Congregation of the Holy Spirit." Information Documentation (i/d) 60: 1-20, 14 
February 2007. 
 
Coste, René. Marxist Analysis and Christian Faith. Edited by Roger Couture and John 
Cort. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1985. 
 
Critchley, Simon. The Cambridge Companion to Levinas. Edited by Simon Critchley and 
Robert Bernasconi. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
 
Davidson, Scott Christopher. "Reflected Freedom: Levinas's Defense of Ethical 
Subjectivity." Ph. D. diss., Philosophy Department, Duquesne University, 2002. 
 
Davies, Charles. Religion and the Making of Society: Essays in Social Theology. New 
York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1994. 
 
 282
Derek, Simon. "No One, Not Even God, Can Take the Place of the Victim: Metz, 
Levinas, and Practical Christology After the Shoah." Horizons 26, no. 2 (1999): 
191-214. 
 
Derrida, Jacques. Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas. Translated by Pascale-Anne Brault and 
Michael Naas.  California, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999. 
 
Descartes, René. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. Edited and translated by John 
Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch. 3 vols. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984. 
 
Descombes, Vincent. Modern French Philosophy. Translated by L. Scott-Fox and J. M. 
Harding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980. 
 
Diehm, Christian. "Facing Nature: Levinas Beyond the Human." Philosophy Today 44, 
no. 1 (2000): 51-59. 
 
"Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation, Dei Verbum." In Vatican II: The Conciliar 
and Postconciliar Documents, ed.  Austin Flannery, vol. 1. New Revised edition. 
New York: Costello Publishing Company, 1998. 
 
"Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, Lumen Gentium." In Vatican II: The Conciliar 
and Postconciliar Documents, ed.  Austin Flannery, vol. 1. New Revised edition. 
New York: Costello Publishing Company, 1998. 
 
Dominique, Janicaud. Phenomenology “Wide Open”: After the French Debate. New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2005. 
 
_______ et alü. Phenomenology and the “Theological Turn”: The French Debate. New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2000. 
 
"Dossier Côte D’Ivoire." Afrique Contemporaine 206, no. 2 (2003): 3-203, 223-25. 
 
Downey, Michael. "Postmodernity." In The New Dictionary of Catholic Spirituality, ed.  
Michael Downey, 746-749. Collegeville, Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, 1993. 
 
Dupre, Louis. Passage to Modernity: An Essay in the Hermeneutics of Nature and 
Culture. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993. 
 
Dussel, Enrique. "Europe, Modernity, and Eurocentrism." Nepantla: Views from South 1, 
no. 3 (2000): 465-78. 
 
______. Philosophy of Liberation. Translated by Aquilina Martinez and Christine 
Morkovsky. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1985. 
 
 283
______. "Sensibility and Otherness in Emmanuel Levinas." Philosophy Today 43, no. 2 
(1999): 126-34. 
 
______. Ethics and Community. Translated by Robert R. Barr. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis 
Books, 1988. 
 
_______. Ethics and Theology of Liberation. Translated by Bernard F. McWilliams. 
Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1978. 
 
_______. History and the Theology of Liberation: A Latin American Perspective. 
Translated by John Drury. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1976. 
 
______. A History of the Church in Latin America: Colonialism to Liberation (1492-
1979). Translated by Alan Neely. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1981. 
 
______. The Invention of the Americas: Eclipse of "the Other" and the Myth of 
Modernity. Translated by Michael D. Barber. New York: Continuum, 1995. 
 
______. Philosophy of Liberation. Translated by Aquilina Martinez and Christine 
Morkovsky. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1985. 
 
______. The Underside of Modernity: Apel, Ricoeur, Rorty, Taylor, and the Philosophy 
of Liberation. Edited and translated by Eduardo Mendieta. Atlantic Highlands, 
N.J: Humanities Press, 1996. 
 
______. Beyond Philosophy: Ethics, History, Marxism, and Liberation Theology. Edited 
by Mendiela Eduardo. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003. 
 
_______. Polarizing Mexico: The Impact of Liberalization Strategy. Boulder, Colo: L. 
Rienner Publishers, 2000. 
 
Ekholmand, Kajsa, Sundberg. "Ethnic War and Ethnic Cleansing in Brazzaville," 
Unpublished manuscript, n.d., May 1994. 
 
Ela, Jean Marc. My Faith as an African. Translated by John Pairman Brown and Susan 
Perry. Maryknoll, N.Y: Orbis Books, 1988. 
 
Ellacuria, Ignacio. "The Historicity of Christian Salvation." In Mysterium Liberationis: 
Fundamental Concepts of Liberation Theology, ed.  Ignacio Ellacuria and Jon 
Sobrino, 251-59. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books/Collins Dove, 1993 
 
______. Mysterium Liberationis: Fundamental Concepts of Liberation Theology. Edited 
by Ignacio Ellacuria and Jon Sobrino. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1993. 
 
 284
Ellis, Marc H. Expanding the View: Gustavo Gutierrez and the Future of Liberation 
Theology. Edited by Marc H. Ellis & Otto Maduro. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis 
Books, 1990. 
 
Eskenazi, Tamara Cohn. Levinas and Biblical Studies. Atlanta, Ga: Society of Biblical 
Literature Semeia, 2003. 
 
Esler, Philip Francis. Community and Gospel in Luke-Acts: The Social and Political 
Motivations of Lucan Theology. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1987. 
 
Ethnic Conflict and Democratization in Africa. Edited by Harvey Glickman. Atlanta, 
Georgia: The African Studies Association Press, 1995. 
 
Ethnicity Kills? The Politics of War, Peace and Ethnicity in SubSaharan Africa. Edited 
by Morten Boas and Gjermund Soether Einar Braathen. New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 2000. 
 
Farley, W. "Ethics and Reality: Dialogue between Caputo and Lévinas." Philosophy 
Today 36, no. 3 (Fall 1992): 210-19. 
 
Fiorenza, Elisabeth Schüssler. The Future of Liberation Theology: Essays in Honor of 
Gustavo Gutierrez. Edited by Marc H. Ellis & Otto Maduro, 311-325. Maryknoll, 
N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1989. 
 
Fowkes, W. "The Concept of Self in Husserl and Beyond." Philosophy Today 24, no. 1 
(Spring 1980): 44-52. 
 
Friedman, M. "Martin Buber and Emmanuel Lévinas: An Ethical Query." Philosophy 
Today 45, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 3-11. 
 
Fulton J., Sheen. "Contemporary Conceptions of Religion." Proceedings of the American 
Catholic Philosophical Association 2 (1926): 66-79. 
 
G, Arrighi. "The African Crisis." New Left Review 15 (2002): 5-36. 
 
Gans, S. "Ethics or Ontology." Philosophy Today 16, no. 2 (Summer 1972): 117-21. 
 
Gauze, René. The Politics of Congo Brazzaville. Edited and translated by Virginia 
Thompson and Richard Adloff. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1973. 
 
Geffré, Claude. "A Prophetic Theology." In The Mystical and Political Dimension of the 
Christian Faith, ed.  Claude Geffré and Gustavo Gutierrez. Concilium: Theology 
of Liberation, vol. 6, no. 10, 7-16. New York: Herder and Herder, 1974. 
 
 285
Geffré, Claude. The Mystical and Political Dimension of the Christian Faith. Edited by 
Claude Geffré and Gustavo Gutiérrez. Concilium 6, vol. 10. New York: Herder 
and Herder, 1974. 
 
Gelpi, Donald L. The Turn to Experience in Contemporary Theology. New York: Paulist, 
1984. 
 
Gentili, Anna-Maria. "Theories of Conflicts and Approaches to Conflict Prevention." In 
Is Violence Inevitable in Africa? ed. Ulf Engel Anna-Maria Gentili Patrick 
Chabal, ? Leiden, The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2005. 
 
Gibbs, Robert. "Substitution: Marcel and Levinas." Philosophy and Theology 4 (1989): 
171-85. 
 
Giddens, Anthony. The Consequences of Modernity. Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press, 1990. 
 
_______. The Nation-State and Violence: A Contemporary Critique of Historical 
Materialism. Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1981. 
 
Goizueta, Roberto. Liberation, Method, and Dialogue: Enrique Dussel and North 
American Theological Discourse. Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988. 
 
Gomez, Fernando. "Ethics is the Original Philosophy or The Barbarian Words Coming 
from the Third World: An Interview with Enrique Dussel." Boundary 2 28, no. 1 
(2001), 19-73. 
 
Goodhart, Sandor. "Conscience, Conscience, Consciousness: Emmanuel Levinas, the 
Holocaust and the Logic of Witness." In Emmanuel Levinas: Critical Assessments 
of Leading Philosophers, vol. 3, 132-152. New York: Routledge, Taylor & 
Francis Group, 2005. 
 
Greisch. "Ethics and Ontology: Some Hypocritical Reflections." Irish Philosophical 
Journal 4 (1987): 64-75. 
 
Gschwandtner, Christina M. "Ethics, Eros, or Caritas? Levinas and Marion on 
Individuation of the Other." Philosophy Today 49, no. 1 (2005): 70-87. 
 
Gustafson, James. Ethics from a Theocentric Perspective. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1981. 
 
Gutiérrez, Juan. The New Liberation Gospel: Pitfalls of the Theology of Liberation. 
Translated by Paul Burns. Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1977. 
 
Habermas, Jurgen. Religion and Rationality: Essays on Reason, God, and Modernity. 
Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2002. 
 286
 
Haight, Roger. An Alternative Vision: An Interpretation of Liberation Theology. New 
York: Paulist Press, 1985. 
 
Handelman, Susan. "Facing the Other: Levinas, Perelman, Rosenzweig." In Divine 
Aporia: Post-Modern Conversations About the Other, ed.  John C. Hawley, 263-
87. Lewisburg, Pa: Buckwell University Press, 2000. 
 
______. "Facing the Other: Levinas, Perelman, Rosenzweig." In Divina Aporia: 
Postmodern Conversations About the Other, ed.  John C. Hawley, 267-87. 
Lewisburg, Pa: Bucknell University Press, 2000. 
 
Hansel, Georges. "Emmanuel Levinas." Philosophy Today 43, no. 2 (1999): 121-25. 
 
Harel, Xavier. Afrique, Pillage à Huis Clos: Comment une Poignée D’initiés Siphonne le 
Pétrole Africain. Paris: Libraries Arthème Fayard, 2006. 
 
Harvey, David. The Condition of Postmodernity: An Inquiry into the Origins of Cultural 
Change. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Basil Blackwell, 1989. 
 
Harwood, Ronald. Mandela. New York: New American Library, 1987. 
 
Hatley, James. "Levinas, Witness and Politics." In Justice and the Politics of Memory, ed.  
G. Ricci. Religion and Public Life, vol. 33, 33-54. New Jersey: Transaction 
Publishers, 2003. 
 
Hegel, G.W.F. The Philosophy of History. New York: Dover Publications, 1956. 
 
Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward 
Robinson. New York: Harper and Row, 1962. 
 
Hellenbogen, Alice. La Succession d’Houphouët-Boigny Entre Tribalisme et Démocratie. 
Paris: L’Harmattan, 2002. 
 
Hellwig, Monika K. "Foundations for Theology: A Historical Sketch." In Faithful 
Witness: Foundations for Today's Church, ed.  Leo J. O'Donovan and T. Howland 
Sanks, 1-10. New York: Crossroad, 1989. 
 
Hendley, Steven. "Autonomy and Alterity: Moral Obligation in Sartre and Levinas." 
Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 27, no. 3 (1996): 246-66. 
 
Hennelly, Alfred T. Liberation Theology: A Documentary History. Maryknoll, N.Y.: 
Orbis Books, 1990. 
 
Holland, N. "With Arms Wide Open of Hospitality and the Most Intimate Stranger." 
Philosophy Today 38, no. 3 (2001): 133-37. 
 287
 
Horner, Robyn. Jean-Luc Marion: A Theo-Logical Introduction. Burlington, VT: 
Ashgate Publishing, Company, 2005. 
 
______. Rethinking God as Gift: Derrida, Marion, and the Limits of Phenomenology. 
New York: Fordham University Press, 2001. 
 
Huff, David L., Lutz. "The Contagion of Political Unrest in Independent Black Africa." 
Economic Geography 50, no. 4 (1974): 352-67. 
 
Hugeux, Vincent. Les Sorciers Blancs : Enquête sur les Faux Amis Français de 
L’Afrique. Paris: Libraries Arthème Fayard, 2007. 
 
Human Rights Watch, May 31, 2002. 
 
Husserl, Edmund. Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology. Translated 
by Dorion Cairns. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960. 
 
______. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological 
Philosophy. Translated by F. Kersten. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
1982. 
 
Lane A., Dermot. “Forward.” In Givenness and God: Questions of Jean-Luc Marion, eds. 
Ian Leask and Eoin Cassidy, xv-xvi. New York: Fordham University Press, 2005. 
 
Jaguaribe, Helio. Economic & Political Development: A Theoretical Approach & a 
Brazilian Case Study. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968. 
 
Joseph, Michel. Le Père Jacques Laval: Le Saint de L’Ile Maurice 1803-1864. Paris: 
Editions Beauchesne, 1976. 
 
Kant, Immanuel.  Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Norman Kemp Smith. New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1965. 
 
______. Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1977. 
 
Katz, Claire Elise. Levinas, Judaism, and the Feminine: The Silent Footsteps of Rebecca. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003. 
 
Kearney, Richard. "Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas." In Dialogues with Contemporary 
Thinkers: The Phenomenological Heritage. Manchester, NH: Manchester 
University Press, 1984. 
 
Kee, Alistair. Marx and the Failure of Liberation Theology. Philadelphia: Trinity Press 
International, 1990. 
 
 288
Komonchak, Joseph A. "Defending Our Hope: On the Fundamental Tasks of Theology." 
In Faithful Witness: Foundations for Today's Church, ed.  Leo J. O'Donovan and 
T. Howland Sanks, 14-26. New York: Crossroad, 1989. 
 
Koren, Henry. To the Ends of the Earth: A General History of the Holy Ghost 
Congregation. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1983. 
 
Küster, Volter. The Many Faces of Jesus Christ: Intercultural Christology. Maryknoll, 
N.Y.: Orbis Books, 2001. 
 
Kyongsuk Min, Anselm. Dialectic of Salvation: Issues in Theology of Liberation. 
Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1989. 
 
_______. The Solidarity of Others in a Divided World. New York: T&T Clark 
International, 2004. 
 
_______. "Toward a Dialectic of Totality and Infinity: Reflections on Emmanuel 
Levinas." Journal of Religion 78, no. 4 (1998): 571-92. 
 
Larochelle, Gilbert. "Levinas and the Holocaust: The Responsibility of the Victim." 
Philosophy Today 43, no. 2 (1999): 184-94. 
 
Le Pape, Marc. "Les Politiques d’affrontements en Côte D’Ivoire 1999-2003." Afrique 
Contemporaine 206, no. 2 (2003): 41-55. 
 
______.  et  Vidal, Claudine. Côte D’Ivoire 2025. Abidjan: Editions Neter, 1997. 
 
______. Côte d’Ivoire. L’année Terrible 1999-2000. Paris: Karthala, 2002. 
 
LeBlanc, J. "A Difficulty in Descartes’ Notion of the Infinite in the Third Meditation." 
International Philosophical Quarterly 38, no. 3/151 (September 1998): 275-83. 
 
Lecuyer, Joseph. Jacques Laval: Extraits de sa Correspondance. Paris: Editions 
Beauchesne, 1978. 
 
Leonard, Ellen. "Experience as a Source of Theology." Sources of Theology: Current 
Issues in Theology, Proceedings of Catholic Theological Society of America. 43, 
no. 3 (1998): 44-61.  
 
Lescourret, Marie-Anne. Emmanuel Levinas. Paris: Flammarion, 1994. 
 
Levesque, Paul J. "Review of Mystery and Method: The Other in Rahner and Levinas." 
The Review of Metaphysics 53, no. 4 (June 2000): 951-52. 
 
Llewelyn, John. Appositions of Jacques Derrida and Emmanuel Levinas. Bloomington:  
Indiana University Press, 2002. 
 289
 
Lyotard, Jean François. The Post-Modern Condition. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1985. 
 
Malka, Salomon. Emmanuel Levinas: La Vie et la Trace. Paris: J-C Lattès, 2002. 
 
Mandela, Nelson. Long Walk to Freedom. The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela. 
Boston & New York: Little Brown, 1994. 
 
Manning Sheffer, John Robert. Interpreting Otherwise than Heidegger: Emmanuel 
Levinas’s Ethics as First Philosophy. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University, 1993. 
 
Marion, Jean-Luc. Being Given: Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness. Translated by 
Jeffrey L. Kosky. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2002. 
 
______.  "D’autrui à L’individu: Au Delà de L’éthique." In Emmanuel Lévinas: Positivité 
et Transcendance. Actes Du Colloque Emmanuel Lévinas et la Phénoménologie 
(Sorbonne, 11-12 Décembre 1997) Under the title Lévinas et la Phénoménologie, 
287-308. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2000. 
 
______. "The Face: An Endless Hermeneutics." Harvard Divinity Bulletin 28, no. 2/3 
(1999):  9-10. 
 
______. "The Final Appeal of the Subject," translated by Simon Critchley. In The 
Religious, ed.  John D. Caputo, 131-144. Oxford: Blackwell, 2002. 
 
______. "From the Other to the Individual," translated by Robyn Horner. In 
Transcendence: Philosophy, Literature, and Theology Approach the Beyond, ed.  
Regina Schwartz, 43-59. New York: Routledge, 2004. 
 
______. God Without Being: Hors-Texte. Translated by Thomas A. Carlson. Chicago: 
The University Press of Chicago, 1991. 
 
______. Idol and Distance: Five Studies. Translated by Thomas A. Carlson. Edited by 
John D. Caputo. New York: Fordham University Press, 2001. 
 
______. In Excess: Studies of Saturated Phenomena. Translated by Robyn Horner and 
Vincent Berraud. New York: Fordham University Press, 2002. 
 
______. "On the Gift: A Discussion between Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion." In 
God, the Gift and Postmodernism, ed.  John D. Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon, 
54-78. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999. 
 
______. Le Phénomène érotique: Six Méditations. Paris: Grasset, 2003. 
 
 290
_______.  Prolegomena to Charity. Translated by Stephen Lewis. New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2002. 
 
_______. "The Saturated Phenomenon." Philosophy Today 40, no. 1-4 (1996): 103-24. 
 
Martinez, Gasper. Confronting the Mystery of God: Political, Liberation, and Public 
Theologies. New York: Continuum, 2001. 
 
Mbembe, Achille. L’Afriques Indociles. Paris: Karthala, 1988. 
 
_______. "Pouvoir, Violence, et Accumulation." Politique Africaine 39 (1990): 7-24. 
 
McCann, Dennis P. "Signs of the Times." In The New Dictionary of Catholic Social 
Thought, ed.  Judith A. Dwyer, 881-883. Collegeville, Minnesota: The Liturgical 
Press, 1994. 
 
_______.Christian Realism and Liberation Theology: Practical Theologies in Creative 
Conflict. Maryknoll, N. Y.: Orbis Books, 1981. 
 
McDonald, D. "Moving Beyond the Face through Eros." Philosophy Today 42, 
Supplement (1998): 71-75. 
 
McGovern, Arthur. Liberation Theology and Its Critics: Toward an Assessment. 
Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1989. 
 
_______. Marxism: An American Christian Perspective. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 
1980. 
 
Mehl, Roger. "La Catholicité de L’Église." Revue d’Histoire et de Philosophie 
Religieuses 48, no. 4 (1968). 
 
Meskin, Jacob. "From Phenomenology to Liberation: The Displacement of History and 
Theology in Levinas's Totality and Infinity." Philosophy and Theology 4 (Winter 
1989): 119-44. 
 
______. "The Jewish Transformation of Modern Thought: Levinas and Philosophy After 
the Holocaust." Cross Currents 1997/1998, 505-17. 
 
______.  "Toward a New Understanding of the Work of Levinas." Modern Judaism 
(2000): 78-102. 
 
Metz, Johannes B. Theology of the World. Translated by William Glen-Doepel. New 
York: The Seabury Press, 1969. 
 
 291
Mieth, Dietmar. "What is Experience?" In Revelation and Experience, ed.  Edward 
Schillebeeckx and Bas Van Iersel. Concilium: Religion in the Seventies vol. 113, 
40-53. New York: The Seabury Press, 1979. 
 
Mignolo, Walter D. "Dussel’s Philosophy of Liberation: Ethics and the Geopolitics of 
Knowledge." In Thinking from the Underside of History: Enrique Dussel’s 
Philosophy of Liberation, ed.  Linda Martin Alcoff and Eduardo Mendieta. 
Lahman, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000. 
 
Mosès, Stéphane. "Emmanuel Levinas: Ethics as Primary Meaning." In Emmanuel 
Levinas: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers, ed.  Claire Elise Katz 
with Laura Trout, vol. 1, 326-336. New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis 
Group, 2005. 
 
Mugai, Githu. "Ethnicity and the Renewal of Competitive Politics in Kenya." 1995. In 
Ethnic Conflict and Democratization in Africa, ed.  Harvey Glickman, 161-95. 
Atlanta, Georgia: The African Studies Association Press. 
 
Mundt, Robert J. "Cote D’Ivoire: Continuity and Change in a Semi-Democracy." In 
Political Reform in Francophone Africa, 182-203. Colorado: Westview Press, 
1997. 
 
Mungazi, Dickson A. We Shall not Fail: Values in the National Leadership of Seretse 
Khama, Nelson Mandela, and Julius Nyerere. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 
2005. 
 
Muskus, Eddy José. The Origins and Early Development of Liberation Theology in Latin 
America with Particular Reference to Gustavo Gutiérrez. Waynesboro, GA: 
Paternoster Press, 2002. 
 
______.  The Origins and Early Development of Liberation Theology in Latin America: 
With Particular Reference to Gustavo Gutierrez. Carlisle, Cumbria, UK: 
Waynesboro, GA, 2002. 
 
Nava, Alexander. The Mystical and Prophetic Thought of Simone Weil and Gustavo 
Gutierrez: Reflections on the Mystery and Hiddenness of God. Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2001. 
 
Olivier, Guillaume Sidibé, Saïdou Verschave. L’aide publique au développement : Un 
outil à réinventer. Paris: Charles Léopold Mayer, 2004. 
 
Orvis, Stephen. "Morality and Political Tribalism in Kenya’s ‘Virtual Democracy’." 
Africa Issues 29, no. 1/2 (2001): 8-13. 
 
Ossebi, Henri. "De la Galère à la Guerre: Jeunes et « Cobras » dans les Quartiers Nord de 
Brazzaville." Politique Africaine 72 (1998): 17-33. 
 292
 
O’Collins, Gerald. "Experience." In Dictionary of Fundamental Theology, ed.  René 
Latourelle and Rino Fischella, 306-08. New York: Crossroad, 1995. 
 
O'Collins, Gerald and Edward Farrugia. "Modernism." In A Concise Dictionary of 
Theology, 145. New York: Paulist Press, 1991. 
 
“Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, Gaudium et Spes.” In Vatican 
II: The Conciliar and Postconciliar Documents, ed. Austin Flannery, vol.1. New 
Revised Edition. New York: Costello Publishing Company, 1998. 
 
Pekarske, Daniel T. "Theological Justification of the Church’s Development Work." In 
Abstract, Karl Rahner’s Theological Investigations 1-23. Milwaukee: Marquette 
University Press, 2002. 
 
Peperzak, Adriaan T. "Emmanuel Lévinas: Jewish Experience and Philosophy." 
Philosophy Today 28, no. 4 (Winter 1983): 297-306. 
 
______. The Quest for Meaning: Friends of Wisdom from Plato to Levinas.  New York:: 
Fordham University Press, 2003. 
 
______. "Transcendence." In Ethics as First Philosophy: The Significance of Emmanuel 
Levinas for Philosophy, Literature and Religion, ed.  Adriaan Peperzak T., 185-
92. New York: Routledge, 1995. 
 
______. Beyond: The Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern 
University Press, 1997. 
 
______.  "Levinas’ Method." Research in Phenomenology 28 (1998): 110-25. 
 
Peterson, Anna L. Martyrdom and the Politics of Religion: Progressive Catholicism in El 
Salvador’s Civil War. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1997. 
 
Planas, Ricardo. Liberation Theology: The Political Expression of Religion. Kansas City, 
MO: Sheed & Ward, 1986. 
 
Ploudre, S. and  Simon, R. "Ethique et Morale Chez Emmanuel Levinas." Le Supplément 
160 (1987): 123-24. 
 
Poché, Fred. Lévinas chemin ou obstacle pour la théologie chrétienne : l’hospitalité des 
intelligences. Paris : Les Editions du Cerf, 2005. 
 
Pojman, Louis P. Classics of Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. 
              Political Reform in Francophone Africa. Edited by David E. Gardinier John 
             Frank Clark. Colorado: Westview Press, 1997. 
 
 293
Pope John XXIII. Mater et Magistra. Encyclical Letter of His Holiness. Translated by 
July 14 "Based on the English translation issued by the Vatican, 1961. Chicago: 
Discoverers Press, 1962. 
 
______. Pacem in Terris. Encyclical Letter of His Holiness. Translated by N.C.W.C 
translation T.P. verso. Boston: Pauline Books & Media, 1998. 
 
Powell, J. "Lévinas Representing Husserl on Representation." Philosophy Today 39, no. 2 
(Spring 1995): 185-97. 
 
Purcell, Michael. Levinas and Theology. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
 
______. Mystery and Method: The Other in Rahner & Levinas. Milwaukee: Marquette 
University Press, 1998. 
 
______. "The Natural Desire for the Beatific Vision: Desiring the Other in Levinas and 
"La Nouvelle Théologie." Philosophy and Theology 9, no. 1/2 (1995): 29-48. 
 
Putman, Hilary. "Levinas and Judaism." In The Cambridge Companion to Levinas, ed. 
Simon and Bernasconi Critchley, Robert, 33-62. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002. 
 
Rahner, Karl. The Cambridge Companion of Karl Rahner. Edited by Declan Marmion 
and Mary E. Hines. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
 
______. "Theological Justification of the Church’s Development Work," translated by 
Edward Quinn. In Theological Investigations, vol. 20, 63-73. London: Darton, 
Longman & Todd, 1981. 
 
______. "The Development of Dogma," translated by Cornelius Ernst. In Theological 
Investigations, vol. 1, 39-77. Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1963. 
 
______. Hearers of the Word. Translated by Michael Richards. New York: Herder and 
Herder, 1969. 
 
______. "The Mission of the Church and the Humanizing of the World." Doctrine and 
Life, no. XXI (April/May 1971): 171-178, 231-242. 
 
______. "Reflections on the Unity of Love of Neighbor and the Love of God," translated 
by Karl-H and Boniface Kruger. In Theological Investigations, vol. 6, 231-249. 
Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1968. 
 
______. "The Thoughts on the Possibility of Belief Today," translated by Karl-H Kruger. 
In Theological Investigations, vol.5, 3-22. London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 
1966. 
 
 294
Ramsay, William M. Four Modern Prophets: Walter Rauschenbusch, Martin Luther 
King, Jr., Gustavo Gutierrez, Rosemary Radford Ruether. Atlanta, Ga: John Knox 
Press, 1986. 
 
Reed, Charles. "The Problem of Method in the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas." Ph. D. 
diss., Yale University, Ann Arbor, 1983. 
 
Reid, Marcella Althaus. "Gutiérrez, Gustavo." In The Oxford Companion to Christian 
Thought, ed. Alistair Mason and Hugh Pyper with Ingrid Lawrie and Cecily 
Bennett Adrian Hastings. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
 
"Republic." In The Collected Works of Plato, ed.  Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. 
Bollingen Series LXXI, 575-844. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1961. 
 
Risley, John. "Liberation Spirituality." Spirituality Today 35, no. 2 (1983): 127-40. 
 
Robbins, Jeffrey W. Between Faith and Thought: An Essay on the Ontotheological 
Condition. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2003. 
 
Robbins, Jill. "Tracing Responsibility in Levinas's Ethical Thought." In Ethics as First 
Philosophy: The Significance of Emmanuel Levinas for Philosophy, Literature, 
and Religion, ed.  Adriaan T. Peperzak, 173-83. New York: Routledge, 1995. 
 
Robinson, John A. T. Honest to God. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1963. 
 
Rosenzweig, Franz. The Star of Redemption. Translated by William Hallo. 2d ed. Notre 
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985. 
 
Roubaud, François. "La Crise vue d’en bas à Abidjan : Ethnicité, Gouvernance, et 
Démocratie." Afrique Contemporaine 206, no. 2 (2003): 57-86. 
 
Rudolph, Kathrine. "Descartes’ Discourse." Philosophy Today 37, no. 1 (1993): 38-51. 
 
Saracimo, Michelle. On Being Human: A Conversation with Lonergan and Levinas. 
Milwaukee, Wis: Marquette University Press, 2003. 
 
Schleiermacher, Friedrich. The Christian Faith. New York: Harper & Row, 1963. 
 
Schmitz, Kenneth L. "St Thomas and the Appeal to Experience." Proceedings of the 
Catholic Theological Society of America 47 (1992): 1-20. 
 
Schneiders, Werner. "Experience in the Age of Reason." In Revelation and Experience, 
ed.  Edward Schillebeeckx and Bas Van Iersel. Concilium: Religion Seventies, 
vol. 113, 21-27. New York: The Seabury, 1979. 
 
 295
Schoof, Ted Mark. Survey of Catholic Theology, 1800-1970. Translated by N.D. Smith. 
Glen Rock, N.J: Paulist Newman Press, 1970. 
 
Schrag, Calvin O. "The Problem of Being and the Question about God." International 
Journal for Philosophy of Religion 45 (1999): 67-81. 
 
Schüssler Fiorenza, Elisabeth. "The Politics of Otherness: Biblical Interpretation as a 
Critical Praxis for Liberation." In The Future of Liberation Theology: Essays in 
Honor of Gustavo Gutiérrez, ed.  Marc H. Ellis and Otto Maduro, 311-25. 
Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1989. 
 
Seo, Bo-Myung. A Critique of Western Theological Anthropology: Understanding 
Human Beings in a Third World Context. New York, Lewiston: The Edwin 
Mellen Press, 2005. 
 
Sigmund, Paul E. Liberation Theology at the Crossroads: Democracy or Revolution? 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. 
 
______. "Questioning the Sacred: Heidegger and Levinas on the Locus of Divinity." 
Modern Theology 14, no. 3 (1998): 299-323 
 
Smith, Christian. The Emergence of Liberation Theology: Radical Religion and Social 
Movement. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991 
 
Smith, Michael B. Toward the Outside: Concepts and Themes in Emmanuel Levinas. 
Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2005. 
 
Soret, Marcel. Histoire du Congo, Capitale Brazzaville. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1978. 
 
Stein, Howard. The Development of the Developmental State in Africa: A Theoretical 
Inquiry. University of Copenhagen: Center of African Studies, 2000. 
 
Sundkler, Bendt & Steed, Christopher. A History of the Church in Africa. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
 
Surber, Jean Paul. "Kant, Levinas, and the Thought of the 'Other'." Philosophy Today 38, 
no. 3 (Fall 1994): 294-316. 
 
Spiritan Life: Torre d’Aguilha 2004, no.15, January 2006 
 
Tallon, Andrew. "Nonintentional Affectivity, Affective Intentionality, and the Ethical in 
Levinas’s Philosophy." In Ethics as First Philosophy: The Significance of 
Emmanuel Levinas for Philosophy, Literature and Religion, ed.  Adriaan T. 
Peperzak, 107-21. New York: Routledge, 1995. 
 
 296
Tangney, Steve. "Countercurrents: The Self-Other Relation in the Philosophy of 
Emmanuel Levinas." Ph. D. diss., Philosophy, Duquesne University, 1996. 
 
Taylor, Charles. Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity. Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 1989. 
 
Taylor, Mark. Deconstruction in Context. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1986. 
 
The Cambridge Companion to Levinas. Edited by Simon Critchley and Robert 
Bernasconi. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
 
The Cambridge Companion to Liberation Theology. Edited by Christopher Rowland. 
Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
 
Tillich, Paul. Systematic Theology. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1963. 
 
Toulmin Edelston, Stephen. Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity. Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1992. 
 
Tracy, David. "Forms of Divine Disclosure." In Believing Scholars: Ten Catholic 
Intellectuals, ed.  James L. Heft. 1st edition, 47-56. New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2005. 
 
______. "Response to Adriaan Peperzak on Transcendence." In Ethics as First 
Philosophy: The Significance of Emmanuel Levinas for Philosophy, Literature 
and Religion, ed.  Adriaan Peperzak, 193-98. New York: Routledge, 1995. 
 
______. "Theology and the Many Faces of Postmodernity." Theology Today 51, no. 1 
(1994): 104-14. 
 
______. On Naming the Present: Reflections on God, Hermeneutics, and Church. 
Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books; London, England: SCM Press, 1994. 
 
______. Plurality and Ambiguity: Hermeneutics, Religion, Hope. New York: Harper & 
             Row, 1987.       
 
Trilling, Wolfgang. The Gospel According to Matthew. New York: Herder and Herder, 
1969. 
 
Troup, David. "Elections and Political Legitimacy in Kenya." Africa: Journal of the 
International African Institute 63, no. 3 (1993): 371-96. 
 
Tsongo Luutu, Vincent. Penser le Socio-Politique avec Emmanuel Levinas. Lyon: Profac, 
1993. 
 
 297
Uberuaga Thompson, William. Jesus and the Gospel Movement: Not Afraid To Be 
Partners. Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 2006. 
 
University of Notre Dame, Gutiérrez, Gustavo.  [Database on-line] available from 
http://www.nd.edu/~theo/faculty/gutierrez.html, accessed April 27, 2006. 
 
Uzukwu, Elochukwu E. A Listening Church: Autonomy and Communion in African 
Churches. 2d ed. Enugu, Nigeria: Snaap Press, 1996. 
 
Vanni, Michel. "Messianisme et Temporalité Eschatologique dans la Philosophie 
d'Emmanuel Lévinas." Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie 1998, 37-50. 
 
Vatican II’s Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith. Instruction on Certain Aspects of the 
Theology of Liberation, 1984. 
 
Veling, Terry A. "In the Name of Who? Levinas and the Other Side of Theology." 
Pacifia 12 (1999): 275-92. 
 
Verschave, François-Xavier. De la Françafrique à la Mafiafrique. Paris: Tribord, 2005 
 
Voegelin, Eric. History of Political Ideas, Religion and the Rise of Modernity. Edited by 
James L. Wise. Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 1999. 
 
Whitehead, Thomas Duane. "Pneumatology and the Problem of Otherness: An 
Ecumenical, Historical, and Hermeneutical Dialogue." Ph. D. diss., Duquesne 
University, 2001. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
